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A MODERN SCIENCE

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THE LIBRARY OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Editorial introduction

The *Journal of analytical psychology* started publication in 1955 and so has now been in existence for eighteen years. The papers published in it came from a great variety of sources and they have been widely appreciated. But it has been recognized for some time that it would be desirable to draw together papers having a common orientation or which present some thesis with which an author is particularly identified. The idea therefore of publishing a number of volumes germinated and after a preliminary study of the possibilities it was eventually decided to do so under the title: *The library of analytical psychology*.

Editors were elected with wide powers and directed to start by collecting together papers from the Journal which represented a trend in analytical psychology within the London Society of Analytical Psychology. This first volume is the result of their labours.

It was with difficulty that its title, the same as Stein's first paper, was decided upon. Its meaning is explained in the paper and its controversial undertones will, it is hoped, be clarified if not dispelled thereby. Since the title is so amplified no further comment on it will be needed but some explanation of the considerations which controlled the Editors' selection of contents may be indicated. They developed round defining the main but not the only activities of analytical psychologists in London, and at the end they were very conscious of all that had of necessity to be left out if the volume was to have truly meaningful coherence.

The members of the London Society have interested themselves in three areas. The first is the study of Jung's works as a whole with a view to finding out what is essential and what parenthetic to his main thesis.

The next was childhood and reductive analysis. Jung's interest in individuation in later life had left on one side the 'first half of life' which he delegated to others especially Adler and Freud. To some members of the London Society this state of affairs did not seem satisfactory. They believed that Jung's concepts could add to what the other disciplines—especially psychoanalysis—had

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developed and their efforts were facilitated by a rather happy state of affairs in London. The Medical Section of the British Psychological Society provided a regular meeting ground for interdisciplinary study and in addition many members were working in clinics where they could meet and exchange notes with psychoanalysts.

The study of development in childhood and the practice of child therapy has really been more important in London than the papers in this first collection indicate. Many members of the London Society have actually come to analytical psychology from this field of practice and their experiences have been illuminated and enriched by theories derived from Jung's.

The present volume is divided into two parts. The first focuses on theoretical concepts with special reference to the structure of the psyche, while the second includes more clinical material. Both exemplify the London Society's interest in childhood and the development of ideas about the use of reductive analysis within the Jungian framework. However, no attempt at a rigid division between theory and practice has been made because the separation would be artificial. Only one article 'Maturation of ego and self in infancy' has been specially written for this volume, the others have all been previously published in the *Journal of analytical psychology*; some have been revised or enlarged. The date when each article was first published is given after the title, and a footnote indicates if there has been any revision. The references to Jung are made to the *Collected Works*, which is abbreviated *Coll. Wks.* followed by the volume number: for purposes of reference there follow details of volumes already published; volumes which have not yet been published are marked with an asterisk. Dates refer to the first publication in whatever language and not to the English translation.

*Analytical psychology: a modern science**

LEOPOLD STEIN

1958

In 1926 Jung (p. 65) was anxious to prove that psychology was one of the youngest sciences and he has reiterated this claim on several subsequent occasions (e.g. 1938, pp. 1 f.), when, describing himself as an empiricist, he has stressed his scientific, exclusively phenomenological point of view in contrast to an approach based on speculative and naive idealistic preconceptions. Jung holds that medical psychology is to be placed among the natural sciences since it sees everything as a natural phenomenon. It may therefore be expected to explain psychic phenomena as properties of life and to subject them to a strictly scientific inquiry along the lines of biology, a science that 'has sharpened the eye of the psychiatrist for factual data and made possible a method of description closely approximating to reality' (1926, p. 86).

Jung is, of course, aware that science does not stop short at factual data. He is, no doubt, acquainted with the idea of scientific prediction and the verification of hypotheses through experimentation. Yet he confines himself to a mere empirical verification of fact and even goes so far as to admit that the principle of explanation employed by analytical psychology as 'pure' psychology is the *ignotum per ignotius* (ibid., p. 87). This means that what is unknown is explained by reducing it to what is even more unknown. The science of the mind is—paradoxically—constrained to make this necessity into a principle, since it can elucidate the process involved only in the same terms as those in which the phenomenon observed has been described. It is, moreover, a fact that the psyche is both subject and object of the science that deals with it (1938, p. 62).

At this crucial point, it is true, psychology stands outside natural science and is, to this extent, at a disadvantage. It will be

* This article has been revised.

shown, however, that to explain something unknown by something more unknown may be even more highly scientific. It also appears that when viewing phenomena in terms of mind and matter, both microphysics and analytical psychology are faced with the same difficulty because the processes to be observed are modified or altered by the very fact that an observer is looking at them (cf. Meier, 1935). Jung is no less aware that the scientific inquirer when observing natural macrophysical processes does not appreciably interfere with his experiment, whereas the psychological observer necessarily interferes and therefore can never verify facts. Although Jung admits that in this respect psychology cannot be strictly scientific, in the sense of classical physics, he maintains that 'the case for psychology versus natural science is not altogether hopeless, even though the issue lies beyond the scope of our present understanding'. This latter assertion will be shown to be debatable from the point of view of modern science. Jung justifies his attempt to group psychology among the natural sciences by asserting that its natural subject-matter is not a mental product but a natural phenomenon, i.e. the psyche (1926, p. 89). Here an ambiguity has crept in, based on the double meaning of the word 'natural'. Apart from that, the question is not so much whether psychology is a natural science but whether it employs the approach worked out by science for the study of the external macrophysical world. Furthermore, does modern psychology, as one of the humane (as opposed to natural) sciences, really use a different method of approach to arrive at a theory? The answer depends on what is meant by science and by scientific inquiry. That psychology has collected a considerable number of empirical data does not make it into a science. In order to reconstruct and explain it must 'look into' the matter, which is precisely what theory does. For *theoria* means basically contemplation or spiritual viewing, mental vision. Its derivation from a compound of two Greek words: *theaomai* 'I look on' and *horao* 'I perceive, comprehend, consider, reflect, experience, find, hold (an opinion), become aware'—reveals it as referring to a mental activity of the highest order. Its more recent meaning of sheer cognition (as opposed to practice), conceptual elucidation of a group of facts and their derivation from a uniform principle, seems to have sprung from the union of inner and outer vision. As the child of these two it is more than their sum total.

Now, what does the *theoros*, 'the one who looks inward and outward', achieve? By looking *in and out* he seems to perceive something that just 'is', i.e. an 'entity' (from *ens* 'being'), that is accordingly a *theoretical* one. The point, then, is that a theoretical entity is essentially and necessarily something both unobserved and unobservable by the senses. According to Bernard Mayo (1954, pp. 10, 56), known for his work in the field of the philosophy of science, we ought not, therefore, even to ask whether theoretical entities exist or whether they are real. These entities are unobservable, not because of practical difficulties but because their unobservability is a logical consequence of their other properties. A theoretical entity can be defined, as Mayo says, only by reference to the job it performs in a particular scientific task. Such theoretical entities are numerous, e.g. the physicist's positron, photon, electron, the biologist's gene, Freud's id, ego and super-ego, Jung's archetypes, Fordham's deintegrates (1957, pp. 99 f.). In fact, one deliberately and intuitively 'contrives'* a theoretical entity of a kind that will provide a clue to the jigsaw pattern one can discern. If, therefore, someone asks: 'Do the archetypes, the anima, animus, shadow, really exist?', he misses the point. Whether they are real or whether they exist has nothing to do with modern science. Research workers often make statements that are not empirical or in any way descriptive of phenomena; their aim is to contrive what the statements are meant to be about. This is where theory begins. Theorizing is not the consideration of general statements; its primary concern is with the contrivance of non-empirical 'objects', the properties of which are unobserved and unobservable. The sole justification of such theoretical assertions is that from them explanatory statements regarding empirical facts can be deduced. That is to say, these theoretical entities are not inferred or deduced from the phenomena, rather are they contrived in order that the phenomena may be deduced from them. Since theoretical statements do not describe phenomena we cannot test them for truth and falsity as we can test the ordinary man's statements about, say, light failure. It is by reason of the theoretical entities known as

* Mayo says 'invents'. I prefer to say 'contrives' in order to throw into sharp relief the psychological chasm between discovery or construction, on the one hand, and invention on the other. Inventions (contrivances) are created by intuitive contemplation, whereas discoveries are often the outcome of inductive combination of data. Contrivances and inventions are, it is true, stimulated by experiences, associations, and dire need, but they are also endangered by derision (Stöhr, 1910).

archetypes that analytical psychology clearly differs from and surpasses empirical science as Jung sees it.

Mayo illustrates how one arrives at a theoretical entity by referring to the advance in scientific thinking from Aristotle to Newton. People have known for hundreds and thousands of years that terrestrial objects, if not supported, fall to the ground. They have also known that celestial objects (planets, stars), although not supported, do not fall on the earth. Aristotle, too, knew this but he could not reconcile these two phenomena. In order to explain them he was constrained to assume that there was, in addition to the four elements known in his time (water, fire, air, earth), in the outermost sphere of the universe a fifth element, the *aither* (αἰθήρ), which is neither heavy nor light. Whereas the motions of terrestrial bodies are rectilinear, the natural motion of the aither is circular. Because of these attributes the stars are prevented from falling to the earth.

Centuries later Newton reconciled the fact that objects on the earth fall to the ground and that objects in the sky do not, by contriving an agency which he named gravity. Owing to its influence two bodies in the universe attract each other in proportion to the product of their masses and inversely as the square of the distance between them. This is truly an invention, because no one has ever observed gravity, only that objects do or do not fall. Newton contrived one single theoretical entity, which is not deduced from what we observe and which is contrived in order to do a job. In this lies Newton's greatness. Aristotle, in contrast, was not able to reconcile two diametrically opposed facts and so had recourse to speculation. Since Newton, many other phenomena, hitherto inexplicable, have become plain.

Let us now turn to the field of medical psychology. Here it was Freud who introduced the 'scientific' approach to displace 'magic', i.e. 'the direct control by man of the forces of nature' (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*), mainly by rites.

Freud regards scientific psychology as one of the biological sciences and explains mental phenomena as being a result of the interplay between the observed biological needs of man and his environment. The former derive from the functions and structure of the body (an agglomeration of matter); the latter comprises social factors that unavoidably determine the individual's manner of existence. Thus, psychoanalysis explains mental¹ phenomena in a dualistic way, using both biological and psychological

frameworks. Its concepts are mainly generalizations derived from observation of the phenomena in the respective fields: penis, breast, masturbation, biting, sucking, etc., as well as father, mother, child, horde, family, war, etc. Psychoanalysis, it is true, operates with some entities (as opposed to general concepts) such as drive, id, super-ego. Yet these belong partly to the realm of biology, partly to that of psychology. In view of these two frames of reference, one cannot help seeing a similarity between Aristotle's dilemma regarding two heterogeneous classes of phenomena and that of the psychobiology of the early Freudian school, as well as that of the American psychobiology in contrast to the self-contained framework of British analysts, such as Mrs. Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott, Fordham, *et al.* (Guntrip, 1956).

The analytical psychologist as a modern scientific inquirer looks upon human behaviour patterns as phenomena that are mere pointers to entities not susceptible of direct observation. The latter are, nevertheless, real: they are theoretical entities in one, and only one, realm. Jung's approach, based on the assumption that 'psyche and body are not separate entities, but one and the same life' (1928, p. 113) is thus monistic, in Spinoza's sense, and resembles that of Newton. The analytical psychologist's approach can be likened to that of the modern physicist, as opposed to that of the scholastics with their endeavour to stipulate qualities (Jung and Kerényi, 1941, trans. pp. 127 f.). The microphysicist has a vision of theoretical entities, such as sheer wave or sheer corpuscule, wrinkles of space, etc. The analytical psychologist talks of indeterminate archetypes, of which persons such as father, mother, child, objects such as tree, and functions such as devouring, drowning, are symbols and/or formulas. Neither physicist nor analytical psychologist has perceived these entities themselves. They do not, therefore, even attempt to describe the very entities that are stated as doing a job for us.

Let us juxtapose an example in the field of primitive medicine. The Akawaio of South America regard as an effective means of curing illness, and of achieving or preventing certain aims, the practice of ritual blowing. This is done by forcing the breath in short, sharp gusts. The blower also utters a charm, or specially worded wish or command, either silently within himself or quickly in a subdued tone of voice. This practice takes for granted the existence, or reality, of a spirit that *does the work* when it is sent

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forth by the breath. Stress is to be laid on the fact that the breath is employed so that the spirit can perform a certain task. There is thus a close association between spirit and breath, but this correspondence is not one of inseparable identity. In the act of blowing a person detaches and mobilizes his own spirit and sends it out to perform certain tasks. Distance is of no account (Butt, 1956, pp. 49 ff.).

Such a practice is not far removed from magical beliefs prevailing in civilized societies. For instance, there are many novels the content of which depends on magical beliefs. One type hides under the cover of science fiction; the other is quite open, that is, the witch in the plot really is a witch. The cure of ailments is sought from Irish witches, West Indian obeah men, or pseudo-scientific healers. In the social field, especially, round-table conferences and the right formula are supposed to exercise a magical influence on the participants (Kerr, 1956, p. 17).

Thus what underlies both primitive magic and modern scientific procedure is the contrivance of agents for carrying out tasks. Whether the entity at work is spirit, witch, gravity, wave, wrinkle of space, etc., makes basically no difference, although the choice of entities depends on the cultural setting.

Jung not only emphasizes empirical facts such as mythological motifs, religious attitudes, and other spontaneous phenomena, but also explicitly refers to and distinguishes from them archetypes and complexes as *entia*. These are theoretical entities and realities that lie beyond consciousness, thus not knowable (1928, p. 238), and of which the phenomena are expressive. He also insists on a strictly biological inquiry, with its empirical and phenomenological outlook, and stresses empirical evidence. No wonder, then, that he seemingly despairs, since the task of experimental verification lies beyond the scope of our present method of approach. His theory of archetypes allows him to reassure us that 'the case of psychology versus natural science is not altogether hopeless', because it goes far beyond scientific psychology as a body of empirical generalizations current some decades ago when depth psychology took its inception. Just as the modern physicist simply avers that there are electrons, although he cannot make clear-cut descriptive statements about them, so the analytical psychologist speaks of archetypes such as animus, anima, self, although no one can state what they are like since they are not directly accessible to the senses. The reason why no

one queries electrons is that they do a job. Likewise the indescribable, because unobservable, theoretical entities called archetypes are taken as real and existing, because they do the work in that they cause 'a peculiar alteration of consciousness' (Jung, 1938, p. 4). It must be stressed again that it is merely their existence which is postulated on the basis of images and events which can be directly experienced and to which certain qualities are ascribed.

The way in which analysts of any description cause the work to be done has induced many people to accuse them of being magically-minded mystics. It may, therefore, not be out of place to reflect briefly on the distinction between those practising black or white magic and those applying the principles of depth psychology to the treatment of human suffering. This all the more so at a time when, in a new edition of a symposium on modern knowledge (Pryce-Jones, 1956) destined for a wider public, it is said that the latter attempts have failed and when, in the same volume, the exposition of Jung's theory has been removed from the section on science and placed in the section on religion and the arts. What, then, is the distinction, if any, between the analyst and the sorcerer? The answer should be attempted on the basis of the analogy between a theoretical entity in the universe, such as gravity, and the theoretical entity in the psyche, viz. an archetype. Thus gravity is to its mathematical formula as the archetype is to the analogon of the formula. Now, a formula is a small, refined form, and a form is that which shows the relative grouping of the parts of a thing. The word 'form' itself is probably derived from the Latin infinitive *ferire* 'to strike', hence it means something struck out. It is the Latin version of the Greek *typos*, derived from *typtein* 'to strike'. Since formula is a diminutive of form (which explicates the grouping within the thing), the particular basic 'type', i.e. archetype, corresponding in the analogy to gravity, is the self, of which Jung asserts that it is indeterminate. To the formula corresponds the symbol in that it indicates the particular interaction of the figures at work. The symbol as an object or assembly of objects in the perceptual world can be regarded as a signpost to the theoretical entity.

The physicist does not attempt to influence, say, gravity, which he has contrived, directly, i.e. magically, but utilizes the formula to effect change. Likewise the analyst does not try to exorcize spirits, etc., but puts to good use the symbol. This brings us to the

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basic distinction between the two classes. The one takes spirits, witches, fairies, devils, and ultimately God as 'objects' and is driven to unite with them. To this class belong the sorcerer and the sorceress in various guises. Members of the other class are those who are aware of the power of the above figures as theoretical entities with symbolic significance.

When, however, Jung stresses the insurmountable barrier between the usual method of the natural sciences and that of psychology he is seemingly oblivious of the fact that he knows better. He appears to forget that it is precisely on account of the theoretical entities which he has contrived rather than observed or even deduced and which he regards as 'facts' that his psychology is the 'youngest' science and surpasses other psychodynamic theories in grandeur of conception. Jung has made no attempt to verify the existence of archetypes empirically nor to explain them finally (Jung and Kerényi, 1941, trans. p. 109), and he appears to have forgotten that were he to do so he would deprive himself of his point of vantage. It is to be noted, however, that evidence of archetypes is provided by images pointing to certain dynamisms.

In his *Answer to Job*, Jung mentions Job's sufferings which the ordinary man finds irreconcilable with God's omniscience and omnipotence. If God has foreknowledge why does he allow all these evils to befall a righteous man like Job? To this there is, according to Jung, only one answer: sometimes God forgets that he is omniscient! (1952, pp. xv, 76, 77). Jung admits that the very nature of modern psychology does not permit the application of certain scientific procedures, such as experimental testing. Like the God of Job he does not seem to remind himself that his psychology has the power of penetrating the secrets of man's nature by going far beyond empirical verification—and herein lies its founder's humble greatness.

SUMMARY

Disagreeing with Jung's emphasis on his work as 'empirical', the author points to the concept of archetypes themselves unobservable, unknowable and universal, as *theoretical entities* put there to do a job, as Newton 'contrived' or invented gravity which was equally applicable to terrestrial and celestial bodies. Comparing analytical psychology and psychoanalysis, he sees the latter as

dualistic, because of its dependence on biological concepts, as was the vision of the universe before Newton. Analytical psychology is therefore the 'youngest' science, comparable to modern physics. The difference between magicians and those who contrive theoretical entities is then discussed.

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*The empirical foundation and theories of the self in Jung's works**

MICHAEL FORDHAM

1963

Introduction

Jung's writings are so extensive that it is easy to overlook important contributions on any particular topic. Therefore in this research the indexes in the *Collected Works* have been used to sample and extract passages on the self. These were recorded on cards and then indexed alphabetically under subject headings. Thus the tendency to select quotations and distort summaries to suit the writer's convenience was, if not eradicated, at least kept in check. Further, by using this sampling technique it was possible to decide what Jung said once and what repeatedly, to which statements he gave weight and which were intuitions thrown out in passing. The method was found to have yet another advantage: it became easier to notice when different formulations were the result of a major or minor change in his views.

It is claimed that what is recorded in the present paper gives the main trends in Jung's developing concepts of the self. The study of them proves conclusively that two mutually incompatible definitions have appeared which will be discussed with the aim of resolving the contradiction. It will be shown by analysing Jung's observations and theories that a solution is possible.

Method of Presentation

The material collected will be organized by classifying it under the two headings: 'Clinical observations' and 'Theory' ('comparative material' is taken to be the equivalent of observation). This apparently simple and classical division needs discussion,

* The text is printed with minor alterations. It first appeared in the *Journal of analytical psychology*, 8, 1, 1963.

since it is doubtful whether Jung would have agreed that he had developed a theory of the self. In 'The undiscovered self' (1957), for instance, when he considers the relation between statistical abstraction and individual facts, he says: 'Since self-knowledge is a matter of getting to know the individual facts, theories are of very little help' (p. 8). As the self is essentially individual it would follow that theory can be of 'very little help' in getting to understand its nature.

Without going into the philosophy of science which Jung's statement implies, it may be questioned whether a theory that does not account for individual facts is performing its proper function. I do not believe that the seeming divorce of theory from observation can be sustained, and indeed his thesis in 'The undiscovered self' seems coloured by the use of 'science' made by political organizations; for his own procedure, his whole theoretical structure, is based on observation of individual facts, as the following passage shows; though written in 1917 it is characteristic of this research method:

'My habit in my daily practical work is to confine myself for some time to studying my human material. I then abstract as generalized a formula as possible from the data collected, obtaining from it a point of view and applying it in my practical work, until it has either been confirmed, modified, or else abandoned. If it has been confirmed, I publish it as a general viewpoint, without giving the empirical material. I only introduce the material amassed in the course of my practice in the form of example or illustration' (Jung, 1917, p. ix).

Thereafter his procedure was modified; he gave more attention to amplification of clinical material with the extensive imagery he had accumulated. All the same, the clinical and other illustrative material that he published continued to illustrate his 'general viewpoint', and it therefore follows that his theory in the sense of 'general viewpoint' controls the choice of examples.

It was this method that led to his formulating his theory of the collective unconscious and the archetypes. With it as a frame of reference he could collect imagery from innumerable sources, bringing order into and making a new sense out of apparent chaos, thus illuminating numerous aspects of human behaviour whether individual or collective. There can be no doubt that

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however individual the self may ultimately be it is also a general phenomenon. If this be so, wherein lay his doubts about the use of theory?

In 1912 Jung wrote *The psychology of the unconscious*. There, in the chapter 'Concerning the two kinds of thinking', he distinguishes between directed thinking, which leads to coherent logical patterns—here called psychological theory—and undirected thinking, which is controlled, as he later put it, by the archetypal forms in the unconscious: it is thinking in imagery, and is loosely called symbolic thinking. It may at first appear chaotic, because the images amplify and overlap each other, thus confusing organized thought-processes which then become defensive. Since Jung contends that this 'undirected' activity of the psyche is important and objective, he resists attempts to replace it by abstract conceptual statements. Therefore he can say (1951, p. 33):

'It is not the concept that matters; the concept is only a word, a counter, and it has meaning and use only because it stands for a certain sum of experience'.

Here, and in other places, he shows his distrust of words as well as abstraction:

'Once metaphysical ideas have lost their capacity to recall and evoke the original experience they have not only become useless but prove to be the actual impediments on the road to wider development' (ibid. p. 34).

Though he here refers to metaphysics the same principle applies in science. Jung's caveat surely refers to theories and to classifications that become defensive or masquerade as 'science' to hide their autonomous sterility. However, this tendency is not so difficult to show up if the defence be analysed, and since this is well understood by analysts a solution is quite within the range of possibility for them. Furthermore, there is a means in the scientific method itself for detecting useless theories: if the number of subsidiary hypotheses necessary to sustain a theory becomes excessive, then the theory is likely to be in need of revision.

Another feature of Jung's exposition which we may include is his contention that theories are the equivalent of primitive and myth-like elements from which they were derived (cf. 1912, p. 32; 1928, p. 61 ff.; 1943, p. 66 f.). In 1946 (p. 264) he says:

'Translated into the language of psychology, the mythologem runs: . . . the union of the conscious mind or ego-personality with the unconscious personified as anima produces a new personality (the self) compounded of both'.

Here he has developed his concept of two kinds of thinking to mean that theory and myth are analogues. The implication of this idea for the philosophy of science has been taken up and developed by Pauli (1955) in a fascinating essay testifying to the fruitfulness of Jung's far-reaching conception that theories are based on archetypal affects.

The advantages of theories over myths in scientific studies cannot be contested; they do jobs of the kind that the theory of the collective unconscious performed for Jung; further, they can lead to the definition of areas of which we are ignorant, can orientate those who think, can become a means of communication, can explain observations, and are the stuff of good interpretations. Evidently theories modify—usefully—the primitive phenomena from which they are derived.

Since it will be shown that Jung has two incompatible theories of the self, it may be inquired whether there is an inherent objection in his writings to this state of affairs. It would at first seem that Jung thought not; indeed in 1913 he had developed his typology and used it to account for the different theoretical positions of Freud and Adler which then seemed to cover the same observations. He developed his position later and at length in *Psychological types*, etc. He supports the idea that contending theories are inevitable, but all the same, by introducing into the discussion a theory of types, Jung clearly tried to resolve the incompatibility he had noticed.

Without pursuing this discussion further, it does not appear that Jung's position makes it necessary to give up the useful division between clinical observation, including that of primordial images, and theory. Indeed, by making observation the equivalent of experiment in the physical sciences, the basis of inquiry, theory is made to serve a defined purpose and Jung's caveat is amply catered for.

For the sake of completeness and in anticipation of what follows, it may here be stated that among all Jung's concepts the self is a special case. Considered as the whole personality in a state of integration it presents a problem when formulating ideas about its nature because it cannot be observed by the ego.

Clinical Observations

Many years ago, in his first publication, the thesis for his medical degree printed in 1902, Jung recorded cosmic mandala images and made tentative formulations about these and other phenomena he then observed. After that time he assiduously collected material from patients that was inaccessible to conscious understanding. Because of this he resorted to his well-known method of amplification in which he used religious texts and other ethnological material.

It was not, however, until 1921, when *Psychological types* was published, that the word 'self' featured much in his writings; and only in 1928, when he published the first version of 'The relations between the ego and the unconscious' (1928a), did he give a clear account of the phenomena as observed in analysis. Yet between 1902 and 1921 there were many indications of the way he was going. 'The significance of the father in the destiny of the individual' (1909) and 'On the significance of number dreams' (1911) are especially suggestive, and in 1916 he wrote, but did not publish, his revealing essay on 'The transcendent function' (1958a) to which reference will be made later. In the intervening period Jung's interest in, even fascination by, religious phenomena became very obvious. *The psychology of the unconscious* (1912) is the first important work to show this. That Jung came from a family in which religion was of great importance in determining his interest and that he lived in a country in which traditional standards are rather more stable than elsewhere must have contributed as well. That he studied schizophrenia, religion, and mysticism intensively before he began his own pioneering research on the inner world of imagination is well known.

All this lies behind and before the later empirical studies: they may be summarized by saying that he found, in dream series and the introverted method of active imagination, a goal-seeking development. The images, among them mandala forms, were often impressive, sublime, and cosmic.

In *Psychology and alchemy* (1944) he published one dream series, in which the symbolism of the self was demonstrated at length. It will be briefly considered in order to bring out some of the salient points.

Jung gives a list of mandala images (*ibid.*, p. 99) contained in the first introductory group of twenty-two dreams. They are:

- '1. The snake that described a circle round the dreamer.
2. The blue flower.
3. The man with the gold coins in his hand, and the enclosed space for a variety performance.
4. The red ball.
5. The globe.'

All these images, except the third, are relatively simple, but in the whole series the contents of the mandalas vary considerably and there is a tendency for them to become increasingly organized. The first image is 'The snake that described a circle . . .'; the last a complex vision of 'The world clock'—'the great vision' which is recorded as follows (*ibid.*, p. 194):

'There is a vertical and a horizontal circle, having a common centre. This is the world clock. It is supported by the black bird.

The vertical circle is a blue disc with a white border divided into $4 \times 8 = 32$ partitions. A pointer rotates upon it.

The horizontal circle consists of four colours. On it stand four little men with pendulums, and round about it is laid the ring that was once dark and is now golden (formerly carried by the children).

The 'clock' has three rhythms or pulses:

1. The small pulse: the pointer on the blue vertical disc advances by $1/32$.
2. The middle pulse: one complete revolution of the pointer. At the same time the horizontal circle advances by $1/32$.
3. The great pulse: 32 middle pulses are equal to one revolution of the golden ring.'

In his commentary Jung begins by saying (*ibid.*, p. 194):

'This remarkable vision made a deep and lasting impression on the dreamer, an impression of "the most sublime harmony" as he himself put it.'

This kind of experience is important, indeed it is central in his whole thesis.

Jung divides the four hundred dreams of his patient into groups of fifty and shows that the number of mandalas increases significantly in each group over the whole series. There is a

diminution in the first three groups but the overall increase is marked.

This study shows that the imagery of the circle and centre is closely bound up with the number 4 expressed either in structural forms, such as the cross or the squared circle, or as four persons, etc. Jung related this symbolism to the process of individuation which had previously been found mostly in the second half of life. It here occurs in a young man 'of excellent scientific education' (ibid., p. 42). It was earlier, in 1940, that Jung felt sufficiently secure to call individuation a 'fact', and since individuation meant realization, i.e. becoming conscious of the self, this clearly became a 'fact' at the same time.

Lengthy accounts of the imagery occurring in individuation were published in three papers, though in many other places examples can be found. The best-known work is the case of the young scientist whose dreams have just been mentioned, but equally important in this context is the patient whose active imagination is recorded in 'A study in the process of individuation' (1950). Here the mandala structure is more persistent and stable than in the dreams, but there is a comparable variation in its content. What is inside and what outside the circle is often depicted very clearly. Jung's observations seem to have been generalized, for in *Aion* (1951, p. 32) is found:

'To the conscious mind the mandala appears at first as an unimpressive point or dot, and a great deal of hard and painstaking work as well as the integration of many projections are generally required before the full range of the symbol can be anything like completely understood.'

Both the two patients referred to were gifted people of considerable intellectual ability; the one was a young scientist, the other a psychologist of whom we hear (p. 290) that she

'... had studied (the subject) for nine years. In 1928, at the age of fifty-five, she came to Europe in order to continue her studies under my guidance. As the daughter of an exceptional father she had varied interests, was extremely cultured and possessed a lively turn of mind.'

She was thus an unusual person, and indeed if one is to judge by most of Jung's case material, where it is not obviously pathological, this has regularly been so.

The third important paper is 'Concerning mandala symbolism' (1950a). In it there are fifty-four pictures made by approximately twenty-two patients, excluding those taken from other sources. They were predominantly female, there being in all approximately twenty females and two males—Jung's reporting is incomplete in respect of sex. Thirteen of the pictures were painted by twelve women and one man; all of this group were aged 35 years or more; most were relatively healthy, but one woman was 'schizoid'. The rest of the pictures were painted by two children (one male aged 7 years, and one female aged 11 years) and seven younger women, two of whom were neurotic and one 'schizoid'. It is thus clear that, contrary to first impressions, mandalas can occur in persons of seven years or more and they can also occur in abnormal persons. These observations have been confirmed more extensively for children by Fordham (1944 and 1957) and by Perry (1953 and 1957) for schizophrenia. In only three of Jung's cases is there any comment on what the patients thought or felt.

DISCUSSION

1. First it is important to assess what significance is to be given to Jung's observations. In this context it is relevant to note that his case material appears to be treated as if it were a random sample from the world population, the conclusions being generalized to include large groups or even all mankind (1957). Yet the cases are usually people with a well-developed inner life, and this applies to other case studies (cf. Wickes, 1938). This supports the commonly held view that Jung's patients had already achieved a great deal in their development. Furthermore, he gives indications that they belong to a special class which he had difficulty in defining. A few were schizoid (cf. also Baynes's (1955) case studies) or schizophrenic, but the majority were mildly depressed (1958a, p. 82 f.). From many of his warnings about dangers of inflation, disintegration, or schizophrenia, etc. it seems likely that a schizoid element was often combined with the depression.

Though the sample is treated as if it were random, this evidence shows that it is not so in the technical sense; indeed, it is not so on other grounds. The patients who came to Jung must have been self-selected by a number of factors from which we may extract the following: first there is Jung's prestige; secondly the fact that patients were often attracted by reading his books; then there is

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the chain reaction from analysing patients successfully; and finally the effect of unresolved transferences cannot be overlooked.

2. Jung's material refers almost exclusively to introverted symbolism, the images coming into consciousness during states of meditation unrelated to the external world, i.e. in states of solitude.

In this connection it may be observed that the best-established feature of living organisms as a whole, and man in particular, is that they cannot be considered only in isolation but are designed to adapt themselves to the objects in the external world. This conception is supported by all analytic experience that interrelation between internal and external objects is an inevitable component in analytic experience.

In the states of introversion described it would therefore seem that the ego structures designed to adapt the organism to the external world are not being cathected. Further, the empirical experiences collected under the heading 'self' are all primordial: therefore, they stem from the unconscious only inasmuch as it has been integrated into the inner world. Do the inner experiences contain evidence of ego structures and functions? If so, they must result from the ego turning inwards, as occurs in active imagination; therefore we may look for the inner aspect of the ego reflected in the symbols. It is in line with this conclusion when patients associate colours with the four functions (cf. 1950, p. 335). Yet though Jung has himself gone into the question of ego functions in the self at length in *Psychology and alchemy* (1944, *vide* index), the reader will search in vain for much reference to the relation of the ego to external objects. The answer sometimes given, that the patient's relation to external objects and people has been dealt with or is not important, is open to doubt and leads to the third issue.

3. What has happened to introjected objects, parents, friends, wives, husbands, not to mention children, recording past object relationships; are these represented or even referred to in the images? They are not. Yet there is increasing evidence that through the analysis of these introjected records of interpersonal relationships and images reprojected into the transference something very like wholeness can be achieved (cf. Fordham, 1957, pp. 62 ff.). Further, there is reason to suspect that, because the interrelation between the internal and the external object is

taken more clearly into account, the result is more enduring than if emphasis is laid on imagination and experience in solitude. Sometimes Jung considered the lack of his patient's thinking or feeling unimportant, and indeed he goes so far as to say: '... As for the self, it is completely outside the personal sphere' (1951, p. 30). But there is another reason for the omission; Jung increasingly objected to including personal material, and in *Psychology and alchemy* states (p. 207):

'... because the dreams touch to some extent on the intimacies of personal life and must therefore remain unpublished. So I had to confine myself to the impersonal material.'

Thus he does not overlook personal relationships in his analytic work, but considers the self to be outside it. How much personal material is there?

The case in *Psychology and alchemy* is particularly revealing; only parts of 59 dreams out of 399 are discussed, and it must be assumed that what he does not publish was saturated with the 'intimacies of personal life'. This means that considerably less than one-sixth of his material is presented, the rest being omitted for 'personal' reasons, a reflection which brings the case much closer to everyday experience in analytical practice where personal relationships predominate. Yet it is only in a footnote that the following remark is to be found (1946, p. 244, n. 15):

'wholeness is the result of an intra-psychic process which depends essentially on the relation of one individual to another.'

He does not, however, expand this, but only goes on to say:

'Such a relationship paves the way for individuation and makes it possible ...'

The relationship presumably means the transference relationship, and there the matter stands. The overall fact remains that the primordial experience occurs in solitude.

Sources of Comparative Material

The other sources of Jung's studies are derived from comparative religion, folklore and alchemy, with the aid of which he succeeded in generalizing, illuminating and amplifying his clinical observations. Originally, particularly in *Psychological types*, he paid

most attention to Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, and Yoga, in which the idea of the self is a central feature, as Brahman, Atman, and Tao. Thus he absorbed into his conceptions philosophic formulae on the one hand, experiential data on the other. It was clinical observation, however, that prompted his interest in the first place.

Later on he investigated alchemy and the Christian tradition at very great length. In the latter he found the imagery in question depicted in the Testaments, in Gnosticism, in early Christianity, and in mystical experience as a whole; he early became interested in Meister Eckhart, but refers also to such writers as Jakob Boehme and Angelus Silesius among numerous others. His work on the tradition culminated in *Aion*, and there he gives the most complete list of self symbols so far collected. Among them are images he has selected for special study elsewhere, such as the child (1951a) and the philosophical tree (1944), but he adds theriomorphic forms like the bull, tortoise, snake, etc. It is not surprising to find that in one place (1948, p. 156) he says: 'Anything that a man postulates as being *a greater totality than himself* can become a symbol of the self' (italics mine).

DISCUSSION

All the ethnological material Jung studied is advisedly historical. He says in effect (cf. 1940, 11, p. 102) that it is important to pay a great deal of attention to history since without the information it provides patients become divorced from the cultural roots in which they are embedded. The psyche has a history, and there is abundant clinical evidence to show it. All the same, this argument only applies with qualifications to the self concept, for though it has, without doubt, come into being as the result of a long cultural history, it is itself the result of a modern psychological development giving new meaning to and demanding new procedures with which to manage trans-personal affects. The new method is analysis based on the psychological reformulation of experiences previously integrated into religious or metaphysical dogma or theology. In short, it is important to keep in mind that the concept of 'self', as well as that of individuation, is born out of a psychological need and not in the first place out of a religious one, where the imagery is embedded in and is interpreted in terms of metaphysics.

Since it is later proposed to include other psychological theories of the self than those formulated by Jung, it seems desirable to expand this point further. Most, if not all, of the historical material cited by Jung comes from a time when science was either quiescent or in such a rudimentary state that one man could get a good grasp of all its branches. This has some important implications. If, for instance, a man of that time was a visionary he could adapt his vision to the established knowledge of the period, and construct a feasible system of philosophy. If he did not do so, it could not be attributed to impossibility. To take an example from the *Hermetic corpus* to which the alchemists frequently refer. It is recounted that Hermes Trismegistos had a vision in which the spirit Poimandres appeared. Poimandres revealed to Hermes the nature of the universe and directed him to go and teach mankind the truth which had been revealed to him. This Hermes did to a number of initiates in a large number of discourses of a philosophic kind. The reader of these accounts is transported into a way of thinking about the world entirely different from the modern one. A great deal that is said about matter is couched in terms of essences, spirits, and abstract elements, while many of the ideas are manifestly part of current scholarship, some of it Platonic, to which the revelation is being adapted under our eyes. In this case the different idiom becomes obvious, and it shows how much the form of visions must be determined by the state of conscious knowledge and the general view of the world current at any given time. If this be so the question arises: How relevant is it to apply the experiences steeped in other cultural milieux to modern states of consciousness and so to the dreams and fantasies of our patients? There is a serious danger that essential elements in their contemporary and personal experiences get overlooked. And surely it must influence us today that knowledge has become so extensive and changes so rapidly that it cannot be grasped as a whole. Further, it must evidently have an effect that there is a concept of individuation. In short, modern consciousness leads to historical metaphysical experience being expressed more and more in the idiom of interpersonal relations, at the same time becoming more and more individualized. This may be why the transference can become so important (cf. Fordham, 1957).

These reflections point to Jung's view that his psychology, views and discoveries need to be related to his own psychology

and to those like it. Inasmuch as he is a type, others will see the psyche as he does and have comparable experiences. This sort of psychology, if valid, would have a history and be represented in an introverted tradition which his material presents and whose history he narrates.

The Main Theories of the Self

Origins of the Concept

Jung himself says that he derived his concept of the self from Eastern mysticism, though it is possible that William James also contributed.

Many oriental formulations refer to a totality, as the following citation shows; it comes from *Psychological types* (1921, pp. 242–3):

‘He who becometh indifferent towards all objects by the disposition of his feelings attaineth eternal blessedness, as much in this world as after death. Whosoever in this wise hath gradually surrendered all bonds and freed himself from all the opposites reposeth in Brahman.’

Jung adds as footnote (1):

‘Brahman is the designation generally applied to the Supreme Soul (*paramatman*) or impersonal, all-embracing, divine essence, the original source and ultimate goal of all that exists.’

Atman is regularly called the self in English translations of the oriental texts. Transposing the oriental view to the psychological frame of reference makes the self the organized wholeness of the personality. This comes into being and is expressed in symbolic experience which is transpersonal and transcends opposites. It is of the kind already cited (cf. ‘The vision of the world clock’, p. 5 *supra*).

The concept of the self, however, also seems to have grown out of Jung’s idea of the transcendent function mooted in 1916. He says (1958a (1916), p. 90):

‘The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent function of opposites. The confrontation of the two positions generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living, third thing . . . a movement out of the suspension between opposites, a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a new situation’.

Later, in *Psychological types* (p. 145 f.) is the following somewhat different definition:

‘This function of mediating between opposites I have termed the *transcendent function*, by which I mean . . . a combined function of conscious and unconscious elements.’

The function is closely related to the theory of the symbol which, by uniting opposites in a ‘living third’, is little if at all different from the self (cf. Fordham, 1957, p. 60 f.).

The Totality Definition

In *Psychological types* (1921) is to be found also an early, probably the first, definition of the self. It comes under the heading ‘Ego’ (p. 540). Jung discriminates between the ego and the self and states that the self is ‘my totality . . . (and) hence it includes the unconscious psyche’. It ‘embraces and includes the ego’ as well.

Since Jung has observed the importance of distinguishing the empirical ego—i.e. the ego as experienced—from the spontaneous images of imagination (non-ego), he had clearly defined the ego as a part system, i.e. one system among others of a different kind. So he needed another term for the total psyche. It is a short step to expand this definition into the formula, self = ego + archetypes, which easily equates with the more usual formula: union or combination of the conscious with the unconscious. There are some implications of this which are sufficiently important to discuss further.

If the self is the whole psyche, then it cannot be observed as such, since the ego is contained in it as a part and there is therefore no observer. It is only when the unity is deintegrated (Fordham, 1957, p. 117) and when some part of the ego stands separate from or only participates up to a point in the rest of the whole that data about the self can be collected. The data are called ‘symbols of the self’. These considerations give a basis for the frequent statement that the self is ‘unknowable’ and as such does not exist. Jung explicitly takes this position on a number of occasions; a passage in ‘The holy men of India’ (1944a, p. 580) shows it:

‘India is “pre-psychological”: when it speaks of the “self”, it posits such a thing as existing. Psychology does not do this . . .

Though very well acquainted with the self's peculiar and paradoxical phenomenology, we remain conscious of the fact that we are discerning . . . something essentially unknown and expressing it in terms of psychic structures. . . .'

It may well be reflected that, by summing inferences derived from data about each incomplete symbol, a complete image of the self could be constructed; it would be a theoretical construct which could not be tested directly. The summation would differ in more or less important respects from any primordial experience and be outside and beyond it. The self as a whole is not therefore unknowable so much as inexperienceable. Jung omits discussion of this deduction, partly because he deliberately combines logical with 'prelogical' thinking but also because of his dislike of relying on theoretical constructs already noted above (p. 14 f.). He refers at the end of the passage quoted to 'the nature of what is to be known', and it here seems that he is hypostatizing a scientific thought, i.e. he treats a scientific inference as if it were a known empirical fact. Elsewhere he specifically justified hypostatization (1954, p. 262, n. 18) which is indeed implied in the phrase 'realization of the self' in individuation; the reason for it has already been discussed above and leads to his frequent assertion that the self is a 'psychic reality' or 'a fact'. These phrases, used by him in various contexts, mean that inner experiences are to be given equal status with the facts of the external world; when, however, he uses the phrases with reference to the self he tends to add such statements as: '(it is) no mere concept or logical postulate' (1948, p. 157), a negative assertion which sounds defensive, though the antagonist is not identified. The assertion, however, also implies that the self is a special case in that a concept of the totality is particularly difficult to construct.

The images, Jung often makes it clear, cannot be *the actual self*; at best they are representatives of it. They are approximations representing states of relative wholeness which alone are possible while bits of ego are split off and function as observers. When therefore the images are referred to as *the self* this is not a theoretical but a metaphorical statement—or hypostatized thinking. They would seem to be a basis for assertions that the self is a thing which exists and not a theory or postulate. It is also why some English translators want to spell the term with a capital 'S', not

only to differentiate it from the self as ego, but also to emphasize its special position in analytical psychology.

DISCUSSION

The difficulties in taking the primordial experience to represent the totality of the psyche are many, but the greatest so far considered is that experiences in solitude, however important in themselves, leave out the organism's adaptation to external objects whether personal or otherwise. A number of statements made by analysts and by Jung himself bring out other difficulties:

(a) The ego is stated to be an entity to be distinguished from the self conceived as the totality of the psyche (1939, p. 542; 1944a, p. 579 f.). So long as it is clearly kept in mind that the ego is part of the self it is justifiable to distinguish the two, but it can be confusing to refer to the ego *and* the self as though they were or could be separate entities.

(b) Arising out of (a) the two (ego and self) are treated as if they could be in conflict each with the other, or as if there could be a self-ego axis (cf. Neumann, 1955), or that the self could inflate the ego by becoming identical with it, producing 'dissociation of the personality' (Jung, 1940, p. 95).

(c) It is stated that in infancy mother (or father) is the carrier of the self while the infant is the ego (cf. Neumann, 1959). What this means is not at all evident, but the statement clearly involves treating ego and self as two different entities.

(d) It is stated that the self can be projected (Jung, 1946, p. 244, n. 15; 1954, pp. 260 and 262; 1958, p. 79); introduced (Jung, 1940, p. 95); that it is in or a function of the soul (Jung, 1921, p. 315 f.; 1948, p. 156); that it can assimilate the ego or the unconscious (Jung, 1946, p. 263, n. 13; 1951, ii, p. 24).

(e) It is stated that the self can be integrated (Jung, 1946, p. 264; 1954, pp. 260 and 263).

(f) It is stated that the self is an archetype or is the totality of the archetypes, the organizing archetype or the archetype of order, etc. This is a major feature of Jung's later exposition to be considered in more detail.

All these statements, and it would be possible to collect more, mean that the self is not the whole psychesoma since the ego is no part of it. The quandary could be resolved by, and seems to demand, changes in theory which I shall indeed propose later.

Self as Archetype

Now that we have considered one attempt to translate observations into theory and pointed out difficulties, we can go to the other definition which contradicts the totality thesis and has already been mentioned as incompatible with it. Jung repeatedly refers to the self as an archetype. In *Aion* (1951, ii, p. 204) he goes so far as to say that the self is 'the real organizing principle of the unconscious, the quaternity, or squared circle of the self', and in various other places he defines or implies that the self is the archetype of order (1944; 1954, p. 284; 1958, pp. 21 and 163).

DISCUSSION

The definition of the self as an archetype does not contradict the idea of the self as essentially *unknowable* though indicated in symbolic imagery, since the archetype is defined as an unconscious function. The self cannot however also be the totality, since in Jung's general theory of the psyche a part of it, the ego, is specifically differentiated from the archetypes.

Many otherwise puzzling sayings by Jung are consistent with the definition of the self as an archetype. The most striking is his tendency to identify God with the unconscious, for instance, in 'Answer to Job' (1952); it is apparent indeed that the ideas centring on God's need of man through whom to become conscious require the concept of God as an archetype rather than the totality. If this definition is nearer the phenomena described, it follows that the experience of wholeness is not a reliable basis upon which to construct a definition of the self as the total psyche.

In considering the importance of any contradiction, there are several conditions to be fulfilled: it is necessary to look at the context in which Jung is writing and also to see whether the statements were made intuitively or thrown out as suggestions which are not repeated. It is found that the two definitions occur in varying contexts and are repeated again and again. Another possibility is that one definition is earlier than the other and has been discarded in favour of the later one. This is not so, for in *Aion* (1951), he refers to the self as an archetype more than once, and also says (p. 5):

'I have suggested calling the total personality which, though present, cannot be fully known, the self. The ego is, by definition, subordinate to the self and is related to it like a part to the whole.'

Though the word 'like' seems to imply that he wants a loophole he can use if he is pressed, it is sufficiently explicit, and it is strikingly close to the early definition in *Psychological types* (cf. supra p. 25). There is, however, no doubt that the concept of the self as an archetype began after the idea of it as the totality of the psyche, for the first form of the theory of archetypes was published in 1919, two years before the appearance of *Psychological types*.

There have been several attempts to deal with problems posed by the data which each definition attempts to cover. Perhaps the most interesting is that proposed by Perry (1957). In studying schizophrenia Perry recorded 'self images' which were related neither to integration nor to individuation in its classical sense (cf. Fordham, 1958, pp. 49 f.). He defines the self as an archetype without, however, considering the contradiction in Jung's writings. But he sees one problem which I suspect Jacobi (1968) was trying to solve: the ubiquity of self images. This it is which had made difficult the exclusive alliance of the self with individuation. Self images appear not only in individuation but in schizophrenia and in childhood as well, though not in the earliest dreams of childhood as Jung has stated (1950 p. 165). These observations make it necessary either to detach the concept of the self from that of individuation, which I favour, or to expand the concept as Jacobi (1968) has done.

With reference to schizophrenia Perry suggested that another name be given to the archetype lying behind the images. He used the term 'central archetype'. Jung seems to have considered it also, for he refers (1958a, p. 137) to '... a central archetype ... which I have called the archetype of the self.'

Perry (1957) observed that self images occur in states of chaos. This was also recorded by Jung (1952a, pp. 456-7; 1951, pp. 31-2 and 194-5, etc.). The images begin to arise when the relation between the ego and archetypal images gets difficult and the free play of fantasy gets out of hand. Since, in these circumstances, mandala forms occur as one among many images, they cannot represent the whole every time, but at best could represent only the possibility of wholeness in a disorganized, even fragmented, psyche. This may very well be the case in relatively healthy personalities as well, and this would account for the varying contents of mandala forms (supra p. 17), which thus reflect the varying psychic contents integrated.

Other Formulations

It would be a mistake to believe that the two formulations so far discussed (i.e. the definitions of the self as the total psyche and as an archetype) are the only ones that Jung has made. However, they stand out in relation to his general theory as the most consistent.

It would go too far to discuss all the others, but to illustrate some we can list ideas put forward in *Two essays on analytical psychology* over and above the main definitions. There Jung refers to the 'individual self' (p. 157) as containing the past and 'the fertile soil from which all future life will spring' (p. 190); again it 'could be characterized as a kind of compensation for the conflict between inside and outside' (p. 237). In this book he also links it with individuation which consists as 'coming to selfhood', or it is 'nothing less than to divest the self of its false wrappings of the persona on the one hand and the suggestive power of the primordial images on the other' (p. 172). And finally he says that 'the self is beyond proof, beyond science' (p. 238). It will be recognized that some of these are ideas which recur, others are tentative and intuitive, reaching out after further understanding.

It may also be mentioned that there are a number of passages in which Jung combines the idea of totality with that of the archetype. Though these are often graphic word-pictures they are theoretically confusing, and perhaps he means them to be so. A passage in *Aion* is characteristic (1951, p. 196). Definable psychic products emerging from the unconscious manifestly indicate

'... the psychic totality of the individual. They indicate the presence of an archetype of like nature, one of whose derivatives would seem to be the quaternity of functions that orient consciousness. But, since this totality exceeds the individual's consciousness to an indefinite and indeterminable extent, it invariably includes the unconscious in its orbit and hence the totality of all archetypes. But the archetypes are complementary equivalents of the "outside world" and therefore possess a "cosmic" character'.

The Self in Other Disciplines

(a) Psychoanalysis

In psychoanalysis the term has been introduced and widely used at first in a rather loose way, though Melanie Klein and

others for instance use it to comprise the whole of the psyche: ego, id, and superego. It is not linked up with any particular or primordial experience but is a useful descriptive tool. Latterly ego-psychologists have made it more precise but have always conceived it as part of the ego. Their attribution seems at first sight very different from Jung's formulations, but it needs bearing in mind that their metapsychology is different, and that the ego is a broader concept than the one used by Jung. There is however, no clear distinction between ego and self except in one instance: Edith Jacobson postulates a primary psychosomatic unity called the self. From it are derived self representations in the ego: omnipotent, wishful, ideal or realistic, and many of them correspond to archetypal images; her idea is closely related to my own concept of primary self and its deintegrates. It is of interest that she arrives at very similar difficulties to the ones being discussed here (cf. Jacobson, 1964 and Fordham, 1965). There is little doubt, however, that the spirit of the psychoanalytic formulations is different from Jung's. Indeed only Scott's concept of the body schema (1948) has anything like the all-embracing sweep of Jung's (cf. Fordham 1958, p. 46).

(b) General Psychology

Since the study of the psyche in bits, as factors, as perception, etc., has been better suited to the experimental method, the term 'self' tends to be left out of writings by contemporary psychologists. There is a chapter on the subject in Spratt's (1947) *General psychology*. The fact that in it he records the work of William James and Calcins in the U.S.A., and of Aveling in Britain, is of special interest because it is probable that Jung was influenced by William James, whose writings contain a long discussion of the self.

In his textbook Spratt divides up the subject in the following way: first he considers the empirical self which refers to the experience of being an 'I' to which objects are referable; this covers the sense of being aware of 'myself' as a discrete person, separate from all others. He goes on to consider the idea of the self in which not only the subject's experience but also observations and statements of others are included; this leads to more complex theoretical constructs. Finally he considers theories of what the self could be. He then discusses what mind might be,

and does so in terms of a number of related happenings among which is to be found the idea of the self persisting in time. It is interesting that he includes the views of Lewin, and also Koffka's theory of the ego, under the heading of organismic theories of the self; these are the nearest equivalent of Jung's concept.

According to the organismic theory the organism acts as a whole, is an 'end seeking totality' (Stern), and is more than the sum of its parts. Behaviour is conceived to be an expression of the total organism, an idea which gestalt psychologists have used to some effect. The distinction between total self and environment means that the two act in a reciprocal manner. From this arises the theory that it is the change in the distribution of boundaries that determines whether a perceived object is felt as part of myself, is related to myself, or is a thing in itself (not in Kant's sense). Without pursuing this theory it can be pointed out that once the dichotomy self-environment is accepted, then perception of the whole self could best be arrived at by an introversion that excluded external objects. Jung does not discuss this point, and there are reasons for supposing that he omits it advisedly: first, the self is frequently referred to as cosmic, and second, his theory of synchronicity infers a boundary-less state between the archetype and material objects.

DISCUSSION

Sprott brings out important distinctions: the differences between the empirical self, ideas of the self, and theories about it. Jung's idea of the ego is very much like what Sprott terms 'the empirical self' and also ideas about it; Jung's concept of the self, however, seems to correspond to the theoretical heading. In Sprott's thesis what Jung may well claim to have done is to get empirical evidence to support the organismic theory. It is interesting that Aveling also holds that it is possible to apprehend the self as 'a basic totality acting in some way'.

It is evident that there is a place for thinking of the ego and the self as separate though interrelated entities, and it is clear that if the self be an archetype there is no difficulty in doing so. The dichotomy is clarifying, for instance, in relation to active imagination and religious matters. To translate God as self and man as ego makes it easier to study their interrelation. If the theory of the self is confused in the respects already considered, a number of questions present themselves. Is it enough to run two

incompatible theories side by side, to say that the self is the totality of the psyche and then treat it as if it were an archetype among others or even an organizer of the archetypes? Is it enough to say that it is effective, prelogical experience that counts and then play down theory?

The sources of Jung's theoretical concept of the self as a totality are in oriental texts like the one cited earlier. From them the theory of the self as the totality of the psyche and as an entity solving the conflict of opposites evidently arose. Jung also found data of the oriental kind in his patients, and these have been confirmed by other analysts. The theoretical quandary thus arises through the translation of this experience into a general theory. Bearing in mind the probable affective archetypal root of theories, the following are possible steps in the translation of the affective experience into theory.

1. First of all there is the experience of the self which could run as follows: 'I experience the presence of God, feel loved, cared for by him. I feel redeemed, free from excessively painful conflicts, whole and united in love with the world'.

2. Then this 'real' experience becomes a memory and can be translated into a vivid metaphor.

3. When reflected upon it becomes an 'as if' experience, i.e. it was 'as if' that really happened.

4. It then becomes possible to build up tentative hypotheses and test them against clinical observation within or as part of the transference. Through reading books it can be found that this type of experience, though varying in detail, is basically general among religious people. Indeed its geographical distribution may be universal.

5. Therefore it is justified to develop the following theory: The experience was due to the psyche functioning as a whole with the opposites united; the tension between the unconscious and the conscious has become transcended.

6. We can test this idea further and find that, though the implications of this view are difficult, it is still useful and others can use it as well.

7. Testing this theory against more extensive data shows that it is necessary to develop other hypotheses which make the first formulation untenable and it therefore needs revision. Either it is to be regarded as a metaphor only, or it has a different application from the one at first supposed.

If we now again review the writings on the self a good deal can be cleared up. It can be understood how it happens that Jung sometimes uses the abstract statement as a metaphor or mixes the two in one context. He slides from one level of expression to another. This easily makes for a confusion sometimes found in analytical psychology so that when, in the face of new data revisions in theory have been made, metaphor gets used so as to blur theoretical contradictions. In a recent paper (1960b) I showed how this confusion led Edinger (1960, p. 3) to conclude that there is an essential paradox in the very nature of the relation between the ego and the self.

It is commonly held that theoretical contradiction is no disadvantage when formulating ideas about the self, and that if we want abstract concepts of it to reflect the affective experience it is necessary to include the opposites in them. This is supposed to leave room for paradox—a false issue since the whole is not an opposite of its parts in any important sense. The point here is as follows: since the self contains opposites, formulations about its contents can be stated paradoxically. The position is quite different when applied to theory in the present sense, for neither the totality theory nor the archetype concept refers to the contents of the self but to its place in the theoretical model of the psyche.

Attempt at a Solution of the Theoretical Quandary

The quandary raised by the two contradictory theories of the self can be solved in the following way:

(a) Self as Totality

The concept of the self as the whole personality comprising the ego and archetypes is treated abstractly and not as a vivid metaphor. This avoids the confusion just discussed.

That it is outside experience is not necessarily a disadvantage. There is, indeed, the asset that the theory can be absolutely generalized. From the generalization deductions can then be drawn without reference to empirical material. If these deductions be found false when tested, the basic theory is not necessarily damaged.

The following are clear advantages resulting from adhering to a theory of the self as the whole organism:

The empirical foundation in Jung's works

1. In describing the events as deintegration or disintegration of a part of the whole we define a wholeness which can be in a state of integration, deintegration, or disintegration. Likewise a term is given to define a wholeness into which an entity can be introjected or out of which it can be projected.

2. The theory gives a special sense to the empirical evidence that the integrative processes observed refer to a total integration and distinguishes this from the joining up of psychic fragments by the ego.

3. As an instrument of communication it is useful in getting into relation with general biological theory, and it makes it possible to include the idea of the organism as a whole which is more than the sum of its parts, if we want to do so.

4. It makes a link between psychology and philosophy—particularly religious philosophy, i.e. theology.

5. It gives a theoretical limit to life, i.e. the organism is conceived to start from a unity (the original state of the self in infancy (Fordham, 1957)) and end as a unity (the end point of individuation); each of these states is outside experience. Further, it can help to explain the so-called death instinct, as Rosemary Gordon (1961) has proposed.

(b) The Central Archetype of Order

Can a theory be formulated closer to the experiences accumulated and capable of being tested against or used to organize them?

It has been assumed by the author of this article (Fordham, 1957) that the self divides up (deintegrates) to originate development in infancy; this leads to observable phenomena, subjective and behavioural. A further step is then taken when it is postulated that integration and deintegration have a rhythmic relation to each other.

States of integration and deintegration can be observed either objectively in instinctual behaviour or subjectively as feelings of good and bad, love and hate in object relations. Jung has paid particular attention to states of integration and has documented them sufficiently. Deintegration has not been so well understood nor the data on which it is founded described. It is assumed to manifest itself in the development of a dream, in active imagination, in instinctual behaviour, in children's play, and in myths, and recently Layard has used the idea effectively in cultural

anthropology. The deintegration theory is thus useful because it provides a bridge between wholeness and the formulation of relatively discrete archetypes which can be observed by the subject as inner images and objectively as behaviour patterns. Each archetypal image is assumed to contain an ego fragment, otherwise it would not become conscious; it gets projected and gives rise to primitive identity. Each ego fragment can become linked with a central ego—the ego centrum or ego as the centre of consciousness in Jung's writings—by a process in which unconscious integrating functions play an essential part. The central ego has a special relation to what, with some hesitation, may be called the central archetype of order (archetype of the self, in Jung's terminology). The central archetype can then be thought of as an organizer of the unconscious; it is closely related to the central ego and contributes to its development more than any other archetype. It is expressed in various images depicting wholeness.

It is a matter of experience that all the archetypal images can express something of the wholeness of the organism; but the central archetype, with its close relation to the central ego, expresses it best in that it transcends and unites opposites.

This formulation does away with the theoretical difficulties listed above (pp. 28 f.), for the central archetype, being a part system in the self, can be introjected, projected, can assimilate other unconscious elements, identify with the ego, be the source of religious experience, the source of the central ego, and function mostly in the unconscious in a compensatory manner till it gets realized, i.e. largely integrated into the ego in individuation; indeed there is not a characteristic or mechanism that Jung has not mentioned and that anybody can check, that cannot be attributed to it without contradiction. At the same time room is left for the personal life of the individual and his relation to the external world as a whole, within the self conceived as the totality. From this position it is however logically confusing to refer to the archetype (essentially a part system) of the self which refers to the whole man.

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What is a symbol supposed to be?

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The idea of the symbol has stood in the centre of the development of analytical thought for many years. So it was also in pre-analytic times, when it was philosophers and especially aesthetes who devoted much energy to the elaboration of this concept. One of them, F. Vischer (1887, p. 154), in a paper which stimulated Aby Warburg, the founder of the Warburg Institute, explicitly stated that the concept was a shape-shifting Proteus, difficult to seize and to pin down. Owing to this awareness, those early workers did not take anything for granted, in contrast with a good many modern psychologists of all denominations, men of letters, historians, philosophers, and linguists who, when using this term, take for granted that they and their readers know what they are talking about. Jung, too in *Symbols of transformation*, written in 1912, seems to take the meaning of symbolism for granted. In the field of analytical psychology 'symbol' is occasionally used as the equivalent of simile even in our days, e.g. when it is said that 'every system in the whole of the cosmos down to the atom is a *simile* of the constitution of the human soul'—'*dass jedes System in ganzen Kosmos bis zum Atom ein gleichnis ist für die Verfassung der Menschenseele*' (Morawitz-Cadio, 1955, p. 17). In any case, the literature on the subject is so vast that I will pick out only those views which have helped me to clarify the concept.

The form of the word 'symbol' shows that it holds many passports, i.e. it is a Greek immigrant which has been naturalized in many lands, and its meaning has consequently been tinged by the verbal community in which it has acclimatized. To us it has come via France which it reached from Italy where *simbolo* is used also to designate the creed of the apostles because belief is closely associated with it (Denzinger, 1937). In common parlance it stands for:

1. (a) Something which represents or typifies another thing,

quality, etc., e.g. the peacock is a symbol of pride; the circle is a symbol of eternity, etc.

(b) An outward sign, an emblem (literally an inlaid device), an object referring to another object, to a person or to an idea of a person, principle, ideal, etc., e.g. the owl is a symbol of Athene, the cross is a symbol of Christianity.

2. A graphic character, figure or sign as used in writing or mathematics. In brief, the terms 'symbol, emblem, sign, and simile, allegory', etc., are often used indiscriminately (Clausberg and Dubislav, 1923, s.v. Zeichen, Allegorie).

In English scientific terminology it means, if we can go by the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 'a visible object representing to the mind the semblance of something which is not shown but realized by association with it'.

The psychologist frequently obtains his material from other fields of knowledge, such as folklore, anthropology, mythology, etc., and then quotes from such works; and unfortunately forgets that here again he is putting a naturalized foreigner into an alien field. This is all the more dangerous when a translation is quoted.

To escape from this bewildering mass of more or less vague concepts let us go into the land whence this foreigner came, viz. Greece. The Greek word is *symbolon*. It is usually translated as an agreed sign wherefrom one can recognize or infer something; a pledge, a token, a distinctive mark; a premonitory sign. This does not get us very far; so let us consult the word itself. It is easy to see what it tells us. It consists of the syllable *sym* i.e. σύν, which means 'together, common, simultaneous, with, according to', and *bolon*, i.e. 'that which has been thrown', from *ballo* (βάλλω)—'I throw'. 'Symbol' thus means something perceptible that is the result of an activity which throws together such things as have something in common, and in such a way that one thing somehow accords with another not presented to the senses, and is synchronous with it. It will be shown later on how this idea was actually implemented in the daily life of the Greeks. We shall soon encounter other terms which express the idea of 'throwing' by the same verb *ballo*.

As regards the interpretation of the word 'symbol' itself, the writer adheres to the idea that words carry with them archaic meanings that survive in the unconscious. Further scrutiny thus reveals first of all that the word *syn* is kindred to Latin *cum* or *com*,

and belongs to Greek *koínos* (κοινός), 'public, communal, kindred, akin, partner. . .'. This meaning is still apparent in the Latin word *communis*, Engl. common. All these words come from an Indo-European base *kom*, 'to grip', from which is also derived an archaic word *cem* which survives in the word *de-cem*, i.e. two hands, hence 'ten', i.e. whole man. In fact, English 'hand' is the etymological correspondent to *cem*— 'the gripper'.

Textual criticism has to take into account that during the classical Greek period *syn* was used only by poets and by Xenophon, whilst in ordinary language the word *meta* (μετά) was employed in the sense of 'with, together'. Just as in fairy tales, dreams, and in discourse with patients, we take notice not only of what does happen but also what does *not* happen or is *not* mentioned, so we must be aware that the compound *symbolon* is formed by means of a noble archaic word of the poets, and not by means of the word *meta*. The word *meta* too was used to form a compound with the word *ballo*: *metaballo*, whence *metabole* (μεταβολή). But here the original meaning of throwing together has developed into that of 'turn-over, change, substitution'. This idea is akin to the psychoanalytic assumption that symbols are conversions or substitutes.

The symbolic process is not metabolic, nor is it diabolic. I have to mention this, because the Greek verb *diaballo* (διαβάλλω) is composed of the word *dia*, 'across', and the same verb *ballo*; hence *diabolos* (διάβολος), our 'devil' is the one who flings or hurls things across, and, as a consequence, jumbles them up. Nor is it emblematic, that is, there is not anything that is thrown into anything else (*blema* (βλήμα), 'throw, shot').

The underlying reference to something that grips together (the hand) gives the word *syn* its truly symbolic meaning. If the word *syn* signifying 'gripping' is compounded with *ballein* 'throwing' we can get a first glimpse at the process which leads to a symbol.

I shall now try to answer the question, 'what is a symbol?' by saying how the thing thus referred to becomes what it is, although the etymology of the word has already told us about the action which engenders it. To this end I should like to mention first certain psychological experiments which were made about forty years ago. Pötzl (1917) flashed pictures in front of viewers, who then noted what they had seen. He found that objects which were perceived by the viewers did not appear in subsequent

dreams, while those which had not been perceived emerged in dreams, even though partly in a disguised form. Likewise Allers (1921) showed that parts of pictures which were not perceived appeared in association experiments, with certain differences. From these experiments Schilder (1924, pp. 149 ff.) concludes that perception takes place in levels, and that this process can be interrupted on any level, but that the mind tends to perfect all that which has not been completed. Analytical psychology consciously encourages this process when it uses association and amplification.

Fenichel (1945, pp. 27, 48) following Freud gets near our idea when he states that 'the unconscious continually strives for expression,' and that 'everyone shares a common reservoir of expressions', a view with which one can but agree; unfortunately he immediately qualifies the idea by the clause 'that serve to distort meaning—symbolism'. Rank and Sachs hold that the symbol disguises repressed material (Jones, 1948, p. 96). Of symbols, Fenichel says that they are a characteristic of archaic pre-logical thinking and that they are used for the purpose of hiding an objectionable idea. According to Schilder, the changes are due to repression. A similar view is held by Layard (1955, p. 7). Yet Fenichel is aware that archaic symbolism as a part of pre-logical thinking on the one hand, and distortion by means of representing a repressed idea through a conscious symbol on the other, are not the same. For instance, in distortion the idea of penis is avoided through disguising it by the idea of snake, which Milner regards as a defence. In pre-logical thinking penis and snake are *one and the same*, that is, they are perceived by a common conception, i.e. identified, a viewpoint shared by Klein and Milner (Milner 1955, pp. 82, 84 f., 90), e.g. the spider representing the concept of the cruel mother in children's dreams. Psychoanalysts have thus postulated a 'censor' and 'disguise', though Milner has recently shown the disadvantages of this idea.

I do not wish to go into the question of whether or not phenomena exist that justify the concept of the symbol as an object identified with another or substituted for another, the retaliation of which is dreaded (Jones, Klein, quot. Milner, 1955, p. 82), or an object into which another object has magically been changed because the former constitutes the aim of a (incestuous) desire which owing to the accompanying guilt must not be implemented

(Sharpe, 1950, p. 263). On the assumption that pictorial signs of identification exist or may be involved in symbolization I submit the employment of another term. Fortunately we would not have to go far to find one, because the above-mentioned word 'metabole' expresses precisely that idea. I suggest therefore that this term might be introduced into our terminology to avoid confusion.

In Ernest Jones's view, first expressed in 1916, a symbol represents a hidden idea highly tinged with feeling, due to an unconscious urge for expression and a need to endow the external world with something of the self, and so make it familiar. It always constitutes regression to a simpler mode of apprehension via the metaphor. In this the feeling to be expressed is over-sublimated, whereas in the symbol it is undersublimated. The former attempts something beyond its strength, the latter fails in accomplishing what it would (Ibid., pp. 89, 98, 144).

Regarding sublimation, Hanna Segal (1957) has emphasized an important distinction, which she exemplifies by two cases. A schizophrenic patient stopped playing the violin since the inception of his illness, which he justified by saying: 'How do you expect me to masturbate in public?' Another patient dreamed that he and a young girl were playing a violin duet. She explains that the difference between the symbols is that in the first case the violin has become equivalent to the penis, in the second case the violin is an important sublimation. In the first case the identifying function was conscious, in the second case it was unconscious. The main difference is that in the first case the violin was felt to *be* the genital (symbolic *equation* characteristic of schizophrenic states), in the second case it is pointed to (symbolic *representation*).

The history of the object originally referred to as 'symbol' is rather striking in this connection. By 'symbols' the Greeks understood two halves of corresponding pieces of bone, coin, or other object which two strangers or any other two parties broke between them in order to have proof of the identity of the presenter of the other part. Symbols are thus tallies. When gripped together they make a whole containing the familiar (known) and the uncanny (literally unknown). The symbol links perceptions—'experience in which, on the warrant of something given in sensation at the time, we unreflectingly take some object to be before us' (Blanshard, 1939, p. 52)—in the material world with an inner experience. It regards an inner experience, say the

concept of motherhood 'as if' it were a sensuous perception, say witch. A symbol is something outside ourselves, it is real, not self; yet what it symbolizes, i.e. ties to it, is in ourselves, it is self. The great symbolists were able to give us the exaltation and grandeur of that other world 'there' and yet their feet were firmly set on the earth 'here' (Bowra, 1943, p. 230). The symbol is a section of an historical and social field which contains the so-called *thing* as well as the process of symbolizing and the apprehending individual, a view similar to that expressed in the work of Charles Morris. The symbol, the broken-off part, is not a separate element but carries with it and points to, wherever it goes, the whole in which it participated as well as the situation in which it was broken in half; when it is 'thrown together' and matched with the remaining half the whole has value because the symbol grips the two opposites together and so can convey—not create or apply—this value. (Bryson, Finkelstein, Maciver, and McKeon, 1954, pp. 21, 73 f., 170). According to Jung (1921, pp. 676, 678) every phenomenon can be a symbol in so far as it entails otherness and something additional which is somehow foreknown or foreshown or of which one has an inkling. It can thus be understood why, as Spengler says, all symbolism is charged with a deepshyness, dread, awe, and reverence (Spengler, 1922, p. 167). He states: 'We live the "here" as something of our own and experience the "there" as something alien and uncanny'. He reminds us that often enough we do not realize that by an act that is both creative and unconscious . . . a symbol throws a bridge between conscious and unconscious (Spengler, *ibid.*, p. 164; see also Fordham, 1944, p. 20). In 1921 Jung took up a similar standpoint. According to him the symbol is the best possible formulation of a relatively unknown and unintelligible, mystic or transcendent state of affairs which cannot conceivably, therefore, be more clearly or characteristically represented (*Ibid.*, p. 601).

One of the greatest examples is Yahweh's decision to become man as a symbol of the development that had to supervene when man became conscious of the sort of God-image confronting him. God acts out of the unconscious of man and forces him to harmonize and unite the opposing influences to which his mind is exposed from the unconscious. The unconscious wants both: to divide and to unite (Jung, 1952, p. 155) Ezekiel grasped in a symbol the fact that Yahweh was drawing closer to man. This

came to Job as an experience, but probably did not reach his consciousness. That is, he did not realize that his consciousness was higher than Yahweh's and that consequently God wants to become man (Jung, *ibid.*, p. 76).

It is therefore facile to define a symbol as just 'something that stands for something else' as Fromm and Sullivan do (Fromm, 1952, p. 21; Sullivan, 1947).

Fordham's formula (1944, p. 18), which contains the idea of 'as if', deserves emphasis because in analytical practice much depends on how this attitude is handled. The idea of 'as if' has excellently been worked out by Vaihinger (Vaihinger, 1924; cf. Fordham, 1944, p. 39; Adler, 1948, p. 167). The fundamental issue is: How is it that human beings believe in something by maintaining what conscious thinking knows or considers to be false? Precisely through tricks which strive for something by accepting what is objectively not justified. Such instruments of thought as enable us to say for instance 'the circle is an ellipse' are known to logic as fictions or fictitious assumptions. They are—it seems to me—based on the unconscious recognition of the primal symbolic function. Just as the scientist's ego advances by way of a fictitious assumption so the self obeys the demands of the symbol. Since all psychic functions operate in the symbol, it is both rational and irrational, or as Jung puts it, it is neither (1921, p. 680). This holds good particularly in the case of such symbols as are known as myths. By myth I understand a symbolic representation in the form of 'a concrete narrative . . . in which', according to Berdiaeff, 'are expressed the primal events of the spiritual life' (Berdiaeff, 1935, p. 90). As long ago as 1887 Vischer (Vischer, 1887, p. 161) recognized the symbolic aspect and value of the myth. He pointed out that it is necessary to distinguish between the one who believes the myth to be a true fact, and the one who sees in it a motif and believes in its efficacy, in other words between the 'as if' attitude and the 'is' attitude. For the realization of truth in mythical forms in the one who does nevertheless not believe the myth, we have, says Vischer, no designation but symbol. For instance, the Madonna ideal has the significance of an image of pure womanhood. It is a symbol because of the intrinsic fusion of mother and virgin as opposites. There is a deep sense in it without creed. It is a representation of tender at-one-ness, e.g. Goethe's ever-womanly (Vischer, 1887, p. 163).

The myth as symbol applied to the man grips together his conscious mind or ego-personality and his unconscious mind, i.e. his anima, and so produces a new personality compounded of both '*ut duo qui fuerant, unum quasi corpore fiant*'. The new personality is both conscious and unconscious together. Since it transcends consciousness it can no longer be called 'ego' but must be given the name of 'self'. Reference must be made here to the Indian idea of the atman, whose personal and cosmic modes of being form an exact parallel to the psychological idea of the self and the *filius philosophorum*. The self, too, is both ego and non-ego, subjective and objective, individual and collective. It is the 'uniting symbol' which epitomizes the total union of opposites. As such and in accordance with its paradoxical nature, it can only be expressed by means of symbols. These appear in dreams and spontaneous fantasies and find visual expression in the mandalas that occur in patients' dreams, drawings and paintings (Jung, 1946a, p. 264).

At this point it is worthwhile to pursue the parallelism between conscious scientific procedure and the symbolic attitude a little further. The mathematician, the scientist and the philosopher know that in a given case A is *not* B, and yet they assert that A is B, and they proceed by working out the assertion which they know to be false. This approach has often led to a considerable advance in knowledge. It must be borne in mind, however, that as soon as the scientific inquirer has arrived at a new truth, he drops the false statement but adheres to the idea that A behaves 'as if' it were B. Likewise the analyst deals with a collective aspect of a person by maintaining that it is a personal one. He equates the mythological aspect with the human one and so establishes new values. Having arrived at them he drops the equation but retains the 'as if' value of the myth as a symbol.

In contrast to the psychoanalytic idea analytical psychology uses the symbol in the way which the word itself conveys, viz. as an image of the 'sense', in other words, as something which carries, as Fordham (1944, p. 8) says, the solution not due to anything worked out by reason. This comes about when the opposites are given equality (Jung, 1921, p. 684). A clear-cut example of the compensatory emergence of new symbols is the appearance of mystic symbolism in literature, e.g. Baudelaire, Verlaine, Rossetti, and others at a time when rationalism and science were receiving a new impetus.

What is a symbol supposed to be?

In the following example I shall work out in more detail the processes involved in the symbol. A man dreams: I find myself in a goodswagon of a train, as one of a crowd. The sliding door on the left is open. The crowd forms a semicircle. In it there is a little boy who has committed a crime for which the penalty is self-inflicted death. He is expected to kill himself by jumping out of the train as soon as it has gathered sufficient speed. The dreamer is horrified but cannot move. The train starts moving slowly, but for some reason the driver of the train does not seem to want to increase the speed. The boy is getting more and more tense as he is getting ready to leap to death. Eventually he runs and jumps out of the slow-moving train. He disappears in the undergrowth and after one or two seconds is heard crying. The dreamer is relieved, thinking: so he is not dead. The memory of this dream pursued the dreamer for some time and filled him with horror. Only after long deliberation and discussion regarding the significance of the train, the driver, the crowd, etc., was it possible to give the dream a caption: Birth-dream. Finding a caption or name-giving is a primitive magic procedure which is, as L. Paulsen has suggested to me, of considerable methodological value in interpretation. Name-giving is as unifying as the symbolic process itself. Once this is done it is possible to distinguish in the symbol other processes at other levels.

Since it is postulated that the symbol involves an activity that throws together something presented to the senses with something else, it is now clear that the picture offered to the senses or to the mind's eye is linked with an immediate inner experience which is not given (Vischer, *ibid.*, pp. 151-6).

The emergence of symbols recognized as such marks a stage of the individuation process that involves the fitting together of the opposites, an aim which logic cannot attain; only symbols make this irrational union possible. They are produced spontaneously by the unconscious and are amplified by the conscious mind. The central symbols of this process describe the self—man's totality, the *teleios anthropos*, the complete man, whose symbols are the divine child and its synonyms. . . . The encounter between conscious and unconscious has to ensure that the light which shines in the darkness is not only comprehended by the darkness, but comprehends it (Jung, 1952, p. 175).

In the face of impending disintegration the symbolic process creates a new centre of personality, superordinate to the ego,

which later proves its superiority in real life, referred to as the self, as contrasted with the ego (Jung, 1946b, p. 101).

For symbols to be effective the conscious mind must actively co-operate in order to understand them. A dream not fully understood is a mere occurrence; understood, it becomes a living experience (Jung, 1951, p. 123).

There are several avenues along which the conscious mind can strive to make the symbol alive. 1. The inner experience is brought home to us by an *allegory* in that this personifies abstractions and dramatizes ideas such as: the leap to death leads to rebirth, man's salvation is brought about by the boy's voluntary sacrifice; the victim equals man (Evans-Pritchard, 1954, pp. 21–33). In this respect it resembles the myth. It is, however, not the abstraction which gives rise to the myth; rather is it the myth which the conscious mind tends to present as a logical proposition. In an allegory a person is presented without mentioning the wealth of properties; the person is thus mainly a container into which a conception is pressed (Vischer, *ibid.* p. 161). E. B. Strauss has recently pointed out (in a private communication) that just as the allegory may give rise to the symbol so the allegory remains as its corpse when the symbol dies. When the theriomorphic symbols of Christianity were banished, a wealth of allegorical animal forms appeared which tally quite well with *mater natura*. Whereas the Christian figures are the product of spirit, light and good the alchemical figures are creatures of night, darkness, poison and evil. . . . The sexualism of the hermaphrodite-symbol completely overpowered consciousness and gave rise to an attitude of mind which is just as unsavoury as the old hybrid symbolism (Jung, 1946a, p. 314). 2. The *metaphor* expresses certain 'theoretical' entities, e.g. the 'self' is the boy on a train on which the crowd, i.e. the collective (group) mind, leaves it to the firm resolution of the guilty, cast-out, self-punishing individual (soul) to die in order to be a baby (reborn). A metaphor presents a picture which translates, or refers to, something else, but in a context where the subject of the picture is already known (Vischer, *ibid.*, p. 155), for instance, when Homer says that the clamour assaulted the lamp of day, or that the Argives were penned in, or that Hector darted away. 3. What underlies the metaphor is a *simile*. When Homer says that Hector sped away like a snow-capped peak it is a simile in which the similarity verbally often takes the 'as if' form which

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of necessity must disappear in visual representation (Stanford, 1936, p. 255). In the dream I have quoted, it is *as if* the soul were a child who accepts his guilt, and *as if* the omniscient and omnipotent good god were a driver, and *as if* the crowd were the collective (group) mind, and *as if* the interplay between the crowd and the driver were these seemingly blind providence.⁴ These ideas can be stated in an *analogy* of the form: A is to B as C is to D, e.g. the soul bears the same relationship to guilt as the child to crime.

Of all these processes that link the unknown to the known in an expedient and practical way (Foss, 1949, p. 56), it can be said: they also serve. By utilizing them we arrive at the symbol as a pattern which depicts relationships as they are seen by the objective psyche. Its function has—to my mind—best been described by Spengler, who in his *Decline of the west* (Spengler, 1922, pp. 163 f.; cf. Hastings, 1922, pp. 139–42) as a historian regards a symbol as an ultimate, indivisible, and above all unsought, sensuous meaningful pattern. It is a piece of reality which for the sensuously alert man has an immediate and inwardly certain significance. It is not communicable by any process of reason and carries with it the sense of homogeneous understanding which unites humanity as such.

In view of what has been said about the avenues leading up to the symbol it would appear that

‘in a sense symbols do in their own realm what a general conception does for the unfortunate learner who struggles to acquire knowledge of a particular science when faced by all sorts of data which he does not find illuminating’ (Whitehead, 1948, p. 41).

A few words may be said about the healing value of mystical symbols and their uniting power. It strikes the inquirer rather forcibly that the more they delve into the profundity of their meditations the more the mystics agree with each other. It is equally noteworthy that, in contrast with the mystics, philosophers usually find their doctrines incompatible (Schultz, 1907, p. 26) the more they try to explicate them.

The analytical procedure calls to mind that Heraclitus in his 11th Fragment says that the God whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals but hints. That is precisely what symbols do. The patient, or for that matter the symbolist and mystic can see, but they cannot share them, at least at first. For

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at first the patient, like the thinker, strives for expression in order to let everyone know: in our language he leaks. As the true analytical relationship develops, the two partners like the members of an esoteric group want to secure the exclusive possession of the symbols with all the power they emanate. What analysts and mystic symbolists *do* is to enable the patient or companion to derive from the intelligible ingredient of the symbol that which can only be divined, immediately experienced or guessed, viz. the mystical union of opposite archetypes. The symbol is thus *ipso facto* esoteric, 'secret', and its language has to be decoded. This work is closely related to the analysis of the transference situation where the analyst has an opportunity not only to find the significant caption, but where also undue emphasis on the significance of any one of a group of symbols, which would make the interpretation too narrow, and so blot out the total dynamic value, can be avoided. Last but not least, in the analytical situation the value of the symbolic force can be realized within the individual's life situation. The analyst often imposes on the word or image that painful silence which he himself has learned and the creative value of which he has experienced. The disciples of Pythagoras had to learn five years in order to learn silence (Schultz, 1907, p. 42). Be it recalled here that 'mystery' and 'mystic' come from Greek *myo* (μύω), 'I am silent'.

SUMMARY

The author untangles the various uses of the term 'symbol' and distinguishes it from the sign, emblem, simile, metaphor, etc. He then goes on to the etymological source of the term and its Grecian origin to arrive at the idea of two things having something in common being gripped together to make a new whole conveying meaning and effecting change. He then discusses the value of symbolic expression in uniting complementary opposites and interprets a symbolic dream.

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Symbols: content and process

ROSEMARY GORDON

1967

Introduction

The ideas that I want to explore in this paper have been prepared by two papers which, at first sight, may not seem to be in any way connected. I am referring to the paper by Jackson on 'Symbol formation and the delusional transference' (1963), and to Edinger's paper, 'Trinity and quaternity' (1963).

Jackson dealt specifically with problems concerning the symbolic process, with its development and its pathology. Edinger in his paper argued persuasively that an archetype of trinity exists as an independent psychic theme, that it symbolizes process and growth and that it is juxtaposed, but complementary, to the archetype of the quaternity, the latter expressing content, structure and wholeness. Edinger contended that any genuine insight into psychic reality requires the representation not only of the 'four', but also of the 'three', and he demanded, rightfully I think, that we be more alert and more respectful to trinitarian symbolism. His argument seems to me valid not only for the psyche as a whole, but also for any of its particular functions.

Is it really just a coincidence that the figure 'four' should, in the past, have been emphasized by Jungians at the expense of the figure 'three', while the study of symbolism has been confined, almost exclusively, to a concern with symbolic content rather than symbolic process?

You may now understand why I have coupled Jackson's and Edinger's papers. Both, it seems to me, have given shape, and therewith further impetus, to a development in analytical psychology which is taking place as a compensation to an earlier and too one-sided interest in structures and contents.

In this paper I hope to discuss some of the features of the symbolic process, a process which Jung (1916) named the transcendent function; and later he referred to the uniting function of the symbol or simply 'uniting symbols' (Jung, 1941 and 1951).

Definition

Much has been written on what a symbol is, not only by analysts but also by philosophers, aestheticists, linguists, historians, anthropologists and students of comparative religion. But to me one of the most useful guides to the meaning of the term symbol has been Stein's paper on 'What is a symbol supposed to be?' By going to its linguistic and historical roots Stein leads us to understand that the word symbol is compounded of the apparently contradictory actions of gripping and throwing, and that it really denotes 'throwing together such things as have something in common'.

When the Greeks first used this word they referred with it to 'two halves of corresponding pieces of bone, coin or other object which two strangers, or any other two parties, broke between them in order to have proof of the identity of the presenter of the other part' (ibid., p. 77). The symbol, or the tally, thus acted as a mediator between the known and the unknown. By presenting his tally the stranger ceased to be a stranger and a link to the familiar and the known was established. The symbol has frequently been described as a bridge, and this indeed is the quality which, to me at least, gives it its principal importance.

The symbol links the stranger with the familiar and so forms a bridge between what are after all separate and discrete objects and experiences: thus it relates the conscious to the unconscious, the here and now to the general and abstract, soma to psyche, physical fact to meaning, the fragment to the whole. When Jacobi, following Jung, defines the symbol as the best possible formulation of something unknown which cannot conceivably be more clearly or characteristically represented, I understand her to say, not that the symbol describes something necessarily unknowable, but rather that it expresses facts, relationships and sensuous and emotional experiences too complex to be conveyed by intellectual formulations. The tally, in fairy stories for instance, transmits instantaneously something of a long and complicated story of adventures that the presenter may then have to tell over a period of many days.

Symbols, so Cassirer has suggested (cf. Jacobi, 1959, p. 82), belong to the world of meaning; in fact, by making apparent the links and relationships between disparate entities they mediate meaningfulness to us. But as Jung and other analytical psychologists have often pointed out, whether a thing acts and functions

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as a symbol depends essentially upon the presence of a symbolic attitude; that is, on the quality and the nature of the approach brought to it by consciousness, by the ego of the observer, the percipient.

Jacobi in her book *Complex, archetype and symbol* writes (p. 83):

‘There are individuals who always cling to what is concretely present, to facts, and others who put the accent on the hidden meaning of things and so approach them with an attitude of openness to the symbol’.

Personally I suspect that the latter may lack the capacity for true symbolization just as much as the former: for while the concretely-minded person may undervalue the meaningful, and the universal, the ‘symbol-hunter’ may be motivated by the desire to deny that which is discrete and separate, the fact; he may experience external reality as hostile, and as unyielding to his demands for the absolute satisfaction of his needs and wishes. Herein, I suggest, lies then the true function of the true symbol: it enables man to value both the separate and the universal, both fact and meaning.

The Symbolizing Process

The capacity of the psyche to form symbols brings together pairs of opposites, synthesizes them and makes bridges between them, through the transcendent function. Some of us have recently tried to explore further the anatomy, physiology, development and pathology of this transcendent function. The analysis of the structure and the content of the symbol is a most important and most stimulating and fascinating study, and it has indeed yielded already enormous riches. But such a study remains incomplete without an equally comprehensive exploration of the symbol-making *process*, for without an effective activation of the transcendent function, the symbolic content will remain ineffectual and incapable of promoting growth and transformation. The transcendent function seems to express the trinitarian archetype in a further sense, inasmuch as it relies on a relationship between three distinct psychic contents: the original object, the symbol for the original object and the ego which must relate to them both.

To look back once more at Stein’s paper, where he has shown

that the original meaning of the word symbol is the tally: the essential feature of a tally is that once there was a whole thing—a coin, a bone or a ring—which was broken apart, and that then each piece went on its own separate way, until some chance or deliberate effort brought together the pieces which at first sight look so disparate.

It seems to me that the story of the tally is a good enough symbol for the psychic process and for the psychic pre-conditions necessary for the development of the transcendent function. For unless the original self has been able to break up, unless de-integration, as Fordham (1955) has defined this process, has taken place and the opposites have been constellated, no bridging, no transcendent function, is in fact conceivable. Instinctual needs and archetypally-directed energies may well project themselves into images, and they may affect the behaviour of the individual; but unless there is conflict and opposition such images just remain images; they do not exhibit the transcendent function of symbols.

It is true that many objects which serve as the content for a symbol have an archetypal origin; but this is not necessarily so. After all, is the Union Jack or the flag of the United States an archetype? Yet for many people their flag is more than a sign; it may really act as a symbol inasmuch as it may provoke a deeply-felt affect, about all that the flag represents, and it may also bridge a gulf for him who feels himself to be both a separate entity and yet part of a community.

On the other hand, an archetypal image, such as for instance the great mother, may well fail to function as a symbol. This seemed to be so in the case of a patient of mine who had so completely identified herself with the great mother in her terrible and devouring aspect that she enacted it in relation to her daughter. Her failure to transform this archetypal image into a symbol had proved almost catastrophic for the development of the adolescent girl; for the latter had obediently regressed to the state of a helpless baby in response to her mother's wish to have her sick and in bed at home rather than well and away from her and at school. Only when, as a result of analysis, de-identification with the archetypal image had occurred could an ego, a person with an individual identity, emerge in opposition to the great mother. When this had happened the patient could begin to recognize individuality both in herself and in the persons around her. She

became more able to tolerate change and growth and could acknowledge that children at different stages in their development need different qualities, need a different 'looking after' from their real mothers. Then she also started to relate herself to the helpless and hurt child inside her and this broke up at last the matriarchal pattern which had gripped her family for at least three generations.

I would tend to agree with Martin (1955) that

'symbols can assume an almost infinite variety of forms, ranging from the most ordinary object or phrase, which suddenly takes on a special quality of its own, to the most unexpected archetypal manifestation. But whatever the appearance of symbols, their effect is essentially the same: they transform' (p. 116).

Death, Separation, Greed and the Transcendent Function

Experience with patients has led me and other analysts to relate the problems of death, mourning and separation anxiety to the problem of the development and pathology of the transcendent function for, indeed, unless the coin be broken there can be no tallies.

I can think of two patients in particular whose transcendent function has been very seriously crippled and impaired. I want to describe them briefly. One is a man of Continental origin, the other an English woman aged 42. Both are pre-occupied with the problem of eating; both are ruthlessly greedy for the analyst; both of them experience the ending of each analytic session as devastating, as catastrophic.

For both of them awareness of their separateness is a tragedy, which they try to undo by unceasing efforts to fuse with me, their analyst, to control me and manipulate me as if I were a piece of their own body, or they a piece of mine. Both of them are greatly troubled by death; both have lost their fathers, the man when he was only nine years old, the woman about five years ago; neither has been able to complete the work of mourning; the man is haunted by his father's coffin, the woman by her father's malignant ghost. And both feel much of the time in the grip of their dead with whom their own identity is much confused: the woman suffers from all the psychosomatic symptoms of her father and cannot conceive for herself a destiny different from his; the

man, who is pursued by the coffin, recognizes it now as his father's and now as his own. The man tries to defend himself against his fear of death and the dead by developing a complicated theory of the existence of the body of growth processes, which, if assisted by a life in what he calls the right medium, would lead to indefinite survival. The woman takes refuge in denial and in the illusion of alertness through compulsive indecisiveness. Neither of them can tolerate silence.

In the case of the woman the capacity to symbolize is almost completely absent. In fact, so little psychic differentiation has occurred, that even images, dreams and phantasies are rare and meagre. She appears to be able and willing to respond only to what is concrete and tangible.

In the case of the man the situation is rather different. He produces a welter of images, associations, phantasies and delusions; but he tends to abort any developing symbolic function by idealizing the unconscious—Jung (1916, p. 84) had called our attention to this particular seductive danger—for instance my patient imputes to the unconscious limitless growth processes, as he calls them, and whenever I attempt through an interpretation to create some awareness, some lines of communication between the incipient ego and his unconscious he will demand imperiously: 'Why don't you ask my unconscious what it thinks?' The effectiveness of any interpretation is further nullified by his tendency to assess it much as a schoolmaster assesses a pupil's homework. As a second method of defence he contrives to juggle so fast and furiously with the many images and phantasies he experiences that their symbolic linkages are constantly re-broken, re-muddled and re-confused.

Thus analytic sessions are often orgies of manic associations; he stays with each image for a short time only, taking flight as soon as the danger of having to bear the affective impact becomes too imminent. To give an example: he had a dream in which he was required to open with a circular saw a coffin that, as he described it, had been closed too early. 'It was not a wooden one', he said. 'It was made of a stiff plastic. The saw could not make any impression on this material because it was stone-like. I think this is my father's coffin, when it was carried out of the house. Perhaps I am carrying the coffin. I always think that my wife will die. My mother's womb was too narrow, I think she aborted me. I was not comfortable there. The analysis is the coffin. You put

me in a coffin. I hate this idea of having 50 minutes instead of 60 for a session. I think I will kill you and crack your bones and eat you. Now I must go and urinate. I want you to pick me up and put me in a coffin but leave a hole for me to breathe.'

I feel as if this patient enacts a sort of treasure hunt, dropping bits of clues as he flees from one hiding place to another. He is much identified with the trickster, and indeed as a child he tried to make himself a place in his sibling group by enacting the magician, the boy who knew how to pull rabbits out of a hat. And both patients, in their own way, defend themselves stubbornly, and almost with panic, against any growth of insight, awareness and real consciousness.

It is my belief that the two most fundamental and basic archetypal themes are our need for union on the one hand and our need for differentiation and separateness on the other. In my paper on 'The death instinct and its relation to the self', I have connected the so-called death instinct to the need for fusion and union, fusion representing regression to an undifferentiated and boundary-less existence, while union denotes the evolved state of wholeness formed by the conjunction of parts. I argued that death acts for us as a symbol of both fusion and union. I also then suggested that the death wish is the vector or impetus of the self. On the other hand, the needs of the ego—the need for a personal existence—involve drives towards separateness and differentiation.

When the symbolic function emerges it is a sign that the psyche is now engaged in attempts to relate to one another these apparently contradictory needs: that is, the needs of the self and the needs of the ego, the need for the personal and unique and the need for the general and universal.

In the case of the two patients I have only briefly described, the immaturity and general impairment of the transcendent function is, so it seems to me, closely related to their fear of death, their intolerance of separation and their ruthless greed. I consider these three characteristics as symptomatic of their overwhelming need to preserve the original self, the original fused whole, symptomatic also of the fact that the need for fusion, i.e. the vector of the original self, far outbalances the ego needs for differentiation and consciousness. Their overt fear of death—though in both of them the relationship to death has really something of a teasing, a flirting quality—is, I would suggest, phobic

in nature; that is to say, the unconscious attraction to it is so great that defensive measures have to be instituted. But their fear of the process of dying, indeed, of all change and separation, is genuine enough.

Their second common feature, their greed, tends to be expressed in directly oral terms. Melanie Klein has been particularly preoccupied with the problem of greed and in her more pessimistic moments she has regarded pathological greed as an irreducible and un-analysable constitutional trait. However, perhaps we might understand better the problem of greed if we recognized it as the expression of the unconscious resistance to the process of separation and differentiation. For the body's metabolic functions probably give a baby one of his first experiences of separateness and of change and temporality. It is the recurrence of hunger pains which informs him that what he eats and so incorporates does not become his once and for all; and the experience of defecation further shows him that he cannot hold on forever to what is inside him. All is in constant change, movement and transformation, and even his own psychosomatic existence is anything but stable.

The greed betrayed by these particular patients might then be seen as their attempt to avoid the whole experience of hunger and of need and so to escape from awareness of temporality, change and separateness. They seem to hope that if only such an attempt were successful then they might remain for ever in the cosy state of unconsciousness in uroboric union.

Finally, the inability of the patients to complete the work of mourning is probably the direct result of their resistance to all separation—although the strongly ambivalent relationship of both of them to their actual father, while these were still alive, undoubtedly further increased their difficulties.

Death presents a mourner with the renewed and now emotionally reinforced evidence of his own mortality, and this may touch off the deep and contradictory feelings he has about it. Every death, so Landsberg (1953) has suggested, is in some ways experienced as one's own death. Furthermore, every death evokes all our most profound hurts, fears, anxieties and pains associated with separation. Indeed, at such moments the balance between the life and the death wishes inside us may be subjected to their most severe test. The study of funeral rites reveals man's unconscious awareness of this, for they betray how strongly

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society feels the necessity to protect the living from the lure of the dead; for instance, among the Dyaks of Borneo, at the time of a death, the head of the family calls by name every member of his kin so that they assemble before him lest one of them be tempted to abscond with the dead.

Psychoanalysts claim that the work of mourning is arduous and cannot be completed unless the individual is endowed with enough capacity for reparation. The analytical psychologist may feel it necessary to amplify the concept of reparation and to add that it is the activation of the archetypal theme of rebirth, and the capacity to mediate the experience of transformation, which help a person towards the conclusion of the mourning process. Through activation of the transcendent function a symbol is brought into existence which will help to create a new relationship between the living and the person now dead. This final phase cannot, of course, be reached if the experience of death and separation have been resisted or denied.

Relevant Problems of Technique

Interest in the development and pathology of the symbolizing process and its transcendent function has inevitably led analysts to problems relating to analytical technique. If one recognizes that a particular material of the mind can be described as symbolic only when the ego's attitude to this material has been examined as well as the form and character of its content, then the analyst finds himself necessarily concerned with new clinical problems. I am here thinking of a case mentioned by Michael Fordham (private communication). He says of a woman patient who produced 'extensive symbolic material', that he became aware that 'the imagery was being used as a defence . . . by this I mean that in the aggregate it has ceased to be symbolic. . . .' In other words, both patient and analyst were led to feel that despite their symbolic content the images had ceased to function as bridges, as true symbols; they had instead become merely 'signs of infantile anxiety'.

Are we becoming more aware that not as many of our patients really symbolize as we had thought while we were still concentrating on content only? Are we becoming more discriminating? Or is there a change—for whatever sociological, economic or psychological reason—in the type of patient who nowadays

comes into an analysis? The fact is that we have become progressively more preoccupied by the technical problem of how to respond to those patients who have difficulty in symbolizing and whom we want to help to develop and to bring into effective use the transcendent function.

Before I deal with one or two such technical problems it may be useful if I postulate what sort of antecedents the transcendent function appears to me to possess. It is my tentative suggestion that its most primitive ancestor is the archetypal image, which, according to Jung's hypothesis, translates instinctual urges into psychic events. These archetypal images are in many ways analogues of what the ethologist calls the 'innate release mechanism', that is to say they are the hypothetical mental configurations in the presence of the appropriate stimulus. The archetypal image thus as it were portrays the instinctual goal.

The next and nearer ancestor is the experience of what Hanna Segal has described as 'symbolic equivalence'. Here two separate objects are related to each other in such a way that the reality and characteristics of one of them is denied because it has become completely absorbed in and identified with the other. Segal gives the example of the violin which a schizophrenic patient had completely equated with the penis, so that he could not in fact touch the violin in public. Thus the violin as a separate and individual entity had been eliminated by the patient.

The third and final stage is then the transcendent function itself which, as Jung has often stressed, involves an attitude of, as if. . . . It involves the experience of representation—instead of identification—and the recognition of similarities in objects that are, at the same time, known to have a discrete and separate existence.

Where the transcendent function has remained elementary or immature, the analyst may be faced with the problem of the inefficacy of words with which to communicate meaningfully with his patient. A paper has recently appeared concerning the use of 'tokens' as an intermediary method before the transcendent function has been sufficiently developed.

I am referring to a paper by Frieda Fordham, 'The care of regressed patients and the child archetype'. The thesis put forward in this paper is that tokens can be valuable aids in communicating with those patients who experience the world mainly in terms of the second phase, the phase of symbolic equivalence,

for tokens might help towards the initiation of the third phase.

Perhaps I should emphasize here that I do not, of course, suggest that a person uses always only one of the three stages of the symbolic function. On the contrary, I expect a good deal of variation and inconsistency. It is, for instance, likely that those mental contents which carry little emotional conflict are most readily available for symbolic expression, while conflictual and highly affective contents may be expressible only in terms of archetypal imagery or else in terms of archetypal imagery or else in terms of symbolic equivalence.

A study in the development of the transcendent function has recently been made by Kate Newton (1965) in which she describes a patient's growth from a stage of symbolic equivalence, intolerance of separateness, and the need for omnipotent control and fusion with the analyst, to the stage where separateness and frustration had become more tolerable and where the beginnings of the transcendent function could then be glimpsed.

Arrest of the developing symbolic function at the second stage, the stage of symbolic equivalence, tends to be accompanied by relationships characterized by projective identification. (Harding in her discussion of Jackson's paper (1963) accepted this term as a potentially useful addition to our analytical vocabulary.) Davidson (1965) describes this mechanism in the transference-counter-transference situation. I myself have tried in another paper to study this concept in some detail. I have suggested that although some analytical psychologists tend to regard the term 'projective identification' as an alien intruder into a Jungian psychology, yet the concept has in fact close affinities with those psychological mechanisms which Jung calls participation mystique, primitive identity, contamination, psychic infection, or in its non-pathological manifestation, as feeling into.

Projective identification, I suggest, is characteristic of that phase of development when some psychic differentiation, some deintegration, has already taken place. But when projective identification occurs it is a sign that there are forces at work which serve the needs for fusion and which would seek to undo once more differentiation and boundary-making. Though the existence of an 'I' and a 'not-I' appears to be recognized, the goal of projective identification is the re-mixing of subject and object, and of inner world with outer world. In this respect it

works almost exactly like symbolic equivalence; the schizophrenic patient cited by Segal (1957) seems to have been aware that the penis and the violin are two different objects, but the need to deny and so to avoid the experience of separateness had tempted him to re-fuse them. Projective identification, I would therefore now propose, is the expression of the process of symbolic equivalence, but in the setting of inter-personal relationships.

The analysis of the two patients I have described to you, and whose transcendent function had been so markedly impaired, was in fact characterized by a transference charged with particularly strong and compulsively used projective identification. Concern with the phenomenon of projective identification is thus most germane to any exploration of the transcendent function.

Of course, symbolic equivalence and its correlative, projective identification, should not be regarded as necessarily pathological phenomena; certainly in any analysis their presence must be accepted with respect and openness. Repressed, neglected or undifferentiated psychic contents and experiences are indeed likely to remain out of reach until a person has been enabled to experience them in this pre-symbolic form. It is at this point that we come up against the whole problem of the artist and of artistic creation. I wonder if artistic creation does not in fact depend on the artist being able, at least during certain stages of his work, to experience at the level of symbolic equivalence. The normality or pathology of a process, so Jung has taught, must be assessed by examining whether it serves or whether it obstructs the development of a person. I tend to think it is the degree of rigidity and compulsiveness with which processes are employed which serves as one of the best measures of health or pathology.

SUMMARY

The expansion of interest from the study of content to the study of process—constellated and made explicit by Edinger's re-assertion of the value and archetypal origin of the figure 'three'—has involved the exploration of the anatomy, development and pathology of the transcendent function. This transcendent function can come into operation only when the original self has been allowed to deintegrate, when uroboric union has been sacrificed and when the opposites have been constellated.

Analytical psychology: a modern science

Certain human problems and experiences have come to be recognized as indissolubly linked to the fate of the transcendent function, and for this reason they have attracted our concern and attention. I am thinking in particular of studies of resistance to loss of paradise and union—and of the accompanying component, fear and resistance to all separation. Then there are studies of mourning and grief, both normal and abnormal. Finally, there is the concern with death, suicide, murder and dying. This theme has been of particular interest to Williams, Hillman and myself. All such studies seem to be contingent upon our attempt to deepen our understanding of the transcendent function and to explore all possible reasons for failure, atrophy or non-development of this most vital human capacity.

For analysts such studies cannot but lead to the re-examination and possible further development of analytical techniques as is evident in papers on tokens, on projective identification and on active imagination.

The task of mediating to patients the experience of the transcendent function, the way in which we can help them to develop it, demands that we bring to bear upon the analysis a dialectical approach. This means that we must listen carefully to the unsaid, the neglected, the undervalued. Patients who cling to the concrete, the factual, the physical, have to be confronted with the meaningful, the psychic, the universal. But patients who try to seduce us with the psychic, the spiritual, the esoteric, such patients need to be faced with the historical, with the here-and-now of bodily facts and sensations and with the turmoil of their actual emotional entanglements. Once the transcendent function operates efficiently there is no more place for an attitude which disparages as 'merely physical' or as 'just mystical' facts which in truth belong together.

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*The archetypes of the collective unconscious**

R. F. HOBSON

The theories of the archetype and the collective unconscious are the most widely known of any of Jung's contributions. Because of them Jung has been praised or classed as poet, seer or mystic; but all too seldom has serious consideration been given to his own claim to be an empirical scientist. This is, perhaps, not surprising, for his methods of thought and exposition vary greatly with the context and, if this fact is neglected, isolated quotations seem to be contradictory and can be used to support diverse interpretations of his views. A casual reader of his writings is likely to be left with a very muddled idea about what is meant by the term 'archetype' for, as with many concepts of analytical psychology, a formulation can be attempted only after a laborious analysis of Jung's writings with a background knowledge of his method and aims. Such an analysis has not yet been done, but this essay makes a start by studying a single volume, *The archetypes and the collective unconscious* (1959).

It includes twelve essays, written between 1936 and 1954, in which Jung presents theoretical and practical aspects of his mature concept of the archetype. An initial section, comprising three general expository papers, is followed by descriptions of particular archetypes—the mother, the child, the trickster, the Kore, the spirit, rebirth, and the mandala. In the final chapters the earlier discussions are brought to life, in a clinical setting, by a detailed description of the individual development of a middle-aged woman. The exhausted reader can refresh himself by meditation upon the seventy-eight pictures, many of which are magnificently reproduced in glowing colours.

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I

A major difficulty in reading Jung's writings is occasioned by the abrupt and sometimes bewildering way in which he changes from one language to another one with a different logical structure. For instance the archetypes, which have been defined as explanatory models or hypothetical constructs, are suddenly incarnated and appear as active personalities or even gods (pars. 7, 50). The unconscious is an inference but is also 'an active and suffering subject', and the shadow, defined as a concept, 'waits for a favourable opportunity' (pars. 4, 8, 477). Yet Jung seems to ally himself with the methods of empirical psychologists, such as Wundt and Fechner, to whom romantic descriptions are anathema (par. 111).

Until relatively recently it was assumed that there was only one type of logic limited to indicative propositions ascribing properties to objects. Mathematics was the model, and all statements which did not follow this model were classed as illogical or alogical. Many modern logicians have abandoned this position, largely by changing the question, 'To what entity does this word refer?', it is asked, 'What job does this word do?' A word is used, as a rule, not only to denote something but also because the speaker wishes the hearer to do something about it, and it is necessary to define the conditions in which a particular word can do the job for which it is intended. The urgent need for logical analysis along these lines can only be hinted at here by a brief indication of how Jung uses different languages to do different jobs.

Jung distinguishes between the 'nominal' meaning of the archetype and what it 'is' psychologically (par. 7), i.e. the difference between defining the word in terms of phenomena which it signifies and the direct personal experience of those phenomena. He is not content to describe or point to an event or object so that it can be recognized intellectually, but seeks for a language which will express an experience with its associated affect (pars. 62, 272). As Jung puts it, the difference is similar to that between a severe illness one reads about in a textbook and the real illness one has. In practical psychology it is not sufficient to reflect upon, or know about, psychic developments; it is essential to have a direct personal experience of their 'living meaning' (par. 304). He maintains (Jung, 1957, pp. 8-13 and pp. 49-52) that the

psychologist who is also a practising doctor, must use a two-way thinking, expressing two mutually exclusive attitudes. One leads to scientific 'knowledge', involving general formulations describing statistical regularities, and the other implies 'understanding', achieved in the experience of an unrepeatable encounter with a unique individual.

These are not the only 'double-thinks' in Jung's writings. He has described two essentially different types of thinking—directed thinking and fantasy thinking. In some contexts, in order to intimate certain experiences, he abandons directed thought, which has a leading idea, and employs fantasy thinking, in which images pile on images in syncretistic groupings based upon analogy. Even in descriptive passages he uses different methods of thought. Sometimes he claims to use objective observation and classification in accordance with traditional scientific method (par. 91). At other times his language is very similar to that of those phenomenological psychologists who have been influenced by Husserl. Phenomenology involves an unbiased observation of how phenomena manifest themselves with the implication that they contain their own meaning. No criteria from other sciences are to be used, no judgements are made about reality, value, or cause, and there is no distinction between subjective and objective. Jung often writes in this way (pars. 63, 112, 113, 117, 206, 209, 308) and proposes a classification based upon common 'meanings'. Yet he also insists that the theory of the archetypes is an explanatory concept similar to that of botanical families—a method of thought quite foreign to phenomenology.

Jung has repeatedly emphasized that his general formulations are very tentative, and that he is concerned mainly with disclosing a wide field of obscure and unexplored experience. In such an exploration there is much to be said for using many different approaches, but it is important to avoid creating pseudo-problems by mixing incompatible languages. There is an urgent need for clarification and definition, and this need not involve defensive intellectualization which denies emotion and rushes into inappropriate and premature formulations. Jung regards the concepts of analytical psychology as names for certain areas of experience which can be described but which are irrepresentable to anyone who has not experienced them (pars. 63, 485). Perhaps, then, we should be content with description and not try to represent what is irrepresentable by using emotive

language which for many readers will be pretentious melodrama or seductive sentimentality.

To suggest that there is a need for terms which serve as unambiguous pointers to reliable observations is not to say that this is the only way in which language should be used in psychology. We need appropriate words to do this particular job, but some areas of ambiguous experience can be intimated only by the use of words chosen because of their multiplicity of reference. Such a term is 'spirit', which Jung uses to describe the archetype. In a discussion of the word he outlines nine different ways in which it has been, or is, used. He suggests that although these many shades of meaning make it difficult to de-limit the subject conceptually yet the different aspects go to form a vivid and concrete picture of the phenomenon in question (par. 388). By bringing together cultural and everyday conceptions, a picture can be formed of a 'factor' or kernel of meaning that can be intimated but not defined (par. 395). Jung often uses words in this way in order to illuminate various aspects of a situation, when rigid definition is impossible and attempts at formulation would be premature.

II

If 'archetype' is to be a useful explanatory term, either it must be possible to translate it into terms of observations or it must have logical consequences at the observational level. The usefulness of any concept, model, or analogy depends upon the reliability with which observations can be described.

Jung does not claim priority for the notion of the archetype. He refers to the existence of the idea in religious writings, in the writings of philosophers, especially Plato and Kant, and in the work of several ethologists. He claims as his own contribution only the demonstration that primordial images can arise spontaneously at any time and at any place without outside influence (par. 153). His main contention is that recurrent themes can be distinguished in individual psychological material, and in myths, religious imagery, and occult speculations; that these motifs have a similar form, context, and function, and that they arise independently of tradition or learning.

The term archetype points ultimately to the observation and classification of regularities in imagery and behaviour which are termed 'mythological motifs', 'primordial images', 'ideas or

affirmations', dominating 'collective representations' or 'psychologems' (pars. 89, 92, 118, 129, 207, 465). Archetypal forms refer to analogous patterns of imagery resulting from the selection, arrangement, and organization of the data of experience (pars. 89, 92, 118, 153, 187). It is not ideas or images themselves which are considered to be innate but the possibilities of certain types of perception, fantasy, thought and action. The archetypal form is conceived as a structural element analogous to the axial system of a crystal which, having no material existence, determines the stereometric but not the concrete form of the crystal (pars. 99, 136, 153, 155, 207). Sensory stimuli are met by specific aptitudes leading to particular patterns of apperception, and characteristic situations activate appropriate archetypal forms (pars. 99, 136). The word *archetype*, when unqualified, refers to a hypothetical construct, an unconscious 'regulator', which controls the activity of *archetypal forms* in creating *archetypal themes* (*motifs*) from the raw materials of sensation and perception.

This formulation corresponds, in my view, to Jung's terminology when he discusses the concept of the archetype in a thorough way. Unfortunately, however, he often uses the term loosely and carelessly to refer to archetypal forms, to motifs, and even to highly elaborated fantasy images (e.g. pars. 188, 207, 711). Moreover, the word 'form' is used in different senses, and sometimes refers to the particular appearance of an image which clothes the archetype (pars. 142, 627). In some contexts, Jung seems to have in mind the philosophical meaning of form as the unifying element in an object apart from its changing manifestations (Aristotle) or as the intrinsic principle of things (scholasticism), but usually his use is similar to that of Kant, referring to the mode of arrangement of parts (par. 384).

The archetype, then, is a concept which is linked to a particular way of regarding phenomena. It involves an abstraction of the archetypal form which can never be directly observed in itself, for there can be no form without content. The phenomenon is the image but, unfortunately, Jung's use of the word image is rather disconcerting. Sometimes he uses the term *primordial image*, not as referring to an actual or possible presentation or representation (the usual meaning of conscious or unconscious image), but as equivalent to the archetypal form *before* it has been filled out with the material of conscious experience and made visible in creative fantasy (pars. 135, 152, 153, 155, 711).

At other times the term refers to the motif or elaborated idea and, occasionally, to formations in the preconscious state before there was any consciousness (par. 396).

The term *archetypal image* can be understood in various senses. In so far as consciousness arises from a preconscious state by a process involving integration of experience in archetypal patterns (par. 187), any mental representation can be regarded as an archetypal image, and some passages suggest that Jung would regard the formal elements in perception as being archetypal (pars. 99, 118, 136, 187). All that is necessary is to demonstrate a typical form of image and a typical situation in which this occurs (par. 152). If the adjective 'archetypal' is given this broad meaning, it will not be used to distinguish one image from another non-archetypal one (for all are archetypal) but in order to focus attention upon the typical form rather than upon the 'matter', which is derived from sense impressions. It will not describe the image but refer to the way of thinking about it (and, perhaps, to particular operations in practical analysis).

The term archetypal image is often used by Jung and others to refer to a fantasy image as distinct from a memory image. It then denotes an image created by elements derived from memory images or from subliminal perceptions which are recombined in a new form, especially when this creation has occurred independently of consciousness. Such an image tends to show mythological features (i.e. the typical patterns are more obvious), it seems to function autonomously, and it appears in consciousness abruptly as 'an immediate datum of psychic experience' independently of tradition and accustomed attitude (pars. 6, 117). It is unfamiliar and strange, often accompanied by a sense of fascination and awe. This numinous quality (pars. 82, 85, 285) is often regarded as being a distinctive quality of an archetypal image, but refers rather to a particular way in which a fantasy image can be experienced. Certainly, archetypal forms can be demonstrated in images which occur without any numinous experience. However, Jung does seem to regard numinosity as a characteristic feature of the 'archetypal dream' and stresses that to have an integrating effect an archetypal theme must be charged with affect.

Sometimes the word archetype is used loosely to refer to elaborated images such as 'the archetype of the snake'. The word snake, however, refers to a perceptual or memory image

which can be developed in various forms, such as a snake biting its own tail, a snake creeping into a hole, a snake rearing up, and so on. With reference to the archetypal theme, a snake biting its tail might have more affinity with a walled city than with a snake going into a hole. Thus, to speak of the archetype of the snake is to use words very loosely. There are some reasons, however, why this happens. Some perceptual experiences, owing to the natural qualities of the things, people or situations to which they refer, are more appropriate than others as expressions of certain themes. Thus, the anatomical and behavioural qualities of the snake are such as to make it an effective analogue of psychic experiences involving ambivalence and transformation; and, from earliest times in diverse regions, it has been regarded with awe and fascination. It is an apt image for expressing certain archetypal themes and for evoking the typical situations in which these patterns are released. There is no reason to suppose, however, that there could be an image of a snake, of a pearl, or of a woman unless these had been perceptual images, and, notwithstanding some careless passages, Jung clearly denies that he assumes that there are innate images. These reflections raise the question whether it is appropriate to refer to archetypes by such names as mother child, trickster, or even rebirth. These names imply a particular matter or content, and it might be that we shall have to evolve abstract formal methods of representation such as are used in mathematics or mathematical logic.

III

In order to identify an archetypal theme four criteria must be satisfied.

1. A theme must be isolated clearly enough to recognize it as a typical phenomenon, i.e. a particular motif must occur in the imagery of different individuals and must recur in a series of dreams or fantasies of one person (par. 110). Thus, regularities, which might be figures or situations, are isolated and classified together (pars. 80, 309).

2. The theme must be shown to occur in many parts of the world in many ages (par. 108).

3. The motif must have a similar context and functional meaning whenever it occurs (par. 103).

4. The fantasy image must not have been acquired through education, tradition, language, or indirectly via religious ideas,

and all motifs must be excluded which have been known and forgotten (pars. 92, 100, 205).

It is an immense task to fulfil these criteria and, indeed, it seems quite impossible to substantiate the fourth one. To demonstrate the continuity and development of typical figures, several hundred dreams are necessary (par. 110); in any one dream there are numberless interconnections with mythological parallels (par. 259), and exhaustive and lengthy descriptions are necessary if symbols are not to be torn from their context (par. 103). It is not possible to demonstrate anything by a few images, but the context is of enormous extent (par. 319), as is demonstrated by Jung's analysis of the Miller fantasies and of the dream series in *Psychology and alchemy*. Sometimes, however, Jung seems to forget his own stringent criteria, as when he relates how the archetypal nature of an image in one of his own dreams became clear to him when he read of one similar theme in one alchemical treatise (pars. 334-8). Perhaps he means this event led to further research (though he does not say so) and, elsewhere, he stresses that he is aiming only to illustrate his method simply (par. 110). But, it must be confessed, some of Jung's descriptions of particular archetypes are unconvincing to a critical reader.

Many criticisms can be made of Jung's method which throw doubt upon the validity of his conclusions. The detection of analogies is arbitrary and open to special pleading, the parallels often seem to be too few to argue universality, and in many of his examples cryptomnesia and the influence of suggestion could have been important. It must be said, however, that Jung has made great efforts to be honest and objective in his observations. He noted the occurrence of mandalas in clinical material thirteen years before he reported any findings because he wanted to assure himself that they were produced spontaneously and not suggested to the patient by his (Jung's) own fantasy (par. 623). The important question, however, is whether the theory can be used and tested by others. This depends to a large extent upon the reliability of the methods of obtaining and treating the primary data.

Jung stresses the importance of observing psychological products which have not been altered by conscious criticism and he uses, particularly, dreams and active imagination. In suggesting that dreams arise with a spontaneity that cannot be influenced (par. 581) he seems to underestimate the extent of

secondary elaboration, which certainly occurs in reported dreams and is probably an important factor in active imagination. Furthermore, the material is often considered apart from the transference situation, as when Jung remarks that, early in an analysis, the personal relationship between the patient and himself appeared to have ceased and that a painting showed an impersonal natural process (par. 531). It seems probable, too, that much of his work has been done on a highly selected biased sample of exceptional people capable of practising active imagination.

In spite of a warning about the elaboration and conscious formulation of myths, Jung does draw conclusions from selected mythological material and appears to contradict what he has said in other contexts. Thus he says that the study of folklore, as it avoids the problems of individual case histories, is more useful for observing a motif without having to consider conditions that are more or less unique, and goes on to say that in fairy tales and myths, as in dreams, the psyche tells its own story (par. 400). If, however, myths are elaborate conscious formulae, the unique social context cannot be neglected. It should be noted also that parallels from alchemy and mysticism are drawn from very special and restricted groups, and it might be that what is demonstrated is not the universality of archetypal patterns but the occurrence of groups of people of similar types in different ages.

The archetypes and the collective unconscious is an eloquent witness to Jung's greatness of mind and heart, and I have, as yet, said little to indicate the richness of its contents. His idea of the archetype involves profound attitudes towards man's existence and intimates values through which very many people have found a new significance in their lives. But, first and foremost, he wishes to be judged as a scientist. Great men can have great faults, and an uncritical acceptance of all that Jung says is as poor a tribute as is prejudiced rejection. His large conceptions have given us a wide horizon, but there is a good deal of mist, and an immense amount of research has to be done before the country can be mapped. He himself says that scientific research was a struggle forced upon him by daily experience of the sick, and adds:

'not everything I bring forth is written out of my head, but much of it comes from the heart also, a fact I would beg the

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gracious reader not to overlook if, following up the intellectual line of thought, he comes upon certain lacunae that have not been properly filled in' (1943, p. 116).

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*The indivisibility of the personal and collective unconscious**

MARY WILLIAMS

1963

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to question a tendency to regard analytic material as belonging to either the personal or the collective unconscious. This tendency will influence interpretation and can be undesirable since it may add to splitting tendencies already operative in the psyche.

The concept of a personal unconscious assumes an ego structure with the unconscious part of it containing unassimilated or actively repressed contents. It forms the shadow aspect of the conscious personal identity. Jung (1959) remarks that as the contents of the personal unconscious are integral components of the individual personality, they could 'just as well be conscious' (p. 7). One of my aims is to show why this desirable state is hard to attain. In the same passage, Jung describes the collective unconscious as 'an omnipresent, unchanging, and everywhere identical quality or substrate of the psyche per se . . .' and the archetypes contained in it as the images of instincts. In another passage, (1950a) he describes the effects of the archetypes of the collective substrate on the personality. Certain archetypes, he writes, 'are permanently or temporarily included within the scope of the personality and through this contact acquire an individual stamp at the shadow, anima and animus, to mention only the best known figures'. (p. 357). This interweaving of the two is basic to my theme.

There are, of course, states in which archetypal forms hold sway as in early infancy and in psychotic states. These conditions are often compared or even seen as identical though one goes forwards as the ego develops and the other goes backwards as it

* An introduction has been added to this article.

disintegrates with all the experiential differences which these contrary movements imply. Creative activity and religious experience can be added as examples of an influx from the collective unconscious which brings about a temporary loss of ego structure, but if the contents are assimilated the boundaries of the ego expand. If not, they would have to be classed as psychotic episodes.

I am more concerned in this paper with those people with relatively organized ego structures in whom the balance between the personal and collective unconscious patterns and images has become disturbed. I hold that in this vast majority the two are indivisible.

I hope to show first the historical roots of the separation of the personal and collective unconscious, and will then suggest how the two concepts can be brought together theoretically. Jung himself did not separate them in the arbitrary manner sometimes attributed to him and was aware of the dangers of doing so when treating patients.

Historical Roots of the Split

The history of the split starts, I suggest, from the split between Jung and Freud. Some clues as to how this occurred are conveniently clustered in Jung's foreword to the fourth Swiss edition of *Symbols of transformation*, his breakaway work, first published in 1912 but revised in 1952.

There he writes (*Coll. Wks.*, 5, p. xxiii) that the matter of the book came upon him

'like a landslide . . . the explosion of all those psychic contents which could find no room, no breathing space, in the constricting atmosphere of Freudian psychology.'

He states that one of his principal aims in writing the book was

'to free medical psychology from the subjective and personalistic bias that characterized its outlook at that time, and to make it possible to understand the unconscious as an objective and collective psyche' (p. xxiv).

Thus this book became 'a landmark set up on the spot where two ways divided'. He remarks that this division, as well as separating him from Freud, marked the beginning of the second half of his

life. As events proved, it also marked the separation of the personal from the collective unconscious. The former, to which he henceforth paid scant attention, was more or less ceded to Freud, and the latter became Jung's province (1916a).

What seems to have happened was this: in stepping out of the constricting pattern of his past, he was overwhelmed by the archetypal world and, like Brother Klaus (Nicholas von Flüe) whom he is so fond of citing, spent the rest of his life working on his experiences. Be that as it may, the split between the personal and collective aspects of the psyche perpetuated a curious situation, particularly curious from the patient's point of view. For a long time, Freudians accepted only patients under about thirty-five years of age, often admitting frankly that their interest and method were limited to the fulfilment of sexual and social aims. On the other hand, the interest of Jung and his pupils was directed to patients in the second half of life who would be likely to demonstrate evidence for the theory of the collective unconscious. It appears to have been hoped that personal problems requiring a reductive, that is a more Freudian, approach could be quickly disposed of so that Jung's synthetic method of approach to the objective psyche could be used.

However, it is well established that psychotic characters can produce the most fascinating archetypal material, and in dreams may seemingly go through the motions of individuation to the unwary student's delight. Jung himself was well aware of this danger. Regarding the 'very real risks' involved in the individuation process, he writes:

'The chief danger is that of succumbing to the fascinating influence of the archetypes. . . .' (1934, p. 39) 'and . . . their effect is always strongest where consciousness is weakest and most restricted, and where fantasy can overrun the facts of the outer world' (1934, p. 67).

This danger is not confined to patients. Jungian analysts are also susceptible to the fascination of the collective unconscious and, when this happens, may disregard the ego needs of patients, not to mention their own and the patient's personal conflicts. In this connection Jung refers to the dangers in the use of active imagination to constellate the collective unconscious. He writes:

'Obviously, this is a method that can only be used in certain carefully selected cases. The method is not entirely without

danger, because it may carry the patient too far away from reality. A warning against thoughtless application is therefore in place.' (1934, p. 49).

Such passages remind me of the dilemma of the sorcerer's apprentice who knew how to conjure up a spirit but not how to stop it working.

These quotations were published between 1935 and 1936 but Jung was concerned about what he had conjured up as early as 1916. For instance, in a passage where he stressed the importance of keeping the integrity of the personality constantly in mind, against the power of the collective unconscious, he writes (1916a):

'When the collective psyche is conceived as a personal appendage of the individual, the result is distortion of the personality which it is almost impossible to deal with. That is why one is so strongly recommended to establish a very clear distinction between the personal psyche and the collective psyche. This distinction is not at all easy to draw, because *the personality arises out of the collective psyche and is intimately linked with it: hence it is difficult to discern which are the collective and which are the personal elements*' (my italics).

This passage raises a problem of interpretation which hinges on the either-or premise inherent in the separation of the collective from the personal unconscious, but it is apparent that as soon as Jung separates them he puts them together again, the personal being to the collective unconscious as a plant is to its root: indivisible.

Healing the Breach

I am now going to present two formulations which attempt to heal the breach between the personal and the collective unconscious. First: *Nothing in the personal experience needs to be repressed unless the ego feels threatened by its archetypal power*; and second: *The archetypal activity which forms the individual's myth is dependent on material supplied by the personal unconscious*.

With regard to the first formulation, Jung writes of the archetypes (1934, i. p. 63):

'(they) have a dominating power, so it is not surprising that they are repressed with the most intense resistance. When

repressed, they do not hide behind any trifling thing but behind ideas and figures that have already become problematical for other reasons, and intensify and complicate their dubious nature. For instance, everything that we would like, in an infantile fashion, to attribute to our parents or blame them for is blown up to fantastic proportions from this secret source.'

In this passage, Jung puts it the other way round from myself. His prime interest is in the collective unconscious, so he points out that what is repressed are the archetypal images which then inflate the problematical relationships. But it is evident that the relationships were problematical beforehand 'for other reasons', i.e. as a result of conflict between the ego and experiences repressed into the personal unconscious. This passage shows how the personal and collective unconscious come into relationship, and how Jung treats them as separate entities in the first place. From my position it lays itself open to the thesis that repressed contents called 'personal' could just as well be called 'archetypal'. I hold that if this were not so they would not be repressed.

In analysis, when the repressed content returns to consciousness, it has the power of the archetype attached to it. As an example, a doctor with a mother who had periodic attacks of mania had entirely repressed his fear of her and dealt with her recurrent breakdowns with professional skill. But he quaked before his wife's tempers and she despised him. After he had lost some of his fear of me in the transference, he re-experienced the fear of the terrible archetypal mother which was attached to his repressed memories of the mad mother of childhood; attached also to his fear of the maniacal aggressor in himself based on his identification with her. He was then able to give his mother some real warmth and his relationship with his wife improved.

The personal and collective contents of the experience were not treated as two entities but as one; this was his image of his mother. Experience suggests that the integration of this image by the ego leads to its humanization; it becomes a suffering human being, a mixture of loving and hating propensities, instead of a one-sided monster that has to be repelled and repressed. As a result, the patient is humanized too and ceases to project this one-sided image. If, however, the personal and collective aspects are divided, the collective aspect *alone* cannot be integrated and may remain a threat to all relationships.

I shall now pass to the second formulation: the archetypal activity which forms the individual's myth is dependent on material supplied by the personal unconscious.

To refer once again to Jung's introduction to *Symbols of transformation*, he writes that after he had finished the book it occurred to him what it meant to live a myth, so he took it upon himself to get to know *his* myth so that in treating patients he would make due allowance for the *personal* factor. In the first chapter he gives an example from a story by Anatole France of a priest who became obsessed with the damnation of Judas. It turned out that he was particularly anxious about it because he was moving towards a heresy himself. (1952, pp. 31 f.). It is clear that if that priest had not been moving towards a heresy he would not have been concerned with the story of Judas. In other words, the activation of the Judas myth was dependent on the priests's repressed heretical urges.

Delving again into Jung I find that, when considering the use of amplification, that is, of parallels between the patient's material and mythology, he writes (1936d, i., p. 50):

'It does not, of course, suffice simply to connect a dream about a snake with the mythological occurrence of snakes, for who is to guarantee that the functional meaning of the snake in the dream is the same as in the mythological setting? In order to draw a valid parallel, it is necessary to know the functional meaning of the individual symbol, and then to find out whether the apparently parallel mythological symbol has a similar context and therefore the same functional meaning.'

These passages point to the interdependence of the personal and collective unconscious in image- and pattern-making activities. For instance, to return to the case of the doctor with the mad mother which illustrates my thesis. His personal myth was largely based on his unconscious role as henchman of the great mother. In her positive aspect he was a healer-priest and in her negative aspect an assassin. When he was six years old his father died of a disease that made his flesh disintegrate as if he had been wounded in many places. This sight was associated later with a horrified preoccupation with blood sports recalling the image of the mother goddess as Artemis, queen of the beasts, who used them to tear to pieces those who offended her; but what was crucial for this man was that such an image took shape in events

at an age when his envy and jealousy of his father was not far from the surface and his hold on reality was still weak. Later in life, when his mother violently objected to his marriage, he had to avoid attacking his wife, as it were, at his Artemis-mother's behest, in case he injured her. Hence his ineffectiveness as a man.

SUMMARY

It has been argued that the personal and collective unconscious are indivisible except in certain extreme states. The reason for their forced separation is traced to the separation between Jung and Freud, and the outcome for both schools of thought is briefly delineated. In Jungian psychology, the conceptual split, though necessary for purposes of exposition, is considered to be undesirable in practice, since it may add to the splitting tendencies already operative in the psyche. Suggestions are made to bring the two concepts together, elaborating those found in Jung's writings where he is concerned with the application of theory to individuals rather than with ideas about the nature of man.

The following formulations were put forward ; (i) that nothing in the personal experience needs to be repressed unless the ego feels threatened by its archetypal power, and (ii) that the archetypal activity which forms the individual's myth is dependent on material supplied by the personal unconscious. Case material is presented to illustrate both themes, and the value of treating the personal and collective unconscious as one entity is discussed in terms of the integration of the personality.

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*Maturation of ego and self in infancy**

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When I put forward the idea of the original self in 1947 it was part of an explanation for the appearance of integrative self symbols in the imagination and dream imagery of children. While the symbols often indicated a stable state, they also appeared in children showing evidence of omnipotent thought. The imagery seemed related to on-going processes and to ego development.

At that time it was very startling to make these observations because symbols of the self had been observed almost entirely in individuating persons after about the age of thirty to forty years. Then a process starts which leads to a change in consciousness: the controlling function of the ego is relaxed and this allows for the activation of previously unconscious archetypal forms which then present themselves as inner experiences. Gradually a new centre of the personality comes to light which finds symbolic expression in circular mandala and other images symbolizing the wholeness of the person.

At the time I did not know that my observation of self symbols in childhood had been confirmed by Jung himself. He never published his findings, but he presented them at a seminar on children's dreams and made a brief reference to them in his essay 'The psychology of the child archetype' (p. 165). Much encouraged I began to develop the subject as follows. Since the imagery occurred much earlier than had previously been observed it seemed relevant to try to find out just how early in the child's life self symbols might appear. It was known that children's scribbles developed into circular patterns, so I investigated these and found an unusual child who, when under one year of age,

* Specially written for this volume.

used the word 'I' when drawing circles. If the circle could be thought of as a self representation it would indicate just how early they might occur. The single observation expanded the idea of a positive relation between the self and the ego, which I had already observed in older children, to very early on in life.

The observations were no more than suggestions in need of support. At the time it was only Jung's massive investigations that had given much information about the self, so I reviewed his work once again and found that he thought of the self as unconscious in the first place. Thus there might be two forms in which the self could be thought about: first when it was unconscious, second when the ego developed a relation to it such that the self became conscious in symbolic forms.

It seemed therefore less daring than I thought at first to assume the wholeness of the infant as a state on which and from which maturation could proceed. For this conception there was explicit support to be found in Jung's writings.

'The self, like the unconscious, is an *a priori* existant *out of which the ego evolves*. It is an unconscious prefiguration of the ego'. (1954, p. 259) (*Italics mine*).

My view could therefore be thought of as an application to infancy of Jung's formulation, even though it implied a theoretical revision of the firmly established conception of individuation; this I did not at first take up.

To differentiate the self in infancy from that in the later life I at first called it 'the original self'. This term seemed satisfactory for it emphasized the idea of it being the origin of later growth; it might also infer the 'originality', i.e., individuality of a baby and his creativeness. However it has the disadvantage that it ignored precedent: 'primary' is the more usual term to use for the first states in infancy. Freud, for instance, had used the qualifying adjective 'primary' in his conception of narcissism; primary narcissism is an analogue of my idea. In addition it seems better to use the term 'primary' because there are secondary self representations or symbols that are the result of development.

Then there was another idea that occupied me. Inherent in Jung's thinking was the conception of the self as an integrate. This is expressed in the title of one book, *The integration of the personality*, but also to be found over and over again in varying contexts. Though this was the main inspiration for me I was also

attracted in a vague way to the concept because of neurological theories derived from Hughlings Jackson and Sherrington.

Pursuing the concept I thought that the primary self must be a psychosomatic integrate. This once again is in line with Jung's conception, for much of his work aims at including the body in his none-the-less psychological studies. It may be held against this view that he postulated the psyche as the basic assumption on which a psychologist needs to rely. True enough, but it is only necessary to study his amplifications of the individuation process to realize that self realization means uniting psyche and soma (cf. Jung 1955/56). He contends that the cultural depreciation of the body in favour of spirit fosters splitting processes and has to be altered if body and spirit are to be united in one integrate—the self. Whilst the adult needs to pass through complicated processes to realize the unity which had been disorganized, it could be assumed that an infant starts from an integrate of which he will become conscious as he develops. I identified this integrate with the primary self.

The idea I was developing had fascinating and difficult consequences. Amongst analytical psychologists, before the introduction of self theory to childhood, the child's unconsciousness was made all important—'childhood' meant the period from birth to adolescence. The child was essentially unintegrated and though he developed fragments of consciousness they were supposed to have little effectiveness beside the far stronger ego of his parents and their representatives. In being unconscious, the child's affective life was believed to be so extensively projected that he did not differentiate his environment from bits of himself; furthermore he fused with his mother's and later his father's affects and especially those that were unconscious to them. In line with this thesis the psychotherapy of children meant therapy of their parents who alone had developed sufficient consciousness to make changes in the pathological states in their children, of which they were the cause. Against a parent's psychopathology a child was powerless because he had not developed a boundary to differentiate himself from him or her.

The introduction of the self modified this view as follows: it postulated that a baby was in the first place a whole individual person separate from his mother and, since self symbols recurred throughout maturation, he might be thought of as in some sense maintaining separation from his parents. Clearly this provided a

very different view of infants and children from the earlier one, but it was much more in line with experiences in child psychotherapy which showed that quite young children could be treated beneficially without needing to analyse parents at all.

Yet the idea of a child being unconscious was not at fault in a comparative sense: adult states of ego organization are quantitatively different from those of childhood. Further, the idea of 'islets' of consciousness, which goes with the conception, was valuable as well as the supposed affective mix up between mother and child, called the state of identity, in which an infant was conceived as a part of his mother, his gradual separation from her being like a second birth or rebirth.

How could the two conceptions be brought into relation with each other? Assuming that the self was primary, states of identity must be derivative and periodic also because a baby is only sometimes under the direct influence of his mother especially in feeding situations at other times he is separate from her, particularly in sleep. It followed that some change in the baby must take place to make identity states possible and I therefore introduced the term deintegration to cover the processes which brought the baby into its first relation with objects, i.e., his mother. Deintegration was conceived as the active contribution by the infant in bringing about states from which it was previously assumed he passively began. Thus the idea that mother, infant togetherness is created by the mother alone is done away with and attention is focussed on what the baby does to help bring this about. The idea that the self deintegrates, rather than splits or disintegrates, grew out of this line of thought. It recommended itself in that wholeness is implied in each deintegrate.

Archetype Theory

An integral part of Jung's concept of psychic structure is that it is just as much innate as the soma or body. He therefore repeatedly attacked the *tabula rasa* idea which Darwin initiated and which has persisted to the present time. It followed from Jung's view that maturation of mental states should be considered as just as much the consequence of interaction between genetic and environmental factors as physical growth. While recognizing that this hypothesis is speculative and not essential to his general theory, it is no less so than its opposite: that all mental

events are acquired through learning. This part of Jung's conceptualization was, therefore, stimulating when considering the nature of an infant and, as the concept of archetypes was a part of these ideas, they could be thought of as the innate psychic structures.

Jung developed his concept over the years. At first archetypes were conceived as the perception of instincts, but later on he thought of them as bipolar structures extending as in a spectrum from instinctual patterns of behaviour at one pole, to spiritual imagery at the other. It would not, I thought, be a violation of this later conception if the theory were translated to mean that there was a unity in infancy between perceptuo-motor activity and archetypal imagery. This would mean that much object representation in infancy would be coloured by the archetypal form and perception of 'reality' would be, in consequence, very different from its mature form. It would approximate to what Jung termed identity or *participation mystique*. Confirmation of this could be obtained from analytic and other observations in older children, i.e., from between the second and third year of age. This showed without a shadow of doubt that the child's affective experience of his parents was often different from the behaviour of real parents and was organized on an archetypal and not 'realistic' basis.

It was here that the theories of Melanie Klein became especially interesting because her reconstructions of infant experience are of just the sort that Jung's theories would presuppose. Hanna Segal gives an admirably clear exposition of what I mean when she writes (1964, p. 2)

'... an infant going to sleep, contentedly making sucking noises and movements with his mouth or sucking his own fingers, phantasies that he is actually sucking or incorporating the breast and goes to sleep with a fantasy of having the milk-giving breast actually inside himself. . . . Similarly, a hungry, raging infant, screaming and kicking, phantasies that he is actually attacking the breast, tearing it and destroying it and experiences his own screams which tear him and hurt him as the torn breast attacking him in his own insides'.

Leaving aside the question of at what stage in maturation these experiences take place, they catch the nature of early archetypal experience very well.

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The main objection to Klein's conception is that she assumes complex mental ego processes in an infant which are out of line with much knowledge that has been accumulated. Hanna Segal's constructions, for instance, are out of line with the probable vagueness of early perceptions. All the same, if her ideas be thought of as a metaphorical and adult attempt to formulate how archetypal physical processes operate in infancy they make a great deal of sense.

In contrast to the Kleinian theory of unconscious fantasies the archetype theory does not require fantasies at the start; it only assumes psychic organizers which influence, to a large extent, the form that the fantasies take on as the result of sensory-motor experience.

There is a characteristic of archetypal imagery which was particularly relevant to the idea of the deintegrate. The study of it showed that, though apparently distinct forms could be separated out, to consider each archetype as a discrete substructure of the self was fallacious. Each always carried within it associative connections with other archetypes and each had a remarkable capacity to become interchangeable and to transform itself. In other words each archetype implied the whole self and therefore could be thought of as a deintegrate of the self.

The theory of archetypes could thus be included in the model I was constructing and, furthermore, since the archetypes were unconscious structures and the conscious is formed out of the unconscious they could also be conceived as the substructures of ego formations—islets of consciousness—which develop during states of deintegration.

Early Forms of the Ego

How early ego formation begins was the next matter to consider. Psychoanalysts following Freud (1937) assume an ego very early on and at least soon after birth when it has significant functions to perform. To analytical psychologists, who conceive of the ego in terms of consciousness, this formulation is difficult to assimilate. It cannot be proved that significant states of consciousness are present in an infant because he has no verbal means of communicating how he feels. Therefore all conclusions must depend upon inference and so on conceptions about the nature of a baby. Here there are two main views. Either he starts from a primarily

unorganized state or there are organized archetypal patterns inbuilt and ready to become activated. Those who think a baby's energies are essentially unorganized will attribute any organized activities that he reveals to the ego; those, like myself, who approach the subject with Jung's concepts in mind, will contend that a baby's archetypal patterns are more likely to be finding expression in organized behaviour which will not necessarily be attributed to the ego.

Jung defined the ego as the centre of consciousness. There are, however, good reasons for avoiding a clear cut definition when considering infancy. So I will start by listing indications of ego functioning as follows: (1) perception; (2) the organization of mental contents; (3) memory; (4) control over mobility; (5) reality testing; (6) defence structures and (7) capacity to relinquish its controlling and organizing functions. This list, which characterizes a hypothetically mature ego, does not identify the ego with consciousness which represents one expression of organization. Applying the framework to infancy: it is controversial how far mental contents, if any, are organized at the start and also how soon evidence of memory can be obtained and with it the existence of defence structures; it is also problematic when reality testing starts and relinquishment of control can hardly occur if no serious volition exists. Perception and control over mobility remain for consideration. It is these that have been most studied and it has been found that they are so closely allied that it is common to link them indivisibly.

With this brief overview of the characteristics of the ego the next step can be taken by considering the two features to which most attention has been given in infancy. I shall then consider them separately for convenience.

(1) Control Over Mobility

There are a number of behaviours in infancy which are organized at birth. Some of them are reflexes like the clasp reflex, the extensor response, the sucking response, etc.; others are more complex like the tonic neck reflex which is adapted to intra-uterine life and gradually fades out after birth. All of them have developed in utero. Then there are the more complex patterns of behaviour which first show before, during and after a breast feed. For instance a hungry baby when brought to the nursing position, but before contact with the breast, will open his mouth and

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'bring his free arm against the force of gravity from his nose to the region of his mouth and the mother's approaching breast' (Call, 1964, p. 286). Such behaviour can be observed as early as the fourth feed.

The essential feature of all inbuilt motor behaviour that does not fade out, is that it becomes progressively more organized till eventually it can be controlled voluntarily. This is the criterion that must be applied when looking for evidence of ego activity. Thus reflexes, like the clasp reflex, become part of more organized and eventually voluntary activities such as reaching out to take hold of objects. The criterion of organization that leads to voluntary control is that which must be applied when looking for evidence of ego activity in this area.

(2) *Perception*

We know very little of perception in the first weeks of extra-uterine life. It is probable, however, that the first experiences are vague and that diffuse pleasure and pain are important. Perception of objects is thought to be vague because clear perception of any kind includes a large component of learning. Spitz, however, thinks that there is a stimulus barrier which prevents experiences like birth becoming conscious, so vague perception might be the result of a defence against painful perceptions. For my part, I conceive this concept unnecessary and prefer the idea that, though sensory stimuli reach the brain and are registered there, the higher centres are not developed enough to give rise to the mental act of *perception*. Apparently against this view is the observation that the shape of a mother's nipple can decide whether a baby takes the breast or no. However this can be understood in terms of neurophysiological processes such as sign stimuli, so that no ego functions are necessary to explain it.

As part of the idea of vague experiences it is usual to suppose that a baby's experience of his mother is not differentiated when he initiates approach behaviour and starts to feed. In later stages when inferences are more reliable, there are two hard facts which help considerably. By about three months, quite possibly before, parts of a person can be perceived accurately according to rather well organized schemata. By six or seven months nobody can replace the child's own mother without more or less disturbance. These observations correlate with the idea of perceptual consciousness having developed at about three months to rather

accurate perceptions of part objects. Whole objects can be perceived at about six or seven months.

Two meanings are given to the terms part and whole object. The concept refers to the perception of parts of a person and to a value that is given to them in terms of being good or bad. A baby may at first feel pleasure or pain without relating it to an organ. Gradually, as he learns to perceive, he will find out that there is a breast 'out there' and discover at the same time that he is different from it. Comparable discoveries are also made about parts of himself and each of these are felt to be good or bad. Gradually his experiences fuse till he feels not only that there are part objects but that they are integrated as parts of himself or his mother each of whom can be good or bad. At first he only knows that there is discomfort or pain without relating it to objects outside or inside him. He has to develop quite a long way before he finds out that one discomfort is because he wants a feed from the breast or that another pain in his tummy can be relieved by his mother picking him up, rubbing his back till he produces wind. It even takes quite a long time, probably months, before he discovers that the discomfort or pain is something in himself or that when he is hungry and there is no breast to relieve it, the breast is bad; or that if the breast is there at the appropriate time he can satisfy himself, the breast is good. These experiences, when organized, lead to the feeling that there are two breasts, a good one and a bad one, which are not identified as the same breast: they are opposites separate from each other. Only later does he discover that the two breasts are really one and the same.

The arrival at the perception of one object as good and bad is referred to as the perception of a whole object. It is the start to forming a coherent ego nucleus where before there had only been fragments of ego.

What takes place with the breast as a focus is repeated in other 'zones' especially in the anal one. Into each nuclei are built cutaneous visual, auditory and kinaesthetic (inner) images, which gradually fuse through growth of cognitive functions till a whole body image is formed.

Maturation of the Self

So far I have considered some of what takes place in a baby during very early transactions between him and his mother as a result of deintegration. But these periods of togetherness in

feeding and nursing are only part of his life. The transition from feeding to sleep, which is the state of a baby for most of the time, is the period when a baby starts to play with himself or his mother.

The integrative act of sleep is the first period which follows deintegration. At the start E.E.G. recordings of sleep are different from later on, indeed it takes several months before the mature sleep pattern develops. Dreaming may start earlier, but it is only known to take place at about nine months. Since dream images are related to experiences whilst awake, it may be assumed that periods of deintegration influence and develop those of integration. So it seems that maturation during integrative periods is a consequence of deintegration, presumably by internalization of experience acquired during deintegrative states. But though the primary self is gradually modified, the integrative energies persist and contribute to integration of objects, indeed to the formation of whole objects. All this means a reciprocal relation between integration and deintegration which combine so as to form organized structures related to each other, performing their own specific functions in relation to objects.

Symbol Formation

During the period of linked sensory perception and motor activity, imagery develops and is at first part and parcel of the total process—object and image are one as Hanna Segal beautifully depicts. At first there is no mental symbol of an object which persists when the object is absent. Nor is there much perception of the object, as a reality, during affective states. Then all objects are perceived in the light of archetypal organizations, i.e., they are the representations of the motor act as well as the 'real' object. This state of affairs creates a primary identity of the self with 'outer' objects.

As maturation proceeds archetypal imagery begins to detach from objects and a representation of the mother archetype is formed, separate from the real mother. In so doing perception of reality is increased and this is a potent element in why a real mother can no longer be replaced by a substitute. Since the mother archetype is ambivalent, i.e. it combines experiences of mother as good and bad, the image is a true symbol in the sense that it is a mental representation which combines opposites.

This achievement by a baby is clear indication that identity

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has been dissolved; not, of course, for all the time but for some of it. Then objects, actions and images, are distinguished from each other and can be 'me' or 'not me'. The achievement is a maturation of the ego brought about by both integrative and deintegrative processes in the self and learning through its interaction with the environment. It contains all the essentials of Jung's basic definition of individuation for the baby comes to realize himself as a person distinct from other persons or objects.

CONCLUSION

Much of what has been said summarizes knowledge about parts of a baby; his perceptual and motor development, the development of imagery and symbol formation; all of this takes place with reference to the self. But a baby cannot perceive the self in first place and till he can make a symbol of it he has no self awareness. In this process play takes an important place. It starts during deintegrative states but is at the same time intermediary between instinctual satisfaction and sleep. It may occur as part of the baby's earliest communication with his mother or on his own. It is the activity through which an infant discovers reality, makes reality into a fantasy or fuses the two; it is one of the earliest manifestations of controlled ego activity in relation to objects, human or not human.

Of special relevance to this investigation is the transitional object. It may be anything from a bit of fluff to a soft teddy bear. It has the characteristic of being of great importance to the infant, indeed its possession appears to be a matter of life and death to him. It has many meanings; it can represent part of his mother or himself, but at the same time is neither, in as much as it can be controlled, and for more and other reasons it seems to be an early self representation. It is transitional in the sense that it takes a place in the infant's life for a limited period and after a variable time is discarded. Until then his mother perceives much for him. She treats each infant differently and as a person and having herself a primary experience to rely on she can do this and facilitate the development of self representation. To put this in less technical terms, a good mother comes to know her baby better than anybody else and always will because of her day to day, hour to hour, minute to minute experience. It does not matter primarily whether she knows why he behaves as he does

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and the neurophysiological, biochemical and psychical processes which together make the baby what he is can only be of secondary interest.

In saying this about a child's mother I have made good an obvious omission—it is not possible for a baby to survive without his mother and therefore I ought now to develop the other component of a single picture (cf. Fordham 1969). It has not however been my aim to present anything complete, but only to discuss the relation of the self to early ego formation.

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The importance of analysing childhood for assimilation of the shadow

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Introduction

Examination of the empirical data and the ideas about the shadow which Jung presents to us in his published work and his seminars shows that no single definition is adequate to elucidate what he means to represent by the term. Therefore I shall start by demonstrating the usefulness of having this concept in mind as a metaphor that helps to organize a number of data from different fields. Later on, we shall employ definitions as instruments to further discussion.

The justification for this method is partly its empirical value and partly the idea that it reflects a dialectic between a clear conscious formula and unconscious processes which are thus elucidated.

Consider first the social field. Here we find that any particular society meets the needs of only some of its members. Others are less satisfied and become resentful, envious or rebellious; others again become antisocial and live a life in opposition to the law, i.e. they are criminals. Thus we can think of the achievements of any society on the one hand with satisfaction and admiration, but can recognize that its one-sided development has also its shadow. If the society is functioning well the shadow compensates the social good, but if it becomes too powerful there will be a disaster of one sort or another.

Next there is the religious field, which can be treated separately, though it is really related to the society of which it is a part. Here again opposites are found at work. In the Christian religion the shadow is one element in a conflict between good and evil

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which can become largely split off altogether from human beings, who then become virtually pawns in a divine drama. In any case, man is not ultimately responsible for his sins, and salvation depends upon a divine act of redemption; the human being, to cite St. Paul's formulation, is justified through faith. Again the interplay of opposites may be expressed in a less moral sense, as in Taoist mysticism, which contributed so much to the foundations of Chinese science because of its concept of the unity of nature.

In the analysis of patients these patterns may be found as intrapsychic, and then they can be studied more closely. The patterns of compensation found in society and religion are also present within patients, and it is some of the intrapsychic expressions of the conflict that will be considered. In particular, how important is the shadow of maturity, i.e. infantilism, in arriving at the wholeness which is the aim of individuation?

Among analytical psychologists there are various views on this subject. In the 'Theory of psychoanalysis' published in 1913, Jung emphasized the ongoing or aim-seeking trends in the personality. He discussed the whole question of regression and progression, but laid particular stress on the prospective function of dreams and fantasies in relation to the task which lay before the patient in the present.

At that time Jung concluded that the infantile data then being investigated by psychoanalysis did not provide an adequate explanation of neurotic manifestations. He criticized the tendency to ferret about in the past when what he termed the 'actual situation' contained the real problem. It is of interest that the cases that he took to illustrate his thesis were children.

Although I think that this point of view needed elaborating at that time a great deal of research has since been done as a result of which many of the theories then held have long been abandoned. Theories of psychopathology have been greatly developed and the techniques of analysis have altered. The importance of the actual situation and of the ongoing processes is no longer disputed and is widely accepted, and nobody holds that infantile sexuality is the only source of neurotic manifestations; indeed, the oedipus conflict is now clearly held to be part of maturation.

But I need not elaborate on this topic as if it were unknown, especially since Jung himself both before and after 1913 modified and refined his view of childhood. In illustration here are some passages from his essay 'The child archetype' (p. 162):

‘... the retelling and ritual repetitions of the mythical event (serve) ... the purpose of bringing the image of childhood, and everything connected with it, again and again before the eyes of the conscious mind so that the link with the original condition may not be broken’.

And again, he refers to the condition when man becomes:

‘unchildlike and artificial and has lost his roots ... this presents a favourable opportunity for an equally vehement confrontation with the primary truth’.

In recording these quotations I do not intend to assert that Jung meant just what I am going to say. I do not think that he was primarily interested in the childhood and infancy of his patients, but I *do* want to show that he left room for us to appreciate the important place they could take in any particular analysis, and in the life of human beings, living in relation to society and their inner symbolical life. Jung left a gap which needs to be filled in, and it is no answer at all to leave this study to others and particularly to psychoanalysts. There is an urgent need for a Jungian genetic psychology if only because, if this gap in our analysis is not filled in, there is one certain result: the infantile material will augment the power of the shadow and often render it unmanageable. By assimilating its value, the ‘primary truth’ found there helps us to understand not only how the present state was reached, but also reveals the primary affective patterns for management of the shadow. Through them regression can turn into progression.

A ‘primary truth’ which my interpretation of Jung’s thesis reveals is epitomized in a short sentence, also from ‘The child archetype’: ‘The child had a psychic life long before consciousness’ (ibid., p. 178). Though the word ‘consciousness’ requires qualification, because we now know that it appears much earlier than Jung supposed, the idea of the infant having some, however rudimentary, psychic life from the outset, i.e. from birth, has received increasing recognition and is supported by reconstructions from child analysis and a growing number of observations made on infants from birth onwards. Child development does not consist only in learning forms of behaviour, nor is it built up only from introjections and numerous identifications with part of whole objects in the environment; in addition, a powerful contribution is made by the child at every step in his psychic

maturation. Today it is certain that constant interaction between the maturing psychic organism and the environment is what produces development.

If the infant's varying needs are not sufficiently met it is known that maturation is retarded or stopped, and false solutions are arrived at, which later on cannot be used to meet the 'tasks of life' demanded of an adult whether they come from within or without the boundaries of either the ego or the self. Then it is that the adult patient needs to be confronted with 'the primary truth' by bringing 'the image of childhood, and everything connected with it again and again before the eyes of the conscious mind'.

It is important that Jung adds 'and everything connected with' the image of childhood. For particular images of the child often have little to do with the 'primary truth'; on the contrary they are true neither about real children, nor about the individual's own childhood, nor about the self. The danger of assuming that any particular child image reveals *a priori* a basic truth is obvious—witness the belief in the innocence of children—and there are many others; indeed the images are legion, and they differ radically from, even though they are remotely connected with the great primordial images which Jung seeks to elucidate. But if the connexions with the images are gone into, then the truth often becomes apparent. 'Everything connected with them' will here be taken to include the experiences of actual children, as well as memories of childhood in adult persons and direct bodily and psychic experiences of infancy reflected in the transference, and the archetypal image itself as depicted in myth and legend.

The picture of actual childhood that Jung's thesis implies may be briefly stated as follows. It is of a person very close to the wholeness of the self, from which he is scarcely separate at all in the first place. Later his psychic life becomes mainly controlled by the play of archetypal energies which derive from the self by deintegration. They are natural, ruthless, absolute, in the ebb and flow of their need to discharge themselves, and so the infant, we might say, seeks means to represent them. Verbal images are not available, but visual impressions, sensations, noises are at hand. The characteristics of the archetypes become attached to them and at the same time begin organizing the infant's experience. We have to add as well that because the infant's ego is so weak, they are felt to be omnipotent. Satisfaction is blissful, frustration catastrophic, noises excite ecstasy or horror. The

child's absolute need for union with parts of his mother—her breast, her holding arms, her soothing sounds, the look in her face—is unconditional; failure to meet it spells disaster.

Now let us turn to some definitions of the shadows as points of departure for further discussion.

The Shadow and Repression

The Shadow is Represented by the Repressed Unconscious

This is an abstract statement. It means that representations of the shadow cannot be perceived unless the barrier that exists between the conscious parts of the ego and other elements is removed. These elements have been prevented from coming into relation with the conscious parts of the ego through repression, which has come about in the course of development. If we want to remove the barrier so that the elements can become conscious, then we need to know especially the nature of the barrier, how it works in the present, and its origins in the past. It can be observed within the transference through following the trends in association, or it can be reflected in dreams and fantasies; we can collect information from the patient about his present situation and we can listen to what he tells us about his development.

Combining these data leads to ideas about how the repression came about and to understanding the appropriateness or otherwise of the barrier, if necessary finding ways to remove or dissolve it. But repression is not necessarily useless; on the contrary, it may be a positive factor in psychic life by successfully holding in check antisocial impulses or unethical tendencies which cannot be released as such without serious danger to the patient or to society.

This is where the transference becomes so important, and where an understanding of the infantile roots of many antisocial or even psychotic elements gives the best hope of a solution. They cannot necessarily be resolved, but in the transference the analyst inevitably becomes the parent, or even part of the parent, against which really dangerous destructive attacks can be made with comparative safety.

It is fortunate that such attacks are not met with in everyday analysis. We have discovered that many repressed elements might just as well be conscious, and in this case we are compelled to ask, why are they repressed at all? The answer can be obtained

only by finding the situation in which repression *was* necessary. In addition we must show the patient, and work out with him, why repression is not necessary now, i.e. in relation to the analyst himself. Only thus can past situations be safely worked over again, and these parts of the repressed shadow be assimilated effectively into the ego.

In contradiction to this view it may be held that it is enough to release the unconscious content and then let the patient work it out with anyone he can find who appears suitable for the purpose. This may sometimes seem to work well enough, but if we remember that the elements are infantile and that children need parents, then the importance of containing the infantile conflicts of adult people within the transference can be understood. The dangers of the patient's being left to work out the conflicts released are numerous, and well documented under the caption of acting out or living the shadow.

For repression to occur we have to assume a rather well-developed psychic structure which has characteristics that can be called mental. This means that a fairly strong ego is functioning and operating in relation to collective attitudes, represented to the child by his parents. Here we need to remember that it is part of healthy growth for parents to introduce behaviour, feelings, or thoughts to the child. When attitudes, often reinforced by collective standards, are inappropriately imposed, they distort or cause damage, so that the child's normal repressive forces get exaggerated and may become pathological.

Such consequences appear in analysis when, for instance, good anger is not able to get a hearing because it has not been listened to before but has resulted in disapproval, threats, or punishments, inspired by a belief that aggression in a child is undesirable. It has been overlooked that *that* bit of aggression or anger on the child's part may have been due to a deeply rooted sense of its rightness, and it will be made to regress and will not be eliminated by repression.

The Shadow as Archetype

Now to consider another definition: *The shadow is an archetype.* This idea is quite different from the first in as much as archetypes as a whole, and so the shadow in particular, do not carry within them moral attitudes and are not the result of repression. They are more like instincts, but are also the basis for psychic activity.

Their most familiar expressions are in visual images, but they are really the substructure of all forms of psychic and mental functioning. Though they lack morals they are not unethical, indeed the quality of absoluteness which they often express is perhaps the basis for ethical attitudes essential to maintain the personality as a whole. The child's anger mentioned above could easily have been based on such an unconscious attitude.

Be this as it may, the small child's morality has much more the character of a spontaneous ethic than of codified morals. Furthermore it can have a rightness about it which can be understood only if it be assumed that it derives rather directly from archetypal forms. It follows that one, if not the most important, part of bringing up children is to find ways to modify the form in which ruthless, omnipotent characteristics are expressed, without repressing them prematurely. Thus the child is helped to integrate or control the value they contain.

That the archetypes form the basis of psychic life in childhood, but most of all in infancy, can no longer be doubted, yet, because the ego is weak, their activity is liable to result in many critical anxieties. To express the situation anthropomorphically, the archetypes attack, persecute, seduce the ego, which reacts by using primitive forms of projection, introjection, identification, and idealization, as means of exerting some measure of control over them. All these defences, though later used in the service of repression, are here held to be pre-repressive.

It is not necessary to bother too much now about whether the defences used by the child are conscious or not. Jung states intuitively that the child has a psychic life long before there is an organized consciousness, and this is good enough for our purpose. What has been said can now be profitably linked with the idea of primitive identity because the processes correspond to the kind of psychic life which Jung was describing. Among primitive people and in the unconscious of relatively mature people there is more structured organization than is found in small children or infants, but none the less the structures and processes are basically the same.

Now consider a state of mind which clearly shows the operation of archetypal forms. It is exemplified by patients who react to any interpretation or other intervention in a violently excited way. This makes no sense till it be established that it makes no difference whether the interpretations are about the good or bad

parts of themselves. It then appears that, if the part referred to is good, they feel the interpretation is not good enough and that there must be something better which the analyst is withholding; again, if the interpretation is about a part felt to be bad, then the analyst must be withholding something worse. In each case the patients feel driven to find out what it is.

The patients are near the stage in their development where good is blissful and total union with the mother; bad is total destruction, death of the mother; and there is no alternative. By knowing the approximate age of development at which such a state of mind is appropriate it can be said:

(a) The mother can be equated with her breast, felt by the infant to be equivalent to the source of life and death.

(b) The experience is non-verbal, so that words can only be lent to the patient to see whether they fit the experiences through which he is going.

(c) Talk as a whole will tend to be felt and appreciated as sound or noise. This means that the analyst's tone of voice and its intonation, the quantity or lack of it, will be more important than the verbal content or the sentence structure.

(d) The patient will compel affective responses from the analyst by projecting parts of himself into the analyst without there being any possibility of developing mature insight.

Features of Jung's practice it can now be recognized: the importance he lays on analysts reacting spontaneously (this does not mean irresponsibly) and if necessary with emotion. His stand against formal intellectual analysis—really the result of the analyst's splitting often in a pathological way—was very vigorous. He knew very well that in regression a patient can need emotional food if progress is to be made. All this is illuminated by the above considerations about the infancy of our patients.

But this example and others like it are liable to give a very wrong impression if generalized. For instance, where it is a question of analysing a defence which has repressed a primitive affect, the expression of strong emotions by the analyst is very much out of place, for it may lead the patient to project the affect in a way that makes it inaccessible. In this case the analysis is impeded rather than advanced. When the pre-repression state of affairs is reached, however, affect can be urgently needed. But it must not be based on illusion and must reflect the patient's need in such a way that the patient's projection can be seen.

In what I have been saying there are analogues with the alchemical figures with which Jung worked, in particular Mercurius in his elusive daemonic form. Jung deals with the historical, social, and intrapsychic manifestations of what were first infantile processes kept primitive and undifferentiated by the interpenetration of individual and collective (i.e. social and religious) conscious attitudes.

After this practical diversion let us return to the cases where ultimate good and evil are inaccessible. They suggest a solution to the paradox that good can be found in the shadow—in short that good, just as much as evil, may be found there, but each has become too persecuting to assimilate. An impasse has been arrived at because nothing is worth standing up for—there is moral and ethical stalemate; any particular good is not good enough nor is any particular evil the real thing.

I have already observed how genetic understanding can hope to elucidate this state of affairs and provide a means of beginning to change it. It is evident that good and bad objects have been split and put as far apart from each other as possible; this corresponds to an early period in development when the self deintegrates to produce separate opposites. But as maturation proceeds this splitting operation ceases to work because of experience by the ego of a breast which can then become good and bad, i.e. sometimes completely satisfying, at other times devastating by its absence. If in a fit of omnipotent rage a baby feels it has destroyed or damaged the bad breast which is also good, then he begins to pine; this happens at about six or seven months. At this time he already has very primitive feelings of guilt and begins to make efforts to restore, symbolically, i.e. inside himself, the object he has damaged. This seems to be the earliest form of symbolism and an essential component in developing independence from the mother's real breast. Indeed it is probable that without this sequence healthy weaning does not take place.

Here lies the earliest process in which feelings for what is good and what is bad are brought into relation with each other. It will be apparent how important it is for children not to have this very primitive development disrupted, as is the case with the patients I have described, because:

(i) They have arrived at the realization that any particular object, and later on any particular person, is both good and bad.

(ii) They have found a way through symbolic forms to repair the damaged good objects, and so increase the feeling of being good inside. The second discovery leads to the increase of good objects within the child. Upon this depends the feeling that it is worth while being alive, and from this grow his sense of identity, his feeling of self-respect, his individuality, and his capacity to differentiate himself from others.

Returning now to the patients. The splitting and idealization of good and evil have come about in the course of development, and were the only means whereby the individuals could continue to live at the time. Later these processes can link up with features of Christianity and such persons may become religious addicts. Through all they learn, they know with their minds that people and themselves are good and bad, but though they have this concept implanted in them, they never arrive at the conviction of its truth that living people need to feel.

There is, I think, another idea about evil which may be worth mention here: patients may swing over from trying ineffectually to be good, to asserting that it is positively desirable to do evil, to behave as though morals and ethics do not exist. This can be rationalized by saying that since the self has a light and a dark aspect, therefore it is almost as much an ethical aim to be bad as to be good. The confusion here lies in a muddle between ego, self, ethics, and morals, and in the meaning of good and bad to the infant. When the infantile roots of this thesis are elucidated, it is either a counsel of despair and extremely self-destructive or else it is like children being 'naughty', i.e. testing their parents. In the latter case it is a conflict between what the child feels to be good and what he infers his parents will condemn. This means that doing what is bad does not represent his reality, but is felt to do so through partial identification with his parents who seem to masquerade as good parents but are really felt to be bad.

Shadow, Self, and Individuation

Now to consider the last definition: *The shadow is one aspect of the self which integrates opposites*. There is an inference from this: the self would be felt by the infant as good and bad at once.

I have deliberately led up to this by asserting that infants can realize through experience that an object is good and bad at once. With the help of our definition we can understand that the

ground for this discovery made by the ego has already been laid down 'from the beginning', since the two primitive affects, inasmuch as they represent opposites, were united in the self before consciousness began to emerge. When they become first related to the ego they occur in sequence, i.e. a bad object that seems dangerous and arouses hostile feelings can become good only when the anger and rage which it evokes are discharged, and then love for it may begin to assert itself.

It is evident to me that experience of an object as good and bad implies activity by the self, but since we are getting on to more controversial ground, the last paragraph needs examining rather more closely. I have said—and there is ample observation to confirm this much—that the object can change from bad to good even though it can be the same physical object all the time. This does, I think, give us a clue to what happens. Consider the alternatives:

(i) The object may change because a projected good or bad object is introjected by the infant. In this case the infant has succeeded in splitting the good from the bad part of the object which may have been attacked, destroyed, and broken up, or it may have been introjected leaving the good, loving object ready to be loved whether the infant feels loving or not.

(ii) The infant may not have split its object but may have gone through the cycle of destroying the good-bad object, and then in fantasy reconstructing it as good enough to love.

Whichever has happened, the object is treated and behaves as part of the infant's psyche, in which there has been some differentiation between what is inside the infant and what is outside, as is implied by the terms projection and introjection.

The dynamic processes, projection and introjection, may be thought about as occurring within the state of primitive identity; they are observable in infants and in the analysis of children and adults. In analysis they appear when the patient makes projections which ordinary insight will not dissolve. They need to be fed back by the analyst deploying his affects in such a way as to give form (I almost wrote symbolic form) to a concretization. In this way room is made for the infant to begin distinguishing between the behaviour of real objects and his magical omnipotent experience of them. Thus he can develop boundaries and differentiate between the external and internal worlds.

We have laid emphasis upon development, upon the ongoing

synthetic life of an infant, and upon the ways in which the frail ego can gradually increase its strength *vis-à-vis* what to a grown-up person is the shadow. It is, however, this shadow world—not yet the shadow to an infant—which leads to the self, whose uniting functions give rise to total whole reactions. The dynamism of the self leads either, through regression to the primal or original self or, through the progression just described, to the realization that the same objects are good and bad. First it is experienced in relation to the breast, later on to the mother as a person, later still to the father, to other persons in the child's environment, and through all this the child realizes it about himself as well.

It may be assumed that, since the reactions of the infant are of a total order, the self is reflected in each particular experience of the infant. This conclusion has been arrived at by studying self-symbols as they appeared in children's paintings and dreams. Trying to understand what these self-symbols could mean led to the idea of the wholeness of the child and infant depending upon his experience of the self which, though different from adult experience in many ways, is essentially the same.

In the analysis of adult (and child) patients the psychic world of their infancy can be reflected directly in preverbal manifestations acted in the transference. Its analysis presents insoluble problems until their nature is recognized by the analyst, and the patient, functioning as an adult (or child), understands enough of what is happening. Understanding these events as interactions between mother and infant is clarifying in a number of respects: it helps to elucidate why it is more important for the analyst to know empathically than for the patient to understand; why it is that verbal communication can only from time to time become a true communication; why on the whole it is only necessary for the analyst to indicate his capacity to understand and leave it at that.

Probably the commonest anxiety that arises here is that the patient will identify in a very primitive way with his analyst. This does not mean primarily that the patient will show symptoms of being identified by behaving or talking like his analyst, though he will do so, but that there arises that fusion which renders the patient unable to do without the analyst and makes any separation even for 23 hours scarcely tolerable. Frequent interviews or keeping contact over the telephone during the weekend can do

much to help. These and other methods can be employed. But the basic question is: will the fusion resolve itself?

There are two views of how the analyst should behave when this condition arises:

(i) That it is necessary to partake in the patient's state, though without getting drawn into it for more than brief spells.

(ii) That a good deal of ruthlessness is called for from the analyst to eject the patient from a symbiotic relationship to which there is no solution.

There is little doubt that both attitudes can be required, but we may go further into the first one because, contrary to expectations, it can lead the patient towards individuation.

Using the model of a deintegrating-integrating self, I assume that deintegration leads to a state of fusion between the mother and the baby; mother and infant become a unit, thus reflecting the primary unity of the self from which the baby has begun to emerge. For his part the infant has not yet learnt how to distinguish himself from the object world, and so all objects are treated as part of the self, but the state of fusion is participated in by the infant's real mother also. Feeling herself a separate person she at the same time is able, as part of mothering, to feel herself as an infant. She must draw on direct experience of having been an infant herself as well as on other undefined origins for her capacity to feel empathically what is going on in, and what is required of her by her baby.

In the analytic situation a state of fusion with the analyst can lead in two directions:

(i) By a regression towards a unity which lies at the beginning of life (the original integrate) which would be real death or a state of nirvana. This might justify ruthless treatment to prevent the regression implied behind fusion.

(ii) If, on the other hand, the fusion creates a state of security, then its existence will help the ego to grow. The self will integrate the experiences gained in this fusion to other non-fusion experiences which can be drawn together in relative safety, thus initiating a step onward in the formation of an individual.

To put the second idea more explicitly, the states of fusion can mean a bodily (non-mental) experience appreciated by the ego as giving security. But to make progression occur it is necessary for the ego to have also experienced, at other times, enough

tolerable states of separation in which the environment has been discovered and does not present a threat.

We assume here that learning has occurred and one kind of learning—about feeling secure through union—reinforces the other—about the external world as separate from the ego. Then the two experiences can be integrated into the ego by the self. All this represents very early steps in self-realization and differentiation. As enough good experiences of the two kinds accumulate, capacity for tolerable separation progressively increases.

Thus expressed it might seem easy to decide which of the two courses indicated above to take, i.e. to go on participating or to become ruthless, but in reality only rather long experience will show which is possible. In spite of this, there is little doubt left in my mind that some patients treated with consistent and active participation, support, and understanding interpretations can progress and start to develop in ways characteristic of individuation. This result came as a surprise to me because I had grown used to thinking of individuation in terms of a historical process emerging in certain people, often with special gifts. It could best, and perhaps only, be grasped through rather methodical dream analysis and active imagination.

But there are people to whom neither dreams nor active imagination are all that convincing. They are saddled with transferences about which something simply has to be done. Everything becomes exceedingly personal to the patients and they do not care about the historical perspective which can be so important to others.

It is not, however, an analyst's job to impose his values or methods on his patients, so it becomes necessary to grapple with the conflicts of these adults. For my part I increasingly use the techniques I have found valuable with children. What I am now writing largely derives from this. I did not expect these patients to show signs of individuation, because it seemed to me they were concerned only with reductive analysis—another way of blinding myself, as I have begun to realize.

What therefore is the essence of individuation? It is surely the progressive realization of our own worth, both positive and negative, in relation to the realities of spiritual and instinctual life, i.e. the contents of the inner world, and the outer world comprising people and the society in which we live. This comes about ideally through our reacting as individuals to all the experiences

with which we are confronted either from within or from without. I say 'ideally' because this is never altogether possible, but it is a standard by which individuation can be judged.

Jung's definition of individuation in *Psychological types* in effect says just this; and in 'The psychology of the transference', though it is full of alchemy and social and religious amplifications, he asserts in the most emphatic way that, though it need not always be so, the transference can be the crucial experience for individuation—the same understanding can be found in many passages of 'The child archetype'.

It is now possible to state more about why in spontaneous or induced regressions to very early infantile experience the transference becomes an essential component in helping patients to differentiate themselves in just the way that would not be expected:

1. A basically fluid state of mind is induced.
2. The affects which emerge are produced in a situation where another person reacts in a way that is basically safe. Further, he provides understanding interpretations where necessary—many or few according to what is appropriate.
3. The analyst remains there, he does not die nor is he seriously damaged when very destructive fantasies and impulses are persistently directed at his person.
4. In this situation the primitive affects that develop can be tested for reactions in the analyst and then, when and only when they are well enough integrated, they can be used in the outer world.

These are conditions in which every sort of basic, i.e. original, conflict situation can come under review, or otherwise be reflected upon, and no collectively imposed standard can remain untested, uncriticized.

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Some views on individuation

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Introduction

In this paper I have tried to clear up some confusion by describing in sequence the various ways in which Jung regarded individuation, and to show that, rather than there being two kinds of individuation or else something peculiar to the second half of life, it is one continuous process from the cradle to the grave. This process may be hindered or distorted, and it may also acquire special significance; for instance, by being stimulated and made conscious through analytic work. It is the manifestations of the process in the second half of life that interest many Jungian analysts, but there are others, notably in London, who are also interested and find value in the earlier manifestations and I shall discuss this in the second part of my paper.

Jung's Thesis

As early as 1913 we find Jung writing to Loy about a powerful urge to develop one's own personality, but it is in *Psychological types*, published in 1921, that he defined what he had now crystallized out as 'Individuation'. The definition is a long one, but the essential features are that it is

'... the process of forming and specializing the individual nature ... (and) ... the development of the psychological individual as a differentiated being from the general collective psychology' (p. 561).

It 'is practically the same as the development of consciousness out of the original state of identity' (p. 563).

As time progressed Jung emphasized another aspect of individuation, namely the integration of the conscious and the unconscious, and this became its most important feature without,

however, dropping the original definition which we find reappearing through the years right up to his last work. Let us note in passing that there has to be a development of consciousness before there is anything to integrate.

Jung also wrote of the analytic process, a sequence of dreams or images, or even a psychosis as an individuation process. In 1952, writing in 'On the nature of the psyche' (1954a, p. 224 f.) he clarified matters by stating that individuation can take a pathological or a religious, i.e. mystical, form. It was the latter form, and the individuation process expressed in religious symbols and beliefs, that came to interest him most; largely because of this many identified it completely with religious development.

In the foreword to *Psychology and alchemy* (1944, p. 4) Jung identified individuation with analysis and linked it both with alchemy and Christianity. He said:

'There is in the analytical process, that is to say in the dialectical discussion between the conscious mind and the unconscious, a development or advance toward some goal or end the perplexing nature of which has engaged my attention for many years'.

He goes on to say how this process may continue even after the work with the doctor has been given up, and that the goal is 'the whole man'. This 'whole man' in Jung's terms corresponds with the archetype of the God-image or self. Individuation has here taken on an expanded meaning: it is a dialectical process concerned with the development of wholeness and the spontaneously produced symbols representing this 'cannot be distinguished from a God-image' (1951, p. 40). It becomes clear as to why individuation became identified with religious or spiritual development, though this new definition does not exclude the original one.

However, Jung states specifically that it (i.e. individuation) is a natural process of maturation inherent in the nature of man, i.e. it is not only an analytic process. The personality (that is, what this or that person has the capacity to become) is 'hidden away in the embryonic germ plasm' and in the course of time should fulfil itself 'as the acorn becomes the oak, the calf a cow' (1943, p. 110).

He neglected to say that even the natural process does not always go smoothly. Just as the nature of the soil and climate

affects the stature and even the shape of the oak, so the environment helps or hinders the natural individuation process. He wrote in a different context of the mutilations that occur in collective man—that is, the man caught up in the wheels of his civilization—but he never had much to say about the early developmental processes and what helped or hindered individuation in childhood except to be scornful of the efforts of educators to produce it. In his autobiography (1961) we have evidence that he understood a good deal about it but that is all.

The analogy with trees and animals breaks down in another respect, for it is not only the environment that makes individuation difficult for 'every child is born with an immense split in his make-up' (1928, p. 51); Jung returns again and again to his 'immense split', but it is in the man, not in the child or infant that he considers it. He wrote a few papers on child development, especially in relation to education, and about the tasks and duties of early manhood; the biological nature to be fulfilled in marriage and the begetting of children, the need for a man to establish himself in his chosen career, a paper on the development of personality in relation to marriage, and there he leaves it. He turned instead to history and in particular the history of the development of Christianity, to study how Western man had tried to solve the problem of 'the two incongruous halves of his psyche, which together form a whole' (1939, p. 287).

For a time any interest in individuation as a natural process receded into the background, and a special value was attached to the consciously chosen and speeded-up process of maturation brought about by analysis. It seems that he came to identify the individuation process with analysis because it was a way *par excellence* of becoming conscious, and of integrating unconscious products; it speeded up maturation, i.e. the integration of the conscious and the unconscious.

Discussing the natural or unconscious movement towards individuality, 'One is like someone', says Jung, 'dragged along . . . instead of choosing to walk upright' (1952, p. 460). There is a moral effort, he says, 'involved in self reflection and gathering together the scattered elements' (of one's personality) and I may add in facing the unconscious, since this means recognizing the shadow. But the reference to 'choosing to walk upright' is paradoxical for Jung also refers frequently to individuation as something towards which one is driven by forces stronger

than oneself (i.e. oneself as known to ego-consciousness) and yet differentiates this from the natural process.

Two world wars with their 'terrifying stupidity and mass emotion' impressed on Jung the urgent need for wider consciousness and its concomitant, better integration of unconscious contents, but he was pessimistic about the outcome. He also wrote about the danger of individuation, and man 'caught between the hammer and the anvil'; on the one hand 'the destructive effects of a mass mindedness' (1958, p. 379) which disregards the unconscious, on the other hand the danger of the ego becoming identified with the self if one opened the door to unconscious contents.

'He cannot conquer the tremendous polarity of his nature on his own resources, he can only do so through the terrifying experiences of a psychic process that is independent of him, that works him, rather than he it' (1954, p. 294).

Here he is emphasizing the power of the unconscious.

Still writing about individuation in 1946 and in relation to the world situation, another note is struck:

'All beginnings are small. Therefore we must not mind doing tedious but conscientious work on obscure individuals . . . even though the goal seems . . . far off. One goal we can attain, and that is to develop and bring to maturity individual personalities' (p. 110).

However, he seemed, in spite of this, to have turned away from the consideration of individuals and to be occupied instead with the history of ideas and in particular of Christianity and related movements such as gnosticism and alchemy. These were the great organized attempts in the Western World to deal with the 'tremendous polarity of man's nature', of central importance to him and yet needing to be seen in a new light, in accordance with the changes wrought by the contemporary spirit.

I say that Jung seemed to turn away from the individual to the general at this time because not only was he considering matters affecting civilization, but his writing took on a sweep and a grandeur which affects one. The ordinary problems of life seem to dwindle into insignificance; only the ultimate questions have validity. It is difficult to keep one's feet and find a point of

balance between the powerful symbolism of the unconscious as unfolded by Jung and the seeming banalities of everyday life.

This work (recorded mostly in *Aion, Psychology and alchemy* and the *Mysterium coniunctionis*) had actually a very personal meaning for Jung. It underlay the shattering inner experiences of 1913–17, as he tells us (1961), and it was also closely linked with the strongly religious atmosphere and peculiar problems of his childhood. He was now in his sixties with a full life behind him—a valid enough reason for occupying himself with the general rather than the particular problems of mankind, though in fact he was usually careful to say, even to emphasize, that he was speaking from an individual point of view and not trying to lay down general laws.

What he had to say at this period of his life had for many a great fascination. It was this fascination, I believe, that led some of his followers to identify the individuation process entirely with religious symbolism and spiritual development, as Jung himself seemed to do in his later years, and to leave aside the original definition. This led, among analysts, to an over-valuation of ‘interesting material’ (so called) and an apparent lack of interest in more ordinary routine work.

Individuation in Infancy

Fortunately for many of us who do the so-called tedious work on obscure individuals, comparatively recent research into the psychic development of infants and small children has opened up a new field of interest and a new therapeutic method. It is clear, not only that children have an important psychic life of their own much earlier than Jung thought but that the beginnings of the individuation process can be discerned even in infancy (cf. Fordham, M., 1968), and that if things go wrong at this stage the later development of the process is seriously hindered. For instance, by paying attention to a patient’s infancy one can discover the flaws in his environment which distorted his later development, led to a weak ego structure and consequent excessive influence of the archetypes.

In what follows I am considering individuation as a process rather than a goal, a view comparable to that of Jacobi in her recent book *The way of individuation* and also Fordham, M. (1968). I am suggesting that significant points can be picked out, like

milestones along a road; some people can then be seen to have started along the wrong road, or, to use Jung's metaphor, the calf is trying to become a horse.

In recent years many members of the Society of Analytical Psychology in London have become interested in early emotional development and its repercussions in later life. A style of analysis somewhat different from what has been considered the strictly classical Jungian one has evolved as a result, and the expression of affects (often violent emotion) in the safety of the analytic setting is one of its results (cf. Campbell, 1967, and Fordham, F., 1964). Patients experience their infantile shadow and learn about its nature in a most effective way (cf. Fordham, M., 1965). Because their behaviour in the consulting room is accepted without criticism or anger and yet the most destructive aspects of it are held (i.e. they are prevented for example from smashing up the room or injuring the analyst) the destructive impulse can carry over into its creative opposite. This may be no more at the time than the capacity to feel regret but it leads eventually to something more tangible.

I am not suggesting that violent emotion occurs in every analysis, but it is always a possibility when there is a considerable regression. Is the concept of individuation valid in any way if one is doing this kind of work with patients? Can the acceptance of regression with its consequent loss of differentiation be reconciled with 'the process of forming and specializing the individual nature . . . (and) the development of the psychological individual as a differentiated being from the general collective psychology'?

In fact this is exactly what the analyst who values reductive analysis is aiming at, but he takes his patient back to the early years, sometimes as near as possible to the beginning, because he recognizes how patchy and insecure is such differentiation as has been achieved. Sometimes there is merely a superstructure uneasily perched on totally inadequate foundations, a castle in the air, which the patient may be relieved to demolish, but will also feel as a loss for which he will blame the analyst—hence the anger. The analyst has become, in the transference situation, the parent who deprived the child.

A number of people who appear individual are really functioning according to collective psychology, accepting general opinions and reflecting the contemporary scene. They are significantly like their parents even though they seem to be quite

different and have perhaps reacted violently against them. When analysis reveals that they are simply repeating parental patterns, only in a different colour, they feel lost and discouraged, and realistically so, because it is usually a long and laborious task to sort out oneself from parent images and means returning in memory to the early years when parents were like gods (and not only beneficent gods) and had a similar influence.

Jung did not think that a child could be a personality or that there was any ego to speak of before the fourth or fifth year. Now we have evidence that the process of ego-building begins from birth or thereabouts. There is a steadily increasing body of knowledge—the result of analytic work and infant observation—and while the inferences drawn from this are open to criticism (for instance, that later fantasies are being retrospectively projected into infancy) there is sufficient agreement on certain points for general acceptance. Thirty years ago Bühler demonstrated that there was a marked difference in mental development in the first year between those babies who had adequate care and appropriate stimulation and those who did not. Much more recently the work of Spitz (1945) emphasized this in relation to babies in institutional care; others are working along convenient lines.

Spitz was also interested in defining in a way that could be demonstrated at what stage an infant could recognize mother as a distinct and separate person and at what stage he defined his own separateness. Spitz (1957) put this in terms of the child's 'yes' and 'no'; not the spoken 'yes' and 'no' but behaviour and gestures demonstrating this. I sometimes find this distinction useful in connexion with patients: there is the type who cannot say 'no' to anything and I can date this disability in the first year and know how important it will be for them to discover this capacity in relation to me and that its first expressions will be very infantile.

All psychologists recognize the importance of the infant's emergence from the symbiotic relationship with the mother; Winnicott (1965, p. 44), defining it as 'the baby reaching unit status' adds much to the concept through his understanding of an inner psychic world. His emphasis on the fact that a young baby (i.e. one who has not yet reached unit status) cannot be considered except in relation to a mother is in essence the same as Jung's view that child and parent are as one, but because he did

a great deal of work with babies and children he was able to observe development and differentiation much earlier than Jung. He saw that psychic development began at birth, and was profoundly influenced by the kind of mothering the baby got. The foundations of mental and physical health were laid down and the child's attitudes to people and to life in general were shaped by it. This view affects the analyst's approach to his work.

At this point it is relevant to mention Michael Fordham's work (1957 and 1957a) and his discovery that self symbols were to be found in early childhood, followed by his theory that the ego grows out of an original self. If, as Jung often said, consciousness is like the visible bit of an iceberg, this theory seems self-evident but it conflicts with the statement that 'every child is born with an immense split in his nature'. Actually this was written in 1928 and in *Aion* (1951) there is a passage (p. 404) where he contradicts this view. 'The only time the split does not occur', he writes, 'is when a person is still legitimately unconscious of his instinctual life, as an animal'. I think we might reasonably apply this also to the new-born baby.

Clearly, as adults we are dualistic, often torn in opposite directions and struggling to unite conflicting wishes and impulses in ourselves, but do we not develop in this way? I agree with the view that there needs to be an original wholeness for splitting to take place. Nowadays we regard splitting as a defence mechanism: the ego splits off what it cannot easily incorporate into its structure and tries to get rid of it in various ways, for example by projection, introjection, repression and so on.

The self or individual referred to by Spitz and the unit status of Winnicott are considered by them to refer to ego development, not to the self as understood by Jungians. Nevertheless they are not quite distinct because the psychoanalytic ego is 'first and foremost a body ego', and (quoting from Jacobson, 1964) its formation 'proceeds under the influence of the energetic and structural differentiation of the primal . . . psycho-physiological self' (p. 37)—a point of view very close to Fordham's (1957). According to Winnicott (1965, p. 46): 'The central (or true) self could be said to be the inherited potential which is experiencing a continuity of being, and acquiring in its own way and at its own speed a personal psychic reality and a personal body scheme'. Jung says that 'The symbols of the self arise in the depths of the body' (1941, p. 173) and adds that 'Fantasies are the natural

expression in the life of the unconscious', and again, 'The unconscious is the psyche of all the body's autonomous functional complexes' (ibid., p. 172). I take this to mean that bodily processes are or can be reflected in fantasy, and that the fantasy can remain unconscious, but it also indicates the very close links between body experience and self. Jung devised active imagination to tap unconscious fantasies, and through this work an appreciation of archetypal imagery was reached. The concepts of unconscious fantasy and archetypal experience can thus be linked up directly with the work of Klein.

Klein (1955) developed her ideas on the infant's (i.e. pre-verbal) fantasy life from observations on and from analysing the play of small children, especially near-psychotic children, and her brilliantly intuitive work led her to formulate theories of infant development in terms of the baby's psychic life, which she related to psychoanalytic theory. She believed that she was simply extending Freud's theories, though had she a different background she could just as well have thought that she was extending Jung's.

In Klein's view (cf. Segal, 1964) unconscious fantasy is the mental expression of instincts and therefore, like these, exists from the beginning of life. As, in Jung's view, instinct (which is represented in myths) comprises one pole of the archetype, there is little to choose between the idea of unconscious fantasy as the mental expression of instinct and archetypal imagery as the mental expression of the archetype. However, Klein's work on early life and its accompanying fantasies has given us a way of understanding how archetypal imagery can be built up and that it begins with what we now call part objects, notably (according to her) breast, penis and faeces, to which I think we should also add eyes and mouth. The mother imagos are archetypal, i.e. they are the way an infant inevitably experiences his mother, and they are both good and bad, they combine something of himself and something of the actual mother; they are reflections of the time when he was undifferentiated from mother and also later projections of the emotions relating to her. For instance his urge to devour the breast is also felt as an attacking breast.

A man patient of mine illustrated this for me before I had ever read Klein. His marriage was in difficulties and he hated his wife without, however, being able to decide to break it up. She was a good housekeeper and had been a satisfactory sexual partner so

that there were strong bodily ties to her (i.e. she was a mother figure) though at this time he was having a love affair with a young woman. While he was in analysis he invented his own way of tapping his fantasies through drawing: he would fasten a roll of paper to the top of his bedroom door and pull it slowly down as he scribbled or drew on it in pastels. He locked the door for privacy. One day his wife, getting impatient, hammered angrily on the door and shouted breakfast had been waiting for ages. Immediately he found himself covering the paper with breasts spouting fire and spikes like a kind of gun. I have come across other examples of gun-like breasts, and the fact that something usually so idealized can be fantasied as dangerous and destructive in this way gives credence to the Kleinian concept of the attacking breast. I do not want to suggest that an infant would have this kind of relatively sophisticated imagery; what we describe as an internalized bad or threatening breast is probably first felt by the baby as a pain in the stomach.

We do not know much about how and when visual imagery develops. M. Fordham, in unpublished notes given to seminar leaders, remarks that 'the deintegrates . . . have instinctual and psychic components which give rise to observable behaviour patterns which can be represented in imagery', while Winnicott (1965, p. 44) believes that the baby hallucinates the breast from the start. I would think, if this were so, it would probably be a nipple rather than a whole breast, but this again brings us up against the problem of the extent to which imagery has a perceptual content. Jung accepts the interplay of the archetypes and the perceptual system when he says, in relation to myths, that they record not the actual event but the way the psyche experiences the event and that archetypal images are influenced by perception, for example the mother is the first anima. Segal (1964, p. 4) says:

'If unconscious fantasy is constantly influencing and altering the perception or interpretation of reality, the converse also holds true: reality impinges on unconscious fantasy'.

She then gives a simple example of how this can be in terms of the good feeding breast which turns bad when a hungry infant is kept waiting too long.

What is observable rather than inferential is the way in which simple forms can repeat themselves throughout life with

ever-increasing elaboration. An American, Rhoda Kellogg, has produced an interesting book on the finger paintings of four hundred nursery school children between the ages of twenty-two and sixty months. She showed how scribbles became simple forms and how these were built up into rudimentary representations of human beings and eventually and quite frequently into complicated patterns of mandala type.

Alchemical-like imagery often appears in childhood, for instance the hermaphrodite and the copulating King and Queen in the *Rosarium* echo children's primal scene fantasies. In childhood it is what mother and father do in bed that matters, in later life it is (at least for some) the heavenly marriage. Furthermore, since the mother image is part of the self image it seems not improbable that the re-formation of the damaged God image discussed by Jung in *Aion* (1951, p. 40) is a later version of the attempt to repair the damaged mother with which we are familiar as an aspect of the depressive position.

The God image was supposed to have been damaged by the fall of man, and Adam's sin, though not usually thought of in this way, was basically that of greed. Greed is also the infant's 'sin', the imaginary greed of having cannibalistically attacked, scooped out and devoured the breast. It seems that we are always struggling with the same basic problem though we experience it in a different way. The Kleinian view is that in healthy development there is a sequel to the fantasy of having eaten the breast—mother—when the infant experiences anxiety and something akin to regret. He shows signs of depression (though no pathological depression) and therefore Klein called this phase the depressive position. The successful working through of this phase depends on his finding ways of making reparation or giving something to the mother as well as taking from her and Winnicott emphasized this aspect by suggesting it might be called the stage of concern, i.e. ruthlessness giving way to ruth. He pointed out the delight that some babies show in 'feeding' mother at this stage as an example of concern (Winnicott, 1958, p. 265).

If we accept the concept of the depressive position as valid we must also recognize that an infant is struggling with good and evil in a primitive sense: evil represented by his ruthlessness and his fantasies of destroying the mother, and good by the capacity for concern. During this time the opposites are brought together and a significant extension of consciousness occurs. It is clearly

a milestone in the individuation process in the terms of Jung's definition. The paired opposites lead directly to the experience of individuation.

The successful working through of the depressive position implies that the mother is recognized by the infant as a whole person, someone who exists not only as his property but can come and go and has relationships with other people. This underlines his helplessness and stimulates his jealousy, but he can also remember the good things she has given him. He can see that she comes back as well as going away and he begins to realize 'that it is the same person—himself—who loves and hates the same person—his mother' (Segal, 1964, p. 56).

We find patients going through this stage in their analysis: they begin to notice the analyst as a person. They have been untroubled by the existence of other patients; suddenly they begin to notice them too. It fills them with fury to meet someone else in the hall, they object to the smell of a cigarette or scent or a new object in the room, or they cannot use the couch because they insist it is warm from another patient. They get angry with the analyst but also they become concerned, thinking that he or she looks tired or ill. They are worried and angry about the weekend or an impending holiday, but they can also genuinely appreciate the need for this. Previously they had tried to extract every extra minute of the analyst's time that they possibly could, now they accept the limits of their session. They can sometimes express genuine gratitude (as distinct from placating) and show pleasure in the analyst's understanding. A patient of mine who had been negative and resistant for a long time became able to say spontaneously that he had noticed how often I had given him extra time and he appreciated it very much. After that he began to take responsibility for ending the session himself and not trying to get more than his due.

The capacity for gratitude comes about through adequate mothering and when this has been lacking it can, if the analysis goes well, be evoked by the analyst's care. However, gratitude or love must also be able to include hate, and the analyst's care includes neglect, otherwise there is simply the perpetuation of a symbiotic relationship. (By neglect, I mean weekends, the analyst's holidays, illness and also ordinary human limitations. A perfect analyst is no more use to a patient than a perfect mother is to a child.)

CONCLUSION

I have concentrated on the depressive position for several reasons: it is a relatively clear stage to define in relation to the process of individuation; though it does not refer to a pathological state it is nevertheless of importance to depressed people, and much of the future development of personality depends on it.

Failure to work through it is observable in later life as an inability to love, ruthlessness and superficiality, it can be manifested in the opposite way as an inhibition of aggression, and lack of reasonable self-assertion because of the person's unconscious fantasy of being totally destructive. In some cases this shows as an excessive concern for other people. As one patient said to me (about herself), 'I give and give what I really want for myself and suddenly I wake up and find myself bankrupt'.

To use the expression 'depressive position' can be misleading because it is not of course a fixed point but rather part of a process which is continuous: it simply means that the foundations are laid for the acceptance of a separateness without which there can be no true relatedness, that guilt can be tolerated because there is understood to be the possibility of reparation, and that the nature of people, things, in fact everything in life, is contradictory.

There are other milestones about which much could be said, the so-called oedipal stage for example, and adolescence. Anna Freud has recently published a developmental profile which could be used, while Erikson has a stages of life programme which in many ways fits in well with what one might call Jung's view. Lastly there is Jung's work on the second half of life.

Sometimes one has a choice at what stage one picks up and works on a patient's problems, sometimes one has not, but the beginnings are always there influencing the present and it is difficult to ignore them once they have been understood.

SUMMARY

This paper reviews Jung's concepts of individuation. It shows how they developed out of a central definition which emphasizes the development of individual consciousness out of the 'original state of identity'. Recent research, especially in London, has indicated that this definition covers development in infancy and so gives a new value to reductive analysis and the study of

maturation in the early months of an infant's life. The work of psychoanalysts, particularly Klein and Winnicott, has illuminated this field and their conclusions are shown to be congruent with Jung's definition.

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*Reflections on not being able to imagine**

A. PLAUT

1966

Introduction

In this paper I am going to consider instances of the apparent incapacity of patients to imagine. I thought this subject would be of interest for a number of reasons which will emerge more clearly as I proceed, but first I want to state my main hypothesis: the capacity to imagine constructively is closely related to, if not identical with, the capacity to trust. Part I is mainly clinical and descriptive; in it I shall show that trust and the capacity to imagine constructively are both severely disturbed by defects in early relationships. It will be maintained that a good enough parent-child relationship is an essential ingredient, if not the actual cause, of the development of both capacities. In Part II I shall discuss the increasingly close relation between the ideas of psychoanalysts and some analytical psychologists.

I

Jung (1916a) states that thought, affect, aesthetic and moral appreciation, etc. are the means whereby images can be apprehended. He also states that without verbal expression they can be very effective. But just as premature and defensive intellectual formulation can neutralize their impact, so can reliance on images alone lead into a kind of desert unless associated with analysis of personal relationships. Analysis requires the use of words which in the long run facilitate the therapeutic process. An additional advantage of putting imagery into words is this: it provides a means of communication with related disciplines of knowledge.

* Part II of this article has been shortened.

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We can now add to my main thesis another, which states that the apparent absence of imagination can lead to the erroneous conclusion that such patients are not analysable: indeed some analytical psychologists appear to think that patients' ability to use dreams and/or active imagination is the *sine qua non* for conducting an analysis. I shall maintain that the following cases all show that this notion can be mistaken.

A word of explanation about my use of the terms fantasy and imagination may not be out of place here. This is obviously a topic with very wide ramifications, e.g. in experimental psychology and neuro-physiology. A paper by David Beres entitled 'Perception, imagination and reality' (1960) reviews the wider context and I shall refer to it again below. For the present it must suffice to distinguish between the terms fantasy and imagination. Fantasy will be used to refer to frustrated wish fulfilments. Imagination will be used to refer to images which, through closer integration with the ego, are valued, can become symbolic or are in other ways useful, and so find their place in the inner life of an individual.

Failure to Use Fantasy

First Case

A middle-aged married woman, an only child of parents whose unhappy marriage had held together by the fact of her existence, complained of feeling empty and so lacked a sense of her own identity. She knew about analysis from a brief and much earlier experience which had been given up after three months: external circumstances partly accounted for her action. When she came for her second attempt, after an interval of many years, she arrived equipped with dreams all written down. The manner in which these were related to me, with no associations following, made it quite clear that she had brought them for my benefit and then refused to have anything further to do with them: she disowned her dreams as soon as they had been told.

I remembered that Jung had once taken the attitude 'Whose dream is it, yours or mine?' and I asked her this question, but met with no response. At the same time I noticed how important it was to her that I should appreciate her dreams as well as her intelligence and personal appearance. I was now able to analyse this attempt at relationship by showing her that for as long as she

could remember she had depended on making a good impression, by behaving in the manner which she thought was expected of her. In this way she achieved a certain amount of social success in a life which, however, she felt was not her own.

It was understandable that the dream-images were not hers any more than her body, of which she said it was a head with arms and legs flailing about. When depressed she depended entirely on what she got from the reflection of favourable images reflected in the eyes of another person. When she thought she had failed, she sank into a despairing, self-accusatory mood.

In a paper appropriately entitled 'On being empty of oneself' Enid Balint (1963) described the need of this kind of patient to orientate herself by the analyst's reaction as an echo or feed-back. Analysis of my patient's transference showed that she had not acquired a feeling of self in relationship to her mother, who had been too preoccupied with herself (including her own body) although not lacking in anxiety about her daughter's health and social success. As a result the patient repressed her hostile feelings toward the mother and gave all she expected but never developed any feeling that she herself was real.

This defect in mother-daughter relationship was later repeated in relation to her husband and determined the transference-projection at the beginning of her analysis with me. There was only one kind of environment in which she felt free and real; when she was on holiday in a particular environment. Just as her mother had been a different person in this setting away from home, civilization and husband, so only in these circumstances could the patient feel that she had a body of her own. As a result she had developed a kind of nature worship which stood for an idealized relationship with a mother who made no demands on her but understood her needs. Aggressive impulses had to be repressed and represented indirectly through fantasies and images about 'nature', e.g. about the ruthlessness of animal life or cosmic events, but not directly and emotionally connected with personal relationships past and present.

In this example conscious imagery was not lacking and dream imagery was at least reported. Her sense of emptiness, partial unreality and depersonalization demonstrated that without the sense of having a body and thus a feeling of her own reality, imagination could not be used by the patient: it had no validity for her and felt entirely alien to herself. I daresay that if I had

been able to become enthusiastic about the dreams which she brought, something like a 'feed-back' could have been established between us, but it could only have repeated her old pattern and would have lacked the immediate connexion between the past and the present which transference analysis brought about. In addition, her dreams were mostly of a terrifying quality, indicating a degree of repressed aggression which needed to find direct expression in the transference.

Comment: In the opposite type of case the patient is 'full of himself', although equally lacking in a real self (i.e. ego), inflated by unconscious imagery whether in the form of dream or fantasy, but without inhabiting a 'complete body'. Nothing really happens while this state of inflation lasts. Such cases are well known to every analyst and I need not go into details. What is pertinent to my theme is that the deepest layers of the psyche are reached and connected with the ego when imagery becomes associated with experiences.

I am referring to conditions in which owing to defective maternal care the vital linkage between exciting bodily experiences and the developing imagery had no chance to become established. Without it there is no feeling of individuality, of being indivisible. Only the infant's mother effectively holding him (cf. Winnicott, 1958) during crises of excitement could ensure that neither the excitement nor the individual are lost. I myself have referred elsewhere (1959) to such experiences as being situated in ego-nuclei as distinct from a central ego (or 'core'). Consequently excitement needs to be connected up with the central ego before the experience of oneself as a unit having a continuous existence can come into being so as to control excitement which otherwise remains overwhelmingly strong and unmanageable. With good maternal care exciting events are linked with the developing core and can be expressed in imagery, e.g. play activity, instead of having to remain repressed as unconscious fantasy.

Whether this repression becomes pathological depends on a variety of factors. The point here is that unless zonal excitement is at least to some extent linked with fantasies which could be elaborated in imagination, this excitement can find expression only in imageless anxiety or psychosomatic symptoms: 'organ language' here makes up for the lack of imagery.

Whatever the method or technique, it seems certain that in

such cases the analyst must fulfil two functions: one is to provide a setting which is suitable for experiences of excitement to be felt and shared through 'holding' in the transference; the other is to help in finding imagery which is appropriate and can eventually—if not always to start with—be expressed in words and thus linked with the conscious part of the ego. It is the experience of the past in the present which supplies the feeling of one's own reality, the ego-feeling as Federn calls it, which is so essential for being able to imagine constructively and to envisage a future.

These points appear perfectly compatible with Jung's formulation made in 'The transcendent function' (1916a). There he shows how conscious and unconscious contents can be brought together by a special technique and since then a lot more detail in developmental terms has been added by psychoanalysts. In the translation by A. R. Pope (privately circulated) a sentence reads as follows (p. 21):

'The ego, as a result of its identity with the individual's own body, has a unique and singular combination of qualities; in fact it consists just in that very uniqueness of the combination, while the elements making up the combination are qualities of a collective character'.

In his paper 'Mind and its relation to the psyche-soma', Winnicott expresses succinctly what I have tried to describe. He refers (p. 244) to '*the imaginative elaboration of somatic parts, feelings and functions*'; that is, of physical aliveness'.

Would it be legitimate to regard the zonal experiences as having collective character and see the uniqueness of qualities as resulting from the way in which these distinct experiences have been combined or come together in the central ego? If so it follows that until a sufficiently coherent ego is established use cannot be made of fantasy as imagination. All conscious content, as Jung sees it (1926, p. 322), consists of images (mental representations) but this does not mean that *imagination, i.e. the capacity to form images and to recombine these into new patterns*, is functioning. Although imagery of a passive kind (dreams or fantasies) may be present in plenty, this often does not seem to belong to anyone. A person in this state of ego-development can only delegate ownership and responsibility. If the cause of this condition is not recognized, *analysis*, as I understand it, comes to a halt. The patient is

also unable to trust, as Isaacs, Alexander and Haggard (1963) have pointed out, because he sees the other as he sees himself, i.e. in disconnected bits, and it is a contradiction in terms to talk of trusting parts of a person who is not identifiable as a whole. In the kind of case I have just described the unfulfilled desire is to establish unity or fusion with the analyst, the aim of which is to re-experience the mother 'lending her ego to integrate and reflect back the child's communications' (Balint, *ibid.*, p. 479).

Inability to Trust Imagination

The kind of patient I now want to describe presents himself in an altogether different way. The ability to form mental images and feel closely associated with these is well established; but the ability to trust imagination is lacking.

Second Case

The patient is a middle-aged spinster, an intelligent professional woman, the eldest of four siblings. The three others are married. She has remained very close to her mother and grandmother, enjoying their confidence (which was especially important owing to a large skeleton in the family cupboard). She repressed her sibling rivalry by means of this identification, which had led her to assume an air of authority and responsibility from an early age. While her brothers and sisters played happily my patient had never been able to join in but lived like a small grown-up.

Soon after her analysis began it was possible to release oedipal primal scene fantasies with which she became very much pre-occupied and which found expression during compulsive masturbation. No experience of sexual intercourse had come her way, but it was clear from the beginning of her analysis that she was prepared for a strong oedipal transference. Her imagined killing of rivals, of my wife and family as well as of other patients was in fact so frightening that she stayed away from analysis only to return later. She was afraid of ridicule—especially by her friends—who might find out that she felt in love with me: depreciation of her fantasies was her way of defending herself against their delusional strength. What was the use of having these fantasies? she asked. After all, they did not lead to anything.

She compared the analysis with having a long holiday in an out-of-the-way place abroad. But when you came back what did you have to show for all the time and money you had spent unless you could write a book about it? In general her attitude to what she imagined was: either it comes true or else it is useless, and worse than that because it misleads you and causes unhappiness. This defence against childish anxieties did nothing to lessen her fantasy and she used to become angry with herself for being so foolish and with me for taking these things seriously and even encouraging her. Thus did she interpret my attempts to link her feeling towards me, my wife, family, etc. with the repressed wishes of her early childhood. Her misconstructions constituted a special form of resistance: by not allowing the fantasies to become imagination (through linkage with the conscious part of her ego) she could stay in her inner world of wish fulfilment paying, however, the price of social isolation.

In all this she demonstrates a difficulty in using images and fantasies constructively so that the image can gain symbolic significance as the best available representation of the facts of her inner life.

This patient also shows how too early emphasis on being responsible, thus becoming prematurely adult, ensured her a special place within the family group. Her mental life became divided up into an intellectual life and a fantasy life containing repressed infantile sexual and destructive wishes which found expression in her symptom and led to self-contempt and depression.

The remnants of her infantile omnipotence were supported by the relationship to parents who made her feel that she was special. As a result no reliable and flexible boundary between her inner and outer worlds could be established. She had to compensate instead by distinguishing rigidly between what was possible and impossible in terms of social conventions. Unlike other children she had never learned to play, she had only become clever. For this quality and her responsibility and reliability she was indeed appreciated. How could she give up her false self-esteem for what she regarded as an illusion without a future? She had a great fear of becoming common because this meant losing control and being humiliated, a fear which she associated with early temper tantrums and the anal phase of her development.

The Development of Insightful Imagination

Third Case

Another patient who comes to mind in this connexion was a professional man in his forties, married and with children, suffering from severe anxiety associated with hypochondriacal symptoms. He had been over-attached to his mother in childhood and this tie had persisted right up to the present time. Many of his symptoms were due to separation anxiety. It became evident early on in the analysis that he had married a woman like his mother but was constantly attracted to what he called 'nymphomaniac' girls; his sexual fantasies with them were more satisfying than intercourse with his wife. So far this case was unusual only in respect of the rapid insight which he gained into the incestuous nature of his conflict.

Coming from a humble background and having successfully made his way up in the world he was much concerned with social conventions. He was afraid of being seen coming to my consulting room because he feared what his colleagues would think. Needless to say, being his mother's precious son, she was not to know about the analysis either. He had successfully supplanted his father in importance to her during childhood, and had it not been for a long absence abroad, I doubt whether he would have got married.

As soon as the incestuous nature of his fantasies and dreams became obvious to him, he began to suspect that I was siding with his would-be seducers, i.e. that I was in favour of his having extra-marital affairs. His imaginative insight had been a visible shock to him which he could not sustain without, for the time being at any rate, denying responsibility for it. I was glad when after a phase of suspicion he gained further trust which meant that instead of identifying me with his imaginary seducers he could see in me a father-figure deflecting his incest-wishes away from their original object.

General Comments

All three cases show how essential it is for the analyst to remain mindful of the relation between ego-development and imagination. Imagination was severely inhibited in the first case by the patient's need to establish her own identity because she felt so

empty when she came to analysis. The second patient's need to remain special on which her whole life had been built was militating against her acceptance of an event in her life so common-place as falling in love. Too much early responsibility had made her distrust her imaginative capacity. The third patient shows how imaginative insight had burst forth from his unconscious and surpassed the limits of what his conscience could support. It led him nearly to break off analysis because he had become suspicious and afraid of what he could imagine.

Further Developments and Vicissitudes

Once the ego has been firmly established there can be an ever-increasing awareness of what is within the bounds of ego-realization and what is beyond the ego's capacity to manage. The form which these experiences take depends on many factors, notably age. In his paper 'Psychotherapists or the clergy', Jung calls love, faith, hope and understanding the four highest achievements of human endeavour which are gifts of grace that come through experience (1932, p. 331). He continues by saying that experience is an irrational datum, that experiences cannot be *made*, they happen.

'Yet fortunately their independence of man's activity is not absolute but relative.'

We can draw closer to them, there are ways which bring us nearer to them, yet we should beware of calling these ways 'methods'. The very word, Jung says, has a deadening effect.

This passage has an intriguing ambiguity and is an expression of Jung's abhorrence of making a closed system or blueprint of the psyche which he nonetheless began to construct. At any rate the door is left open to human endeavour and for developing some ways—and, I even dare to suggest, methods or techniques—for helping experiences along. Certainly the analyst must consider how to help his patient towards realizing his potentialities, and these will depend on the relation between the patient's imaginative and intellectual endowment and his ego-strength. To this end the analyst must be able to use his own imagination as well as his knowledge, methods and techniques. So far, I assume, there is general agreement.

My interest is to discover what difference understanding by

the conscious mind makes in the distinction I have made between fantasy and imagination. While analysis is going on it would seem certain that the analyst's response to such imagery as the patient presents has a definite influence on the course of events (cf. my earlier remark on enthusing in connexion with the first case). But if trust in imagination and its transforming influence may thus be encouraged, the obstacles which prevented the patient's development will escape detailed analysis. As I am concerned with the synthesis of exciting bodily experiences with fantasy and how this leads to creative imagination I must find out as far as possible what went wrong in the patient's development. Without this exploration which inevitably leads back to infancy and childhood a superstructure without foundations can or even will result from joint enthusiasm about interesting imagery (fantasy) which may not be firmly enough linked with the ego core. The only reliable way of exploration is to combine all available data through analysis or the transference. My experience concerning the harmful effect which the free supply of images can have for the patient despite an immediate but illusory blossoming of the personality is illustrated as follows.

Impact by Image-psychotherapy

Fourth Case

The patient, a man in his middle-thirties, was seen by me many years ago when I practised what I would now call impact by image psychotherapy. I mean by this that the therapist relies on imagery borrowed from a variety of sources (e.g. mythology and religion) which *appears to be* appropriate to the patient's problem. The impact of this may be impressive to the patient and thus convince the analyst that he is on the right track. But the effect is often fleeting and at any rate this patient who had before been under his father's dominating influence, married, had a child, and divorced all on the strength of imagery mainly provided by me; its appeal resembles that of magic. Integration is thus neglected.

I had stimulated his imagination and there appeared to be no negative transference. Everything I said he seemed to absorb readily. After he had left I received an enthusiastic testimonial from him. Only later did I learn that his life was in a complete mess which it would have taken blind faith to regard as unavoidable and all to the good, i.e. in the cause of the development of his

personality. My revised practice is to analyse the obstacles in the way to ego-development.

It must be admitted that the analyst's imagination does at times create imagery for the patient. When this happens to me I feel uneasy unless it turns out that my imagination coincides with what had already been in the patient's mind unknown to me, in which case I regard the event as indicative of the 'syntonic counter-transference' (cf. Fordham, 1957). It also happens, although more rarely, that the patient seems to put into words exactly what was in my mind. Logically we would have to call this syntonic transference.

I would add that without acting the clown (manic defence) and without resignation (schizoid withdrawal) it may become possible as the ego matures to make use of a sense of humour, with which—given time for reflection—even the grimmest or most uplifting archetypal images and experiences can be faced. In my experience, it aids imagination and is inseparable from the ability to trust the good inner object, which has been established as the result of a relationship to a good enough person.

Related Conditions and Phenomena

(a) *Psychiatric disorders.* The three patients I related to psychiatric syndromes at the beginning do not exhaust the list of conditions in which fantasy does not work creatively as imagination. I can only refer here to psychotic or borderline patients whose appreciation of reality is so limited that they can hardly distinguish between what is inside or outside themselves. Imagination in the sense I have used it here hardly exists for these patients.

Both the first and second patients voiced their resentment against being drawn into someone else's imagination in very similar terms. Both admitted liking novels which took them 'out of themselves' but said they dreaded coming back to themselves so much that they preferred to avoid the novels altogether and stick to their hum-drum daily tasks.

While this demonstrates one kind of objection to analysis, the opposite kind is not usually so explicitly stated. I am referring to patients who are so intensely preoccupied or involved with another person, e.g. by their being 'in love' or 'in hate', that imagination and reality cannot be clearly distinguished. Just as

the attention of a driver on a straight, monotonous road is fixed onto the terminal point where all lines seem to meet so the direction in which the libido flows seems to be severely limited or canalized (= intensely cathected). Such patients seem to have one-track minds. Obsessional symptoms are another example of this condition.

The opposite is seen when a patient notices that his imagination begins to turn in unexpected directions, be it in the form of associations or vivid dreams or to activities like painting. Or there may be surprising experiences to which he refers with expressions like 'I never knew I had it in me', indicating a breaking through his usual boundaries.

(b) '*Body memories*', '*enacting*', '*psychosomatic syndromes and acting out*'. When commenting on case I, I indicated that the earliest cause of lack of imagination may be determined by the absence of a link between zonal excitement and central ego. In her paper 'On basic unity' Margaret Little (1960) used the term 'body memory'. She speaks of patients who harbour in memories an actual threat to their survival in infancy which they try to repair by establishing a state of total identity with the analyst and of undifferentiatedness from him. One is not dealing with repression but, as I should prefer it, with bodily experiences which have not linked up properly with their mental representation and thus with the central ego. Such experiences then may be preserved as 'body memories'. In these circumstances fantasy, let alone imagination, is non-existent, and the patient's behaviour when potentially suitable conditions for repair are provided (e.g. in the transference) should be called 'enacting' a primitive memory in contrast to 'acting out' (see below) a fantasy. The latter indicates that events and their mental representations have linked sufficiently with the central ego for the ego to recognize the danger they threaten and to exert its repressive function defensively. 'Enacting', however, is looked upon as the necessary condition before a body-memory can be linked with the central ego for the first time.

We may also agree with Beres (*ibid.*) who, in the paper referred to, mentions a pre-perceptual phase. Here sensations exist, of course, as neuro-physiological phenomena; organization into percepts (= apperception) has occurred, but here mental representation, i.e. representation of what is not actually present to the senses at the time, the raw material of fantasy, has not yet

come into existence. Only after mental representation has come about can repression occur together with well-known symptom formation, e.g. in the form of psychogenic ('psycho-somatic') bodily disorders or as behaviour known as 'acting out' which may occur in complex and highly-organized patterns. The latter state of affairs would indicate that the gap between psychic and external reality had not yet been bridged. According to my contention and Beres' formulation the shared awareness of external reality between two or more persons is still lacking. (See also my remarks on object relations at end of part II.)

II

Observations on the Status and Function of Imagination in Psychodynamic Thought

The images which portray man's inner world play so large a part in Jung's writings that it may be useful to draw attention to some theoretical assumptions which influence the status of imagination in the school of dynamic psychology and also to compare the usage of certain terms. Evidently all this must have a bearing on analytical methods or techniques. This was the case with Jung, whose concept of the transcendent function (linking conscious with unconscious contents of the mind) developed out of his discovery of 'active imagination'.

Unconscious phantasies are spelt with a 'ph' in English psychoanalytic literature. We know that in some psychoanalytic quarters the concept of object relations has taken priority over that of instinctual drives. Thus Paula Heimann (1951):

'By the term unconscious phantasies we mean the most primitive psychic formations, inherent in the operation of instinctual urges; and because these are inborn, we attribute unconscious phantasies to the infant from the beginning of his life'.

And again:

'Unconscious phantasies are associated with the infant's experience of pleasure and pain, happiness or anxiety; they involve his relation with his objects' (p. 24).

Fantasies for Jung (spelt with 'f' in the *Collected works*) are conceived as the spiritual or creative expression of archetypes, the

instinctual aspect of which is conceived as the polar opposite. As many ideas have their roots in different abstract frames of reference it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make point for point relation between these two frameworks. Nevertheless, I hold that the status of fantasies in each 'school' is now approximately equal.

In 'The structure of the unconscious', Jung, under 'Fundamental principles of treatment' states (1916b, p. 286):

'It is in the creation of *fantasies* that we find the unitive function we are seeking. All the elements engaged by the active tendencies flow into the imagination. The imagination has, it is true, a poor reputation among psychologists, and up to the present psychoanalytic theories have treated it accordingly'.

And in the same paragraph:

'Imagination is nevertheless the creative source of all that has made progress possible to human life. Imagination holds in itself an irreducible value, for it is the psychic function whose roots ramify at the same time in the contents of the conscious mind and of the unconscious, in the collective as in the individual'.

It is of interest to compare this early quotation with a much later psychoanalytic source, Guntrip (1961). Speaking of dreams and the play of children he says (p. 222 f.):

'With these, however, we must link . . . the myths and legends . . . folklore, and the imaginative creations of literature and art. . . . The prosaic mind may dismiss all that as "mere imagination" or as "fantasy" or even "fantastic nonsense".'

Later he quotes Susan Isaacs on the psychoanalytic concept of unconscious fantasy and the special importance it has in Melanie Klein's work:

'But can phantasy be unconscious? . . . It would seem that phantasy is the form in which we express unconscious emotion when it becomes conscious. . . . It is always a story of some form of ego-object relations in which the "object" is imagined and is in fact an "internal object". . . . It seems preferable to say, then, that the primary content of the unconscious

mental process is an emotionally active psychic structure, and that phantasy is its emergence into consciousness' (p. 224).

We notice in passing how close this evaluation of fantasy is to Jung's early formulation and how an 'emotionally active psychic structure' seems in its function just like an archetype, but with primary emphasis on emotion and, thereby, I should add, connected with repression and so with ego-development and -defences.

The juxtaposition of these quotations will, I hope, go some way to illustrate how close some recent psychoanalytic assessments of fantasy have drawn to Jung's own evaluation. Jung's statement also illustrates how fantasy and imagination were used more or less synonymously in some places. However, with the introduction of the term 'active imagination' imagination became the term denoting a closer connexion with consciousness than (spontaneous) fantasy. Fordham (1958) in the chapter called 'Problems of active imagination' has clarified these issues and made distinctions between various fantasies, the imaginative activity of children and active imagination. He distinguishes states of imagination according to developmental considerations and ego-establishment, a point which is central to my theme and to which I shall return.

In order to assess whether any change had taken place in Jung's views it will be of interest to compare his statements on active imagination made in 'The transcendent function' (1916) and nearly forty years later in *Mysterium coniunctionis* (first published in 1955 and 1956). The techniques by which imagination can be harnessed for therapy are extraordinarily similar. But when Jung comes to consider what is to be done with the material obtained by active imagination we do find a difference which is, to my mind, significant.

In the earlier work he distinguishes two classes of case: those who deal with the material by means of creative formulation (the libido flows in the direction of artistic expression) and those in whom the principle of understanding predominates (the material is abstracted into ideas). Moreover, Jung goes on to say about these two tendencies that the one is the regulating principle of the other, they are in a compensatory relationship and that both need to supplement each other to form the transcendent function. In *Mysterium coniunctionis*, however, the adjectives have changed and

nothing is said about this compensatory relationship, although the earlier statements are in no way revoked.

Here Jung (p. 530) speaks about the difficulty of transition from a 'merely perceptive, i.e. aesthetic attitude to one of judgement' as being 'far from easy'. He hints that there may be two reasons for this: firstly, that by the knowledge and insight gained the patient could become independent of the analyst—a conclusion the patient does not like to reach—and that they frequently stop short at the mere observation of images and so often come to a standstill. The second reason is the fear of psychosis 'because voluntary participation in the fantasy ("If the observer understands that his own drama is being performed on this inner stage, he cannot remain indifferent. . . ." (p. 496)) is alarming to a naïve mind' (p. 531). About the attitude of judgement Jung says (ibid.) that it should, of course, be morally and intellectually binding.

While in the earlier work the problem of how the ego is to relate to the unconscious is stressed we notice that in the later writing the burden which falls upon the ego seems even greater. For the attitude of judgement described must be regarded as an ego function and the ability to dispense with the analyst's help likewise. This amounts to an eventual demand for self-analysis as is demonstrated by the analogy between the master and the alchemist's apprentice who at some time must set about the opus himself (*Mysterium coniunctionis*, p. 528). More needs to be said about the particular ego function demanded: to enter into active imagination judgement must first be suspended and then be turned full onto the material obtained. From where is the ego to derive all this strength or, as I prefer to call it, trust?

Before attempting to answer this question, on which obviously so much technique (particularly in terms of transference analysis) depends, I want to compare the situation as regards trust in imagination, with developments in psychoanalytic theory.

For the purpose of this paper the most important consequences of the changing point of view in psychoanalysis which began with the introduction of the structural theory are the following (summarized from Arlow and Brenner (1964)):

(1) Primary process tendencies remain active throughout life; they are not necessarily pathological nor always maladaptive.

(2) No sharp line of distinction between the primary and secondary processes is possible; there is a continuum, i.e. the

difference is quantitative and depends on the mobility of cathexes. It is this quantitative difference which indicates the ego's ability to regulate the cathectic discharge.

Other observations express even more positively the importance of the primary process type of mental activity. Kris (1952), who wrote on art from the psychoanalytic point of view, stated that the artist experiences the creative urge in a positive manner, flooded by a plethora of impressions, thoughts and images. He it was who had introduced the phrase 'regression of ego in the service of ego' and other psychoanalysts have emphasized the positive role of infantile modes of mental activity in art and scientific creativity.

Thus Winnicott (1958), in his paper on 'Transitional objects', stresses the importance of a period of illusion in the infant's development and mentions the continued need 'in analysis or in various activities of ordinary life . . . (for) the valuable resting place of illusion' (p. 237). He refers to the intermediate areas of art and religion as being in direct continuity with the play area of the small child. Marion Milner (1955) in her paper 'The role of illusion in symbol formation', describes the case of a boy with much common sense and his feet firmly on the ground and his need to transcend 'the common-sense ego' and to 'tolerate a temporary loss of self, a temporary giving up of the discriminating ego'. (She, incidentally, is the only contributor to that book who mentions Jung though without remarking on his much earlier and pertinent discoveries.) G. J. Rose (1964) goes even further. He makes a distinction between creative and regressive imagination and asserts (p. 82) that creative imagination, far from providing a diversion from the task, 'directly deals with the task itself—the task of relating inner and outer reality. . . . It offers not only the opportunity of losing oneself but of refinding oneself with deeper awareness and within wider and more meaningful integrations of reality'.

The important difference between uncontrolled regression and creative activity is that in the latter the central ego, although temporarily or partly suspended, remains intact. We thus arrive at a position where so-called ego-weakness (lack of trust) can express itself symptomatically in opposite ways.

On the one hand we see patients who keep an anxious control over their more regressive forms of mental activity, as I have shown above. On the other hand there are conditions like

schizophrenia where day-dreams and fantasies seem to have become autonomous, i.e. apparently disconnected from ego and reality and out of control.

These opposite expressions of ego-weakness are comparable to Jung's theory described in *Aion* (1951) concerning the relationship between ego and self in which one or the other may become dominant. If the ego is assimilated by the self adaptation to reality is threatened (which can also happen 'if the ego falls for any length of time under the control of an unconscious factor' (ibid. p. 24)). If the self is assimilated by the ego a kind of pride results from being able to control oneself and to believe in the omnipotence of one's will-power. As Jung says, the result in both contingencies is the same, i.e. inflation, although the clinical symptoms appear to be opposite.

Despite the differences in concepts employed it seems beyond question that Jung was among the first to realize the value of regression, or the ability of the ego to initiate regression of its own functions in furtherance of its growth. He saw that regressive fantasies 'to the pre-conscious, pre-natal phase' (1912, p. 181) lead to archetypal images. He also spoke of regression as 'purposive introversion' (ibid., p. 335). In 'The theory of psychoanalysis' (1913) he speaks about the teleological significance of regression as follows: 'It is thus in very truth the basic condition for the act of creation' (p. 180).

Despite his repeated emphasis on the need for ego development Jung did not go into detail concerning the pre-conditions, of which, in my submission, the capacity to trust is an essential one. All the psychoanalytic papers mentioned describe how in one way or another there had been a failure to achieve this trust. I am at a loss to explain completely how Jung apparently got over this hurdle and I therefore return to my earlier question about the origin of trust which I hope to answer in a speculative way.

First, there are Jung's remarks on the transference contained in the paper on 'The transcendent function' (1916a), which did not fundamentally change in his later work on the subject. He is against the tendency to regard the transference as a projection of infantile erotic fantasies, but rather regards it as a 'metaphorical expression of the not consciously realized need for help in a crisis' (p. 74).

Next we have to take notice of other comments in *Mysterium*

coniunctionis on the process (initiated by active imagination) Jung says (p. 496):

‘This process of coming to terms with the other in us is well worth while, because in this way *we get to know aspects of our nature which we would not allow anybody else to show us* and which we ourselves would never have admitted’ (italics mine).

In terms of transference analysis this must mean that ‘the other’ is not directly projected onto the analyst but appears in the form of imaginative products which both patient and analyst can look at and react to.

Third, there can be no doubt that the analyst has sometimes to act as a catalyst, guide or even teacher in the technique of active imagination as the following quotation from ‘The transcendent function’ shows (p. 78):

‘Another source is spontaneous fantasies. They usually have a more composed and coherent character and often contain much that is obviously significant. Some patients are able to produce fantasies at any time, allowing them to rise up freely simply by eliminating critical attention. Such fantasies can be used, though *this particular talent is none too common*. (Italics mine.) The capacity to produce free fantasies can, however, be developed with practice. The training consists first of all in systematic exercises for eliminating critical attention, thus producing a vacuum in consciousness. This encourages the emergence of any fantasies that are lying in readiness. A prerequisite, of course, is that fantasies with a high libido-charge are actually lying ready. This is naturally not always the case. Where this is not so, special measures are required’.

This ‘none-too-common talent’ is referred to again in a later paper, ‘Psychological factors determining human behaviour’, where Jung (1937, p. 14 f.) refers with some reservations to a ‘creative instinct’ (which has much in common with the drive to activity and the reflective instinct). Although this ‘creative instinct’ is not common, he says, when present it is compulsive.

CONCLUSIONS

1. For the reasons given I venture to speculate that Jung’s statements and the source of trust in imagination were based on

experience with people who were either (like himself) exceptionally gifted in the direction outlined or who came to him with a transference preparedness which made them receptive to the 'artificial aid' and teaching of a method of experiencing unconscious contents. In this respect his method resembles Winnicott's 'therapeutic consultation' with children (1965). Here, too, there is transference preparedness, but no movement within the transference itself. Instead there is contact with unconscious contents promoted by squiggles which the analyst makes and the child is asked to complete and which may or may not be interpreted or commented upon. This therapeutic consultation depends on the *application* of psychoanalytical theory, but is not psychoanalysis. Despite a certain similarity in the method of activating unconscious content, Winnicott's aim is to elicit relevant events in the child's history as experienced by the child, whereas Jung's particular interest was not in genetic explanations.

2. In spite of this one may conjecture that where a creative talent is strong enough, trust in it may substitute in some measure for the trust not developed in the way I outlined in my comments on case 1. Just what constitutes such creativity in psychological terms requires more investigation and I hope to present a review of recent literature on this subject soon. Although creativity can be linked with Jung's concept of the self, the comparative rarity of creative personalities, the evocation of creative imagination as well as its possible destructive effect when the ego is poorly established all require clinical research. This is, however, hampered by the fact that analysts have not published failures.

3. It stands to reason that in people who are not particularly gifted (in the way outlined) and whose imagination is blocked, one either has to rely on transference preparedness and teaching of methods like active imagination which may be psychotherapeutic, or alternatively on transference analysis along lines which Jung called 'causal reductive method of analysis'. I found this necessary with my patients in order to establish sufficient trust in their own fantasy and imagination the lack of which could be traced to environmental factors. I referred to one case without adequate ego formation in which an illusory condition resulted from activating imagination. Trust must be coupled with judgement, i.e. the ability to discriminate between a whole person or situation and a part-object relationship.

In patients whose need to integrate major archetypal images

is equal to their resistance and who seemingly prefer to stay in an inner world which is either black or white, the analysis of infancy can demonstrate a corresponding handicap in ego-development. Without much analysis these patients may be regarded as 'unanalysable'. Transference analysis of their early infancy helps to establish the trust requisite for imagination to bridge unrealistic divisions in their relationships.

SUMMARY

The hypothesis is put forward that the capacity to form images and to use these constructively by re-combination into new patterns is—unlike dreams or fantasies—dependent on the individual's ability to trust. The latter is an essential ingredient in the parent-child relationship and thus in ego development. Failure in this area impoverishes life and requires careful transference analysis in order to further the ego's function to trust both in relationship and in one's imagination. Three case illustrations are given showing different points in the patients' histories at which adequate trust was not established. A fourth case is referred to in which no transference analysis had been undertaken and a development took place which, as it turned out, was the result of an illusory transference: a superstructure of interesting imagery (which was temporarily effective) had been built by the patient's and analyst's joint enthusiasm, but it lacked solid foundations. This showed the soundness of the first and second patients' defences: both refused to let themselves be drawn into their own or someone else's imagination before their own egos were sufficiently established.

In the second (theoretical) part, the author sets out to examine the status and function of imagination in analytical psychology and psychoanalysis—thus making an indirect comparison. He clarifies the differences between unconscious fantasies and symptom formation on the one hand and the use of imagination (especially active imagination) on the other. It becomes evident that certain exponents of psychoanalysis value the creative aspect of imagination as highly as Jung did. Early references to this subject are compared with Jung's later writings and the conclusion is drawn that the ego's task in active imagination is increasingly stressed by Jung. Psychoanalytic writers, on the other hand, seem to have come round to the view that regression

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(of the ego) can be of therapeutic value. It further appears that Jung's desiderata for talent as well as judgement in the use of imagination are practically speaking of equal value to the psychoanalytic requirement of transference analysis according to the causal reductive method.

The author warns against methods designed to stimulate imagination before such ego functions of trust and discrimination have developed.

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A problem of identity in relation to an image of a damaged mother

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1965

Introduction

In this paper I shall attempt to show how one patient has been able to develop a sense of her own identity over against an image of a damaged mother with whom she had previously been unconsciously identified and how, together with this development, the image has changed. The material in the form of dreams, fantasies, and experiences within the transference represents a transition from hysterical symptoms, where the image or fantasy had been, as it were, acted out or embedded in the physical symptom, to the beginnings of a sense of separateness or inner psychic reality.

My particular interest in presenting this material is that it sheds light on Jung's term primitive or unconscious identity, which he describes as follows:

'Unconsciousness means non-differentiation. There is as yet no clearly differentiated ego, only events which may belong to me or to another. It is sufficient that somebody should be affected by them' (1931, p. 83).

The 'somebody' who is going to be affected when a patient is in this state of unconscious identity is, of course, the analyst. Hence the great importance of the analyst's being able to see himself as an object into which the patient unwittingly projects parts of himself.

As the counter-transference becomes conscious, the analyst becomes aware of what he has experienced subjectively within himself. He can then use this experience as if he were an object out of which he can make interpretations that help to form a

boundary against which and within which the patient is enabled to integrate the parts of himself which he had projected into the analyst. The selected material extends over a period of five years, so that it has been possible to check my earlier interpretations, and way of looking at the material against the more recent developments in my patient. I have been impressed particularly by the forward and backward movement of the images and by the way in which my patient has used concrete happenings and objects as a means of acquiring a sense of identity. The images constellated feelings she had apparently repressed; through the affectiveness of the images we were able to develop a language which seems to have led to the possibility of the feelings being re-integrated.

*There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows, and in miseries.*

Case Study

Initial Picture

My patient, whom for the purposes of this paper I shall call Julia, is now thirty-four. She is an attractive and highly intelligent person, doing well in her profession, which is in the field of design, but in other respects not fulfilling her obvious potential. The presenting symptom was a fear of eating in public and a corresponding fear of vomiting; it seemed to work out as being unable to eat very much with other people for fear of feeling, or being, sick. The sight of other people eating in public places, for instance in a park or on a bus, would make her feel disgusted and sick, and she would be obliged to get away. Seeing somebody being sick, and she had a quite remarkable facility for this, made her feel not only sick herself but actually disintegrated. It seemed that this became for her an actual picture of the disintegration of a personality: not a particular person happening at that moment to be sick, but the loss of all sense of personality, her own included; it meant to her what primitives describe as 'loss of soul'. Once this had happened, she would remain in a depersonalized state for some time—often a few days—until, as she put it, she 'got myself back'. Her life had thus to be arranged round this

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phobia; although she longed for close personal relationships she was obliged to avoid them; she hated and reproached herself for this and for her lack of any sexual experiences. She had a flat of her own in which she took great pride and in which she tried in vain to fortify and contain herself. Her fears and anxieties took the form of an inability to draw her curtains at night for fear that someone would break in, and a feeling that she must constantly watch. She had a fear of space, which was expressed in various ways: for instance, she felt odd in moving trains when the countryside appeared to be rushing past; she often felt odd in the street, buildings and people got too near or too far away and she had to hold on to her coat buttons for safety; things often looked long, narrow, and flat instead of square. A blank page at the end of a chapter in a book was also frightening.

She complained that she did not feel things, except panic; she often felt blank; she thought she had no real memory. There were various events she remembered about her life which she knew, intellectually, had been upsetting, and she described these as 'blitzed sites', or said that she had 'done a scorched earth' on them. It seemed she had dealt with these in a phobic way and tried never to return to them in thought, let alone physically. She complained that she did not understand what plays, films and novels were about because she felt as if the people in them were speaking in a foreign language. She felt obliged to avoid feelings and getting involved with people because proximity made her feel sick.

History

The salient points in her history are that she is the youngest and only girl in a family of four, born at a time when her parents' marriage was beginning to break up; her father was away from home a great deal. Julia was deeply attached to her brothers, particularly the youngest, whom she tried to be like. Her parents finally separated when she was nine. Shortly before this there was a fire in the house, and shortly after Julia was sent away to boarding school; her brothers were already away at school when the fire broke out. The three events had become telescoped in her mind. She and her brothers remained with their mother for holidays, but occasionally visited the father, who remarried. There was an unspoken code between the children that they never discussed one parent with the other or among themselves.

There was no longer any fixed home, because their mother was obliged to work, and the four children spent their holidays wherever she happened to be.

Progress of the Analysis

Julia cried a lot in the early days of her analysis; at least, tears ran down her cheeks, though she never at this time actually sobbed, nor did she have any idea what the tears were for and she complained of feeling blank. She was not sure whether she was justified in having analysis at all, because she did not think she was genuine about anything. Above all, she was afraid of getting involved with me because this would confirm her worst fears that she was a lesbian. Furthermore, she feared that if she did get involved she might get better, and this would mean leaving me.

She found it difficult to imagine the middle of anything. Houses, for instance, had top floors and basements, but the middle was difficult to picture. The scorched-earth and blitzed-site imagery seemed to correspond with the gaps in the house and in her memory and possibly had its origin in the fire that had broken out in her home, which, in her mind, was synonymous with the separation of her parents and with her being sent away to school.

Julia had had what she called train dreams as long as she could remember. In these, she was either frantically packing and unable to collect up her belongings or find anything to put them into, or she was in a train going alone to an unknown or frightening destination, or a destination that was not really there—a gap.

Again and again Julia talked about buildings or houses that were in some way damaged, and it seemed that she animated them with feelings. For instance, she broke down and really cried when she described seeing the beginnings of the demolition of Hyde Park Corner. She felt that the houses themselves minded being demolished and that they felt they would be forgotten forever; she could not bear, either, the gap in time that would elapse before Hyde Park Corner was reconstructed. It was the first time with me that her feelings got the better of her.

With the help of the imagery Julia had so far hinted at, I could see a picture in my own mind that she was, as it were, projecting herself, or the feeling part of herself, into an image of a blitzed site, the scorched earth, the gap, or the house in the process of being demolished, and that it corresponded with her fears

about proximity and space and could account for the sense of no boundaries. I thought that it also corresponded with her feelings about vomiting and disintegration.

Inevitably, this imagery was projected onto me, and I became to her the blitzed site, which could be thought of as an inferred image of a mother too damaged to contain or hold her. Later on, Julia supported her feelings about my being damaged by discovering through a friend that I had suffered a bereavement. The extent to which she feared I was damaged became apparent when she arrived one winter evening for her session looking frightened but saying, when I commented on this, that she felt blank, which by now we both knew always meant that somewhere else she was feeling a great deal. Eventually she said that, coming along the street, she had looked up at my window and had not seen a light. A few seconds later she realized she was looking at the wrong house; it was the thoughts and feelings she had had in those few seconds that she found so difficult to recall. Even now, she was not sure precisely what the imagined horror was, but it was a feeling that I was 'in a heap on the floor'. It was, of course, very important to point out that this was another aspect of her blitzed-site feeling about me, and, although I had not denied the fact of the bereavement when she brought it up, she was able with the help of my interpretation to see that the degree of damage she attributed to me was really to do with her own fears about feeling herself to be a damaged and damaging person. Julia agreed that she always thought of me as too damaged to help her, but she felt women were doomed and damaged in any case. She said I reminded her of her mother after her father had left, but that her mother had made her feel shut out, as if Julia had no right to mourn too. She began to express feelings of guilt and anger—she felt I was like her mother all over again; at the same time she felt very guilty, as if she were responsible for the way in which I was damaged. She began to remember things: that she had consoled herself after her parents separated with the thought that, even though she had lost her father, at least her mother could not have him either. She felt appalled at this recollection and she re-experienced this guilt in relation to me, so that we could see how she had both needed to feel I was in the same state as she, with, as it were, no one having father, and at the same time needed me not to be damaged in the way she thought I was. Her eldest brother had been killed during the war, and Julia had never

mourned him; she had, as now, experienced the grief inside her mother. She realized she had felt angry with her brother for dying and leaving her, as her father had done, to cope with a grief-stricken mother. Gradually, she began to see that it was her own life she was mourning—a life she felt she did not have or live. She noticed that she seemed to rush through her life: at work she got through things in order to keep her desk clear; at home she constantly cleaned her flat; with me she so much dreaded the end of the session that she felt she could not risk letting herself feel she was with me. She felt she had to sit on the edge of her chair poised for departure; she said it was like seeing someone off in a train—you longed for the train to leave the station so that you could get it over. At this point I increased her sessions from four times per week to five, and the mourning for her life went on. She mourned the changing seasons. In summer she wanted the fire back in my room and felt she had not appreciated it enough when it was there or 'had it'. In winter she wished it was summer with the leaves back on the trees outside my window. The present in this way eluded her, and the future was too frightening to contemplate; only the ceaselessly mourned past was real.

A very moving image now turned up. Julia saw in the Underground a little boy fast asleep on his father's lap. There was something about the child's complete abandonment and trust that constellated for Julia something she felt she wanted very much. It enabled her, later, to have a fantasy of leaning against the lamp-post outside my house, of leaning against my front door, of leaning against the banisters, and finally of realizing that perhaps after all I was strong enough to lean against, in imagination. 'Having a good old lean', as she called it, coincided with another idea she had about me, which was that she thought of me as a bag into which she put her thoughts and feelings. She was impressed with my memory and felt that I 'put her together inside myself' by remembering; it was as if she could experience herself via me; she felt that in this way she did not just 'fall off into space'.

As a result of these leaning and containing themes, Julia was much more able to express her feelings about loss and separation and everything breaking down. Behind this lay another fear, that everything, including herself and me, was a hoax. She wondered if it was really worth arriving and getting involved with me, only to have to leave at the end of fifty minutes. The connexion between

separation anxiety and unconscious identity became clearer. Julia had often expressed the fear that I forgot about her as soon as she left the room; or, worse still, that after the weekend break I might fail to recognize her. The belief in the validity of her identity was, so to speak, resident in me, so that separation from me meant leaving her identity behind with me. At times when she believed I was not too damaged and could be relied upon to remember and recognize her, separation was just tolerable; but it was, and still is, the most difficult aspect of her problem. For instance, her work had apparently improved so much that she was given greater responsibility and a substantial rise. She was at first elated and then quickly went into one of her depersonalized states. She interpreted the recognition of her work as meaning that she was getting better and that this would bring nearer the final separation from me. It seemed that if she became successful it meant I was depreciated in her eyes; she became bigger and I became smaller and therefore not reliable. This was unbearable to her, and so she felt she had to stay ill. She believed that if she was happy it made me sadder than ever; she felt constantly burdened by the damage that appeared to be me, burdened and angry because she felt she could not desert me—I, like the demolished houses, would feel I had been forgotten—so although she could now dare to talk about wanting to get well enough to leave me and even though she was able to enjoy some weekends, they were overshadowed by her conviction, which was unshakable, that I was unhappy and could not do without her.

Gradually, Julia began to understand her need to keep me as a damaged object. Her envy was so strong that unless, as she put it 'I can keep you at my level', she could not identify with me, and this would bring about a return to depersonalization, which frequently happened. Julia's level meant damaged, and damaged meant no sexuality. Allowing herself to think of me with a husband often made her feel completely excluded and cut off from me. She said she had previously tried to deal with this envy, together with her anger and despair at leaving at the end of sessions, by 'doing a scorched earth' and in this way destroying the possibility of, as she later put it, 'keeping you alive inside me, even when you are not actually there'. This new ability was the beginning of her being able to symbolize the reality of inner experience; keeping me alive inside her meant she was not

destroying me as her internal object. Previously, separation had been so intolerable because she felt she damaged me in her rage and despair; something of this was reflected in the following dream:

‘There were two small green parent birds with four much larger black babies. The parent birds were encouraging the babies to fly, but allowed them to return to the nest afterwards’.

The parents allowing the babies to return was the point that impressed Julia. She had always thought of parents as hating their children and longing for them to grow up; children were parents out and patients were analysts out, hence the large black babies. This dream impressed Julia deeply, just as the sight of the boy on his father’s lap had done, and it led on to another more direct image. She had a fantasy that I allowed her to be inside me; it was dark inside but she felt safe, and also she could see everything that went on, particularly between my husband and me. The most important feature of this fantasy, in Julia’s opinion, was that *I* allowed her inside me. My being whole enough to contain *her*, which for the first time *she* could allow me, did not, as she had always feared, make her feel excluded; on the contrary, for the first time she felt that she belonged and that she and I could both exist without damaging each other too much.

One day, as Julia was leaving, she asked if she could take the matchbox off the table. The fact of her being able to ask for something felt to me as if she was risking a spontaneous impulse and so I gave it to her. Next time she came she brought it back. Periodically, she would take it again in times of particular stress and had it with her during two holiday breaks. At a later stage she explained that she liked me to have the matchbox most of the time so that I could re-infuse it for her; she felt that if she had it too long she drained it of the qualities with which I apparently endowed it. This threw more light on the transference and her fears about draining me. During this time she bought a soft toy to give a child and then found she could not part with it, because it reminded her of a similar toy she had had in her original home before the fire. She talked a lot about this toy, an owl, called Wol, after the owl of A. A. Milne fame. She had chosen the original toy herself when she was about four, because it was like another toy she had. Toys had never meant much to her because she had preferred her brothers and their games, but Wol had been

important, though she had been rather ashamed and secretive about him. Julia knows from her mother that after the fire the contents of the house were sold and Wol was given away—something Julia still feels angry about. No material objects from the original home still exist. Julia brought the new Wol to one or two sessions, and once asked me to hold him. The re-finding and re-discovery of Wol represented a fragment of the original home when Julia's parents were still together. The new Wol, who had, like the phoenix, mysteriously risen from the ashes, or blitzed site, therefore seemed to represent the means by which Julia was re-linked to her own roots. Julia has told me that sometimes when she has my matchbox she makes Wol hold it and in this way she joins him up with me. This, too, was why she had asked me to hold Wol, so that he was directly and literally joined up with me.

The primal-scene material contained in the fantasy of being inside me, which was linked with what had been going on through the re-discovery of Wol, seemed to have to do with Julia finding her place of origin or conception, a place from which she could start to *be*. It seemed to mean a rebirth in terms of being able to symbolize and have a stronger sense of the validity of her own identity.

Eventually, Julia became aware of a fantasy which, she felt, looking back, she must always have had but not consciously known. In the fantasy a mother and baby are together in an almost empty room, 'shut away from the life of the household'. The baby, really a toddler, clings to the mother and is afraid that if she gets off the mother's lap or for a moment escapes her encircling arms she will never be allowed to return. Equally, the mother dare not leave the baby and join her husband and friends in the 'grown-up world'. The two are locked in a *status quo* which neither dares to break. This image was clearly a reflection of the transference. Whenever my counter-transference response did not fit this context, Julia felt angry and immensely relieved. This has led on to what Julia calls 'real talking' as distinct from talking 'at' me. Each time an interpretation leads to 'real talking' it is as if a strand of the unconscious identity, of which the interlocked mother-baby fantasy was the root, had been broken. She felt she was symbolically able to get on and off my lap. This was accompanied by considerable anxiety and depression, but she managed a recent holiday break 'keeping me alive inside her'.

DISCUSSION

Returning now to where this paper began, with a description of Julia's physical symptoms, it seemed that they mirrored to a remarkable degree her psychic state. It was as if she had been trying to live inside the body of a damaged mother who resembled a blitzed site. Her own body image seemed to match this, a body with no middle, no stomach, in which nothing is felt to be contained. Food in certain circumstances was sicked up; at other times, when she was trying to assuage the feeling of emptiness, Julia felt that she simply went through food and that it did not nourish her or make her feel less empty, as if she were trying to stuff it into a stomach that had no walls, and in the same way the food lacked substance. Recently she has talked about feeling 'less bottomless' and less devouring. During these times she is able to eat normally both alone and with other people. Her vomiting attacks are very rare and she feels she knows what it is like to have an inside.

Julia was nine years old when the fire broke out in her home, and I am not suggesting that it explains her psychopathology. The image of the blitzed site seemed to be the result of a repression of feeling. The feeling appears to have been around her own conflict about her parents. She was with her father in his dressing-room when the smoke of the fire was first seen; it looks as if the fire and the resulting separation of her parents coincided with a fantasy she must have had much earlier. She had always felt that it was her birth that really separated her parents. Her father had always been away a great deal and when he was at home she never remembers them being together and talking to each other; they always seemed to be in separate rooms, and there was a frightening atmosphere of silence. Julia remembers feeling that she should be as quiet as possible, and very early on she seems to have been afraid of making demands and afraid to show she loved either of them for fear the other would be angry. The fire may have coincided with a fantasy of her mother's anger.

The blitzed site suggests a static image of emptiness and desolation, and it was not until Julia broke down over the houses being demolished at Hyde Park Corner that whatever feelings had been lost began to move in her again and alive images followed. Her vicarious suffering over what she felt to be my damage revealed more about the nature of the conflict that had been repressed.

Jung says,

“‘Constellated’ (i.e. activated) unconscious contents are, so far as we know, always projected; that is, they are either discovered in external objects, or are said to exist outside one’s own psyche. A repressed conflict and its effective tone must re-appear *somewhere*. The projection caused by repression is not something that the individual consciously does or makes; it follows automatically and, as such, is not recognized unless there are quite special conditions which enforce its withdrawal.

‘The “advantage” of projection consists in the fact that one has apparently got rid of the painful conflict once and for all. Somebody else or external circumstances now have the responsibility’ (1912, p. 59).

The toy, Wol, seems to represent the breaking through of the block in feeling—something had come to life again, as it were, within the blitzed site. The fantasy of being inside me was really the beginning of the breaking through of the unconscious identification as distinct from her ability to identify consciously with me in the fantasy, which was only possible after she had been able to face her envy; previously she had had to deal with it by ‘doing a scorched earth’, thus leaving herself with the dead image in a depersonalized world. The conscious identification with me was possible when she could allow me to have something, to be whole; then she could be free of the guilt of having destroyed me out of envy.

Julia once said, ‘You can’t give up something you haven’t had’. Which explained something that had puzzled me about her mourning and why it had been so endless. She *had* once had something, of which Wol was the representative, but it seems that she had, through her ‘scorched-earth’ or phobic mechanism, lost the connecting good feeling with her own mother, who appeared to have been destroyed both in feeling and in fantasy. True mourning, on the other hand, retains the full consciousness of what has been lost, and during the process of grief the psyche assimilates the essence of the lost object.

Julia’s relationship with her real mother has changed and she feels the picture she originally had of her is not objectively true. The blitzed-site and the interlocked mother-baby fantasy appear to have come about as a result of areas where the mother could not give adequate responses, and this was experienced by Julia as

an absence or gap in her mother, which she came to feel had been caused by her own instinctual needs and demands. It would appear that in reality Julia's mother had considerable difficulty in expressing her love and hate and that she had many hypochondriacal fears which Julia sensed. It is only recently that Julia has been able to express directly to me what she calls her 'ill feelings' without feeling that I would become correspondingly frightened and ill, and this has formed another boundary in place of a gap. The new relationship with her mother has enabled Julia to begin to believe in her capacity to repair.

Julia has had a long series of dreams in which she visited hospitals full of severely damaged and ill people. She experienced grief and shock in these dreams, but felt the people accepted their damage and remained people—they were not disintegrated as personalities because they were damaged. These people retained their personalities—in contrast to her earlier sense of the destruction of personality when anyone was sick. More recently she dreamt that she was pregnant and was very happy. She associated the pregnancy with what she calls her 'growing feelings', and although she still feels very precarious about this 'pregnancy' the dream strengthened her feeling of hope.

SUMMARY

I have tried to show in this paper how a patient, a woman of thirty-four at the time of writing this paper, was able to develop a sense of her own identity. She had been unable to acquire this because she had unconsciously identified herself with her image of the damaged mother. Her knowledge of a personal bereavement of my own made her project this image upon me which we could then work through in the transference-counter-transference relationship.

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Invasion and separation

DOROTHY DAVIDSON

1961

Once I went to some art classes and I was impressed by the fact that, at the end when we were invited in turn round the room to hold up our paintings, not only were all the paintings of the same thing different, as one might expect, but also people added things that were not there and left out things that were. This led me on to think about insides and outsides, because it seemed to me that our individual fantasies endowed the concrete outside object we were trying to paint with all sorts of properties it did not possess and that what one produced in the end was not so much to do with talent, or lack of talent, but with what one brought from one's own inside to the concrete object. Thus the act of looking, even at an inanimate object, was much more complex than I had supposed. This, of course, became infinitely more complicated when the object happened to be a person.

One of my former patients who was an artist may provide an illustration of what I mean. This man drew pictures of me in the privacy of his home; some of these he showed me, and I found he had portrayed me as a hebephrenic-looking woman who did not resemble me at all, though he was quite a good artist. Later he explained how he felt he could never really paint except when he was alone. When it came to painting portraits with the sitter in front of him, he experienced great difficulties. It seemed that the proximity of the sitter not only inhibited him to the extent that he had to *pretend* to paint and do most of the real work from memory afterwards, but also the sitter somehow got inside him, and persecuted him, and interfered with his creativity. Apparently the results were similar to the pictures he painted of me, because his sitters complained that he made them look depressed, ill, and ugly. So that his portraits seemed to reflect the bad things that had got inside him and invaded him. This patient had later to be admitted to a mental hospital. In his case I do not think it was

possible for him to keep himself separate from the object in any sense, because he involuntarily endowed it with so much of his own subjectivity.

This confusion between subject and object belongs to a very primitive level of psychological development where there is not much awareness of what is inside and what is outside. There is not, as yet, any clear awareness of what is myself and what is not myself, so that one could say, 'I *am* the universe; the universe is me'. This state is, I believe, what Jung has described as unconscious identity or *participation mystique* and the psychoanalysts refer to as projective and introjective identification.

For the purpose of this paper, I am describing it as a state of confusion between subject and object where the subject, or ego, is solely concerned with artificial attempts to keep itself intact. An ego, that is, which is unable to tolerate love, hatred, envy, anxiety, or depression and has to deal with these by means of projection so that much of the potential ego remains outside in the object. I believe it is these projected parts trying to become conscious which are experienced by the ego as invaders. These invaders have again to be reprojected so that a vicious circle is set up which blinds and isolates the ego from real relations with the object—since it is never able to be experienced alone as a separate and discrete entity. This condition leaves the subject in what I think of as a one-person situation where invasions and compulsive efforts to drive out, or separate from the invaders, unceasingly recur. It is my intention to try to show how two of my patients, one child and one adult, have attempted to deal with this problem.

By way of introduction to my child patient, let me first give a general outline of the way I arrived at being able to treat this child.

For some time I had been puzzled by the fact that a number of children I had treated appeared to have improved without many verbal interpretations on my part. Looking back over these children I began to see that they had either been very young children under five, or very disturbed children whom I would now think of as being in the one-person situation I have just described.

The thing, to me, which is fascinating and bewildering about working with little children is that almost everything they say and do is expressed in a concrete way and can mean anything and

everything. Thus if a little child pours water into a hole in the sand it can be that he is imaginatively feeding someone, or he can be urinating into or onto someone and be poisoning or drowning them, or again he can be imaginatively having sexual intercourse and he can be one or other or both of his parents. The hole can be a mouth, an anus, a vagina, his mother's inside, and so on. At another level the child's activity is probably all of these things at one and the same moment, and the variations on a theme of pouring water into a hole reach into the realms of fertility rites and mythology.

One cannot begin to interpret such play until, if I may borrow an expression of Fordham's (1959), one knows the context. The child, once I can begin to follow him, will eventually convey by some means or another what it is that is really going on. So I have discovered that when I begin to understand what the play is about it is not necessary, always, to tell the child in words what appears to be going on; it is more a question of responding through my behaviour. The play develops and moves on if I have been able to understand it inside myself.

The first few sessions with Martin (aged seven) appeared to me chaotic, and consisted of his bursting into my room, throwing a few things at me, and dashing out again. He could not be in the room with me for more than a few seconds. If I intimated that he threw things at me because he felt I was dangerous, he shouted, 'Shut up!' and left the room. This was, I think, at one level a correct interpretation, but in effect was useless. Whenever I spoke he tried to kick me or to throw things, or to make such a noise himself that I literally could not speak, or else he simply left the room, thus rendering me completely powerless. It was this realization which led me to see that he appeared to be attempting to reverse a situation he himself was terrified of, namely annihilation, and that his constantly having to leave the room was, quite literally, an attempt at separation from this terrifying thing. Accordingly, next time he threw a small chair in my direction I said, 'Now there is a fence in between us.' He replied scornfully, 'It isn't a fence, it's a chair'. But he did not throw anything nor did he leave the room. Instead he made a line of furniture across the room dividing it in half, with himself on one side and me on the other.

He did this for many more sessions and he now attacked me verbally, saying things like, 'I am ten trillion million miles high—

you are only a quarter of a quarter of an inch—you are a cry-baby—you are mad', etc. This was at one level, I think, a reversal of his relation with his older brother, who bullied him a great deal, but at another it seemed to reveal much deeper fears. I found that he could not stand any verbal interpretations on the brother theme or, in fact, any interpretations at all, and he continued to respond to them, though much less violently, in the ways I have already described. We therefore had to proceed for the most part in silence. He could now dispense with concrete boundaries and could even sit at a table beside me and draw, but on one condition. I had to sit with my eyes closed, and was allowed to look at his drawings only when they were completed. They were all to do with destroying me, my flat, and the square in which I live. The point I want to emphasize is that I found sitting in the presence of such a violent child extremely difficult. I was tense and apprehensive and sometimes I cheated. If Martin saw me open my eyes he immediately tore up his drawing, and my looking seemed to throw him into rage and despair. It was not until I recognized the extent to which he seemed able to trust himself not to take advantage of my being blindfold that I began to see what was happening between us. This mutual trust seemed to be the basis on which we could be together and yet be alone and have separate egos. It seemed that if I looked *before* the drawing was complete I killed it for him, which meant, I believe, destroying his struggling ego. This I attempted to say to him, in more suitable language, and it then became obvious to me that my words and indeed the sound of my voice, invaded him as much as my looking had done and so this interpretation was still premature. His response to it was to put one hand over my eyes and with his other hand cover my mouth and say, 'Just keep that shut'. He then made a telescope out of some paper and peered deeply into my eyes with it; I thought he was now beginning to get some control over his fears of my invading him. He continued this theme: on one occasion he came with a balloon and let the air out in my face, he said it was bad gas and would get inside me and poison me and I would die. Later still he came with a pair of scissors and threatened to cut all my hair off so that I should not be strong any more and he went on to tell me the story of Samson.

It was now much clearer to me why my earlier interpretations about his brother had not been any good; it was because the

depth of his fear was far below this level. It was only when I was able to get into touch with this through experiencing the apprehension myself that my behaviour could correspond with what he needed.

I wish now to pass on to my second patient, whom I shall call Charles. He seems to have attempted to deal with the same problem, but in a different way. Martin, as you have heard, attempted in the first place to deal with his fear of invasion by violently attacking the object, myself, whereas Charles appears all his life to have tried to keep himself intact by withdrawing from the object.

Charles was twenty-six and had just qualified in his chosen profession when I started seeing him. He talked volubly, giving his history in a detached way as if he were talking about someone else. Anything he described would be in abstract terms or in some way generalized, so that he gave the impression of a shadowy, empty world where no body or feeling was present. He never had any dreams, always came dead on time, always paid his fees promptly, and always agreed with everything I said. I began to discover that it seemed as if I had to carry the emotion he left out, so that together we seemed to form the one-person situation already described. As he agreed with everything I said, often repeating my words as if they were his own, I wondered how we were going to be able to proceed.

Then something happened. Charles normally wore spectacles but he started taking them off as soon as he came into my room. When I commented on this, he replied, 'I take them off because then you seem like a blur'. He added that then he could not see the expression on my face either. I suggested that this gave him some feeling of distance from me, and he said, 'Yes, I feel I have a screen'. Here, I thought, was a boundary, the beginning of some sort of separation.

An important piece of history now came to light. He had a memory, he could not say how early, of his mother going out of the room and when she returned he could not be sure whether she was his mother or someone disguised as her. He had felt the same way too about a cat he was fond of. It then emerged that if the expression on my face changed or if I had moved anything in my room, such as books or ashtrays, or was wearing a new dress, he experienced the same uncertainty about my identity.

It seemed fairly clear that somehow Charles' analysis would

have to be carried on within the context of this delusion. If his mother is not genuine then neither is anything or anybody else except himself. This idea seemed to fit in with further bits of his history.

While at school Charles had begun to have ideas that he had some sort of messianic mission which was concerned with bringing people to a sense of reality. He felt that no one experienced reality except himself. This was a tremendous responsibility and meant that he had to preserve himself from fights or playing games. He was taken to a child guidance clinic, and as far as he can remember was seen twice. According to the patient, the Clinic recommended that he should not play games, and thus unwittingly fitted in with his fantasies, frightened him, and strengthened his feeling of omnipotence. Later, at his university, he seems to have become aware of his own deadness and experienced this as an intense and terrifying feeling of isolation which precipitated him into analysis.

As long as he can remember, Charles has had an image of himself living in a prison. I shall return to this fantasy later; for the moment it seemed, to me, to lay emphasis on being the place where he *was* and on the idea of preservation. Winnicott (1954) has described this type of preservation as 'being preoccupied with the care of oneself within oneself', to an extent that there is little energy left for dealing with the outside world.

Recently Charles went to consult an orthoptist. I think this was possibly a magical way of trying to speed up his analysis since he equates getting better with being able to see. He says the orthoptist told him there was nothing wrong with his eyes except that he appeared never to have used his eye muscles properly. She also told him that he appeared to live in a dream and only glanced at objects momentarily and thus never focussed his eyes on an object.

By chance I then came across an article by Ruth Griffiths entitled, 'Through your baby's eyes'. I quote (1958):

'When a baby is a month old he is able to hold the image of mother (or a bright object) only momentarily. The image goes in and out of focus and is fleetingly sharp at about eighteen inches range. In the second month of life a baby's twelve eye muscles have received enough exercise to allow the infant to *hold* the image of a familiar object clearly, although the

background is still unsharp. As the eye muscles come gradually under control, which occupies the first three months or so of the average child's life, the two eyes begin to work together as a pair.'

She then goes on to describe the baby's further explorations in the field of touch. She says:

'Eyes and hands have now become co-ordinated, they must work together if the baby is to progress. He gradually comes to know what is too far away for him to reach, the ceiling light for example. He will also come to know, not only what is near and distant, but also what is above him and below, to the right and to the left, in front and even behind him. He will be discovering location, finding out where objects are in the room around him. This is largely helped by sounds as well as by what he can see. Although entirely without language, the young baby in the early months of life will learn by experience the qualities and textures of the many things within his environment'.

Charles, although extremely verbal, did seem to behave very much in this way, and I could now understand why it upset him if I moved objects in my room—it seemed to disturb his attempts to find himself in space and furthermore showed that I was identical with my room. Another piece of his behaviour also fitted in with the idea of eye and hand co-ordination because he began to pick up and play with my ashtrays, sometimes actually sucking one from time to time. He told me too that he could never think of people except *inside* their rooms or houses.

Another piece of behaviour also became more comprehensible to me. Charles had difficulty in leaving at the end of a session; he would hesitate in the doorway and seemed to have to struggle to remember the time and day of his next session. I would have to repeat this sometimes two or three times before he seemed able to grasp it. Sometimes when little children, or very disturbed children, have difficulty in leaving after a session I give them a small piece of Plasticine to take home.

These would be children who cannot retain an image. It occurred to me that this was what I was really doing in repeating the time and day for Charles. The interesting thing is that since my recognition of this, and without my saying anything about it, he has stopped this particular ritual. I suppose that something in my response towards him as a result of this piece of insight

conveyed itself to him. It seemed that he was now able to experience and retain a thread of continuity.

The only kind of continuity he had been able to find previously, so far as I could see, had been within the confines of his prison. At present I am inclined to think this prison is a false ego designed to protect himself from total invasion by the object or disappearance into the object. It is as if he either dives headlong into the object so that it is no longer there or that he lives in an ever-receding world with the object vanishing over the horizon. It seems to me that, as the messiah and in his prison, Charles attempts omnipotently to control life or the object. In preventing himself from looking at even inanimate objects he is able to preserve the illusion of a sort of deathlike concrete stillness, which is therefore continuous in the sense that it remains statically the same. My changing expression would be something which moved and was alive and therefore could not be held in place by him, if he allowed himself to see it.

In his fantasy Charles must have killed his mother when she went out of the room; at any rate she ceased to exist. There was no continuous mother image, not even any recognizable fragments (Rosenthal (1960) has described this idea of a fragmented mother in his 'Jesus-in-reverse').

It was now possible to understand the need for isolation. Charles's prison is a place where he is preserved in cold storage. Here one can see the ego's desperate attempts to prevent invasion by shutting itself off from the object by way of delusion. It will also have been noticed that Charles's awareness of the object seems to be entirely through his eyes, and that by not using them properly he can preserve himself among illusory objects which he can then control in fantasy. This is a false separation.

Charles expressed this in another way; he is in love with a girl whom, in his own words, he 'worships from afar'. He dare not approach her in any sense. When I talked about his fear of letting himself know that he wanted to see her, he replied, 'It's like dying of thirst in a desert and seeing an oasis and not daring to approach it in case it's only a mirage'.

I would say that Charles's illness was more highly organized than Martin's. In spite of the compulsive character of Martin's behaviour, he nevertheless dealt with me in a more real way, in that he attempted to do in actuality what Charles had done in fantasy.

Martin's attacks on me and his drawings had one continuous theme, murder. Had he succeeded in this, it would have been another false separation, because it was his *fantasy* of me he was trying to kill, the fantasy invader who must have contained all his murderous and envious wishes together with the anxiety and depression connected with them. The fact of my remaining alive seems to mean that his repetitive-compulsive fantasy eventually foundered on reality, and he can now relate to me in a much more normal way and has shown both concern and sadness towards me.

This state I regard as one of having found a place to *be*. A state which T. S. Eliot (1948) has expressed in different and more beautiful terms in his poem 'The rock':

. . . and man without God is a seed upon the wind, driven this way and that, and finding no place of lodgement and germination.

Martin, in the course of his treatment, has been able to break through the isolating vicious circle of his compulsive murderous attacks and so reach a place of germination, whereas Charles is still imprisoned in a void.

A false separation of Charles's kind is highly precarious and makes the therapeutic task extremely delicate, because as soon as any feeling is reached, the object, in this case myself, immediately turns into the invader, containing the revenge for the murderous wishes, so that feelings of intense guilt and fear predominate and lead to flight or putting up strong defences, while the ideal object, in the form of Charles's girl, is preserved whole and perfect through his never approaching her: thus the isolation of the ego from life is almost complete. I say almost because Charles is successful in his professional life and it is in the sphere of personal relations that he is dead.

At this point I noticed that during the course of writing this paper I had switched from using the term 'invasion' to '*the invader*'. The new term suggested an archetypal pattern at work in both my patients. I think there is no doubt that the invader is an image of the self, and in this context the stories of Charles and Martin are in effect hero myths, one negative and the other positive, and represent the hero ego's struggle with the invader self (cf. Jung, 1912, p. 248).

It is difficult to account for the fact that some people appear to be much more liable to invasion than others, and it would appear to have something to do with the nearness of the ego to an

archetype representing part of the self, so that the ego is virtually unable to separate itself and get born, so to speak, out of the self. Thus one could say that the nearer the ego is to the self the more ill is the patient.

Though what follows is by no means the entire explanation, yet I think it may be part of it. Charles's father was in the Army while Charles was little and was also away from home a good deal at other times, so that Charles saw very little of him and has always felt his father had no interest in him. Martin's father is unpredictable, sometimes violent and sometimes very gentle. Because of this, both patients were exposed to an emotional burden properly belonging to their mothers' relation with their fathers—which ordinarily would have been carried by the father instead of the child. This means that the child was exposed naked to an archetype, the invader, instead of it being, as it were, mediated to him through his parents. An emotional imbalance of this kind between the parents can expose the child's ego to emotions which are far too great for him to deal with, so that highly elaborate defence systems, such as I have been describing, are set up by the ego, which in turn isolate it from life.

By way of conclusion, I would like to turn once again to literature. This time to D. H. Lawrence in a passage from his novel *The rainbow* (1915, p. 98):

'Anna's soul was put at peace between them (her parents). She looked from one to the other, and she saw them established to her safety, and she was free. She played between the pillar of fire and the pillar of cloud in confidence, having the assurance on her right hand and the assurance on her left. She was no longer called upon to uphold with her childish might the broken end of the arch. Her father and her mother now met to the span of the heavens, and she, the child, was free to play in the space beneath, between'.

SUMMARY

Details of my clinical work with two patients—one a boy of seven, the other a man of twenty-six—have been used in this paper to show that those whose ego appears to be too close to an archetype, which represents part of the self, tend to experience objects and persons as potential invaders and hence as

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threatening. This makes them liable to states of confusion which Jung has called 'unconscious identity' or 'participation mystique'. They tend to deal with such fears of invasion either by attacking the object or else by withdrawing from it.

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*Mediation of the image of infant-mother togetherness**

KATHLEEN NEWTON

1965

I am going to discuss the image of infant-mother togetherness which appeared in the analytical material of one of my patients, and its relevance to the original self, unconscious identity, and infantile omnipotence on the one hand, and to a body image and ego integration on the other.

Of this image of togetherness, Jung writes in 'Psychological aspects of the mother archetype' (1936):

'The carrier of the archetype is in the first place the personal mother, because the child lives at first in a complete participation with her, and in a state of unconscious identity. She is the psychic as well as the physical precondition of the child. With the awakening of ego consciousness the participation gradually weakens, and consciousness begins to enter into opposition with the unconscious, its own precondition. This leads to the differentiation of the ego from the mother'. (p. 102).

Jung here depicts the infant's state of unconscious identity with the mother. It is a state in which there is no consciousness of boundaries; the infant, therefore, is unable to distinguish in terms of actuality between himself and the world. When there is no differentiation between inner and outer there is in effect only 'oneness'. Marion Milner (1956) puts it imaginatively when she says that the infant experiences this as a feeling that his mother's arms are his own creation—'All heaven is ours and all power'. She goes on to say that this state in which the baby is omnipotent is inevitably broken up with the frustration of instinctual experiences.

Another quotation from Jung which is relevant to my theme comes from 'The psychology of the transference' (1946):

* Revised in 1971 and illustrations added.

‘The individual’s specious unity that emphatically says “I want”, “I think”, breaks down under the impact of the unconscious. So long as the patient can think that somebody else (his father, his mother) is responsible for his difficulties, he can save some semblance of unity, but once he realizes that he himself has a shadow, that the enemy is in his own heart, the conflict begins, and one becomes two’ (p. 198).

This specious unity, to me, equates with the description Plaut (1959) gives in his paper on hungry patients, of an emergency ego, which can control the archetypes but cannot establish a fruitful relationship with them because it cannot sustain the conflict of opposites implied in such an experience. That is, there is an attempt to maintain an omnipotent position in relation to the archetypes, the omnipotence here being of a defensive kind. First, therefore, omnipotence is the infant’s necessary situation, a state of wholeness in which, because there is no ego structure, existence is dependent upon a second person, the mother. Secondly it is a defensive manoeuvre to protect a weak ego which cannot sustain conflict or a two-person exchange.

According to Fordham (1959) the original self is constellated at the birth of the infant; it is different from all other states of integration in that it has no subjective manifestations, no awareness of wholeness or consciousness of conflict. The self has a rhythm of deintegration-integration, through which the ego is gradually built up and the psyche gains a demonstrable structure. The self as a state of wholeness in infancy, therefore, is in marked contrast to the experience of the self in individuation when wholeness is experienced out of the resolution of the opposites, conscious and unconscious. This necessitates an ego structure with sufficient strength to integrate a personal shadow.

Before discussing some analytical material it is relevant to consider Winnicott’s description of the phases in the infant’s development which both arise out of, and are concurrent with, a state of unconscious identity (Jung, 1946). Winnicott (1960) studied the infant/maternal-care unit. He describes the early entanglement of the infant and maternal care, the holding situation, which is both prior to and concurrent with the infant’s experiencing instinctual gratification and object relations—first the relationship to the breast. If the holding, which is an expression of the

mother's loving, is good enough, the infant can experience a continuity of being out of which he can acquire in his own way and at his own speed (that is within his own omnipotence) a personal psychic reality and a personal body scheme, which form a psychosomatic partnership. There is a growing awareness of a boundary which is related to the skin, and an initial realization of the me and not-me is established. If things go badly the psychosomatic partnership may not develop, or, having developed, may break down; there is then a split in the ego structure. A body image is not integrated into consciousness, and there is a separation in consciousness of emotional experience, of both a loving and an aggressive kind, from bodily experience and the erotogenic zones.

In infancy, therefore, the infant's potential identity is merged with that of the mother. Her responses are an important contributing factor in determining whether the separation which comes through physical, mental and emotional maturation is an integrative experience or the reverse. That is, whether the infant can emerge from a state of participation with the archetype represented by the personal mother with an ego structure based on a psychosomatic partnership; or experiences separation as a fragmenting process in which some aspects of the personality develop, whilst others remain encapsulated in an unresolved dependency situation. In this case there would be an ego structure with a pseudo-independence and an underlying area in the personality which has not emerged from a state of unconscious identity. If unit status based on a psychosomatic partnership is achieved, defences arise to protect the ego structure and there is a repressed unconscious. Without unit status defences are related to protecting the infant's 'central core', his 'inherited potential for a continuity of being' (p. 590). This continuity would come from the self with its rhythm of deintegration-integration (Fordham (1959)). Defences at this stage, before a psychosomatic partnership is established, have a psychotic quality and involve the organization of a defensive personality to protect the 'central core'. Winnicott calls this defensive personality the 'false self'. It bears resemblances to Jung's 'specious unity' and to Plaut's 'emergency ego'. Winnicott makes it clear that children who have achieved integration implying unit status may be threatened by ego disintegration later, when a defence system of the same quality may arise, by splitting the personality. In his review

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of Jung's *Memories, dreams, reflections* (1964) he relates this to Jung's 'No. 1 and No. 2 personalities'. Individuals with a defence which involves a separation in the psychosomatic partnership are not necessarily psychotic in a clinical sense: they may be functioning relatively effectively in the outside world. But they have a different problem from those individuals who have retained unit status: to find a way of feeling real. It is, says Winnicott, 'a task that belongs not only to schizophrenics; it also belongs to a large proportion of the human race'.

Winnicott's description of the holding situation, and the way in which he elucidates how the quality of the mother's care affects the infant's capacity to develop a separate identity, when taken in conjunction with the views of Jung and Fordham, were helpful to me in understanding the analytical material of one of my patients.

Case Illustration

The woman patient whose material I am going to discuss had not achieved unit status as described by Winnicott. Her psychic reality was split off from an awareness of a personal body scheme, erotic and aggressive feelings were lived, but not integrated into a unified ego structure. Her material illustrates the longing for wholeness which such a state engenders, and how this longing overlaps with a longing for an all-loving state of 'togetherness' or 'oneness', in which there is no frustration. The work in the analysis centred round mediating in the analytical relationship the opposites contained in the inner image of togetherness, the two-in-one holding situation, so that some of the affects could be released, and the conflict sustained and finally integrated in a personal relationship.

I am, of course, having to be extremely selective in presenting the merest fragments of my analysand's inner world. For the present purpose I need only say that she was a gifted, intelligent woman, unmarried, the younger of two girls. As an adolescent she had had a strong urge to emancipate herself from her parents, whose way of life she had felt to be restricting to her development, both emotionally and intellectually. In order to make a life for herself she had carved out an academic career, and had achieved success in her professional work. Her account of her upbringing was that she had been an attractive baby, and she had felt that her mother had enjoyed her at this time because she could show

her off and get 'vicarious sexual satisfaction' in looking after her, though she had had eczema as a baby, and had been told that her arms had been put in splints to stop her scratching. Later she felt that her mother had lost all interest in her and neither helped her towards nor gave any value to her academic success. From my patient's point of view, therefore, her mother had used her and regarded her as an extension of herself. Any differentiation from the narrow standards and patterns which her mother felt morally bound to impose, meant loss of love. She felt she had been her father's favourite, and that her sister had been closer to her mother.

At the time of coming into analysis she was involved in activities needing a great deal of intellectual concentration. She found that she was unable to apply herself and felt unable to cope with life, academically, emotionally, or practically.

At the beginning of the analysis the mother archetype was the central theme. The figure was split into good and bad. My patient was full of bitter, angry feelings towards her own mother, whom she felt had ruined her life, and had strong loving feelings towards a woman who was in a mother position to her at work. She felt fearful about embarking on the analysis in case I should 'grab her'—implying that vicarious sexual satisfaction might arise out of the relationship.

Slowly she became deeply involved in the analysis, and wrote telling me that there was a baby with us in the sessions. She then brought me a sculpture which was a representation of us (Fig. 1). It was of circular shape, hollowed out, with an impression of breasts and an embryo baby within. To me it represented the stage I have been describing. Its circular form suggested an original self-image, but there was also a development in that there was a suggestion of a mother and baby in a merged state.

When she brought the sculpture something in the way in which she said 'It is yours' made me say 'It is between us', and when she felt hurt and rejected by this, 'I will keep it for you'. On looking back, I think her statement had asserted our oneness; my reply made her feel that there was a differentiation and twoness. In the next session she brought a drawing (Fig. 2) depicting two mother-daughter pairs: on the right a nun-like, pure, loving mother and yearning daughter, each holding out their arms to each other; on the left a witch-like figure, in a threatening attitude, stretching out claw-like hands to attack a crouching,

suffering girl. The two mothers were back to back and just touching. Underneath was a fire, the flames of which just reached and joined the backs of the two aspects of the mother. There was a delicate, abstract quality about the figures and the whole picture gave the impression of an *idea* of love and hate, and the fire an *idea* of instinctual experience. There is almost a complete split between loving aggressive and erotic feelings, although the tenuous connection between the three images implies a potential for integration. The conflict of love and aggression belongs to the two mother-daughter pairs, the one an idealized non-erotic love the other a sado-masochistic interaction.

Soon after this she had a dream. She was a princess in a fairy land, sitting on the king's knee and he was penetrating her. The king was all-powerful, and because he loved her best, he would do anything for her, and so she had complete power in the land. His wife was somewhere in the background, but she did not count; also another woman who she thought might spoil it all. I did not regard this dream as indicating a development into an oedipal situation. In fact, the reality of a 'threesome' is almost discounted; the two aspects of the mother figure are in the background and don't really count.

It seemed to me that it was not possible at that time to work through the conflict of opposites shown in the picture (Fig. 2). In fact, the picture indicates that my patient had not achieved an ego structure with which to do so, nor could the transference relationship sustain it then. That the king was penetrating her in the following dream, did not seem to have a sexual connotation, but was rather a defensive transition to a state of identity with him: a state of infantile omnipotence, in which she had 'complete power in the land'.

Later on in the analysis my patient's psychic situation was illustrated by another picture (Fig. 3). It was divided into two horizontally, but this was not a simple split between conscious and unconscious contents. Both elements were present in each, inextricably muddled up. In the top half the patient is standing in the centre facing to the right, she is declaiming, with upraised arm, to an admiring kneeling crowd. Chained to her back, and facing left, is a weeping child looking towards a formidable and angry mother and father, who are standing together as a pair. Below the line is a very inflated child, sitting on and practically




Fig. 1



Fig. 2



Fig. 3



Fig. 4

obliterating a diminutive father. His puny arms are trying to hold her, and his head only reaches to her shoulder. The child is pointing a scornful finger at a hungry looking, scolding mother approximately the same size as the father. A 'sister' figure on the left is ignored.

This picture illustrates the lack of differentiation in my patient's psychic structure, the confusion between inner and outer, conscious and unconscious elements. The declaiming image of herself equates with an 'emergency ego' or 'defensive personality', so that though her capacity to get recognition has been achieved by the hard work she put into developing her gifts, she can only use these gifts to fascinate and control others. Her defensive personality is based on an image of uneasy 'oneness' with the father figure whose power has been taken over, hence the child's inflated size. This gives her an unsafe control as the father has ceased to be a supportive factor. The aggressive feelings towards the mother figure can only be expressed in terms of scornful rejection from a position of defensive omnipotence with the father figure. Yet chained to the back of the declaiming image of herself is the helpless child facing the power of the combined parental figures.

I do not propose to go in any detail into the work done in the analysis. The quality of anxiety and the catastrophic implications of becoming consciously committed to her own bodily and aggressive feelings were indicated by the strength of her need to cling to her 'specious unity' and so to her image of herself as loving. The aspects of her personality illustrated in the pictures were lived in a very fluid way in the transference relationship. In the loving times I was idealized, and she got caught into being a good child, which meant a sacrifice of physical sensations and aggression. This gave a 'specious' feeling to the good experience. The angry times occurred when I did not live up to her ideal, and because she felt that her attacks arose mainly out of my inadequacies, there was minimal conflict about them for her. On other occasions she felt that I should understand that her attacks were meant only for her real mother, and by splitting in this way the situation between us could remain good. The result was that there was often a dramatization of loving and angry situations, but in that there was a very illusive manipulator or stage manager in the background, there was a sense of unreality. The sado-masochism shown in the pictures and inherent in the

idealized mother-daughter situation was lived, but remained largely unconscious.

As the analysis progressed my patient experienced a great increase in bodily sensations and pleasure. A play situation developed in relation to the sado-masochism, her image of her attacks at this stage being that of a kitten who would jump on my lap and then dig its claws in. It still 'didn't really count'.

At a considerably later stage in the analysis she brought another picture of a mother-baby pair (Fig. 4). A full breasted mother who had a vital voluptuous quality was sitting naked with her legs wide apart, holding a baby on her right arm who was about to have a feed. The baby rose up between the mother's legs and had a distinctly phallic quality. The mother's expression was intense, and her eyes witch-like; the impression that she was casting a spell was emphasized by the claw-like hand held over the baby's head. The patient felt that there was a possibility that the baby might separate out and penetrate the mother who would then lie back and disintegrate, but also saw this picture as herself as a loving mother feeding me as baby and at the same time stuffing me up her. The image includes the oral and genital zones: there is the idea that the baby could be fed, although it may be destroyed by the claw-like hand, and is being used mainly as a phallic object to satisfy the mother's need for power, and her sensual satisfaction. There is therefore, the idea of a loving situation in the context of an extremely aggressive and dangerous one. A process of integration has occurred, aggressive, erotic, and an idea of loving feelings is now contained in one mother-infant pair. The fact that the two cannot separate without destroying each other symbolizes very clearly the failure in the maternal holding situation, when separation had been experienced as damaging and isolating.

The working out of this picture was a great struggle. The father was again used to try and evade the conflict with mother. She had another dream in which she was playing with her father sexually and getting a sense of pleasurable power. She suddenly wondered what would happen if her mother came in. She then thought 'This is my right, it doesn't matter what mother feels'. During this time she showed a strong need to maintain her 'good' position with me. She brought thoughts and insights, but at the same time they were used to control the exchange between us. At times there was a life-and-death feeling in our exchange,

very much as in the picture with the voluptuous mother and her baby. Mostly, it was I who had to be the hungry mother who envied her, or the danger for her began. The tension seemed to arise from this either-or situation, as to who had to suffer the hunger and the envy—the mother or the baby, and as to how the roles were allocated between us.

Envy was one of the feelings with which she was struggling both within and outside the analytical relationship. There was a feeling of annihilation if she felt that I or someone else had been creative; or she despised me or other people as valueless at times when she felt that she had been creative. Here again I did not feel that the envy belonged to an object relation in terms of the breast, but to a two-in-one situation in which only one person could exist. The difficulty was in realizing the possibility of a creative give-and-take, a two-person exchange. At this time she felt me as a person who made things that were really 'innocent' bad just as she felt her mother had done. If I interpreted her need to control, or her indirect hostility, she felt the interpretations as sadistic attacks of which she was the despairing and misunderstood victim. It seemed equally negative to me if I acquiesced in a manipulated 'specious good' situation. It was her longing for an idealized state, and the quality of despair, rage and blame when she couldn't achieve it, which was so persecuting; it led to tyrannical demands that I should be, or behave, just as she wanted me to, and there was a sense of complete hopelessness when I failed to do this. Feelings had an all or nothing quality, of life or death, innocence or guilt.

It was some time before I could find a position for myself in this sado-masochistic situation. I could only do this when I recognized and valued her need for 'oneness' with me as distinct from the ideal which she was trying so desperately to impose. It was in valuing the need that I was able to relate differently to the persecutory ideal. It enabled me to stay with and in some way 'hold' or accept her attacks, without succumbing masochistically, or cutting myself off and insulating against them, which she would have experienced as a sadistic withdrawal. I owe a debt to Marion Milner here. After I realized the patient's need for fusion, there began to be a break-up of the either-or situation, and my patient's aggression could begin to be expressed more personally and there was a greater possibility of warmth.

On looking back I can understand her urgent need, at this

time, to remain consciously 'good' and keep her 'specious unity' in terms of her inner image of wholeness and mother-baby fusion on which her identity was based. Winnicott's description of a defensive organization to protect a 'central core' seems relevant here. My patient's infantile eczema suggests there were difficulties in the holding situation at a time when psychosomatic integration should be occurring. According to Spitz (1965, p. 224) in the majority of cases the mothers of babies with this symptom have an unusually large amount of unconscious repressed hostility, expressed in the form of manifest anxiety. One can understand the terrors of an early relatively undifferentiated state in infancy when affects got constellated in a vicious circle of skin irritation, scratching, and arms being put in splints. At this time, when she most needed helpful intervention from her mother it seems probable that she was instead the recipient of her mother's unconscious hostility. This would make her, in a very real sense, the victim of an unconscious interaction of a very painful kind, with insufficient support to integrate overwhelming affects.

Another testing out of the relationship arose over the number of sessions. She wanted four at a time when I could only give her three, although I was going to increase to four as soon as I could. I think it was because of the work that we had put into the relationship that she was able to commit herself as a whole to her needs in relation to me, and fight for them, risking the rage that arose out of frustration and the realization of the loss of omnipotence and 'oneness' when I could not meet her request. The danger was that her rage, in which there was considerable physical feeling, would destroy our relationship and that she would cut off from me as she had done from her mother. We were able to work through to a situation where it was possible to value her anger as positive, in so far as it enabled her to fight for what she needed; also to recognize the quality of omnipotent demand, in so far as it belonged to a two-in-one image. In this way we arrived at a situation in which our exchange could be more realistic, freer and warmer.

The new potential in the situation was expressed in a dream in which she and some other people were looking at a life-sized doll. Suddenly she saw the doll's eyes move, and realized it was smiling at her in a mocking way. She was terrified and said, 'it's alive!' The other people said, 'Oh no, it isn't', and to try and

convince her, said, 'Don't you remember, it was made for a child because she wanted it?' In the dream they were then looking at a picture of a small child sitting on a bench with a doll beside her the same size as the child. My patient was not reassured, and suddenly found herself being chased by the doll. She ran into her bedroom and shut the door, but heard the doll following her. Then she realized that her mother was in the next room, and if only she could call her, she would come and it would be safe. With a tremendous effort she just managed to mouth the word 'mother'. Having a doll made gives a vivid image of the nature of her defensive personality and of the split in the psychosomatic partnership—'live head, doll's body'—which enabled her to achieve intellectual success and a pseudo-independence and control. The new potential in the dream was in differentiating herself from the doll, feeling the need to escape from it, and the fact that there was a mother on whom she could depend if she could call her. The challenge was whether she could articulate the word 'mother'. Managing to do this would mean separating out from the inner state of unconscious identity symbolized by the merged mother-baby pair and establishing an ego position from which she could recognize her mother as a separate effectual person.

CONCLUSION

My patient's material posed two problems. Firstly, why, when it so clearly contained infantile experience in which hungry feelings were included, there seemed to be no place for oral interpretations; secondly, why did it seem impossible to integrate the shadow. I can see now that it was because the sado-masochistic shadow belonged to an idealized image of an all loving 'holding' situation. It related to a developmental phase when ego integration is taking place and before boundaries have been firmly established. This makes it understandable that the conflict had to be mediated and sustained in an interpersonal situation. It could not be interpreted in terms of intrapsychic conflict because this would have implied a sufficiently integrated ego structure to have a shadow.

Jung gives a graphic account of the way in which analyst and patient can get caught in a state of unconscious identity, and describes how crucial is the analyst's ability to relate to

archetypal images if the danger of mutual imprisonment is to be surmounted (p. 176). Winnicott's description of maternal care in infancy, the mother's ego supporting the infant's incipient ego if instinctual experience is to be integrated, describes a parallel situation. Both these accounts seem particularly relevant to the analysis of my patient. Her images related to an area of her personality which had remained encapsulated in an unresolved dependency situation. They belonged both to the inadequacies in her infantile experience and to the archetypal themes, relating to unconscious identity and separation, which were compensatory to her conscious attitude of 'specious unity' and pseudo-independence.

Mediating these images within the analytical relationship involved finding my personal relation to the ideal, through which I began to be able to 'hold' rather than be caught by the sado-masochistic circular interaction of blame, guilt and despair when it could not be attained. This process meant differentiating my personal responsibility for the difficulties that arose within the analytical relationship from the global either/or, total innocence/total guilt quality shown in Fig. 2. The degree of anxiety behind the blaming attacks which my patient expressed at those times when she felt misunderstood seemed to belong to the primitive fear of annihilation although they were expressed in the more sophisticated concepts of 'right' and 'wrong'. I think it was through the work involved in releasing and relating to the aggressive and erotic affects contained in the persecutor/victim shadow that my patient gained the confidence to separate out from her defensive personality, and arrive at an ego position indicated in her dream, from which she was able to call to her mother with the expectation of help. With a greater potential for give and take there was a possibility that oral experience might now be symbolized in the analytical relationship. We were, of course, a long way from this position being consolidated. It was a question of a process having been initiated.

It has been established that working through infantile material with adult patients can lead to individuation (Fordham, 1964). Strauss (1964) postulates an archetype of separation and describes how her patient through having an experience of 'oneness' in the analytical relationship was able to experience separation leading to differentiation and growth. She elucidates the archetypal theme of union and separation and the constant pull

between the two. My patient's material highlights some of the complexities in working through the opposites, the positive and negative aspects inherent in the image of mother-infant togetherness or union, in order that separation can occur as an ego integrative experience rather than an isolating cutting off process. The nature of the analytic endeavour runs parallel to the individuation process. The goal has a different emphasis, to achieve a more unified ego structure rooted in a body image. This would imply an increased potential for integrating conflict, feelings could be experienced personally and the shadow belonging to them could be recognized.

SUMMARY

The image of infant-mother togetherness which appeared in the material of a woman patient whose defensive personality was breaking down is considered. The development of this image and the relevance of the material to the concept of the original self, unconscious identity and infantile omnipotence on the one hand, and to the establishment of a body image and ego integration on the other is discussed with reference to the literature.

The enactment in the transference of the sado-masochistic shadow inherent in the persecutory idealized image of togetherness is described. The analyst came to understand that she could best help to hold these warring affects by valuing the patient's need for oneness. It was only then that differentiation could occur.

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*The unimaginable touch of time**

LOLA PAULSEN

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About three years ago it struck me that time plays a very special role in some analyses, and I started to make notes after sessions in which time, or the discussion of time—in this or that aspect—had been prominent.

My paper has grown out of these notes on nine patients.

The first part is about the sense of time, that is, ego time, for time is experienced by the ego. It is subdivided into: (1) time rigidly imposed on the infant, and (2) the patient's actions with time, e.g. wasting time, stealing time. The second part of the paper is on the archetypal aspect of time: free time and the devouring mother.

Introduction

Interest in time—I might almost say fascination with time—sent me to the poets, and I have acknowledged this in the title of the paper, which is taken from the last line of Wordsworth's poem 'Mutability'. Time is one of the topics perennially engaging poets: they are aware of its psychic importance, they have represented it in countless images and symbols throughout the ages.

Thinking further about time, I realized that it was apposite to my emerging theme that in some languages the word for time is masculine, in others it is feminine or neuter. In this it is like the words for sun, for moon, for death. For example, *die Zeit* and *le temps*; *der Tod* and *la mort*; *die Sonne* and *le soleil*; *der Mond* and *la lune*; *das Leben*, *das Schicksal* and *la vie*, *le destin*. There are also masculine, feminine and androgynous world-creating and life-destroying gods. These observations in the field of mythology and etymology have I think yielded a fuller understanding of the patients' unconscious links with an archetypal background.

* Material in the conclusion and summary of this article has been revised.

Time the fact, and also the concept of time, imply division, definition, discrimination and finiteness. Consciousness, activated by the spiritual principle and having masculine connotations, separates itself from the *mater*, earth or *materia*. New concepts of time are constantly in the making, with archaeologists and physicists each contributing in their own way. Different again from both is the analyst's approach. Time is the analyst's business in a particular and special way. It is his stock in trade: processes, change, dynamics, are among his major concerns. He and the patient are working on the 'present past', that is the past which is still active in the present, and on the potential future which is concealed in the present state of the individual psyche with its desire for survival and for self-realization. The day-to-day work takes place in the here and now of the transference relationship within the frame of the 50-minute hour. The analyst cannot dispense with the tool of clock time. Interviews used to be called hours and lasted 60 minutes, later they were changed into the 50-minute hour. A fixed clock time is for the analyst an indispensable tool, just because it does not always coincide with his or the patient's subjective experience of time which may be slower or quicker than the clock.

The Sense of Time

1. Time imposed on the Patient

There are patients whose sense of time is far too strong to be good. Among those who feature in this paper there were several of this kind. Although their problems had apparently to do with time their analyses did not develop in them a sense of time as a symbol of on-going processes, but revealed very early experiences which had *occasioned* their sense of time. With some of them I found that their sensitivity to time was connected with their having been brought up by the Truby King system. During the analysis their anxious sense of time relaxed; what had been an internalized rigid clock became more flexible and more tolerant of a personal rhythm.

One of these patients had, early in her analysis, a truly remarkable ability to know when the time of the session had run out. She did not look at my clock nor did she wear a wristwatch, but it was she who ended the session, and ended it punctually. Paradoxically, her uncanny sense of time slackened after she had decided

to wear a watch: the compulsion was no longer at work, so that she was able to stay until I indicated that the session was over.

A later development in the same patient's analysis revealed another aspect of her sense of time. She became aware that the patient before her often left a few minutes later than the appointed time. Great jealousy was aroused in her by my apparently preferential treatment of the other patient. I was in turn accused of liking that patient better, of having a good time with her and of being fed by her. These angry accusations expressed first that the baby part of herself which had so far not come into the analytical process enough was jealous of 'somebody' who was, so to speak, fed on demand, or at least seemed to feed as long as she wanted to. Further, she perceived *me* as feeding and being fed, assuming that I had the cherished experience which is variously called the 'nursing couple', the 'harmonious mix-up', the mother/child union. Her attack on me also let me know that she herself was now needing to enter into a relationship with me which would enable the split-off baby part of her to be brought back into the whole of her personality.

After having achieved a certain flexibility with regard to time she did not notice (or, if she did notice, did not worry) that she herself now quite often overstayed the 50 minutes. When I had occasion to tell her about her more relaxed behaviour she retorted that this was quite a different matter. The fact that I didn't send *her* away was because I was afraid of her, not because I enjoyed her as I did the other patient. I interpreted her supposition that I was afraid of her, or rather of her anger, as being due to attacks which she as a baby must have made on her mother, and which she was making on me in fantasy. It was clear to me that guilt feelings and the fear of losing the mother must also have been part of her complex about time.

Pursuing the same theme, she told me one day that she let a few minutes go by after the departure of the previous patient before she rang the bell 'to give me time to pee'. The 'time to pee' was immediately rationalized by 'I know what it is like if one has not even time for that'. There are various ways of understanding this new turn regarding time. Before I discuss them I want to add that the patient's gift of time *to* me was coinciding with a 'free gift' of time which she wanted *from* me. 'Babies must get it from their mothers', she assured me, and she must get it from me; it was

something that should be given to her because I enjoyed her, not out of duty.

A free gift may be offered and received in analysis by both parties concerned. How this is done is all-important. In this connexion I might interpose here an instance from my early days as an analyst when I once mistakenly took the demand for a gift of time quite literally, and made a whole morning free for a patient who thought that his inability to get to grips with certain difficulties, of which slowness was one, was due to my not giving him enough time at a stretch. The result was disappointing for both of us; which does not astonish me today, but it did then. I now wonder whether he felt, unconsciously, as I now think, that I was afraid of his anger and disappointment. He was making a demand which seemed a justifiable one to both of us, but I was giving in to it rather than meeting it. It is not possible for the analyst to behave as though he literally were a mother, who gives. If he attempts to do this, he violates reality, acts out his fantasy and he misunderstands the patient's current need for interpretation rather than action. The patient's anger is thereby fobbed off and he is left feeling guilty and bewildered because he finds himself incapable of accepting what was offered as good.

To come back to the first patient's gift of time *to me*. One could interpret it as a demonstration through reversal of her own wish to be given time. But I do not think this is adequate. It comes nearer to the patient's reality, as it was then, if it is interpreted as a reversal of her own wish and need to *have* time, that is to be able to arrange her time according to her needs, to be able to *make* time for them, and this belongs to acquiring an ego. In the transference situation it was very important for her to see to it that I had time, that I should not feel hurried as she so often did, and that my time should not be invaded. The unconscious meaning of her gift of time to me was that she helped to create me as a person who had time, which was the kind of person she wanted to become. Therefore in later phases of the analysis she forgot to give time to me.

Symbols of urethral and anal activities are derived from a stage in life during which the child is becoming aware of being able to make things. It is precisely this making which he is taught to control in ways which involve time, so that he learns about time with his body. His conception of what time is, the nature of time, comes to him through body-experiences. The transition to

the stage in which a degree of independence, of potency and of self-control can develop, has to be made from the preceding one, in which feeding and evacuating events, wholly dependent on the mother's care, were what constituted time. In the earlier of these stages the baby over and over again experienced the cycles of needs and satisfactions, of frustrations and fulfilments, of discomforts or comforts. Time sequences are inevitably associated, for the baby, with the tensions inherent in these experiences. His growing sense of time comes partly from the mother and partly from his physical experiences and his emotional responses. It is as though time becomes, for him, tangible in his body.

It is most likely that his understanding of what time is, his sense of time and his attitude to time, all stem from this stage of life. If he has to try to endure long waiting periods, he may find them unmanageable and he will be delivered over to anguish, rage and despair, or even perhaps to the fear of death. His fantasies may be of a confused murderous kind, but they may be equally passionate ones of longing for rescue, for love, and for the return of his own loving feelings. The need to create a good mother, if she does not already exist—evidenced later in the transference projection which I have described—is paramount for health. Yet if the mother comes to the baby only after a long, too-long, waiting period, she is experienced ambivalently by him. She may be accepted in fact and rejected in emotion; she will be a sad disappointment in comparison with her baby's idealized expectant fantasy. Time as the infant comes to know it then arises out of the mother-child relatedness. The drama of this interrelatedness becomes the basis for the person's later attitude to time.

Winnicott (1954) stresses the importance of 'a time factor' when the infant has reached the depressive position (stage of concern). In his opinion it is up to the mother repeatedly to hold 'the achievement of ambivalence' over a span of time.

'The consequence is that something can be done about something. The mother's technique enables the infant's co-existing love and hate to become sorted out and interrelated and gradually brought under control from within in a way that is healthy' (p. 263).

I have a slight resistance against the word technique in connexion with the mother, but find it fully appropriate to the

analyst who finds himself or herself very much in the same position of giving the gift of unswerving commitment and concern, together with his technical knowledge, and of building and maintaining a *temenos* in which the patient can feel safe, so that 'something can be done about something'.

I shall have more to say later about the link between time, food and digestion, but I would like to introduce Truby King here. I could not get hold of one of his own books at a public library, which may be a sign that he has gone out of fashion. But I got a book by his daughter, Mary Truby King (1937), who is his faithful apostle. She dedicated her book *Mothercraft* (1937) to her father, Sir Truby King, who 'by his life-time of devoted work for humanity has made this world a better place for little children'. The frontispiece shows a photograph of him, a man of large handsome features with very melancholy eyes—suggestive of his having been brought up according to his own system. I quote from chapter one which answers the question 'What is a Truby King baby?'

'Truby King babies are fed four-hourly from birth, with few exceptions, and they do not have any night feeds. A Truby King baby has as much fresh air and sunshine as possible and his right amount of sleep. His education begins from the very first week, good habits being established which remain all his life. . . . After he has gone through his regular morning performance of bathing and being 'held out', and has had his breakfast, he sleeps all the morning. If he wakes a little before his 2 p.m. meal, all one knows about it is a suddenly-glimpsed chubby little leg and foot waved energetically from his cot for exercise and inspection. . . . Altogether he is one joy from morning till night to himself and all the household. . . . The mother of such a baby is not overworked or worried, simply because she knows that by following the laws of nature, combined with common sense, baby will not do otherwise than thrive'.

Here is a quotation from Sir Truby King himself:

'Were the secretion of the milk and the feeding of the baby functions of men and not of women, no man inside or outside the medical profession would nurse his baby more often than five times in the 24 hours if he knew that the child would do as

well or better with only five feedings. Why should it be otherwise with women? Mothers have too much to do in any case; why should they throw away time and leisure by useless frequent nursings?’

This argument appealed to the rigid father concealed in the mother, the mother herself overinfluenced by an unrecognized slavery to her father’s dogmatism. It is a seductive argument to a woman who assumes she should go about the business of feeding and tending her baby according to a rigid timetable, in the mistaken belief that this is rational and, presumably, that rationality, wherever it is evidenced, is to be cultivated and admired. This becomes later one of the dangerous roads along which the growing child travels, copying what was called right or good in the words or deeds of his parents. So he is seduced in turn by what has become the culture pattern: in emergencies controlling and ordering behaviour is evoked in answer to a need imbued with archetypal strength. Patterns of control which are so rigidly imposed from outside cannot lead later to healthy control of emotions from within.

An example from the analysis of another patient will throw further light on how the infant’s feeding experiences can reappear in the transference, and how the part he plays in changes of timetable can be reflected in it also. This patient had been coming four times a week, but his hours of work altered and he had had, reluctantly, to give up one of his four sessions as I could not entirely fit in with him. Then it occurred that I was able to offer him a fourth time which he would have found convenient. He did not take up the offer.

Later he told me that he had regretted this and that he found the gap between Tuesday and Friday rather numbing. He said that he felt sustained by the Tuesday session till Wednesday, but that he sank into a depressed state afterwards. I asked him whether he had any associations to or imagery of the state he had been in between Wednesday and Friday. He said first that it was an effort to keep up the continuity but it was an effort he did not mind. After a pause he added: ‘It has something to do with the lavatory. It felt as if I had been eating and digesting and then been to the lavatory. This is good, but there is also a feeling of emptiness’. I said, ‘It is like the dogfish’. The theme of the dogfish had been introduced by the patient at the beginning of the

interview. He had told me that he had just been dissecting a dogfish and how astonished and rather awed he was at the content of its stomach in which he had found quite big pieces of undigested crab and shells. He also had been much impressed by the layers of muscle beneath the fish's mouth and by the fact that the dogfish does not chew, but tears its food to pieces.

So it appears that what happened from Tuesday to Friday was twofold: at first there was a satisfactory digestive process going on which resulted in pleasant emptiness and which was followed by a waiting period that could be sustained, but there were hard bits of undigested food left in the mental stomach which after a while made for depressive feelings and possibly guilt about the tearing that had been done in fantasy and which numbed him or which he had to keep under control.

My last reference to the development of a sense of time brings in scheduled time to sleep and again the time necessary for digestion. A woman patient said to me: 'A man needs six hours sleep and a woman seven hours'. If this patient has not had her seven hours sleep she feels tired—one could say, on principle. Talking about being tired reminded her of another habit: after dinner at night, she told me, she must not read a serious book, even if it interests her, even if she really wants to read it: because after dinner she must not work—she may only look at television or play patience or do a crossword puzzle. The adult ways and means for working through the time after feeding are clear here. They are only wrong—inconvenient or detrimental—when they become compulsive. I am convinced that this sort of compulsive timetable of the adult is conditioned by the original schedules imposed on the child.

2. The Patient's Actions With Time

Wasting Time

I had another patient who wondered whether he was wasting his time when he came to me tired and with his mind still pre-occupied with his work at the office. I knew from experience that this introduction meant that for some reason he could not enter immediately with me into his most absorbing subject, which was his sex life and his marriage. When, fairly soon, he got on to it he complained that although he was what he referred to as 'performing' intercourse with his wife, he was not *in* it. He thought he

should not make love to his wife when he was preoccupied with other matters. He called himself mean, suspecting that he did not want to give pleasure to his wife.

The parallel between preoccupation during intercourse and preoccupation during analysis is an obvious one. In each case it was his office work that stood in the way; that is, his rational side which needed to be in control of things and people. Having in mind his expression that he 'performs' intercourse and that he feared to waste his time if he did not perform in analysis, I said that giving his wife pleasure meant letting his emotion come into intercourse and that metaphorically speaking he did not dare give up being the boss in his office, i.e. being rational, knowing and knowledgeable, rather than being receptive and letting things happen. His answer was very much to the point. He said that to be *in* the intercourse, giving and having pleasure, was much too dangerous, it would make him fall back into mother-boundness. In other words: his longing to let himself experience his incest longings must be warded off.

His feeling of wasting his time was therefore quite accurate if taken on the level of his not living fully. He wasted time in other ways too. I fought a constant battle against his attempts at conducting the analysis as a question and answer game, which according to him was in order to acquire as much knowledge as possible as quickly as possible, for he was convinced that recognizing the existence of a problem was the same as solving it. He looked out for all sorts of remedies against the waste of time as he understood it, and at least once a week made a survey of what he had gained in the analysis and particularly of what the analysis had *not* done for him. The trouble with this sort of waste of time is that it cannot be avoided. He usually added 'and money' when he spoke of the waste of time due to coming preoccupied to his analysis: he had literally to pay for this waste of time before it could be fully analysed.

Stealing Time

Stealing in dreams and in fantasy can be an act of acquiring what was previously stolen from one. It is a way of dealing with deprivations, first imposed from outside, later internalized. John Layard has given examples of such stealing in a lecture (unpublished) given to the Society of Analytical Psychology in London. More recently Jean-Paul Sartre (quoted in Laing and

Cooper, 1964) made similar observations and came to similar conclusions in his biography of Jean Genet. In myths and fairy tales the ferocious prohibitions against appropriating something, or entering a secret room, or stealing a treasure, etc., are broken without fail. The very prohibition provides the hero with the challenge to disobey it; not to take it up would lead to psychic death.

The theft of time is particularly a modern theft. Not 'having' time is a common outcry today. We are all too aware that time is a dimension of everything living, but we do not necessarily deduce that it is therefore ours to use. I said before that time becomes first tangible in the body of the baby that has to wait for mother. The child who was once subjected to a timetable that did not cater for him according to the rhythm of his needs lives, when he has grown up, with an illusion that his time is subjected to a management in which he has no say. It becomes materialized as if it were a commodity that is scarce (Laing and Cooper, 1964).

The case of the patient who had to steal time provides a good example for one of the manifold processes which can be projected on time. She said to me that she had to steal time for gardening which she would like to do much more often. I asked 'steal from where, or what, or whom?' 'Oh, for instance, from what has accumulated on my desk, or from obligations I have in connexion with my profession'. She was stealing time from herself.

The patient's childhood had been beset with interruptions and empty periods. Her parents were often absent from home and several times she had been sent to hospital. Those were events which made it almost impossible for her to keep her parents, or what they stood for, alive in herself, let alone good. They had told her that she used to cry inconsolably night after night. Her mother moreover showed paranoid trends, so that as a baby and as a child she had been defeated to an unusual degree in her longing for quiet and undisturbed times together with her.

I surmised that this patient's sense of time was a most distorted one. As a child she had been dreamy, sensitive, imaginative and withdrawn to such an extent that she even appeared to be almost deaf and dumb at times of stress. Eventually she learned enough as she was very intelligent. She built up a successful career: it was as though she could not prevent herself from doing so. But prompted by flight from her unsatisfactory home, her adult life

started much too early and it was over-active from the beginning. She studied and earned her living at the same time. At first she hardly noticed that she was herself, at least in part, contriving her lack of leisure; she over-crowded her days and rationalized on this with the excuse of necessity. Much of the consequent hardship seemed worth suffering as she was satisfying another need in that way: leaving no gaps which would have been reminiscent of the discontinuities of childhood.

In spite of her efforts, this patient's depressions were frequent and severe. She drove herself so hard that she was often completely exhausted, mentally and physically. Then she felt plunged back into her childhood state of near-dumbness; she felt as if she had never wanted to do anything at all and that she never would in the future. Her compulsion for incessant activity was an antidote to her fantasy inertia, and that 'inertia' was the negative image of the coming to rest which she desired so much, but so much feared.

At the point of analysis when the theft of time was mentioned, the patient realized that unless she stole time for recreation she would suffocate in the very activities which apparently had saved her earlier on. So this theft became of vital importance indeed, but she often failed to accomplish it. Whenever she did, it gave her not merely the feeling of being replenished, but the even more satisfying one of being in contact with her own potential of creating and nourishing.

Comments

I have shown some aspects of the genesis of the sense of time and I think it is likely that the baby who was brought up by the Truby King system may later cling to an inner clock. If scheduled time has been imposed too early, this produces uncertainty with regard to instincts: the child cannot meet these needs healthily, nor healthily tolerate the frustration of them. The dependence-independence problem also becomes very difficult to resolve; over-punctuality results, or carelessness over it, and there is much difficulty over being kept waiting. In the cases I have seen it has brought about, at least before analysis, not happy, but 'good', pleasing, reliable personalities, *overadjusted* at their own cost to the demands—fantasied and real—of parents and parent figures.

The unconscious fantasied demands which are uncovered in

analysing the transference point to the inextricable coincidence in time of personal history and archetypal functioning of the psyche (Mary Williams, 1964; Erich Neumann, 1963). I would go as far as to say that too early interference with a natural rhythm by rigidly scheduled management warps the child's original endowment, if we regard endowment (*Erlebensfähigkeit*) as a *conjunctio* of inner and outer realities.

As timing and feeding are bound up, it stands to reason that often feeding and eliminating difficulties arising in infancy are carried over into adult life. I think that the experience of abandonment which is a basic human experience, again inevitably combining painful personal history with the archetype of the abandoned child, can under a rigid timetable become catastrophic.

Archetypal Aspect of Time

Free Time and the Devouring Mother

It is possible now to turn to an aspect of the experience of time which is archetypal in quality: the essential link between the child's and the patient's sense of time, and the archetype of the devouring mother. To examine this theme, I will describe one of my women patients whose particular symptoms were slowness, difficulty in organizing her inner and her outer world and procrastination. She needed a great deal of sleep. She could not bring herself to go to bed in the evening at a reasonable time and found it a great effort to get up in the morning. Change from one occupation to another was wearisome. Nearly everything she did took so much time, meant so much effort, and was so beset with crippling feelings of inadequacy that even enjoyable occupations became more like burdens to her than pleasures.

I had been working with this patient for some months on a twice-a-week basis when I discussed with her the possibility of her having a third weekly session. An elderly aunt of hers was ill with a somewhat mysterious illness. The patient was very fond of this aunt, whom she described as being almost a godmother to her. In spite of being worried the patient decided to go to her own cottage over the weekend, and to get in touch with her aunt by telephone from there. She forgot to telephone her. When we analysed this so-called lapse of memory, it seemed very unlikely that it was due to ambivalence towards her aunt. The trouble lay somewhere else: anything that interrupted a stretch of time

which she thought of as 'free' time—that is time without defined obligations bound to the clock—was apt to be forgotten, repressed or consciously, though guiltily, not done.

It was at this point, when the patient was deeply shocked by these events and their significance, that I suggested the possibility of a third weekly session. My offer was received without any enthusiasm, to put it mildly. The patient objected to it, because it would mean yet another 'fixture' which she could hardly bear the thought of and it would interfere with her free time which she had not enough of even now. I asked her what she needed the free time for. The answer was 'for myself'. I suggested that the analysis was perhaps also for herself, thus putting myself in opposition to her illness. This made her feel me to be an intruder, a persecutor who was demanding more of her than she could do, just like her mother. However, after the weekend she came back, saying that she had been thinking a lot about the analysis and hardly been able to wait to come back. She herself connected this with my proposal of the third session to which she had reacted so negatively before. I think that she had realized that I was on the right side after all, on her side as over against that of her depressive inertia.

The topics of free time and of being weighed down by inactivity continued in this patient's analysis. They invariably led to memories of the demands her mother used to make on her. Clearly 'free' time was time into which her mother could not intrude; it had become a symbol of escape from the suffocating bondage to the mother.

On another occasion this patient gave a further example of the ways she had of fighting the battle of 'time for myself'. She told me of a conversation she once had with a stranger, an elderly woman who had confided to her that she envied anyone who was very busy; she felt useless, unwanted and disheartened if she had time on her hands. I interpreted this communication as showing a similar, though unconscious, trend in my patient. I said that she filled up her time by doing everything slowly and that when she left work undone her hidden purpose was of making sure that she never had any free time, any empty time.

My interpretation that she dreaded free time as much as she wanted it did not suit the patient. She said it was not empty time, like that of the elderly woman, that she was suffering from. However, inadvertently she acknowledged that free time can be

as undesirable as empty time, for she followed up her denial with an association that some years ago she took on a job for the simple reason that it made her unavailable to her mother. If she had no free time she could avoid upsetting her mother by open opposition, but she was opposing her all the same.

Discussion about the frequency of sessions is, in analysis, one of the occasions when the archetypal Medusa head of the destructive mother appears.

For whatever reasons the analyst may increase the number of sessions in the course of an analysis, it results immediately in a new transference situation. It can constellate in the patient's psyche either the image of the good mother-analyst's care and generosity or the image of the devouring mother-analyst's destructiveness.

One patient in particular reacted with panic to my suggestion, at crucial points of the analysis, to an increase of sessions from three to four and later from four to five. Out of this state of panic accusations were hurled at me such as: you don't want me to have any time for myself, you want to make it impossible for me to see my friends, to have any life outside analysis; you will be content only when you have me entirely in your power; you want to bring about my complete breakdown. She expressed fear of going mad and of being mad and compared me straightforwardly with the wolf in Red Riding Hood. Such experiences of being passively subjected to intolerable impositions from outside can represent the original state of helplessness in very early childhood when there was not yet any ego structure strong enough to cope with the panic induced by temporary abandonment. They are a re-living of states which felt at that time like total abandonment and total annihilation, corresponding to total dependency.

At the very lowest point of depression and regression this patient lay on the couch, silent and rigid. After a while she said, 'I cannot move', and that she had felt like being in a coffin. It reminded her of a time in her childhood when she could not swallow her food. I found myself remembering Snow White lying in the glass coffin as if dead after she had swallowed the poisoned apple her cruel stepmother had given her to eat. In the fairy tale it needed the prince to make her come alive again, but also the jolt when the bearers of her coffin stumbled over a tree stump which made the apple come out of her throat. In analysis, too, it sometimes needs a jolt—the unforeseen and unforeseeable, an

error, an apparent failure—to resolve the image of the death-dealing mother.

Patients' wishes to decrease the frequency of sessions are often an attempt to evade being confronted with their dependency. A certain patient started a long argument about wanting to reduce analysis from three sessions to two shortly before her holiday. 'I want to have money', she said, 'to buy myself some summer dresses. Now that I am able to care better for my appearance, I think that I spend too much money on my inner beauty. I need time also for myself'. 'Time for myself' was then defined as 'time in which I have no engagements. For instance, if I did not have to come here on Wednesdays I could have the whole day free'. Questioned on what she would like to do on her free Wednesday, she said immediately that it would make shopping possible. Further, it was a day which she could spend at home while her husband was not at home. The weekend at home with her husband was not reckoned to be free time, as she often could not choose what she wanted to do, but had to fit in with what he wanted, or so she felt.

A little later, when we had apparently gone off the vexing problem of the sessions, the patient spoke again about her coming summer holiday. It went somehow like this: 'I don't want to see my parents, but, of course, I have got to; they will be on holiday too. That's lucky and will at least solve part of the problem.' She argued fervently that it was natural for her parents to want to see her, and that she could not deprive them of this pleasure without feelings of guilt.

Throughout this false reasoning the patient's parents were in the foreground. They had all the rights on their side and the patient 'had got' to give up her own wishes for them. In the circumstances it was at first puzzling that the patient felt so differently about me and the analysis. She tried to convince me that it would be an achievement to come twice a week instead of three times, that it would mean she was becoming less dependent on me and so on. But she felt guilty with regard to me in just the same way as she did with regard to her parents, and was afraid that she might offend me or even harm me by her separation from me. As an afterthought she wondered whether I might need her fees.

Here, as in the last case, the struggle for free time was an attempt at loosening the tie to parents and authority figures. I

have coined the word 'un-dependence' for this intermediate stage between dependence and independence. It is denial of dependence, but not independence. It is usually compensated by I-can-do-it-myself or I-can-do-without-you activities like shopping, beautifying (where women are concerned), spending money, even working too hard.

Before another patient's summer holiday it was the long smouldering ambivalence towards analysis which manifested itself in her proposal to have fewer sessions. Her rationale was that she could not make proper use of the analysis. Also, she felt, it was so difficult to fit it in with her work, it meant too many interruptions, and it made her days too rushed. Since the patient came for all her sessions either in the morning before going to work or in the afternoon after work, the argument, apart from that of being rushed, was not very convincing. Here again time was made the scapegoat for various 'sins', of which defeating the analysis by way of self-destruction was certainly one. An associated motif was envy. The patient experienced her own mother as unacceptable because of her mother's ego-centricity, her over-activity and ambition and particularly because she 'ate' her children by claiming that their successes in life were due entirely to her. Envy of her mother played a considerable part in the patient's negative competitiveness which made her always complain that she was not good enough at her job, just as she felt that she was not good enough as a patient. Her envy of me manifested itself mainly in a hopelessness of ever being able to gain anything for herself which I possessed, either in her imagination or in reality.

I think that in her case it was mostly her envy that made her fear that both she and I might get destroyed, if we met too often. Once, significantly at the end of the last hour before her summer holiday which, as I have said, was mostly spent discussing the number of sessions, her whole pent-up hostility, anxiety and guilt broke out. She was already outside my front door, when she turned round to remark, rather like the other patient, 'By the way, I don't want to talk you out of a job'.

CONCLUSION

In terms of this limited research with patients who felt time as a persecutor, the time problem was handled as a projection onto

time of dependency problems. These patients could not organize their time satisfactorily for they either had to obey or oppose parental figures.

An individual's sense of time is linked to his personal history but is always tinged with the unconscious, archetypal mode of experience. Its genesis can be traced back into infancy when total dependence on the mother for being cared for makes the time factor very important. Thus the early introduction of a rigid timetable which disregards the baby's rhythm in respect of his physical and emotional needs will disturb his sense of time as well as his relationships with people from his babyhood experiences of anguish and of rage, felt in his body, and from the archetypal fantasies inevitably bound up with them. Such early patterns of upbringing were easily recognizable in the transference.

I found that certain of these patients who could not bear their dependence tried to deal with it by 'stealing' or 'wasting' time. Stealing time was perceived as taking back that which was withheld from the patient in infancy. Wasting time, or rather the fear of it, hinged on a flight from symbiotic longings which in the transference appeared as dissatisfaction with analysis. Those patients who refused the time the analyst offered, wanting 'free time' for themselves, experienced the analyst as the archetype of the devouring mother. In several cases, this image was constellated when an increase in the number of sessions was proposed. Others reacted unconsciously against the image by demanding a decrease in the number of sessions so they could have 'free time' for themselves. This wish coincided in several cases with the last hour before a holiday, a time which so often raises dependency anxieties. Strong feelings of guilt arose at the crucial point of the attempted flight, confirming the still effective tie to the devouring mother archetype.

In the course of treatment, symbols of urethral and anal activities were used to express the need for 'having' time or 'making' time, pointing to the patients' growing ego functions and creative abilities.

SUMMARY

Notes were made over three years on nine patients who were particularly concerned with time. These patients experienced

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time mainly as a persecutor which would devour them. The genesis of the sense of time is traced back into infancy and persecutory time to rigidly imposed time schedules. These were easily recognized in the transference. Some patients felt helpless about ever having 'free time', others tried to deal with their time problem by 'stealing' time or 'wasting' time. Such attitudes to time were handled as projections onto time of dependency problems and are discussed in these terms.

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