


THE PSYCHOLOGY OF C.G. JUNG

CONSCIOUSNESS

TRANSLATED BY DAVID N. ROSCOE



C.A. MEIER

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
Copley Square

CONSCIOUSNESS

Copyright 1989 by C.A. Meier

Translation 1989 by Sigo Press

All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher.



Sigo Press

25 New Chardon Street, #8748

Boston, Massachusetts 02114

Publisher and General Editor: Sisa Sternback

Associate Editor: Marc Romano

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Meier, C. A. (Carl Alfred), 1903–

Consciousness.

(The Psychology of C.G. Jung; v. 3)

Translation of: Bewusstsein.

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. Consciousness. 2. Jung, C. G. (Carl Gustav),
1875–1961. I. Title. II. Series: Meier, C. A.
(Carl Alfred), 1903– Lehrbuch der komplexen
Psychologie C.G. Jungs. English ; v. 3.
BF173.J85M43513 vol. 3 150.19'54s 88-15824
[BF311] [153]
ISBN 0-938434-12-8 [hbk]



Printed in the United States of America.

In memoriam
C. G. Jung

Centum Annorum
1875–1975 A.D.

Knowledge is the specific nature of the Psyche.
Corpus Hermeticum X, 9



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD	ix
INTRODUCTION	1
Chapter I: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARADOX	7
Chapter II: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS ..	17
Chapter III: THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.....	27
Chapter IV: THE LOCALIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS	47
Chapter V: THE THEORY OF AFFECTS.....	65
Chapter VI: THE ADAPTIVE MECHANISMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.....	69
Chapter VII: THE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE OPPOSITION OF INTROVERSION AND EXTRAVERSION IN THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION	77
Chapter VIII: THE ORIENTATION FUNCTIONS, OR THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS	95
APPENDIX—Literature on Typology	109
NOTES	115
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	119
INDEX.....	123

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Except where otherwise noted, translations of source material are by David Roscoe. All English citations of C. G. Jung are drawn from his *Collected Works*, Bollingen Series XX, Princeton: Princeton University Press. All *Faust* passages, again, unless otherwise noted, are drawn from the George Madison Priest translation.

FOREWORD

In order to write a comprehensive psychology of consciousness, an author would have to take into consideration every aspect of the human spirit. All the arts and sciences would have important contributions to make. Whether or not they are closely related to psychology would probably be regarded as irrelevant. Every expert, depending on his nature, would attack the observations of any such author, condemning them as encroachment upon his own territory or else dismissing them as mere “psychologizing.” The observations that would bear the brunt of the attack would be those on religion, for it is a thorn in the flesh of theologians (and not only them) to think that religion could possibly have something to do with psychology. And yet where is religion active if not in the human soul? And when we psychologists say: the more conscious, the better, why does the Church then feel threatened? At any rate, such a psychology of consciousness, one which does full justice to the subject, would be beyond the competence of the author. Yet that does not stop many young people crying out for an extension of consciousness; so there is a thirsting for greater awareness. Yoga and drugs are supposed to supply the goods. *Contraria contrariis!*

Faced with this abundance of both knowledge and ignorance, we have decided initially to describe just some of the most striking phenomena of consciousness. As we chart our course we shall make use of the compass of Jungian typology, the value of which was constantly brought home to Jung in his practice. Orientation is always indispensable when the

known is explored as the unknown. For consciousness is and always has been the greatest miracle in our world.

Going back to the arts and sciences, we have given their individual exponents the opportunity to make the corresponding relevant connections with their own special subjects. For the reasons outlined above it is only possible to provide mere rudiments. It was the author's experience that at every stage he felt he could recognize points of contact with "neighboring disciplines." That is, of course, particularly true for the numerous specialized fields of modern psychology. But in most cases he not only did not have the necessary expert knowledge, but he had to keep telling himself that his essential task was to present *Jung's* thoughts on the subject of consciousness. Yet even in this it became necessary to be selective and to try to make a sort of summary. The fact that in the second part of this volume we have adhered closely to the compass of typology should not give rise to the false impression that we believe that only consciousness is covered by the system of typology. Its greater importance lies rather in an understanding of the dynamics of the psyche, i.e., where the unconscious comes into play. However, what this concept really has to yield in this respect can only be proved in the next volume.

Conversely, our use of Jungian typology should not give rise to the false impression that these "types" have a real, personal existence of their own. A psychological type is actually what Goethe indicated with the expression *daimon* in his octave of the same title, that is, a molded form that develops as it lives. The Greek word *typos* means "molded form," and if it is to live and develop there must be the unconscious, for which it is conversely a prerequisite.

Finally it remains to me to thank my wife and all my friends who have been involved in the manuscript, especially Barbara Reinhardt and Barbara Gubler; my thanks are also due to the Swiss School Council for their friendly contribution of a substantial sum from the Dr. Donald C. Cooper Fund of the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule in Zürich.

INTRODUCTION

It does not worry me that people do not know me.

What worries me is that I do not know people

—Kung-Fu-Tse, *Conversations* 1.16

In Volume II of this textbook we stated that in the published works of C.G. Jung there is relatively little space devoted to the dream as such, certainly not as a continuous presentation. The same may be said for consciousness. It would, however, be completely misguided to jump to the conclusion that consciousness plays a subordinate role in Jungian psychology. It must be made clear right away that for Jung consciousness is the central factor in human psychology, and indeed in human existence itself. Jung's first major work, *Psychological Types*, (1921) could in fact be regarded as a work on consciousness in that it takes the conscious orientating functions and attitudes as its basis. But this is just one aspect of the problem of consciousness, and in his work Jung also brings into the discussion the role of the compensatory function and attitude of the unconscious. This approach establishes a dynamic relation between consciousness and the unconscious, and it is this very relation that was to be of abiding passionate interest to Jung. From this angle he viewed human psychology as a circling round the synthetic center between conscious and unconscious; in his method he remained faithful to C.G. Carus when he said that "the key to recognizing the essence of the conscious soul life lies in the region of the unconscious."¹

Thus Jung's later work can readily be understood as preparatory work for the psychology of consciousness, for although it concerned itself with the laws of the psychology of the unconscious, it regarded the unconscious as the topsoil of consciousness. The aim of all psychic effort, however, will always be to strive for consciousness. True, the possibility of consciousness is bestowed upon us at birth, but its dimensions, the way it is structured and organized, can only be defined by ontogenesis. Initially it would appear that the increase in the dimensions of consciousness essentially comes about with the gradual assimilation of the material of experience, which comes to us from the surrounding and external world in the course of life. But it gradually transpires that the more conscious we become, the more material of experience comes to us from our inner world as well. The assimilation of this material is at least as important as the other, and in fact becomes more and more important as life goes on. What is meant here by assimilation is adaptation to and bringing into relationship with what is already conscious. This has been described in detail in learning theory, but what has not told us is how we are to learn to really understand that which is to be assimilated.

As the unconscious is really the topsoil of the conscious, this means that it is likely that we have only truly learnt, understood and assimilated when a similarity exists or can be recognized between the new material and the imminent, corresponding unconscious condition; this similarity must create the impression of a platonic anamnesis, as if we were recalling some fundamental given fact as correct.²

It would seem that as far as the learning process is concerned, what is essential is not only external stimuli—which are the only things to be considered by the orthodox learning theory based on experiment—for during the learning process we receive a constant flow of information from within. Actually, unlike external stimuli, this flow of information never ceases, even in sleep, as can be proved by dreams. But during the waking state this flow is drowned by the sheer volume of external stimuli.³ The direction being taken by the latest sleep research indicates that there is a link between dreaming and learning.

One is perfectly justified in saying that according to Jung the aim of human existence is *to be conscious*, but in view of what we have just said, we must give a more precise definition of what this actually means: ever since the Fall of man, it has been impossible for us to allow ourselves to be guided by our instincts. We know about “Good and Evil” and we have to choose between them. When we do so, it always emerges that the criteria vary according to the individual and his cultural background, and that we are now almost unable to act according to

pure instinct. That could be cause for regret, but the existence of consciousness gives us freedom and thus presents us with a choice. It is the difficulties arising from this aspect of choice that Konrad Lorenz and his critics have both been tackling in their different ways.⁴

Thus the fact that we are so different from the rest of the mammals has very little to do with our cerebral cortex, for this does not adequately account for the existence of our pronounced consciousness. Our consciousness is both our distinction and our curse, the reason for the latter being that it compels us to accept the responsibility for making decisions. Just how far we should and may rely on our instinct in so doing remains an open question.

A feature of our consciousness is that it enables us to come to terms with our instinctive forms of reaction, in other words to make conscious decisions; this takes us into the sphere of ethics, however, and as we are dealing with psychology here, this is not the place to pursue such a subject. These decisions, however, despite the existence of consciousness, are not so “free” as one would like to hope (or fear), and this is a specific challenge to psychology, which sees itself as having to seek an answer to the question of what role is actually played in our behavior by the act of making conscious decisions. This means, of course, that a preliminary decision has to be reached as to whether we want to *decide* or whether we prefer to obey our instincts. If the former is the case, and this should be so in all important human issues (it is also the situation where ethics really comes into its own), then it appears that we would be wise to steer a middle course; this middle course not only does not reject what we might describe as the biological prerequisites, but actually takes them into account, and yet also meets the demands of consciousness. In other words, the conflict that thus arises should be deliberately confronted, and it is precisely this that is meant by the demand for consciousness in the Jungian sense of the term.

Let us recall at this point that the much deplored separation of conscious and unconscious that is held to be responsible for all the evil in the world is by no means a modern manifestation; from the very beginning, it must have been a source of fundamental contradictions and problems. And it is precisely here that the Jungian demand for consciousness gains its real significance, for it is to be understood as an achievement of synthesis, one which can only be attained as the outcome of lifelong effort.

This brings us to a paradox: consciousness is the product of a synthesis between consciousness and the unconscious. This reminds us of a phrase that has caught on in analytical jargon and often leads to misunderstandings: one often hears the phrase used about someone that

what he did was “very unconscious,” but what we actually mean is that he is acting only according to exclusively conscious arguments. Seen from the analytical point of view, however, this means that the person is not allowing his unconscious motives into the discussion, so that common sense would say that this person is acting very markedly in accordance with conscious viewpoints, in other words, is very conscious. But analytical psychology is precisely out to make man conscious of his unconscious motivations, too, and only then confront him with making decisions when that stage has been reached. Only then would someone really deserve the epithet “conscious” as we understand it, namely when he has tackled the conflict that has now become conscious and then reached a decision. Admittedly, this is a lot to demand and it can hardly be demanded of everyone. At the moment it is only a vanishing minority that goes so far, usually whether they want to or not, because it is neurotic troubles that have driven them into analysis. We have learnt much from people who suffer, for suffering is not necessarily a sign of weakness.

Hölderlin says:

Nah ist
Und schwer zu fassen der
Gott.
Wo aber die Gefahr ist, wächst
Das Rettende auch⁵

God is close
and yet intangible.
But where there is danger
There is also salvation

When human nature is sick, and perhaps only then, it can also cure.

However, it is not very easy to prove that a person who lives consciously in this way lives “better,” for upon what factors is our judgment based, and how are we to evaluate them? Moreover, the considerations that lead to consciousness give rise, because they take time, to procrastination in the way people behave, and this is a further burden, one which can actually be dangerous. In this respect, the habitually hesitant can also come across as neurotic, insofar as they have lost some of their spontaneity. A similar thing applies to those with too many scruples. I have not seen such “results” of analysis in the Jungian sphere, though some of the people coming out of Freudian analysis have been alarming, although it may well be that compulsive neurotic elements were present in them from the beginning. In such cases my explanation would be

that psychoanalysis on Freudian lines is generally speaking a more heroic and often “more successful” attempt to exercise what is truly unconscious, which then leads to the disappearance of genuine spontaneity.

As regards the extrapolation of data from the sick onto the healthy, it must be stressed here, as before, that since Charcot, Janet and Freud, modern psychology has made all its decisive findings from this extrapolation. This is why people who resist the unconscious like to criticize analytically-minded psychologists as holding theories that smack of the sickroom or even the madhouse, and they claim that the psychologists are such “cases.” It is particularly those who are not doctors who make such pronouncements, for the specifically medical mentality of courageously looking all things human in the eye is not to their taste. Terence’s *Homo sum, nil humani a me alienum puto* (I am human, let nothing human be alien to me) is, however, a very humanistic attitude, and we shall not be put out by it but will turn it to our own advantage. This attitude will emerge later, whether or not we are able to do full justice to the phenomenon of consciousness and still be true to the above prerequisites, which at any rate should constantly be borne in mind during the reading; otherwise, the impression could easily be created that what we are attempting here is a schematic representation of a phenomenon which, by virtue of its particular liveliness, could never be reduced to a schema. Hence I shall make every effort to keep the representation essentially phenomenological, so that the important epistemological question can only be touched on throughout. At this point I shall not give a closer delineation or definition of the term *conscious*, the reason being that first of all we shall familiarize ourselves with the many different aspects of the phenomenon so as to then see what conclusions this knowledge of the details allows us to come to.

Given the fact that there is no publication that compiles Jung’s views on the central issue of consciousness, I am in the fortunate position of owning his notes for a one-semester course he gave on this subject at the ETH in 1935. He passed them on to me when I succeeded him, generously allowing me to use them as I saw fit. This means that the essential points of what I have to say can lay claim to authenticity, and for this I should like to express posthumous thanks to my teacher.

CHAPTER I

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARADOX

Consciousness is undoubtedly the alpha and omega of all psychology. This is particularly true for C.G. Jung's analytical psychology, the aim of which is to arrive at as complete a consciousness as possible. As has already been mentioned, there is no summary of the psychology of consciousness in Jung's works. This is because Jung's main concern was to indicate the process of *becoming* conscious, be it a spontaneous process or one set in motion through analysis. In other words, his aim was to tread the path towards consciousness and then to describe it. In many instances this leads to a fascination with the unconscious and its attendant phenomena, but this should never be the aim of analysis. With the exception of *Psychological Types*, Jung's published works lead many people to this over-estimation of the unconscious. It is therefore necessary to stress again and again, perhaps somewhat exaggeratedly, that most of Jung's works are actually preparatory instruction for consciousness and that what is achieved in analysis is precisely this striving for consciousness.

Unfortunately much of the secondary literature on Jung has also fallen victim to this fascination. One notable exception is Aniela Jaffé in her work *The Myth of Meaning*, although perhaps the title does not make this as clear as one might have wished.⁶

A textbook on analytical psychology could very well start off with a discussion of consciousness. We explained in the first two volumes why we have opted for another sequence, not the least reason being

that a psychology of consciousness is probably one of the most difficult and complicated issues to tackle, as will immediately become apparent in what now follows. The sequence we have chosen is also correct from a developmental point of view, for both phylogenetically and ontogenetically consciousness is the most recent development, so that if we are to understand it, we need a certain familiarity with its precursor—the unconscious.

Moreover, when we come to describe consciousness, we are faced with a particular problem: in the natural sciences, our consciousness, i.e., a psychic entity, observes a physical object or process and then, as it were, “translates” it back into a psychic one. It may, for example, become a mathematical formula or definition, which for us is an intellectual, i.e., psychic assimilation and an understanding, provided the physical facts observed are thus classified for us into terms of reference with which we are familiar. In other words, the situation exists already in the natural sciences, where the psyche observes the physical—the physical object is observed and described by a totally different and largely independent system. The natural scientist is thus in the fortunate position of having at his disposal, *a priori*, a sort of Archimedean point outside the problem that is to be dealt with in mere psychology.

It can be seen at once that in psychology the situation is very different and much less favorable, for here the psychic is observing the psychic. It will be clear that this situation is an epistemological problem of fundamental importance and is one that one should be aware of in all psychological matters. We psychologists do not have an Archimedean point of view.

However, if, as was the case in the earlier volumes of this textbook, the conscious is observing the unconscious, or rather its effects on consciousness, then the situation is not quite as bad as one might expect. For here there are two different systems—the conscious and the unconscious—with the first one (the conscious) observing the second one (the unconscious). Thus the point of view of the observer (the conscious) is still actually outside the object (the unconscious), although it is perhaps disconcertingly close.

From the point of view of epistemology, things are much worse with the psychology of consciousness, for here the conscious is observing the conscious. Whereas in the psychology of the unconscious the two systems can still be distinguished from each other (conscious and unconscious), here we have two systems that are basically of the same nature (conscious and conscious), which as it were, can only be mirrored in each other. When my consciousness observes the consciousness of another individual, which is the normal case of all human contact, the

two systems are not actually completely identical, but are essentially of the same nature. But when I, that is my consciousness, observe my consciousness (reflection, introspection), then the two systems are perfectly identical, with the result that we are obliged to introduce an artificial distinction between subject and object.

From the remarks made so far, it might seem as though this is a situation peculiar to the field of psychology, so that we psychologists are thus victims of an irremediable congenital defect. In this unpleasant position there is a certain consolation to be derived from learning that the same fundamental inadequacy is proving to be a source of trouble even in modern physics. On this point I shall refer to Wolfgang Pauli, because there is no clearer or more concise way of defining the problem:

These facts concerning complementarity in physics lead naturally beyond the narrow confines of physics to similar situations in the general conditions of human perception. In physics, however, the term consciousness does not need to be applied directly, since an automatic recording apparatus can also be regarded as a means of observing. All that has to be assumed about it is that it can be described in everyday language, possibly supplemented by the terminology of classical physics. This means of observation thus represents a technically extended perceiving subject. In this way, modern physics generalizes the old opposition of the perceiving subject and the perceived object into the idea of a distinction between the observer or the means of observation, on the one hand, and the system observed on the other. Whereas the *existence* of such a distinction is a necessary condition of human perception, its *placement* is, to a certain extent, arbitrary and the result of a choice influenced by considerations of expediency, and thus partially a free choice.

In fact, the subject/object has paradoxical characteristics closely analogous to the relation between the means of observation and the system observed, as is the case in quantum physics. This paradox in perception is described by Bohr as follows: on the one hand the description of our thought activity calls for the opposition of an objectively given content and an observing subject, whereas, on the other hand, object and subject cannot be strictly separated, given that the last-mentioned concept also belongs to the thought content.⁷ In connection with this, Bohr also points out that "the conscious analysis of any concept stands in an excluding relationship to its immediate application."

The concept of consciousness also calls for a distinction between subject and object, the *existence* of which is a logical necessity, whereas once again the *placement* of the distinction is to a certain extent arbitrary. If these facts are disregarded, this gives rise to two different types of metaphysical extrapolation, which themselves may be described as complementary. One is of the material or general physical object, the

nature of which is said to be independent of the way in which it is observed. We have seen that modern physics has been obliged by established facts to abandon this abstraction as too narrow. The complementary extrapolation is that of Hindu metaphysics of the pure object of perceiving, with no object to oppose it. Personally I have no doubt that this idea, too, has to be acknowledged as an untenable extrapolation. The Western spirit cannot acknowledge such a concept of a superhuman cosmic consciousness, with no object to oppose it, and must keep to the middle course indicated by the idea of complementarity. Looked at in this way, the concept of consciousness already presupposes a duality of subject and object.

In place of the objectless pan-consciousness of the Orient, Western psychology has set up the concept of the unconscious, whose relationship to the conscious reveals paradoxical characteristics similar to those we meet in physics. On the one hand, any conscious-making, i.e., any observation, represents a fundamentally uncontrollable intervention into the unconscious contents. This then limits the objective character of the reality of the unconscious and at the same time endows it with subjectivity.⁸

Somewhat later (1957), Pauli continues, also with reference to Niels Bohr⁹: "In so far as the perception of the contents of consciousness is also an observation, the more general question of the separability of subject and object leads beyond the narrow confines of physics into the broader field of life manifestations."¹⁰ In saying this, he is thinking of psychology in particular.

It is known fact that in physics the relation between observer and system observed has found a satisfactory formal solution with Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty. Unfortunately, we do not have an efficiency quantum in psychology, a fact which makes it impossible to describe psychological processes from an energetic point of view—a point to which we shall return later. On the other hand, the concept of the distinction between subject and object in psychology seems to me to be more productive, and we shall deal with it later.

Let us repeat once again that for this quite elementary reason it is much more difficult to present a psychology of consciousness than of the unconscious. This obviously makes a paradoxical impression, for it is quite clearly thanks to consciousness that we owe our ability to understand. It seems to me highly likely that the popular interest in psychology, as we see today in the Western world under so many different guises, is ultimately due to this problem, even if it happens completely unconsciously. At any rate, the human psyche has become problematic in this day and age. The fact that there is something intrinsically unpleasant, something basically dubious about the psyche

making statements about the psyche, should be essentially explained by the above remarks. If the object of consciousness psychology is at the same time its subject, then we are reminded of Schopenhauer's definition of the perceiving subject as "that which perceives everything but is not itself perceived."¹¹ This gives rise to the thorny question of whether a psychic statement can ever lay claim to validity or can even be "true." The observations made so far compel us to be rather modest; so, as the starting point for our further investigations, let us take the commonplace observation that every psychic statement, or indeed any statement at all, need not necessarily be true in term of its actual content; however, we must also add that as an occurrence it is certainly real, i.e., it cannot be disputed and is thus true in the ancient sense of the Greek *aletheia*, which means both truth and reality.¹²

The point of view that would seem to commend itself in the light of this fact is a purely "phenomenological" one which, particularly when describing the psychology of consciousness, confines itself to establishing what has occurred. This alone would probably yield enough that is of interest, for consciousness as such already has an inexhaustible variety of characteristics and different aspects.

Before going on to the subject of pure phenomenology, I should like to mention something that Jung was very fond of saying: the conscious is a sheer miracle. If it didn't occur, didn't exist, it could never have been discovered. DuBois-Reymond, in one of his famous speeches, said that "even the spirit of LaPlace could not have foreseen consciousness coming into being."¹³ It is simply, if not exactly suddenly, there, and its origins and nature will probably never be known. Titles such as *The Origins and History of Consciousness* and suchlike are misleading, for at best all they can be, as we said in the introduction, is a presentation of the ontogenesis of consciousness, not to mention the phylogenesis.

Hence consciousness is actually an irrational reality, and forms an irrational contrast to the world of physical manifestations. The world of consciousness may be compared to the world seen from within. Consciousness is also the condition for all experience and all perception, and thus for us it is a condition for the existence of the world, for whereas in physics, for example, the material supplies answers to the questioning psyche, in psychology or in consciousness, the psyche answers itself. In other words, the questioning element supplies its own answer. It has no use for an external object, except possibly as an analogy to make the issue more clear.

But the authenticity and reality of this statement of the psyche about the psyche, i.e., the conscious, cannot be denied. If that were the case, we could bring this book to a close here and now. Lest anyone should

be getting the idea that this is all a modern discovery, it would be salutary to note the following passage from Tertullian (he came from Carthage, died in 222 A.D., and was one of the first Christian theologians to write in Latin):

I summon a completely new witness, or rather I summon a witness that is more known than any written monument, more debated than any system of life, more published abroad than any promulgation and is greater than the whole of man, yea that which constitutes the whole of man. Approach then, O my soul, whether you be something divine and eternal, as many philosophers believe—the less then will you lie—or not wholly divine because mortal, as Epicurus alone contends—the less then you ought to lie—whether you come from heaven or are born of earth, whether compounded of numbers or of atoms, whether you have your beginning with the body or are later joined to it; what matter indeed whence you come and how you make man to be what he is, a reasonable being, capable of perception and of knowledge. But I summon you not, O soul, as proclaiming wisdom, trained in the schools, conversant with libraries, fed and nourished in the academies and pillared halls of Athens. No, I would speak with you, O soul, as wondrous simple and unlearned, awkward and inexperienced, such as you are for those who possess nothing else but you, even as you come from the alleys, from the streetcorners and from the workshops. It is just your unknowingness that I need, for your experience, slight though it be, is not accepted by anyone. I want to question you as to what you bring with you into man, how you have learnt to feel, either from yourself or from your creator, whoever he be. As far as I know, you are not a Christian; for you usually become a Christian rather than coming into the world as such.¹⁴

So, in the spirit of Tertullian, let us give the psyche the possibility of speaking to us and showing us what it can and cannot do. And let us not be too discouraged for the moment if we have to try to operate without a frame of reference and do not even have objective scales.

Since the conscious as an object is neither more nor less than the subject, we are inevitably reminded of the example of the dog chasing its own tail. Certainly psychology, especially the experimental branch, has long been looking for ways out of this dilemma, by introducing reproducible experiments and questionnaires, resorting to statistical methods and using the results to draw conclusions about individual cases. (Incidentally, this approach bears a striking similarity to that adopted in parapsychology.) Unfortunately, individual cases, by definition, are small in number, with the result that the situation is still a rather awkward one. The tautological fact remains that in all other sciences the nonpsychic is “translated” into the psychic (terms, laws, contracts), whereas in psychology, as we have seen, especially in the

psychology of the conscious, the psychic expresses the same (psychic) by the same (psychic).

This is probably the essential reason for the still prevalent disregard for psychology in scientific circles. But unfortunately these same circles are still committing the equally common basic error of projection; they naively believe that psychology is what I think, do and am. Hence it is the same with everyone else, and if this not true of B, then there is something wrong with B. They then, in all good faith, set about performing missionary work, and this is when the actual misrepresentation occurs. As this sort of tautology is unconscious, it cannot be rectified and it puts a stop to any psychology. The extent of this error can be seen in the fact that even a few years ago a professor of philosophy at a European university was able to come out with the remark that there was no need for psychology in the syllabus, for we *have* it, we *are* it, pure and simple. When he used the verb “to be” he left psychology trailing behind! Our anatomy and physiology are also things that we all “have” and “can do,” of course. But when something goes wrong with our health, the problem is treated by calling on the results of our research into anatomy and physiology, and we are undoubtedly grateful for having that knowledge. As we remarked in the introduction, this point of view should also be applied when we look at the significance of psycho-pathological finding compared to normal, healthy psychological functioning. Of course, in such extrapolations the right parameters should be selected, otherwise one can be accused of psychologism, and rightly so. Unfortunately this is no rare occurrence, for many psychologists do not have the necessary manner or delicacy.

Bearing in mind all these restrictions, there is one further approach that offers us certain criteria for judging the phenomena of consciousness. It is always possible to introduce a *comparative* approach, the best way being to examine great differences in certain conscious factors. To this end several fields of research can be applied as auxiliary sciences:

1. *Ethnology*. Ethnological and anthropological observations provide us with knowledge of the consciousness phenomena of different ages and cultures. When a certain factor of consciousness in very early or very primitive cultures is compared with its condition in very late or very advanced cultures, this comparison enables us to make inferences about the history of its development.

This also applies, of course, to

2. *Comparative history of religion*.

3. *Developmental psychology*, in that it observes the differences,

for example between child and adult, as regards such a factor. Similar conclusions can also be drawn from the psychology of age or age groups.

4. *Ethology*. Here we have the comparison (difference) of the psychology of man with that of certain animals or species, which is actually a form of *comparative psychology*, as already practised by C.G. Carus (1866) and Charles Darwin (1872) (cf. Vol. 1 of this textbook).

5. *Sociology*, in so far as it deals with the difference between certain races or classes. In this respect, certain aspects of

6. *Folklore* also belong to our "auxiliary sciences."

7. *Genealogy*. It is common knowledge that certain families form dynasties, in the old sense of the term, and that they see themselves as very important, are very proud of their family characteristics and actually cultivate them. This means that there are tremendous differences between one family and another, and these differences may shed light on the question we are dealing with. Here, of course, genetic factors are involved.

Even within one family there can be great individual differences in the structure of consciousness, and these differences give us fundamental insights into our question, for everyone has normal, neurotic and psychotic relatives. Of course, the genetic factor is a prominent one, as is the so-called constitution research, but the purely psychological approach still enables us to draw very interesting conclusions. Evidence of this are, for example, the works of E. Furst¹⁵ and J.B. Lang,¹⁶ which were reported on in Vol. I of this textbook, and which led to the sarcastic comment that the family is the dictatorship of its most neurotic member!

Whereas the above-mentioned comparative methods work on the basis of group and collective psychology, there are also intra-individual, i.e., *individual psychological* approaches, which can help towards an understanding of the conscious. The best approach with this method of investigation is to compare *opposing quantities*, such as, for example,

Conscious	—————	Unconscious, which, as we have said was what <i>Carus</i> began with.
Thinking	—————	Feeling
Drive	—————	Willpower, in which respect we only need think of Romans 7:18–19

to realize what tremendous problems of opposites arise from this position: "I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do." But science

cannot advance unless there are opposites, unless the negation does not automatically appear with any position adopted. In this respect at least, the old Aristotelian scheme of thesis-antithesis-synthesis retains its validity.

Moreover, the sum of the above-listed approaches does form a sort of *objective* factor, for this factor is outside subjective psychology. For example, one could say that *collective* language is such a factor, as can be seen here in Switzerland in the broad selectivity in the various dialects. One thinks of the great differences in the various types of language, for example between the Indo-Germanic languages and Chinese. Whereas the Indo-Germanic languages are based on a grammar, it is the syntax that is important in Chinese. That is why Indo-Germanic logic is a logic based on language, whereas Chinese logic is analogistic, based on principles of association. Of course, objective factors also include convictions of an intellectual, aesthetic, cultural and moral nature, as well as religious ideas. Social, national, family and contemporary prejudices are also objective factors which affect most individuals. Local influences, in the sense of a geographical and climatic nature, are purely objective, of course, as can be seen clearly in the striking differences between the collective mentality of mountain dwellers and that of those living on the plains. One is also constantly struck by the insular psychology of the English, and they themselves experienced the colonial psychology which their civil servants used to develop in the colonies and dominions.

All these factors together create a collective psychology of a special character which, as can be seen, is established both internally and externally, although the internal factors may be of an objective nature. This collection of objective data, some of which are imponderables, produces something akin to an objective spirit, a *consensus spiritualis*. True, it is largely removed from arbitrariness, but precisely for that reason it makes it possible for there to be a system of measuring and hence a *psychology*. As can easily be seen, this psychology is based on very complex factors. It will constantly have to be borne in mind that this is merely a *relatively* objective point of view, and that for this reason the validity of such a point of view can also only be relative. Thus it can only make statements *about* the soul, but must never lay claim to being a statement on what the soul actually is.

Because the objectivity of this so-called objective spirit is only relative, one must once again resort to criteria and values from other cultures. In other words, here too the procedure to be adopted is a comparative one.

CHAPTER II

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In this chapter an attempt will be made to outline as precisely as possible some of the most striking characteristics of consciousness. No importance is to be attached to the order in which they are listed.

1. *The conscious psyche is a system*, i.e., a mixture of just about every characteristic possible, and they fall mainly into two categories:

a) somatic ones, such as sensory-physiological ones and other biological data, such as instinctive and

b) "mental," imponderable factors, which cannot be measured or compared with anything in physical nature, such as ideas, thoughts and feelings. ,

The system as a whole is both rational and irrational, ordered and chaotic, partly intentional and partly accidental. These few pairs of opposites could be further differentiated and multiplied almost at will, but I should like to limit myself to listing just the most important ones:

intentional
rational
ordered
objectively given

accidental
irrational
chaotic
subjectively given.

2. *The conscious psyche interacts with both the external world and the internal world* (i.e., with the unconscious).

The internal and external worlds are objective realities for the con-

scious psyche, and consciousness acts as a *connecting system* both for them and between them. It will readily be seen that this is one way of describing one of the most important functions of consciousness. Here lies the reason for a fact that is all too often given inadequate consideration in psychological and philosophical discourses, namely the relative validity of what is being presented. From the very outset authors should always give the chosen zero point of their reference system, so that the reader knows what their “personal equation” is. (This is a qualification introduced into astronomy by F.W. Bessel [1784–1846] in order to correct the error due to the personal point of view of the observer in space). In psychology it is reasonable to assume that this “personal error” may be attributed to the particular psycho-physiological individual constitution of the observer. But its presence is not just a disadvantage, even if it makes things awkward in research, for it is actually due to this that we are in a position to form an “interpretation” of our actions. At any rate, the conscious psyche is a complicated perception and coordination system for our actions; one could also say that the conscious is the clearinghouse between the individual and his milieu or between the individual and society.

3. *Consciousness is a phenomenon that is limited in time*, as can be seen from the following:

- a) at nights, when we are asleep, it switches off altogether or almost completely, for long periods at a time.
- b) it only begins to form in the course of life; one could say that the starting point is when the child begins to talk of himself as “I.”
- c) in many, maybe regrettable cases, it comes to an end before life itself does.
- d) it peaks, i.e., its clarity only lasts for a few hours, a fact to which we shall return later.

The first thing that emerges from this is that on average a human being spends over one third of his time in an unconscious state, a fact that should be enough in itself to compel us to think about the relativity of the significance of consciousness, or conversely, the significance of the unconscious. The periodic function of the conscious is a major problem, a question that is much discussed today, without a solution having been reached. We are still largely in the dark as to where the pendulum lies and what significance is to be attached to the various internal and external timekeepers. It would not surprise me if the relatively recently discovered REM phases in sleep were to turn out to be a factor.

Returning to the subject of the *clarity* of consciousness, which is also

characterized by its limitations in time, it is here that a particular aspect of the conscious is revealed, namely the fact that it requires *effort* to maintain a state of consciousness. This aspect of consciousness means that *energetic* factors have to be taken into consideration. Everyone knows from experience that if conscious effort is maintained for any length of time there is a need for recuperation. Many people not only become jaded but actually hungry if effort is invested for any length of time on consciousness, which takes its toll on our physical strength. The necessary recuperation is provided in all cultures under social auspices, both individual and collective. Whereas in the East this is one aspect of Yoga, the West has such institutions as the cinema, theatre, concerts and a host of other activities. What the first three here have in common is that with them the *external* becomes the *bearer* of consciousness. Externally, for example on the screen, a series of images is produced which allows us passively to fantasize and to project, for it happens automatically that either we identify with the “series of images put before us” or else we experience processes which are otherwise unconscious, in other words we project. The reader is reminded at this point about the effect of drama which I expounded on in connection with dream theory in Vol. II of this textbook (p. 87–93). This question will also be dealt with in section 4 below. The state thus produced corresponds psychologically to the normal middle course between maximum clarity of consciousness and an unconscious dominated by what we would describe in psychological terms as *automatisms* (see Vol. I of this textbook). We can readily understand that such a state also serves as recuperation once we recall the energetic manner of observation of consciousness. What is striking here is that the “purely mental” phenomenon of consciousness is seen to have a direct link with the soma, the subject.

4. The attentiveness of consciousness can be defined as a tension, a concentration of consciousness in the sense of the highest conscious confrontation of the subject with the object. Thus consciousness is simultaneously understood as a self-perception of the subject in its relation to the environment and the inner world (=object), in other words, the perceptive function is subsumed into consciousness. The simultaneity that thus occurs—or is produced of internal and external objects in relation to the ego—is a synthetic achievement of consciousness in that it does not exist in its own right. That is why it is also described as assimilation, a process by which the objects are “acquired.” It is in this process of assimilation that consciousness makes its major effort or exertion. As an illustration of this, please see Figure 1.

In his work *Wachen, Schlaf, Traum und verwandte Zustände*, J.E.




Fig. 1 simultaneous

Purkinje, the famous anatomist and physiologist, made the following comments on the subject of this function of consciousness.¹⁷

With different individuals, the state of being awake takes on varying modalities and degrees of intensity, depending upon age, sex, temperament, cultural level, type of occupation, and so on. In the prime of life, between the forties and sixties, the individual is in the most intense stage of being awake, partly because then is when the subjective, psychic power is almost developed and partly because the external conditions and relationships, as a means of waking the psychic life, are usually at their most abundant then. In early childhood the degree of being awake is usually at its lowest, gradually progressing through childhood, youth and maturity and falling off again in old age. However, it is important here to distinguish between the absolute and relative quantity of consciousness, for the latter is determined by its barriers as regards its intensity. As regards the absolute quantity, it is in middle age that the sum total of consciousness and reflection is at its highest. In childhood and youth the sum total is smaller, but the intensity may be just as great, if not greater; this is partly due to greater excitability because of the new stimuli of the inner and outer worlds, partly to the stronger movement towards the outside, but mainly it is due to the smaller sphere of action within which a smaller amount of mental power, i.e. a relatively larger amount of consciousness, is operating. This is the opposite of the phrase: *pluribus intentus, minor est ad singula sensus*, meaning that the fewer objects the mind focuses on, the greater is its effectiveness. Thus with

a woman, although there is a smaller degree of consciousness in a more limited sphere of activity, the intensity is as great if not greater than with a man, where there is a greater degree of consciousness in a wider sphere of activity. In the familiar setting of one's own sphere of activity, it is possible to attain a high degree of consciousness, but this vanishes as soon as one is faced with unfamiliar circumstances. The intensive and extensive aspects of this state of mind create a state of tension. The more we compress mental power into the individual, the less is left over for the surrounding area. Conversely, as expressed in the saying above, the more meaning we invest in the whole, the less is available to the individual. But there are also times, at least occasionally, when mental powers exert themselves, and those are the situations of the highest alertness or mental power, when both the parts and the whole are imbued with the greatest intensity of consciousness. The activity of the conscious has two fundamental directions: one outwards, towards the things around us, the world consciousness, and the other inwards, our individual consciousness; one of them may predominate at any given moment, or they balance each other out. It is precisely at this point of equilibrium that we find the center of alertness, reflection and total self-composure. From there the path may lead inwards, into greater subjectivity, exaltation of feeling, thought and will-power; or it may turn outwards, as an objective losing of oneself in perceptible concepts, external activity and endeavors, as a way of being outside of oneself. In both of these directions of consciousness, reflection is more or less obscured in that at the balancing point of subject/objectivity, where consciousness is most intense, the difference is swallowed up in one sphere or the other amid total indifference and inability to distinguish between the two.¹⁸

In addition to the perceiving function of consciousness, there is also its equally important *coordinating* function in relation to the ego. Looked at from a formal point of view, it consists in adapting the objects to the subject (cf. the last sentence in Purkinje above) and thus is connected to the process of assimilation mentioned earlier, which makes it clear that this is the main endeavor of the achievement of consciousness.

It is common knowledge that in the release from tension there is a dissimulation, through which the painstakingly acquired assimilation collapses and the objects of the imagination are no longer coordinated. From the viewpoint of the ego, this gives rise to a lack of coherence in the contents of the imagination, which amounts to a lack of distinction. But this is a characteristic of the unconscious, for there all the contents are contaminated by each other (see Vol. I of this textbook).

From this it can be seen that one of the most important faculties or features of consciousness is *discrimination*, i.e. the ability to distinguish

between the objects of the imagination and especially to distinguish between them and the subject. This characteristic was dwelt on at length in ancient psychology, where it was described by the term *diakrisis* or *distinction*. Schelling’s disciple, Wilhelm Rosenkrantz (1821–1874) comments on it with the utmost clarity: “We only come to know it when we can distinguish between ourselves and the thing (outside us), that is with our discrimination, and can look upon the thing as it is presented to us. We must separate ourselves and the thing and then link them up again in our consciousness (our assimilation).”¹⁹

Just how far the inability to make distinctions affects consciousness can be seen vividly in the psychopathological sphere, for example in the manic state, where it appears in the form of the well-known “flight from thoughts.” The dissimulation of internal objects in particular is graphically demonstrated by certain schizophrenics who suffer from bodily hallucinations. *Freud*²⁰ was fascinated by the case of the Chief Justice of Saxony, Daniel Paul Schreber,²¹ who suffered from hallucinations in the form of “runaway men” who sometimes disappeared under his skin (frustrated attempt at assimilation) with the cry “Oh, be damned!”

5. *The narrowness of consciousness* A distinctive feature of the conscious is that it can only dispose of a few clear ideas at any one time. A good way of demonstrating this is the spotlight, which can only light up a limited number of objects, with the rest being temporarily in the dark. The light symbolism used here springs to mind because of many common idiomatic expressions, such phrases as “it dawned on me,” “I see,” or the concept of enlightenment or illumination.




Fig. 2

As can clearly be seen, this schema is borrowed from the anatomical-physiological world of our sight process, with our clear conscious contents corresponding to the field of vision. Its radius and thus the quantum of the contents that are simultaneously covered is determined by the opening of the iris diaphragm. When the aperture is habitually too small, we speak of narrow-mindedness in the figurative sense; in pathological cases we speak of “tunnel-vision,” in medical terms known as “tubular scotoma.” Ernst Mach (1838–1916), alluding to the much discussed views of Freud in Vienna at the time, used to say in his lecture on optics: “Ladies and gentlemen, there are people who are now trying to investigate the human soul through the telescope of the vagina. But they can’t find anything, the opening is much too small” (related by W. Pauli).

Another reason why the light image is a good one is that we are relatively free to change the direction of the beam. With my beam I can scan all sorts of objects virtually at random and more or less determined by my free will. This would be the place to embark on a lengthy discussion on the concept of free will, but bearing in mind what we said in the introduction, we shall have to make do with a few remarks in passing, otherwise we would get bogged down in the field of ethics. In our situation the will turns out to be the more or less available energy which enables us to turn the spotlight almost at will. But when we are totally obsessed with an idea, some content of the conscious, which is certainly nothing unusual, then the turning becomes difficult, if not completely impossible. Thus the thorny question remains of whether wanting is something that can be wanted when one will. Should this not be the case, then it is not a want but a *must*. This dubious question of volition is a late acquisition in the whole psychic system. For example, we see with so-called primitives that for volition they need a *rite d’entrée* and for nonvolition they need a *rite de sortie*. And we, too, when we are in situations where we feel helpless, resort to rituals, such as prayer for example. Nor is there anything wrong with this; at least it is better than the superstitious belief that has often proved fatal that “where there’s a will, there’s a way.”²² As we have said, volition is an acquisition that has come into being through the gradual raising to conscious level of preferences and inclinations; as a cultural acquisition, it has a long history of development, it did not come into being overnight and we cannot always keep on that level. The training of the will should be influenced more by qualitative than quantitative factors; more and more internal and external objects should be lit up by the spotlight, making it possible for them to be assimilated. Thus in the course of ontogenesis there is an increase in the aperture of the

beam and in its brightness and range. In other words, the sphere of influence of the conscious and its scope both grow, which certainly counts as a form of cultural progress. At any rate, the material of the imagination grows in this way. There is here a link with the concept of *vigilance*, which is much discussed particularly in the field of neurobiology, but we shall not comment further on this as there is still a lot of work to be done on the subject.

What we can comment on is the fact that this material of the imagination is actually

6. *Memory*. Enough has already been said on what the memory is supposed to be, so we shall simply give a few theoretical details here: it is the ability of the conscious to actively and spontaneously reproduce the material of the imagination. Its duration and scope vary widely from person to person. In our teaching methods, we try to improve memory. Moreover there are memory training tricks involved in the well-known laws of Association (see Vol. I of this textbook). Once again I should like to refer to Purkinje: "Through the agency of the memory, objective perception is subjectively reproduced in the imagination, somewhat altered, either simply by fancy or because of certain requirements. What happens now is that practicality tries to assert itself and transfer the altered idea onto real things and then change these in turn to suit its own purposes."²³

Today we are under the impression that everything we have experienced is stored in the memory, a view that would seem to be confirmed by such things as the treatment of amnesia under hypnosis. Conversely, these experiences also prove the highly regrettable fact that this material is not always available. Just think of the way we study for examinations and are then unable to recall what we have learnt just when we need it! What is crucial when it comes to the availability of the material in the memory is that one has seen the connections between the various facts and thus has a picture of the whole. Otherwise there is always the risk of memory gaps; these gaps are partial amnesias and must not be *forgotten* when it comes to discussing memory! One can only echo the words of Faust:

Ah, happy he who still can hope to rise,
Emerging from this sea of fear and doubt!
What no man knows, alone could make us wise;
And what we know, we well could do without.

—Faust I

These lapses are particularly embarrassing in old age, when it is precisely recent events that cannot be remembered. Old people are well

able to recall events in the distant past, and this makes for a reversal of the cultural progress we talked about earlier.

Whether or not an idea can be reproduced often depends on the *affect* that is involved, or simply interest, so that something unpleasant is either quickly forgotten or, on the other hand, cannot be shaken off. Further unpleasant effects of the memory are, for example, automatisms, ideas that crop up spontaneously and become obsessive. A good example would be tunes that we cannot get out of our heads; there are also *idées fixes* or other ideas that block the thought process. What I should like to emphasize, in other words, is that with the memory there is always a factor that is irrational, imponderable, spontaneous and *creative*. Fortunately it does not usually disturb but is urgently needed and is useful, for which we should be grateful. At any rate, when it comes to the memory we had better not lay claim to absolute freedom, for freedom can only be possible in relation to something that is known, a fact which I should like to emphasize above all, Sartre notwithstanding.

CHAPTER III

THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The Ego as the Center of the Consciousness

Providing the contents of consciousness have a certain coherence and one common point of reference which forms a sort of center for them, this center is known as the ego. Wherever there is a center, there has to be a periphery, and the area between the two, the contents of the circle, is known as the field of consciousness. Any ideas or concepts that lie in this field are linked by the fact that they are related to the ego. The field of consciousness may shift but the ego always remains in the center. Thus certain contents are permanently involved with consciousness and form the ego complex. Part of this is also that one is aware of one's body. Anyone who is not aware of it is in an abnormal state, for example in ecstasy (beside oneself).

Moreover consciousness is constantly contaminated by certain unconscious contents; these are permanently constellated by the ego. This is the "shadow" (cf. below under section 4). Closer investigation shows that this ego is not an elementary particle, but in fact has a very complicated structure. It corresponds exactly to the definition of a complex as defined and experimentally researched by C.G. Jung in his "Diagnostic Studies in Word Association," which the reader will find referred to in Volume I.²⁴ The complex, like an atom, is a compositum with a nucleus and several secondary elements. From now on, to save

time, whenever we refer to the ego, it will be understood that we mean the ego complex.

Unlike most of the complexes discussed in Volume I, it cannot, of course, be said of the ego complex that it is relatively incompatible with consciousness, for it is actually its nucleus. But, as will be seen, this nucleus is inherently—from a formal and phenomenological point of view—a quite complex dimension.

The nucleus element will be discussed later but, like the nucleus of an atom, it will always remain a mystery.

The following remarks can be made about the ego complex:

1) It consists of general and poorly defined bodily sensations which correspond most closely to what is known in French psychology as *cénesthésie*. These general feelings form an entity, and they can be best understood by observing what happens when this entity falls apart, as happens, for example, in the initial stages of a psychosis (cf. Vol. II, pp. 84–85). They in turn are affected by

- a) sensorial feelings, affects and drives, i.e. somatic stimuli and
 - b) purely psychic stimuli, such as ideas, thoughts and memories.
- They are perceived as hunger, thirst, fatigue or a feeling of well-being, equanimity, animation, (a) or joy, disgust and lust (b).

In addition to this relative uniformity, however, the following observations can be made, too:

2) The ego complex is a plurality, a state of affairs that can be expressed in its most elementary form by the fact that it is possible to “be another person.”

Two souls, alas, are housed within my breast,
And each will wrestle for the mastery there.
The one has passion's craving crude for love,
And hugs a world where sweet the senses rage;
The other longs for pastures fair above,
Leaving the murk for lofty heritage.

—Faust I

And if in a dream my ego does things that my waking ego abhors, then one is forced to accept the existence of more than one ego. Fortunately, the double ego or partial ego show a very high degree of *coherence*, *constancy* and *continuity* (which is much less the case with pathological complexes), so that there is *practically* just one *identity* to this partial ego. This is why William James (1842–1910) says that “the ego has a functional identity.” We may have some misgivings about all this, but we should not lose sight of the positive side; this plurality of the ego

is also what gives the ego its flexibility, and this in turn is a necessary condition if there is to be any development of the personality in the course of life. If consciousness were completely static, this would amount to a paralysis of the personality.

However, this plurality of the ego has its bad as well as its good aspects, if I may resort to the jargon of astrology. The “functional identity” or entity may crumble, as can be seen clearly in pathological cases. There the situation of the dual personality is a familiar one, and elements of this can be seen in the Goethe quotation above. There are other examples in literature, the most famous one probably being “The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” by R.L. Stevenson. Among the psychopathologists to have done research into such cases of multiple personality, one of the most prominent ones is Morton Prince.²⁵ The problem of the ego is made more acute by the fact that

3) *the ego is itself a subject*, that is, itself part of the contents of consciousness, indeed its central part. Even as long ago as Maimonides (1135–1204) the ego was considered the entity of consciousness, and proved to be unwavering despite his ideas. With Kant, the ego is the “transcendental synthesis of apperception.” There is no misunderstanding him when he says: “I am conscious of myself is a thought that contains a two-fold ego, the ego as subject and the ego as object.”²⁶ Or when he says that “the ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my ideas,” as otherwise they could not be his ideas, then he is speaking of course of this fundamental fact of consciousness, i.e. the ego, which is also the *res cogitans* of Descartes. Let us recall at this point Schopenhauer’s definition as referred to in the introduction, namely that the ego is the perceiving subject that perceives all, but is not itself perceived. And Fichte says: “The ego is only in so far and how far it is conscious of itself.” I would like to add that it is important when looking at all these philosophical observations to realize that the existence of the ego automatically presupposes the existence of the non-ego, of the unconscious; this theoretical point of view is not entirely irrelevant in relation to the existence of the unconscious, especially as a complement to the “Unconscious in its Empirical Manifestations” which is the subject matter of Volume I.

One of the things that emerges from 3) above is the idea of the ego as *self-awareness* for this is probably what is meant by the ego as its own subject. J.W. Dunne has dealt theoretically with this problem as that of the observer of the observer.²⁷ His experiences, published in his book *An Experiment with Time*, cannot be doubted but unfortunately they are too inadequately documented for strictly scientific purposes.²⁸ (They are essentially of a parapsychological nature, dealing, for exam-

ple, with precognition, which would lead to a possible connection with the idea of the “observer of the observer”). Dunne’s views on the ego lead him to an infinite regression from the observer of the observer to the observer of the observer of the observer, etc.; what the cosmological proposals he applies boil down to is that the “explanation” of such possibilities rests on the assumption that whenever a further dimension is added (to the established four) then a whole series of worlds can be imagined, with each one subsuming the other. He puts forward his view with great brilliance and a goodly portion of English humor, but it amounts to little more than a mathematical game. But these thoughts, as well as the philosophical and psychological ideas we have referred to, are nothing more than a *regression* to the *absolute ego*. Jung has pointed out to us that Origenes tackled this question.²⁹ “*Vides, quomodo ille, qui putatur unus esse, non est unus, sed tot in eo personae videntur esse, quot mores.*” (“You see that the one who seems to be one is not one, but so many people appear in him as he has individual characteristics”).³⁰ The Indians would talk here of the atman or Brahman. In our culture it is probably Schelling who has coined the most concise and accurate phrase for the absolute ego: “The absolute ego is what can never ever become the object.”

When we look at what has been said about the ego under 3), we must conclude that whatever has been said does not and cannot exhaust the question, for the creative origin of these remarks is still the subject. So the ego cannot be once again set forth as the object, not even in further progress or regression. It thus remains the apriority of perception. In the center of the ego problem and thus in the center of the problem of consciousness, or in the center of the problem of perception, we are once again in a paradox. I feel that Husserl was trying to unite these opposites when he remarked that “The ego has a transcendency in immanency.” The observations made so far about the problem of consciousness reveal that the closer we come to the central question, the more strongly we feel that we are nowhere near a solution, and the more aware we become of the paradox of the phenomenon. I am not disappointed about this, for in psychology we have had to accept more and more that the fundamental facts are of an essentially paradoxical nature. Since 1935 I have been pointing out that in this respect there is a striking parallel with the situation in physics, which is what brought about Jung’s interest in these questions.³¹ Not being involved in the exact sciences, we psychologists feel more justified now that physics has found itself faced with similar paradoxes and has had to deal with them and accept them. It is very reassuring to see that our problems of epistemology are not unlike those in the exact sciences.

One such paradox to emerge from what has been said under sections 1–3 is that 4) *the ego is only partially conscious*. Insofar as the ego is by definition conscious, one must assume for reasons of symmetry (cf. analogy with physics) that it also has an *unconscious* part, however paradoxical this may sound, seeing that we refer to the ego as the center of *consciousness*. In actual fact we find that behind the conscious ego there is an equivalent *unconscious ego*. True, with this complex (for that is what it is, just like the conscious ego, cf section 1) we are talking about a dimension that cannot lay full claim to consciousness, but must remain partially unconscious, at least in genuine symmetry to the ego. This is a part that is linked reciprocally with the light symbolism of the conscious, i.e., with the *shadow*. What we have to do here is make a regression by regarding the ego as a complex that contains an *ego field* as a covering outside the inner one, a field made up of concepts of the ego, with its nucleus being the “absolute subject” (cf. Fig. 3). “Behind” this ego field there would be its requisite anti-pole, just as for the Pythagoreans there was the dark anti-earth to the earth, or for the alchemists the shadow of the sun to the sun. “*Sol et ejus umbra perficiunt opus*” is a quotation by Michael Majer in the *Scrutinium chymicum*, meaning that nothing can be complete without its opposite.³²




Fig. 3

This more or less unconscious anti-pole to the conscious ego has been described by Jung as the shadow, and he realized that it invariably

projects onto an external figure of the same sex, the *bête noire*, as actually bearing the shadow of the subject. The term *shadow* makes it quite clear that it refers to an inferior part of the personality, one that is maladjusted and probably characterized by inferior moral values, which is why nobody likes it when his shadow side is addressed. We are not supposed to tread on each other's toes! The so-called primitives seem to be fully aware of this, for they literally avoid treading on the shadow of a friend, as the consequences could be disastrous.

The genesis of this shadow existence can be traced back essentially to two factors: first, to the natural presence of certain inclinations, which means that with every individual, those characteristics that do not fit in with or actually oppose those inclinations are forced into the background, i.e. into the shadow. Second, there is the fact that life makes us develop certain qualities or talents, be they for social or professional reasons, with the result that less suitable qualities are neglected if not actually repressed. These then are what make up the shadow, and it is clear that in fact it is not necessarily made up exclusively of "negative" characteristics. And yet in the course of life these characteristics often only come into their own through dire necessity, if personality is not to become one-sided and inflexible. At any rate Jung found that any further development of the personality depended absolutely on this central problem being recognized and on an ability to come to terms with this unacceptable side.

5) A further observation concerning the psychology of the ego: *the ego is found or discovered in the course of one's individual history*. We recall here that Fichte says "the ego sets its own being," which, of course, may be regarded as tautology. At any rate, what is certainly true is that the ego represents the absolute *real*, which is probably why Bergson calls it the *durée réelle*, for no actual existence can be attributed to something that is not observed. The only exception here is the absolute subject.

In the history of an individual the ego, as has been stated already, is determined at some point, perhaps between the third and fifth years. Thus it is also a sort of cultural achievement, as can be seen if we look at what things are like before it is discovered. Before the ego is discovered or formed, there is simply an objective series of psychic states that are experienced but only partially remembered. There are islands of consciousness without a continent having been built. Thus the conscious is not yet an entity, a whole. There is no reflection yet, and as a consequence, no sense of responsibility. There is a total absence of self-control, a great readiness to be distracted, a selective memory, no will-power, but unrestrained covetousness. Children and

adults who remain in this state are unable to concentrate, are easily hurt and offended—they are over-sensitive. Many feelings of inferiority and hypersensitiveness can be traced back to this, and it manifests itself in a rather unpleasant form in populations with mixed races, such as North and South America.

The presence of an ego complex that is still weak has at first to be asserted by the subject, for as yet there is a lack of self-confidence. This only comes with an ego that is firmly in place. As a complex, the ego complex has the tendency to pick up (assimilate) many things, such as property, family, position, knowledge etc., with which consciousness readily identifies. In the course of life, the wise man has to learn the painstaking lesson that these things are not important for his identity. The ego complex is thus reduced, indeed it will have to be sacrificed if it is not to become a problem complex. Coming to terms with the shadow, the right attitude towards the persona, the anima and the self (see Vol. IV), all these are the road to the true identity, to individuation.

So much importance is attached to the ego today in the Western world, but it must be pointed out that a relatively “small” ego does not just have negative effects. For example, it is precisely for this reason that so-called primitives create an *impersonal* impression, for they are not identified with their ego. Oddly enough, the same phenomenon crops up in all great cultures, whenever we have artistically superior pictures of human beings. We can see that these people always assume a sort of hieratic expression. The impersonality of the portrait was the accepted form up to Byzantine art and the early Renaissance (e.g. the Siennese). In the art of the twentieth century there is a similar tendency and a lack of interest in creating portrait-style resemblances, which might well be a reaction to the exaggerated clinging to the ego so prevalent in this day and age.

What now follows is rather complicated, and so to make it somewhat clearer I shall resort to a diagram that first appeared in Joan Corrie’s *ABC of Jung’s Psychology* in 1927 (Fig. 4).³³ In her book, Corrie admits her indebtedness to Jung for the diagram. What it does is to give a sort of “geology” of the individual. The individual person always soars above the statistical average of the collective in some way or other, sometimes in “splendid isolation,” and so it is possible to look at him as if he were a mountain. However high he raises himself, the various strata will rise with him, for as a man and a living creature he is part and parcel of these strata. The sequence of ego levels is what then forms the mountain’s peak, and the number of its levels (N) can in theory be calculated, from regression right up to the “absolute subject.” (We shall look at further aspects of this diagram later on).

From a purely phenomenological point of view, the N should not be much larger than 2, with the result that higher ego levels remain theoretical, although the figure will probably vary from culture to culture (cf. Chap. IV).

6) *The absolute subject is the source of the psychic dynamics* of the individual, in other words it is a *force*, for firstly, the elevation to the mountain peak is due to its efforts, and secondly, it expressed itself as an immediate source of energy and one that is felt. It is of the utmost spontaneity, i.e. autonomous, for who can actually *choose* whether this “geological fold” or that “volcanic elevation” should come about precisely at this place or this time? And who can take it upon himself to decide that the individual should have this structure and not another? We experience the libido directly as energy in the form of a “life force” that is felt at first hand, a vitality whose object we are. It flows towards us or is denied us. The question of causality here is a tricky one, and it is not a good idea to talk of psychic energetics and to try to introduce psychological thermodynamics. (The titles of Jung’s endeavors in this respect came about under the influence of the “energetic imperative” of Julius Robert Mayer, Mach and Ostwald, and the enthusiasm that prevailed at the time).³⁴

This incongruity of psyche and physics was felt right away, and so it was agreed that instead of talking about energy in the psychic sphere, the word *libido* would be used (Lat *libido* = appetite, lust, impulse, desire, craving), which does not really get us very far. Apart from the fact that unpleasant clashes that broke out between Freud and Jung over the definition of this term, I do not have much interest in a “libido theory” based on the above reasons, for its foundations are both inadequate and unsound. Nevertheless, we shall continue to use the term “libido” to refer to psychic energy.

In conversation, Markus Fierz once made a suggestion to the effect that in any discussion on the “energetics of the soul,” the tables could be turned and one could apply this approach to the psychological background of physical energetics. It might then be possible to put forward a plausible argument that the projection of an archetype with all its numinosity was responsible for the rudiments of thermodynamics, i.e. the concept of indestructible “energy.” This was the approach I adopted in Volume I when talking about J.R. Mayer.

7) *The libido has two aspects*: on the one hand it is experienced directly as energy and is thus not concrete; on the other hand it is concrete, in the form of images, which is what gives the libido its *formal* aspect. The image is thus the *specific form of the energy*. The psychic flow of energy is a series of images.




Fig. 4

Here we return to the diagram of Fig 4: it will not have escaped the reader's attention that the figure has a phallic form. This is certainly no coincidence, for the formation of each individual personality is a creative act par excellence since creation never comes to an end, and for this eternal power the phallus (not the penis) is the eternal symbol. But the strength which the individual seems to produce derives from the apparently chaotic depths of what is common to the whole world, the central fire, as the ancients called it; for the alchemists it was the *prima materia*, coming from what was primary and original, and thus which would probably be identical with Schopenhauer's "will." It is not difficult to see that we are now in the sphere of the actual unconscious, the *true* unconscious or, as Jung says, the collective unconscious. Thanks to his energy (grey in the diagram) the individual emerges from out of the period of indifferentiation without us being able to find adequate causality for that emergence. So here too we end up with a paradox: the very nucleus of consciousness, its ultimate peak and its essence, is and remains the unconscious. Perhaps the paradox needs to be expressed thus: that the "absolute subject" corresponds to the "absolute object." It would then be identical with Plato's "being," Spinoza's "god," its only substance, which *is* because of itself. It would also correspond to the god of Aristotle, who only thinks himself: "Reason, if it is really the greatest thing, thinks itself, and its thinking is a thinking of thinking" (*Metaph.* 9. 1074).

This reminds us of what Goethe had to say about the "hollow spot in the brain," a comment which I should like to quote here:

Man is placed in the midst of a real world as a real person and endowed with such organs that he can recognize and produce the real and the possible. All sound people are convinced of their existence and of something existing around them. Yet there is a hollow spot in the brain, that is, a place where no object is reflected, just as there is a blind spot in the eye. If Man pays particular attention to this and becomes absorbed in it, then he becomes mentally ill, has a presentiment of objects from another world which are actually non-objects; they have neither shape nor boundary but give rise to fear as a sort of empty night-spatiality, haunting those who cannot shake them off.³⁵

Let me mention at this point that the last sentence reveals an attitude that we shall come to see later (in Chapter IV) as typical of the extravert.

8) *The concrete aspect of the libido* is thus the stream of images or the *fantasy*. It can be understood as the manifestation or the product of energy-laden psychic contents. We have to distinguish between two types of fantasy:

a) *Passive fantasy*: this includes automatisms, dreams and involuntary waking fantasies. It is likely that this form of activating the fantasy is a temporal continuum which only seems to be interrupted because it is drowned out by ideas of the waking conscious mind, exertion of will and concentration on psychic contents.

b) *Active fantasy*: this can be brought about by the positive participation of the conscious in unconscious contents. Doing this can sometimes be a very elevated form of mental activity, in that the conscious and unconscious psyche are both pulling in the same direction in synthetic cooperation, which can lead to a joint creative product. I would remind the reader of my examples in Volume I, especially Kekulé. There is no better way of phrasing it than to quote Shakespeare:

The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth and earth to heaven;
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.

—A Midsummer Night's Dream V.i. 12–17

Both forms of fantasy are identical with the way that psychic processes operate, that is with their formal, image aspect. Perhaps what they do is simply reveal, at the lowest level, the life process as it goes on: this would make them continuous and also make it possible to view them as both causal and final. As an example one might turn to such a fantasy as quoted in *Ancient Incubation and Modern Psychotherapy*.³⁶

Images of the fantasy are thus to be viewed as direct representations or image aspects of psychic contents, especially when the latter do not correspond to real objects. Let us recall that when we are in conversation, for example, and our ideas have not yet taken clear shape, we are very prone to say "it's like . . .", and then we come up with a metaphor which is pure imagery. It is possible that only later are we able to bring in clear, abstract concepts.

The question is: what are the sources of these images? They may be said to have two roots, external and internal. We shall try to draw up a list here, bearing in mind that the two categories may overlap.

External

1. Sensory perceptions, in which we shall include physical sensations. But it must be borne in mind that these perceptions are subject to many illusions (e.g., the most common sensory illusions) and because of blurred perception they leave much scope

for extension of the fantasy and are thus only an approximate representation of the real object.

2. Concepts of external objects and experiences, i.e., what we might call the *situation image*.
3. Thoughts and feelings which attach themselves to external objects and experiences and are what we might call *meaning images*.
4. Recollections of external objects and experiences, bearing in mind that mistaken recollections may well be causes as well as effects of fantasies.

Internal

5. Exercising of will
6. Affects, moods
7. Intuitions and perceptions of unconscious contents
8. Dreams (as passive fantasies)
9. Possible pathological hallucinations and delusions

In summarizing let us state that components of the fantasy may have either external or internal sources.

Not every reader will find it easy to accept our strict equation of image and libido as two simultaneously existing aspects of the psychic dynamis. People do not all have the same gift for directly perceiving images. This does not necessarily mean that they have a lack of visual ability, but rather that they are unable to see visions. But I am inclined to believe that this ability is initially very widespread, for it is easy to observe in children. It is only in the process of so-called education that children have to learn to distinguish their fantasies from "reality," indeed to suppress them, and it is this that leads to the above shortcoming. If one is to embark upon active imagination, one may have to learn to regress to a relatively childish level. To clarify what we mean by the term "image," let us recall that the German word for "image" is *Bild*, which is connected with *Bildung*, meaning "education" or "training." In other words the image has a formative effect. The alchemists hoped that through the reality and hence the effectiveness of images they would be able to transform matter, i.e., through *imaginatio vera* (*imago* = image). There was much talk during the Renaissance of the "forming" and transforming effect of the image. Gianfrancesco Pico (the nephew of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola) was preoccupied with the role played by the image in the sense of its formative effect upon man. What he is concerned with is ancient anthropoplastic in relation to artistic and scientific activity. These philosophers were much preoccupied with the ancient Greek *morphe* as spiritual form, the formative image as idea or

type (“shaped form which develops as it grows,” Goethe). And when we look at 2 Corinthians 3,18: “But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image,” we are reminded once again of the Aristotelian idea of all matter being determined by form, and all change consisting in bringing the potentiality of a substance into actuality.

It is remarkable to note that even the last century Sir Francis Galton was conducting experiments on the image aspect of the libido; he reported on them in “Proceedings of the Royal Institute,” Vol. IX 1878–81, pp. 644–655, under the title “The Visions of Sane Persons.”³⁷ As he was collecting his material, he was amazed to find that this characteristic was much more widespread than he had expected. What we have said so far on this subject is confirmed by Galton both in theory and practice, and it is fascinating to see that almost forty years before Jung he was collecting spontaneous material which comes very close to that of active imagination.

Let us now attempt to describe some further characteristics of the ego.

9) *The ego has a series of directly opposed traits* and in this respect is like the head of Janus. There now follows a list of these opposing features and it should be borne in mind that they can easily co-exist side by side, which, of course, leads to paradoxes once again. So the ego is:

<i>either</i>	<i>or</i>
<i>agens</i> , i.e., all will	<i>patiens</i> , i.e., fascinated, for example
productive	receptive
active	reactive
positive	negative
warm	cold
radiating	absorbing, reflecting
light	dark
constant	changing
sunlike	moonlike, borrowed light

As can be seen, the list, which could easily be extended, becomes more and more full of imagery as it gets longer. Rather than extend the list I shall turn to a quotation from Origenes, who gives a very apt description of this aspect of the ego: “*Intellige te alium mundum esse in parvo et esse intra te Solem, esse Lunam, esse etiam stellas.*” (Understand that you are another cosmos in miniature and that in you are also the sun, the moon and other stars.)³⁸

I shall try to outline how the casuistry of this polarity of the ego manifests itself by taking as an example two characteristics and showing how differently they appear with the active and the passive ego.

a) The influencing capacity:

active

as will

“I want you to . . .”

passive

as suggestibility

= outside will dominates

b) The productive capacity:

active

as ability to

express oneself

planning ahead

shaping

linguistically

graphically

musically

dramatically

in mime

in pantomime

passive

as dreaming

especially daydreaming

and passive fantasies

As can be seen, the opposition is that of activity and letting things happen, and once again we see that there is an external or internal “causality,” which produces reciprocal results.

When we talk about active and passive we must realize that it is always a “force,” which sometimes works from within and sometimes from without, and this takes us back to the problem of psychic energy we touched on above. I do not wish to repeat myself on this subject, having dealt with the essentials in my discussion of the Julius Robert Mayer case in Volume I of this textbook.³⁹ The connection between energy and image is brought home particularly clearly there.

Just as the elements of the image derive from external or internal sources, it is possible to observe that the conscious or the ego usually has a preference for the one or the other, and this is described as

10) *the attitude of the ego* to the object.

Qualitatively this attitude may also have the following directly opposing traits:

positive

or

negative

emotional

or

realistic

subjective

or

objective

personal

or

impersonal

If they are predominantly conscious they may be more of an *intention* in nature, and if predominantly unconscious, then more of an *inclination*.

Quantitatively the attitude may have varying degrees of intensity. These are brought about by

- 1) the will (e.g. attentiveness)
- 2) the interest (or the fascination)
- 3) the emotion

The expression “intensity” as a quantity reminds us once again of the term “energy” and it can also be understood as the amount of invested libido. But we must bear in mind that in psychology the expression “energy” is invariably used in the anthropomorphic sense. That was also the case in physics until relatively recently, for whenever people talked of “force” they turned to the “image” of animal horsepower or human muscular power. The expression *libido* is a better one, being less prejudiced, although in using it one does seem to be following Mephistopheles’ advice in Part I of *Faust*, when he says that we should not bother our heads too much, for when we cannot find the expression, a word always turns up at the right time.

May we never forget that this word is “just an image.” This has been the case in Jung’s works, for after describing a fantasy, a stream of *images*, of a patient in his first great work, *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*,⁴⁰ he felt compelled to set alongside the contents of these images another theory based on *energetics*; this was in the form of his next great work, *On Psychic Energy* (1928), which actually complements his *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* and should be read parallel to it.⁴¹

In 1932, Count Hermann Keyserling published a book under the title *South-American Meditations*. On pages 153/154 he describes a phenomenon that is very typical of the mentality of the South American and is probably due to the climate and also to the racial mixture. He talks about the word *gana*, which corresponds very accurately to what we mean by libido. This is what Keyserling says:

In Argentina I met the first people of whom I could actually say that they could not do what they wanted to. Some of them were tremendously spontaneous; at first I had the impression that they had vivid imaginations and great will-power, but I soon found out that appearances were deceptive. They improvised without any preconceived ideas; they could only do things when they had to. And their will-power was not much stronger than an ability to say no, comparable on another level with the water lily when it pushes away a foreign body. This way of thinking was so different from what I had hitherto regarded as the only possible one, and the meaning behind it only became clear when a friend told me the following tale. She was playing tennis in the country just outside Cordoba and she offered a child one peso per hour to be ball boy. The boy shook his head sadly: *no puedo* (I can’t).—Why not? *Porque no me da la gana* (the *gana* does not move me).

This *gana* is not a just-not-feeling-like-doing-something, which is behind any decision of will that is based on perception; nor is it quite the same as the Spanish *gana*, which does not mean volition either: it is the unconscious primeval force, welling up from inside, and the conscious has no power over it. And the Spanish idea of *gana*, too, does not correspond to any determining content of intellectualized Western consciousness. It means neither volition, nor drive, nor urge, nor instinct nor internal obligation as we understand these words, but rather it is a combination of elementary mental image and blind, organic urge. It includes the fantasy element, which with the so-called volition is the actual creative element, which is why one should not say, "where there's a will, there's a way," but rather, "ideas create reality." On the other hand, what *gana* lacks is the ability to demarcate, to delineate, and because of this lack the actual will has no directives. The function represented by *gana* in the Spanish soul corresponds to what the Germans and the French would call volition. This is why the Spaniard rarely uses the word *voluntad*: in our sense of the term he never *actually wants*. When idea and spontaneous drive coincide, this leads to a powerful dynamic force. Otherwise the Spaniard lets things go; he lives and lets live, enjoys what is going on as a spectator and rejects any serious commitment. If he makes a promise, he works on the assumption that the other party has sufficient tact not to insist that the promise be fulfilled at all costs. Moreover, the fact that *gana* dominates rather than volition means that in Spain initiative comes from the whole nation or is totally absent. Hence there is either faith or indifference, *hazana*, heroic deed, or passiveness. The fact that it was Spain of all countries that brought forth Ignatius de Loyola, whose *Spiritual Exercises* are a true testimony to will-power, fits in with the law of nature that every nation produces its countertype.⁴²

Thus it can be seen that with such people and under these conditions the motivating image or the fantasy is either there or not there, so that the question of will does not even arise. One can almost envy such people! And yet what is going on with them is not completely foreign to us. For although the libido or the *gana* is in the foreground of the phenomenon, the image or the fantasy is in the background, and that is also the case with us. Just think of the all too frequent failure of children at school. It can often be proved that although the foreground is the inability to make abstractions, the background is the lack of fantasy. Of course one must understand that this background remains unconscious and can yet be effective, provided it is not repressed by a conscious exertion of consciousness. To avoid this, our society has various institutions at its disposal, such as chess and card games, which even for mathematicians form a means of fruitful cooperation between foreground and background.

It should be clear by now that a satisfactory libido theory cannot be postulated unless the role of the unconscious is taken into consideration. Let us just recall the example of Julius Robert Mayer (to which I have already referred on several occasions), where the unconscious essentially made itself felt in the form of depressions. One of Jung's basic convictions is the compensatory relation between the conscious and the unconscious. In fact, to be more precise, he saw them as complementary systems.

We have taken the term "potential" from the field of physical energetics, and we can thus talk of a libido potential. All we mean by this is the higher or lower psychological valence of the one content or system compared to the other. The libido flow would then be polarized, always flowing from the higher to the lower level. But this "hydrodynamic approach" does not seem to meet the requirements of the psyche, for the two systems of the conscious and the unconscious, for example, are not "communicating tubes." So one cannot say in advance how high one level or the other is, which means that there is no predicting the direction of the flow of the libido, as would be possible if it were simply a mechanical system. The composition of the libido, or the potential, or the level, cannot be measured but can only be postulated according to this theory, and then in practice the astounding observation must occasionally be made that the current is beginning to flow uphill. An example of what I mean is the following: consciousness can be greatly stimulated or indeed excited by an idea, and one becomes completely fascinated or obsessed by it. This content almost certainly has a maximal libido composition. Then for no apparent reason it suddenly loses all its potential and one realizes that one is depressed. This is what happened to J.R. Mayer time and time again. So it can be seen that borrowing from physics does not make matters any easier to understand, but can actually make them more complicated. This springs from the fact that we cannot really bring the unconscious into the equation because it cannot be adequately measured. On the other hand, one term that has stood the test is the idea of the progression and regression of the libido. This simply refers to where the libido is gravitating at any given moment, without the subject of potential arising. In the case of progression, the libido would be directed at adapting to the *surroundings*, whereas the object of regression is to adapt inwards. So one can claim that when switching from regression to progression, or vice-versa, those contents which were previously paid little or no attention enter into consciousness. It will be clear that such a swing of the pendulum occurs with relatively small amplitudes in normal psychic life, and is in fact what makes up the autonomous or self-regulating activity of the psyche.

More pronounced swings of the pendulum, on the other hand, would correspond to such pathological states as mania (progression) or melancholy (regression).

The above critical observations are not intended to be a pointless attempt to throw out or carry to absurdity any energetic approach to psychology. My concern is to steer clear of the pompous terminology one so often comes across in this sector of our science, and that is why I should like to illustrate with the simplest possible example from everyday life what I have said above about everyone experiencing his psychic energy as a direct force: a young man meets a young woman and they are immediately attracted to each other (note the “physics” terminology!). It is common knowledge that in such cases neither of them can see clearly what the basis is for this energetic phenomenon of attraction, for it is a product of images and fantasies that crop up of their own accord. They may not even cross the threshold of consciousness and yet, as we have already stated, they are still very effective. We have listed their sources above under section 8b, 1–9. Despite their great effectiveness, these images do not need to correspond to the object to the same extent, with the result that later the sobering discovery can be made that one has been “mistaken,” thus betraying the original fantasy nature of one’s conceptions. From the point of view of experience, however, the initial effect remains a force and is probably the same one that Freud tried to demythologize with his term “object libido.”

We remind the reader at this point that the term “energy” had been introduced much earlier into psychological terminology, albeit with a totally different meaning. This is *specific energy*, according to the Berlin physiologist Joh. Müller (1801–1858). The idea stems from the well-known physiological fact that every sensory organ only conveys the sensation that is specific to it, no matter how the stimulus is created. Pressure on the eye (i.e. not light stimulus) produces just as much light sensation as electric stimulation or mechanical stimulation or cutting through the optic nerve. Equally, the ear can only hear, regardless of what modalities it is stimulated with. Müller thus speaks of specific sensory energy. It is perfectly obvious that these stimulus modalities have nothing to do with the term “energy” as such.

Conversely, “psychic energy” should be understood rather in the sense of the *energeia* of Aristotle, where it has the meaning of living reality and effectiveness, actuality as opposed to potentiality. In Aristotle, God alone is all actuality, and his energies are eternal and unchanging. (I cannot help recalling once again J.R. Mayer’s concept of indestructible force). According to Aristotle, everything that happens

is the change from the state of dynamics to that of energy. Matter is pure dynamis.⁴³ As God is all actuality he has no potential and therefore no suffering, no *pathos* and therefore no substance, an important topic with scholars, especially Thomas Aquinas. Just look how far away we are from Einstein's $E = Mc^2$! Purely in passing, I would like to say that serious thought should be given to how the M could be determined in psychology.

CHAPTER IV

THE LOCALIZATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The question of where the actual seat of the conscious is has long been something that has preoccupied humanity, although the terms “psyche” or “soul” have been used more frequently than the word “conscious.” Over the centuries and in different cultures, definitive assumptions have been made about where the conscious is situated. As we shall see, the Greeks argued for centuries about the seat of the stoic *hegemonikon*, the guiding principle of Zeno. These discussions about the seat of the Aristotelian *hegemonikon*, which went on for centuries, are a particularly good example of the uncertainty regarding the whereabouts of anything to do with the psychic. Fortunately M. Putschner has taken great pains to examine the changes in this attitude, so we can refer to her excellent book when necessary.⁴⁴ Concerning the *Orientation Functions of Consciousness* by C.G. Jung (cf. Chapter VIII) we should like to point out that Thomas Aquinas, unlike Avicenna, who postulates five spiritual forces, is convinced that there are four of them. For more information on cerebral localizations we now have a good overview of the subject in the work by Clarke and Dewhurst.⁴⁵

From the viewpoint of analytical psychology, these variations provide material for comparing the stage of development that the conscious has reached in the cultures and nations concerned. Let us make it clear right away that we are not so conceited as to assume that our contemporary Western level of consciousness, and hence the apparent localization of the conscious in the brain, is the highest stage of this

sequence. On the contrary, we are much more inclined to claim that the whole organism is the locus of the psyche and that the localization in specific organs can only be accepted as possible locations for specific aspects of the psyche.

Our scientific approach and methodology have certainly shown that the experimental elimination of the cerebral cortex also brings about the extinguishing of consciousness. But the same empirical research has also shown that the continuity of the psyche is thus also stopped. Moreover, observations have shown that in accidents involving brain trauma, such as bullet wounds in the brain in wartime, for example, psychic processes continue in an apparent state of unconsciousness.⁴⁶ The numerous well-documented cases of out-of-the-body experiences, as collected by Celia Green, for example, are also along these lines.⁴⁷ Actually, they are almost on a parapsychological level, but that should not bother us. We shall return to this later in a different context. The clinical observations of Jantz and Beringer also shed an interesting light on Dunne's observer of the observer. Another aspect of this problem is the rather trivial fact that every night we have the most vivid experiences in what is largely an unconscious state. Of course what this means is that the question of unconsciousness, and hence indirectly that of consciousness, is far from being cleared up. Every doctor has seen at a sickbed that even with the most heavily comatose patient it cannot always be said with certainty that all consciousness and perception has been extinguished. Nevertheless, it is clear that the cortex has a certain priority when it comes to the processes of consciousness, and the sub-cortical processes only have a conditional influence on consciousness.

As the brain, like the skin and the sensory organs, is ectodermal in origin, it is also, among other things, a sensory and perceptive organ; its perceptions are, of course, predominantly optical and acoustic, as can be seen during its activity when it is basically shielded from external stimuli in sleep, i.e. in the dream. Thus the brain is essentially our psychic orientation system, though never the psyche itself.

Let us now look at and compare some of the ancient theories about the localization of consciousness.

1. A well-known one is what many "primitives" refer to as the *bush soul*. They believe that their soul, and hence their innermost identity—we would tend to call it their conscious ego—is located at a certain place in the bush, perhaps in a certain animal, tree or stone. In other words it would be *extra corpus*. This, of course, does present certain dangers because it means that the soul can easily be separated from its owner. This will make him physically and psychically ill and he can even die, for the soul possesses a so-called *participation* with him, or

he with it. So the medicine man has to fetch it back, and one of the ways that happens is as follows: the medicine man goes into the bush with a birdcage and cages some "soul birds" that have escaped. On his return the patient lies on the floor and the cage is opened. The cage is some distance away from the patient's head and there is a trail of seeds leading from one to the other, with the last one being on the patient's brow. When the birds are released they peck their way along this trail and the bird to take the last grain of seed, the one on the patient's brow, is regarded as his escaped soul bird; it has thus become integrated again with the sufferer and the "loss of soul," the illness, is cured. There are numerous examples of this kind. This localization of the soul outside the body, which is typical of the primitive, and the ensuing "participation," give rise to many other psychic effects of people on external objects and vice-versa.⁴⁸ There they are taken for granted, but from our point of view they have to be looked on as purely parapsychological, i.e., as psychokinesis. They also remind us of the ancient doctrine of sympathy, but this still leaves us with the unsolved question of the subject/object relation. There are especially difficult problems when the two are physically separated without there being any known channels through which the effect can be conveyed. Even in our society, by the way, in certain "mystic" atmospheres such concepts of sympathy arise very easily and have considerable poetic merit.

If we are going to pursue this theory of localization on a comparative basis, it is the anatomy, i.e., the body, that will be our frame of reference, and we shall work our way through it stage by stage.

2. Localizations in the *bladder* and *rectum* would be regarded by us as the most primitive. Yet there are phases in life (infancy) in which these areas dominate in importance or then assume it again more or less pathologically. One tends to think of the "mentality" of the dog, for example.

3. For the next stage, the *stomach* is a characteristic organ. I am not referring to that category for whom satisfying the stomach is the be all and end all of existence and even less to the fact that there are still nations for whom the stilling of hunger is given top priority. Yet there were civilizations where people were only motivated to go hunting, for example, when the pangs of hunger could no longer be staved off.

And in German we say that we only really become aware of something when it starts to "lie on one's stomach" (*auf dem Magen liegen*). The solar plexus, which lies at this level on the aorta, seems to be a sort of organ of expression for many contents of the psyche. According to what Laurens van der Post has told me there are impressive examples of this with the bush men. At vast distances they can perceive and thus

predict the approach of strangers because they feel a warning “tapping” in the pits of their stomachs, and this almost certainly comes from the solar plexus.

4. The *diaphragm*, from the Greek *phren*, can be seen as the localization of the psyche in the passage in the *Iliad* where Achilles kills Hector:

Hector knew the truth in his heart and spoke aloud:
—*Iliad* XXII.296

Today in psychiatry we talk of schizo *phrenia*, the illness that most seriously affects consciousness, but in doing so we do not intend to convey any indications of localization. In the Roman world the diaphragm was regarded as the seat of thinking and feeling. Another name for it is *praecordia* and it is said of it that “*intima praecordia movit*” when something especially moving happens.

5. Today for us we regard the *heart* as the real seat of the soul, and not just as a poetic metaphor, at least in so far as it makes its presence felt through strong feelings and passions. With the Greeks the corresponding expression is *thymos* and actually means “the breath of life,” in Latin *passio*, *affectus* or *perturbatio*, in other words, effects that are part and parcel of our being human. See Volume II, p. 50, for information on the heart as seat of the *koinon aistheterion*, the central organ of sense and feeling in Aristotle.

6. For modern-day man the highest stage in this hierarchy is the *brain*. This localization can hardly be disputed but does not at all exclude the fact that the lower stages can also be represented in the brain. It is even less the case that the brain will ever succeed in completely controlling or rendering ineffective the lower localizations. That would mean we had lost direct contact with our biological and psychic prerequisites and had turned into formidable sub- or superhumans. We can safely say that the purely brain-computer controlled state of being a robot is an absurd extrapolation. The *whole* man is the one who functions correctly and in proportion on at least these six levels: brain, heart, diaphragm, stomach, intestines and bladder, and, finally, even *extra corpus*.

In a private seminar in 1930, C.G. Jung presented the case of a patient who had done active imagination in the course of analysis and had produced drawings and pictures. These had made an extremely odd impression and Jung only started to understand them when he read a book that was first published in 1918. This was *The Serpent Power* by Sir John Woodroffe, alias Arthur Avalon.⁴⁹ The book gives the Sanskrit text with an English translation of the *Shatchakranirupana* (Description of the Six Centers) and is basically a Yoga meditation text. It is

the Bengali-South India Tantra Yoga, sometimes known as Kundalini Yoga. Tantra here simply means “book,” and thus Tantrism consists of Yoga sects who have their holy books, just as we have the Bible. Kundalini has the form of a coiled and sleeping serpent and, as can be very clearly seen from the text and from meditation, symbolizes psychic energy, or libido. In the Yoga process, this energy is circulated round the whole body, and in this respect bears a striking similarity to the “Circulation of Light” in Chinese Taoism so accurately described by Erwin Rousselle.⁵⁰ In this process the Kundalini flows through the seven *chakras* (*chakra* is Sanskrit for center), which are presented as localized hierarchically in different centers of the body. These localizations bear striking analogies to those we have described above, which we arrived at quite independently both from clinical observations and from the fields of comparative history of religion and ethnology.

The fact that this Western method of approach is closely similar to that in the East is not just a confirmation, but should lead us to see for ourselves that the fundamental psycho-biological aspects of mankind are more or less the same everywhere. In other words, what emerges is that in Jung’s language the facts of the collective unconscious are the same everywhere, that is, archetypal. But let us not lose sight of the fact that in the East their representations are much more strongly differentiated than with us, because of thousands of years of tradition, observation and experience of the body in the East; and so we have a lot to learn from them.

Far be it from us to make propaganda for Yoga, for our spiritual background is too different from that of the East for us to really be able to adopt Indian philosophy. When the Shakta (a member of the Bengali Tantra sect) says “he who makes honor without fighting against the powers of the world and against tradition does not achieve his aim but brings about his downfall,” then this shows us that this attitude is identical with that which Jung felt was necessary for analysis, but it also shows us that Yoga is the specifically *Indian way* to the introspective handling of experience.

I shall now attempt to list the seven centers, making use of Avalon’s text, but I shall have to leave out many details, simply concentrating on those which help to make some things clear for us in the West.

I shall just give the basic details of the description of the chakras in the following order: 1. the Sanskrit name of the center; 2. localization in the body; 3. where this is feasible, the corresponding localization of ganglia of the vegetative nervous system, with which we are familiar, for if it is possible to categorize them in this way, it would be easier for us to allow these centers a certain degree of psychic representation;



Fig. 5
Localization of the 7 chakras
in the body




Fig. 7
2. chakra Svadhisthana




Fig. 8
3. chakra Manipura



Fig. 9
4. chakra Anahata




Fig. 10
5. chakra Visuddha




Fig. 11
6. chakra Ajna



Fig. 12
7. (final, highest) chakra Sahasrara

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Name	translation	location	ganglia	element	petals	animal
1. Muladhara	root support	perineum	plexus pelvicus	earth	4	elephant
2. Svadhisthana	own place	bladder	plexus hypogastricus	water	6	makara
3. Manipura	jewel abundance	navel	plexus coeliacus seu solaris	fire	10	ram
4. Anahata	unassailable	heart	plexus cardiacus	air	12	antelope
5. Visuddha	purification	larynx	plexus pharyngeus	ether	16	white elephant
6. Ajna	episteme	between the eyes	pineal gland		2	none
7. Sahasrana	pure consciousness	on the scalp- extra corpus	none	the void	1000	none

Cf. Figs. 1–8

4. the assignment according to the “elements”; and 5. the number of petal leaves of the corresponding lotus, i.e. chakra, without going into the finely differentiated number and letter symbolism that operates in India (anyone interested in this body of lore, and it is certainly worth looking at, should consult another work of Avalon’s: *The Garland of Letters*,⁵¹ where he goes into detail about the mystical aspect of the phonetic symbol); lastly, 6. the corresponding animal symbol.

What the Yogi is supposed to do is to meditate these centers from bottom to top, one after the other, not only to imagine them in every detail, but to build them up out of the elements and make them present in physical terms, and realize them in *dhyana*, or “sinking,” a way which we cannot really understand. What I think becomes what thinks me; I am thought. The energy or libido necessary for this process comes from the Kundalini sleeping in the lowest center, which now wakes up and is gradually driven upward through the other centers, where it leads to realization, an almost physical perception of the *chakra* concerned. Every earlier level is preserved and taken up to the next one. Once at the top, one turns round and successively dismantles each level till the Kundalini is once again at rest in the Muladhara. Then the Yogi returns to his daily round.

This hierarchy inevitably reminds one of Hughlings Jackson’s “progressive cerebration” referred to in Volume II, for they have much in common, even though they have entirely different starting points.⁵²

Going back to the patient we mentioned earlier, whose drawings were so Tantric in character, C.G. Jung brought in an expert to explain them. This was J. W. Hauer (Tübingen), a scholar of Indian culture and Sanskrit who was invited to a private seminar in 1932, with Jung giving a psychological commentary on the proceedings. I am in the fortunate position of being able to draw on those discussions.

1. In *Muladhara*, the lowest level, we are, psychologically speaking, on the conscious level of our everyday existence, of family, profession, and so on. The four lotus petals symbolize material reality in its entirety, which is why the element of earth is assigned to this chakra. As we are very close to this reality, the state here is an almost latent one, where all that is divine still slumbers, as does the Kundalini. All she does is hum gently “like a swarm of lovesick bees,” coiled three and a half times round the Linga (phallus), her head covering the entrance to the Sushumna, the door of Brahman (the lingam reminds us of our diagram, Fig. 4, on p. 35). The animal symbol here is the elephant, which for India signifies domesticated libido. The next stage now is to arouse the Kundalini and galvanize her into action.

2. *Svadhishthana*. There are two symbols here which, like the element of water, clearly represent the unconscious: the crescent moon and the Makara, an alligator-like animal. The latter can be recognized as a sort of leviathan, the reverse, as it were, of the elephant of the *Muladhara*. Let us here remind the reader of what was said in Chapter III about the shadow as the first stage in coming to terms with the unconscious as part of the process of becoming conscious. What is true for us in the West is expressed here in the East as a necessity, in that negative tendencies have to be accepted as a prerequisite for increased consciousness.

3. *Manipura*. The picture shows a crucible on the fire and its symbolic animal is a ram, which corresponds to Agni, the Lord of Fire. (In our astrology, too, the ram is the house of Mars, and Mars is closely related to Agni.) The chakra is assigned to the element of fire. And in the *bindu*, the dot on top of the inscribed Sanskrit letter, we find Rudra, the destroyer of creation, for the inflaming of passions threatens to destroy everything again. We are reminded here of Heraclitus when he says: “It is difficult to fight against desire, for it will purchase what it wants with the soul.”⁵³ This is the *thymos*, the affect, a purely emotional psychology, where one is only conscious of the things that “make one’s blood boil,” that affect one’s stomach (hunger) or bile. In other words, this is a state of lack of freedom, and yet also the beginning of a real psychology. But we are still below the diaphragm, and conscious psychology only begins above this level.

4. *Anahata* means “unassailable,” which refers to the symbol that now appears for the first time, that of the “self,” the Indian Atman. The term “self” coined by Jung represents a center of the personality, and has been exhaustively described in the phenomenology of the Atman in Indian philosophy. The element here is air, for out of earth (1) comes water (2) and out of this, by means of fire (3), comes air (4). The element air is represented by the lungs, where the heart is embedded. And the symbol animal of the antelope, noted for its fleetness, represents air as well. From the neurophysiological point of view, we are now on the level of the partially conscious control of the functions, of which breathing is obviously one. Man is now beginning to reflect, to judge, to make distinctions. He is becoming capable of removing himself from the pure affect. At the same time he is now for the first time becoming aware of his impersonal side (self-Atman). Only now have we reached the starting point of our conscious psychology. It is also probably at this level that Christian mysticism is to be understood. The self is something that is extraordinarily impersonal, and by looking at it as something objective one becomes impersonal oneself. What we call personality disappears. However, the risk for us in the West is that identification with the self, which amounts to an inflation, a sort of delusion of grandeur, is such a dangerous thing that no warning about it can be too strong. I remember an experience that Jung had with the Pueblo Indians in Taos, New Mexico, which made a deep impression on him. His Pueblo friend was complaining about the Americans, saying that they were all crazy, for they claimed that they thought here (pointing to his brow) whereas everybody knows that we think here (pointing to his heart).

5. *Visuddha*. Due to our Western way of looking at things, it will now become increasingly difficult to have a clear idea of which psychic characteristics we are talking about in these higher centers. Visuddha is assigned to the element ether, of which we can say that it is a material and yet not a material, thus a purely abstract concept, and so making this chakra one of pure concepts, or purely psychic. This also makes it the chakra of the *reality of the psychic* altogether, and unfortunately it now moves into loftier spheres where we have little to say on the subject. Today Western man seems to be roughly on the level of Anahata. At this level the world and its events seem to be an image of our own psyche, of our own individual internal drama. Phonetic sound, language and singing belong here for the Indian. In bindu we see Arddhanarishvara, an androgynous god who is both sun and moon, gold and silver, thus uniting elementary opposites.

6. *Ajna* is the place of union, the *unio mystica*. There are no longer any animal symbols, for at this level psychic experience no longer needs support in external reality. Not even God can be found here, for through the *unio mystica* the Yogi himself has become the psychic content of God, which means he is himself the content of the psychic. The *lingam* crops up once again here, but as *itara siva*, a different lingam, which has nothing in common with the lingam of the first level except the form. We must be perfectly frank and admit that all of this is barely conceivable for our Western mentality.

7. *Sahasrara*. What we have just said is even more true of this center. But here there is an interesting paradox: here there is a void, *sunyātā*, of which it is said: "That is the place where all being is no longer being. Only now is realness attained. Whoever goes totally into the void arrives at total fullness. Only when this void has been achieved does the knowledge that has been acquired on the way become real." For here there is only Brahman. And Brahman cannot experience itself, for it is *a-dvaita*, "not two." It is not-being being, which means the same thing as the idea of Nirvana, which is *nir-dvandva*, meaning free of opposites. As a result of the union that has taken place in Sahasrara between the Kundalini (Shakti) and Shiva, which amounts to a sacred marriage (*hieros gamos*), there flows from here a stream of nectar. This nectar signifies total liberation, so that the Yogi now enjoys the blissful state of *advaya* (where there is no second one), and is therefore identical with Kundalini.

What makes it impossible for us to judge here is the difficulties we have with the metaphysical speculation, so beloved by the Indians, on the concept of perception with no objective opposite. As W. Pauli so accurately says, it has to be rejected by us as an untenable extrapolation, for our consciousness presupposes the duality of subject and object and the split between them. Pauli concludes that the situation with us in the West is that we focus on the idea of the unconscious instead of on the idea of an objectless pan-consciousness. We should not overlook the fact that with Sahasrara we once again find ourselves outside the body, a situation that is curiously reminiscent of the *extra corpus* localization of the "bush soul" of the primitives. We could actually draw a curve as the Tantrists do, and move from the bush soul of the primitive, which is completely outside the body, over the caudal end, through various levels, which get higher and higher, until we reach the cranial end and are once again outside the body.

The linking factor for us is the libido and its circulation, which makes itself felt here in the way it affects the body, or various organs. Let us

not forget that this is the origin of the term "affect." But we have always known in the West that this is not the whole activity of the psyche. On this subject I should like to quote the words of an alchemist:

*Corpus enim nihil scit, quicquid in corpore fortitudinis sive motus est, mens facit ista; corpus tantum est menti sicut instrumenta alicujus artificis. Anima autem, qua homo a caeteris animalibus differt, illa operatur in corpore, sed majorem operationem habet extra corpus; quoniam absolute extra corpus dominatur.*⁵⁴

For the body knows nothing about what is in it as regards strength and movement; that is what the spirit does; the body is to the spirit no more than the instrument to the artist. The soul, however, which is what distinguishes man from other living creatures, has those functions in the body, but it is outside the body that it has a more significant effect, because it is outside the body that it is a force unto itself . . .

And Gerardus Dorneus says: *mentis a corpore distractio necessaria est.* ("The spirit must be separated from the body.")⁵⁵ More recently we have found out about a gnostic early Christian passage in the same spirit: "Jesus said: woe betide the flesh (*sarx*) that depends on the soul (*psyche*); woe betide the soul that depends on the flesh."⁵⁶

Recently Tantrism seems to have made a deep impression on the West, with the result that the Tantric texts are now more accessible in English and other Western European languages.

We are of the opinion that everything that has been written and said in the West about stages and levels of consciousness is illustrated in an interesting way and given an empirical basis by these experiences and our Jungian way of looking at them.

CHAPTER V

THE THEORY OF AFFECTS

There is a clear and obvious connection between the comments in the last chapter and what A. Adler⁵⁷ referred to in 1907 as “the language of the organs.” Adler’s studies were related to evidence of the fact that in a disturbed organism psychic contents only reached the level of consciousness when they made their presence felt affectively.

Unfortunately the effect is rather naively equated with the cause and, as we have seen in Volume I, things are not so simple as that.⁵⁸ In a certain sense the effect is hypostatized. Purely phenomenologically at any rate, a certain organ is *affected* by an initially unknown, unconscious content, and this is identical with the emotion perceived. It used to be said that the organ was irradiated. It would be opportune here to take a serious look at the James-Lange theory of affects.⁵⁹ What is certain at any rate is that an emotion (*e-motio*) is felt as a movement which has to be restrained—it is felt as an immediate force whose libidinous nature is clear; vice-versa, libido is perceived directly as power.

It is for these reasons that the theory of affects has been a concern of mankind since ancient times, and of course even today it is still an issue with the Doctors of the Church, where it has led directly to the drawing up of the catalogue of vices.

Affect, like the Greek *pathos*, Latin *passio* and *perturbatio*, is felt as an excessive animation (*motio*) of the soul and therefore regarded as subhuman. This is why Plato considers it the lowest of the three parts

of the soul. Ever since Democritus, there has been a demand for harmonious, imperturbable tranquility. *Adiaphora*, *Eudamonia* and *Harmonia* are largely synonymous. In connection with our discussion of the libido as a force, *e-motio* as movement, and the question as to the origins of this energy, it is interesting to see that the Stoa describes the affect as *kinesis alogos*, that is, a movement whose mechanism is not understood. This takes us back indirectly to the unsolved problem of the relation between the psyche and the physis. Later the *pneuma* was introduced as a third factor, and Philo was convinced that its origins were purely metaphysical.

As the affect is a fire, an inflammation, Aristotle and the Peripatetic School recommend a *metriopatheia*, curbing the passions (a recommendation endorsed by the Latin Academics Krantor and Cicero). The Cynics and the Stoics made stronger demands; what they sought was Apathy, an extermination of the affects in human beings, something which Christians would say only God could achieve. But this raises problems about the wrath of God in the Old Testament, which was an important issue with the Gnostics, who wondered about the peace of God. Origenes spoke about the affects in images of demons, wild animals and fire. Freedom and release from these affects led to moderation and reflectiveness, characteristics regarded by the Greeks as the mark of the wise man. This ideal became somewhat more humane with the Christians, especially with St. Augustine, who modestly demanded that the affects should be "guided aright." There are doubtless sound foundations, based on empirical experience, for Galen's view that we breathe in order to cool down the heart (emotional excitement) and to curb the affects. It reminds us of the Indian breathing exercises (*pranayama*) in Yoga, and hence what was said earlier about Anahata.

As we can see, the theory of affects was a central issue in ancient times and has been the subject of lengthy discussion in various schools of philosophy. In medicine and in culture, too, excessive swings in emotion are treated more sympathetically. Music is particularly important in this respect. I have examined elsewhere the therapeutic significance of music and do not wish to repeat myself, except to remind the reader that in the *Asclepieia*, music was regarded as having great therapeutic benefits.⁶⁰ Music acts as a catharsis and a natural outlet for pent-up emotions. The theater is also important as a therapeutic institution, and as such was discussed at length in Volume II.⁶¹ So people had a wide variety of means at their disposal in order to bring about transformation. Oddly enough these were later largely forgotten, and what was recommended instead was a living out of the affects as the only reasonable and healthy course of behavior. Only in monastic

life and in the East has the asceticism necessary for maintaining mental calmness been in any way cultivated.

Only thanks to recent clinical observations have people once again become aware of the psychic and somatic consequences of fluctuations of the libido, and thus gone on to demand psychosomatic medicine. Forensic psychiatry has also been obliged to look more seriously at the question of to what extent considered reflection, free self-determination and insight can be cancelled out by spontaneous outbursts of emotion.

Conventional representations of the psychology of consciousness tend to ignore the field of the affects. Yet it will be clearly seen from what we said earlier that there can be no understanding of consciousness without taking into consideration the emotions as a source of psychic dynamics. In the light of complex psychology, apathy, for example, would amount to a total lack of vitality and hence a state of maximum entropy, a sort of death warmed up. This is why it has been necessary in this chapter to repeat some of the things we have said earlier, for it is only here that emotion really comes into its own in the understanding of the dynamics of consciousness.

CHAPTER VI

THE ADAPTIVE MECHANISMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Earlier on, in the discussion on attentiveness (pp. 18–19) and later, in the analysis of fantasy (pp. 35–36) we came face to face with the fact that the libido has the possibility of being directed towards two diametrical poles. The predominance of one or the other in different people can represent a habitual one-sided attitude. C.G. Jung realized this very early on, and it seemed to him to be the characteristic feature of the two corresponding types. This is why, in one of his first major works, *Psychological Types*, published in 1921, Jung embarked on systematic research into this phenomenon, which culminated in the identification of the two attitude types of “extraversion” and “introversion.” These terms had been proposed by Jung at the Psychoanalytical Congress in Munich in 1913,⁶² and then were first published in 1915 in French and English, but oddly enough not in German.⁶³ Jung also gave extracts from his work on this subject in an appendix to the second German edition of *Der Inhalt der Psychose*.⁶⁴

In the meantime these terms have fallen into popular usage, although the number of readers of this fundamental book is probably comparatively small. The terms are also an accepted feature of scientific discussion, a subject to which we shall return later. Here they are examined on the basis of psychological-statistical testing methods, with the results of one test being “validated” by those of a different one. One hopes that in this way they would attempt to come closer to Jung’s original definitions, to organize the methods more specifically. This is extremely

difficult, for normally anyone who draws up such a test has an unconscious preference or contempt for one or the other attitude types, and he automatically falls into one of the categories. It is not clear whether statistical methods will make it possible to eliminate this bias. One theoretical prerequisite might be that anyone drawing up such a test would have to have gone through sufficient Jungian analysis for this prejudice to be compensated. Investigations that have taken place on the basis of the one genuine Jungian method of testing still leave room for doubt as to whether they have managed to achieve this neutrality.⁶⁵

However, there can be no disputing the reality of Jung's attitude typology as a basic principle of distinction between polar manifestations of human consciousness. Most of the everyday and age-old human problems that crop up in all situations can be traced back to this question. But whenever there is a growth of consciousness there can be a solution to the problem, and this alone should suffice to make us realize the significance of this issue. In *Psychological Types*, Jung gave a large number of comparative historical amplifications on the subject, so there is little reason in belaboring the point here by repeating them. There is just one aspect that we shall dwell on later on because it has given rise to arguments over the centuries and is therefore particularly instructive.

To begin with, I should like to try to explain the basic situation by means of a diagram that Jung himself made use of in his lectures:




Fig. 13

The ego is situated in the center of the field of consciousness. It sheds its "spotlight" either particularly on the objects of the surroundings, the external objects, or particularly on the objects of the inner world, the inner objects. In the first case the object or the system of reference of the ego is the world, the collective conscious; in the second case the object or system of reference of the ego is the subject itself, i.e. his inner world and its background, the collective unconscious.

With a little practice we can soon see in our dealings with people whether the spotlight is usually turned more on the external or the inner objects. The two attitude types could be characterized briefly as follows:

The Extravert: For him the main thing is the bright and brilliant world, with its wide variety of contents. The dark inner world with its reactive, passive character seems to vanish away, is dimmed and repressed. Everything happens during the day and for the day. His most important aim is his activities and thereby drawing attention to himself, having an effect on others and seeking effect in others. Everything that is good and worthwhile is external, in the immediate and distant surroundings. Meister Eckehart says:⁶⁶

The man who does not have God within him but has to seek him outside, by means of certain works, people or places, does not actually have him. Then something can easily happen that disturbs him. He is not just disturbed by bad company but by good company, too, not just by the street but also by the church, not just by bad words and deeds but by good ones. For the obstacle lies within him: God has not yet come into the world in him. If that were the case, he would feel well and secure in all places and with all people: he would always have God.

Thus the extravert “has God outside.” This extraverted attitude is conveyed vividly in Schiller’s “Ode to Joy”:

All men shall be brothers,
Where your gentle wing does hover.
Approach, ye millions, and embrace!
To the whole world my kiss shall swell!

This attitude also appears in the final chorus of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, although it must be said that Beethoven comes over as genuine, whereas Schiller does not, for he behaves like a false extravert here, as can be seen in the tastelessness of his verse.

The Introvert: He is not terribly interested in the dazzling glare of the world of sunshine. What does impress him is the *impression itself*. What concerns him is the actual suffering of the impression, especially that which this too bright world creates in the dark depths of his inmost being. The main thing for him is what this dark inner being reactively sends out to consciousness. We can hear him saying something on these lines: “True, the sun is shining, as it does every day, but I feel wonderful.” Often it is a subjectivism that seems to be almost an illness. Freud uses the term “narcist” (instead of narcissist!), but it transpires that the definition cannot be made compatible with that of the introvert, for Freud’s view is that the subjectivism of the narcissist starts from the ego. With Jung, however, the introverted subjectivism is given with the presence of what

he calls the “subjective factor,” so that the ego would actually be its victim. This subjective factor can be described as follows: between the perception of the object and the introvert’s own action there is a subjective view that is interposed over the perception. The introvert selects the subjective determinants as the decisive factors and is therefore oriented by “that factor in perception and cognition which responds to the sense stimuli in accordance with the individual’s subjective disposition.” For the introvert, “the world exists not just in itself but also as it appears to me.” Jung also says: “If we were to ignore the subjective factor, it would be a complete denial of the great doubt as to the possibility of absolute cognition.”⁶⁷ Positivism seems to make precisely this mistake:

By overvaluing our capacity for objective cognition we repress the importance of the subjective factor, which simply means a denial of the subject. But what is the subject? The subject is man himself—we are the subject. Only a sick mind could forget that cognition must have a subject, and that there is no knowledge whatever and therefore no world at all unless “I know” has been said, though with this statement one has already expressed the subjective limitation of all knowledge.

This applies to all psychic functions: they have a subject which is just as indispensable as the object. It is characteristic of our present extraverted sense of values that the word “subjective” usually sounds like a reproof; at all events the epithet “merely subjective” is brandished like a weapon over the head of anyone who is not boundlessly convinced of the absolute superiority of the object. We must therefore be quite clear as to what “subjective” means in this inquiry. By the subjective factor I understand that psychological action or reaction which merges with the effect produced by the object and so gives rise to a new psychic datum. In so far as the subjective factor has, from the earliest times and among all peoples, remained in large measure constant, elementary perceptions and cognitions being almost universally the same, it is a reality that is just as firmly established as the external object. If this were not so, any sort of permanent and essentially unchanging reality would be simply inconceivable, and any understanding of the past would be impossible. In this sense, therefore, the subjective factor is as ineluctable a datum as the extent of the sea and the radius of the earth. By the same token, the subjective factor has all the value of a co-determinant of the world we live in, a factor that can on no account be left out of our calculations. It is another universal law, and whoever bases himself on it has a foundation as secure, as permanent, and as valid as the man who relies on the object. But just as the object and the objective data do not remain permanently the same, being perishable and subject to chance, so too, the subjective factor is subject to variation and individual hazards. For this reason its value is also merely relative.⁶⁸

After these generalizations, I should now like to attempt to describe the two attitudes types more closely by drawing up a list of their characteristics, showing how they complement each other.

<i>Extravert</i>	<i>Introvert</i>
active	passive
unhesitating	hesitating
obliging	critical
friendly	unfriendly
warm	cold
optimistic	pessimistic
confident	clumsy
sympathy	stubbornness
joining in	enduring
candid	
enthusiastic	reserved
apparent impulsiveness	rejection of
flightiness	external influence
wanting to make	
an impression	anxious, cautious
exerting influence	
organizing	headstrong, defiant
dynamic	distrustful
exercizing power	listless
activity	apathy
empathy	
expectations from the	
outside world	haughtiness
readiness to help	
courage to the point of	
recklessness	unfriendliness
extravagance	greed
mimicry with movement	mimicry without movement
collectivism	individualism
sense of community	no sense of community
forward	restrained
tactless	tactful
indiscreet	discreet
unaware of form	aware of form
vague	precise
aimless	sense of purpose
talkative	taciturn
ruthless	considerate
superficial	thorough
vulgar	distinguished
dependent	independent

On the basis of Jung's "General Description of Types" in Chapter X of *Psychological Types*, it would be relatively easy to draw up longer and more detailed catalogues of introverted versus extraverted behaviors. As early as 1924 M. Freyd,⁶⁹ inspired by the English translation of *Psychological Types*, made an attempt to do this.⁷⁰ All the later proposals about setting up typological tests on introversion and extraversion are derived from this.

Greater efforts have been made recently by Jungians to validate the Gray-Wheelwright Test and to improve its selectivity, but this work is still going on. All these efforts will only really pay off when they can be applied to the clarification of the dynamics of the psyche. What is meant by this is the conclusions that this will lead to as regards human understanding and the so-called technique of analysis. I should like to refer to my 1970 article on this subject (see the Bibliographical Appendix, entry 67), although I must point out that there are still no statistical data as yet, and these could only be supplied by comprehensive analysis of psychological tests.

The value of such lists for psychological testing comes from the setting up of characteristics as pairs of opposites. We can then draw up a questionnaire which calls for either/or answers. One would have to decide which of the two characteristics one felt to be applicable to oneself. Anyone reading the above list will have automatically looked at it this way, anyway, and made a spontaneous diagnosis for or against extraversion or introversion.

The possibility for diagnosis concerning typological affiliation is based on the following fact, which is part and parcel of this affiliation: for example, if I am introverted, regardless of whether I am aware of it or not, then I shall quite naively regard as unpleasant, disagreeable and inferior those characteristics of the extravert which are placed opposite the characteristics I regard as appropriate for myself as an introvert. Just by doing this I have shown that I am an introvert, for one automatically assumes that one's own attitude is the right one. This somewhat naive reflex prevails even when there is a high degree of consciousness, and is evidence of the tenacity of the conscious attitude, which, of course, from an objective vantage point, always means one-sidedness. This leads to all sorts of misunderstandings and misinterpretations, both individually and collectively, the classical example of the former being marriage.

There developed an immediate popular interest in Jung's two attitude types (introverted and extraverted). In particular, the psychology oriented to diagnosis of personality has made the concept its own, and it has crept into everyday language as well.

In the passage from *Psychological Types* quoted earlier, it is clear from the way Jung describes introversion that he is trying to “defend the honor” of the introvert, and thereby, of course, giving himself away. This is confirmed by later biographical details. However, all his life he tried to develop his extraversion and to live it out when appropriate. As we shall see later, in Volume IV, one of the requirements of individuation is that one should learn to understand the opposite attitude and those who share it. But this is no easy task for, as we stated earlier, this attitude dominates, even when there is a high degree of consciousness. This can be seen clearly in the cases of Freud and Adler: Jung showed with unmistakable clarity that Freud’s basic concepts stem from an extraverted attitude, those of Adler from an introverted one.⁷² The level of consciousness of the two pioneers was undeniably high, and yet each felt that the other’s point of view was incompatible with his own, q.e.d. Any objective observer can see how regrettable this is. What is even more regrettable is that neither Freud nor Adler made use of Jung’s proposal. The two attitudes seem to be irreconcilable opposites, for the acknowledgment of the opposing type by either one would mean that at least half of one’s own universe would collapse.

Jung’s psychology is always complex, for he never forgets that in our mental account book there are no separate columns for rational factors on the one hand and irrational ones on the other. This is also proved by the fact that there is no such thing as a “pure type.” Every person has characteristics of his opposite type, albeit to a slight degree. These characteristics remain essentially unconscious, and so when they emerge they are felt as nothing more than a complication or an embarrassing disturbance. As the conscious attitude, being the habitual orientation of the libido, is taken for granted and functions quite “automatically,” it does not force one to reflect. Either/or questions, however, such as appear in psychological tests, also automatically constellate the opposite type by means of puzzle questions. One starts to reflect and discovers that actually one “might be different.” This can affect the decision and hence the experiment.

With a certain amount of psychological knowledge and the acquisition of experience, it is not difficult to diagnose the attitude type of a person at sight. I have been struck by the fact that even with a small child, if not an infant, it is possible to make a diagnosis. This would seem to indicate that there are genetic factors involved, but this question has not been tackled at all. And yet this supposition is given some support by Kretschmer’s observations on the link between body structure and character.⁷³ Kretschmer reached his conclusions at the same time Jung was working out his typology, so that it can be said that their

views support each other although they were arrived at independently. Jung, however, did not wish to stress this connection too much, because he felt that introversion or extraversion were to be understood as a purely *psychic* phenomenon. It is the dominant orientation that steers the libido: with extraversion it is towards external objects, with introversion it is towards inner objects, more precisely to the “subjective factor.” If this were genetically determined it would be a permanent factor, but clinical experience shows that this is not the case. For many people, in the course of their lives and as their consciousness grows, there is a decline in the valence of the original attitude and the opposite attitude gains in importance. In most cases this is a gradual process. People learn from their experience with others that the opposite type also has a right to exist, that it is also right. In making the first attempts at walking in this direction, one becomes more tolerant and more understanding. However, it is possible for the change to be more dramatic, in the form of a breakthrough, although this may lead to clinical side effects. More will be said about this in Volume IV.

The irrational presence of one’s own introverted or extraverted point of view, which, as experience shows, is never seriously considered by the bearer, was described by Jung as follows: “for the introvert the *numinal accent* is carried *a priori* by the inner object, for the extravert by the external object.” What this is intended to convey is that the predominance of inner or external objects with the two attitudes is determined by a given fascination, something we are familiar with from the numinous objects of Rudolf Otto.⁷⁴ This will be dealt with at greater length in Volume IV.

CHAPTER VII

THE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE OPPOSITION OF INTROVERSION AND EXTRAVERSION IN THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION

Every psychiatrist is confronted with the inexhaustible and often confusing variety of basic human attitudes, and this often compels him to become aware of and to adopt decisive attitudes of his own. The "compass" of typology can be of invaluable assistance for the following reasons:

1. Only when what is initially a confusing abundance of relatively elementary phenomena can be arranged in order is it possible to have an overview and to make them more easy to understand. The typology of attitude has this advantage of simplicity. Attitude is elementary and does not need to be reduced to something simpler. The element is clearly enough defined: it is *a priori* the dominant orientation of the libido. The attitude is a fact that seems to be given at birth, or at least it behaves as though that is the case. Practical psychology need not pursue the question any further here, although it might be of interest to geneticists. Yet if this question is to be cleared up, it would be necessary to have a reliable test to record the attitude type. We have already stressed that the attitude type is not completely free from the influence of the surroundings, but that probably applies to all psychical factors. Is it not mainly through these that man is in a state of reciprocal action with his surroundings?

2. In the psychiatrist's consulting room an attempt is made towards genuine human understanding. This naturally involves opposing attitudes between doctor and patient. If the psychiatrist has the same

attitude as the patient, it is easy to reach an understanding. But this does not teach the patient to get along better with people who are completely opposite in nature. This ability can only be acquired with a partner of the opposite type. Thus the analyst must, if necessary, be able to turn himself “upside down.” This, of course, presupposes that the analyst himself has acquired an understanding of how to do this. Jung’s attitude typology automatically means that any future analyst must go through a “training analysis,” and in fact Jung was the first to introduce this idea, mainly because of his findings in the field of typology. Freud accepted this at once and without reservation.

3. This “teaching analysis” can be viewed as a model for the necessary development of the personality and for its adaptation to reality. As we have said on several occasions, pathology is a borderline case in this respect. Adaptation presupposes understanding other people and other things. In this sense, attitude typology has proved to be a very useful prescription, if not actually a panacea. This statement should not be taken as easygoing optimism. We are very well aware that there is enormous resistance to “turning oneself upside down.” For as we said in the introduction, acceptance of the opposite is a problem that is both painful and full of moral implications. This can be seen in the fact that the extrapolation from the psychiatrist’s consulting room onto the “healthy” human situation is of often regarded as unacceptable by the equally “healthy” human instinct.

We realize that, with the three points referred to, we have outlined a whole program for the acquisition of consciousness. We can only go into this more thoroughly when we have also dealt with the functions of consciousness in Chapter VIII. But let it be said at this point that anyone concerned with realizing his wholeness as a human being will not be spared the task of having to come to terms with his opposite attitude. That this possibility exists is based on the fact that each and every one of us participates in all that is human, to a greater or lesser degree (i.e. consciously or unconsciously). And we can also refer to Matthew 25,45:

Verily I say unto you: Inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of these least, ye did it not unto me.

If we now turn to the subject matter of this chapter, then basically we are pursuing a historical amplification of Jung’s concept of extraversion and introversion, as set out by him in his book on psychological types. This amplification is related mainly to the medieval *universals dispute*, which has been a bone of contention for centuries. But this historical perspective should not prevent us from looking at many of

the problems in the Western world today from this point of view. Ideally, the understanding of this one historical problem of opposites, from the point of view of attitude typology, would help towards reconciling many conflicting attitudes both in the collective as well as in the personal here and now.

The controversy over the problem of universals was particularly heated among the philosophers of the 12th to the 14th centuries. Actually it goes back even further than that, as can be seen from the H. Heine quotation which Jung uses to introduce his book:

Plato and Aristotle! These are not merely two systems, they are types of two distinct human natures, which from time immemorial, under every sort of disguise, stand more or less inimically opposed. The whole medieval world in particular was riven by this conflict, which persists down to the present day, and which forms the most essential content of the history of the Christian Church. Although under other names, it is always of Plato and Aristotle that we speak. Visionary, mystical, Platonic natures disclose Christian ideas and the corresponding symbols from the fathomless depths of their souls. Practical, orderly, Aristotelian natures build out of these ideas and symbols a fixed system, a dogma and a cult. Finally the Church embraces both natures, one of them entrenched in the clergy and the other in monasticism, but both keeping up a constant feud.

The paragraph that comes next is not quoted by Jung, but I shall take the liberty of bringing it in here because I find it relevant:

In the Protestant Church the same feud is to be found, and that is the rift between pietists and orthodoxists, who correspond to a certain extent to the Catholic mystics and dogmatists. The Protestant pietists are mystics without fantasy, and the Protestant orthodoxists are dogmatists without spirit.

Jung's great achievement is to have brought all this into a perspective that is comprehensible from a human, psychological point of view. This has been recognized for several years in *academic* psychology (although the author is often forgotten!), but its significance lies much more in its practical application. As we stated earlier, however, this calls for exceptional ability. Heine had this ability, and the best thing would be to copy his treatise in its entirety here. Germany has always abounded in philosophical and religious disputes, and will probably continue to do so. May they continue to produce geniuses of the stature of Heine.

The universals are nothing more than general concepts such as beauty, goodness, man, animal. The problem was whether they were just words or whether they had an existence of their own. Anyone who

attributed to them a reality of their own was considered a *Realist*, anyone who regarded them just as words was a *Nominalist*. One of the Realists of the Middle Ages was Johannes Scotus Eriugena (810–877), and a typical Nominalist was William of Occam (1270–1347). The dispute revolved around the relationship of the general terms to things. If, as is the case with the Realists, the former are attributed a general existence that lies behind individual things, i.e. what actually constitutes the essential reality of things, then we can recognize in this attitude the orientation to Jung's "subjective factor". This would make the Realists introverted. If, however, like the Nominalists, we do not ascribe to the universals any distinctive reality of their own, then we recognize ourselves as extraverted.

The discussion among scholars was based upon arguments about the meaning of genera (types) and species (individual things). Jung expresses himself very clearly on this subject, saying that the genera are an expression for the existing conformities of things; he goes on to say:

For anyone who is psychologically so constituted as to perceive chiefly the similarity of things, the collective concept is, as it were, given from the start; it forcibly obtrudes itself (like a real existence = Realism). But for anyone who is psychologically so constituted as to perceive chiefly the individuality of things, it is their difference which forces itself upon him and not their similarity (as in Realism) and such a person is a Nominalist.⁷⁶

I feel that, with this concise summary of attitude typology, Jung expresses extremely clearly the enormous range of its effect on clarifying problems of the history of thought. This emerges even more clearly when we follow Heine's lead and trace back the history of the universals dispute to the days of the early Scholastics. It can then be seen that the seeds of the dispute were already sown with Plato and Aristotle: the "old way" (Rationalism) of Plato and the academics corresponds to Realism, the introverted attitude, for which the Platonic ideas exist in themselves. For Plato the general is viewed simultaneously, in a spiritual way, with the perception, and is hence as real as all things spiritual. The "modern way" (Empiricism) of Aristotle, the Megarians and the Cynics corresponds rather to Nominalism. Here the general is only derived from the individual. The weight of reality is assigned almost exclusively to transient things that are outside, whereas eternal ideas that are inside are not given their due. Thus the "modern way" is definitely more inclined towards extraversion.

The judgments that have been formed here are perhaps of a somewhat general nature, and a thorough philological and philosophical examina-

tion might reveal that the Aristotelian standpoint is an attempt at mediation. The important thing, however, is that with his comparative approach to the history of thought Jung was able to prove that the problem of opposites in attitude typology has been an ongoing process for centuries.

Examples of this are the fierceness with which the Arian and the Communion disputes were conducted. This was a christological dispute that in retrospect can be seen as significant in the history of dogma, although at the time there was hardly any dogmatic theology. Arius (4th century) and Athanasius (3rd century), both from Alexandria, had different points of view; Arius believed in the *similarity* of Christ's substance with God, as opposed to outright *identity*, which had been the accepted view since Athanasius. Arius was denounced by the Council of Nicaea in 325 A.D. Today the sole testimony to his belief is the Arian baptistry in Ravenna, where Jung had a vision which until late in life he misunderstood as real. The Arian point of view of *homoiousia* (similarity of substance) corresponds to an extraverted attitude, whereas that of *homoousia* (identity of substance) corresponds to an introverted one.

Peter Abelard (1079–1142) also concerned himself with the problem of the universals. With his conceptualism he makes an attempt at conciliation in the sense of moderate realism. He regards the universal as a mere term. For him universals are words, intellectual conventions expressed by language but based on real things. Thus the genus is merely the thought content or object. A thing is never a general but always an individual fact. It can be seen that this attempt at conciliation remains precisely that—an attempt. The distinction between *ousia* and hypostasis is supposed to be of assistance here, but one is not really convinced by that.

An epitaph in an Oxford manuscript will serve as a fine illustration of the universals dispute:

Hic genus et species in sola voce locavit,
Et genus et species sermones esse notavit
Sic animal nullumque animal genus esse probatur.
Sic et homo et nullus homo species vocitatur.

He taught that genera and species were matters of words alone,
And made it clear that genera and species were sermones.*
Thus he proved that both "living thing" and "no living thing"
are each a genus,
And "man" and "no man" both rightly called species.

* Ed. note: In context, the term "sermones" could refer either to arguments or to particular *styles* or modes of discourse. The latter interpretation seems the more accurate. Both this passage and its translation are drawn from *Psychological Types*, p. 50.

And as early as the 5th or 4th century B.C., Antisthenes had said: “There is no such thing as horseness, just horses.” Thus one can say: when for me the genera are objective facts, then I am a realist; if they are just subjective, I am a nominalist. The realist takes the genera as given *in re* or even *ante rem*, whereas with the nominalist they are *post rem*.

As evidence of how old the problem is of typological attitude, I shall now list some of the most important representatives of the two attitudes.

Realists

Anselm of Canterbury
Bernard of Chartres
Remigius of Aurerre
Vincent of Beauvais
Scotus Eriugena
Kant, with his proposition of
the *a priori* recognition of
logical thinking

Nominalists

Antisthenes
Stoics
Occam
Leibniz
Berkeley
Hume

Condillac
Thomas Aquinas
(as a moderate realist)

Many European readers will have recalled by now that in our intellectual history we have a classical extra-introverted pair: Goethe and Schiller. Jung examined very carefully the relationship of the two philosophers and poets in the light of attitude typology. Their correspondence shows with utmost clarity the loving care with which Schiller sought to make clear to his dear friend Goethe his own introverted point of view. As this correspondence is easily accessible, it will not be introduced here. Schiller was fully aware of the problem of opposites and concerned himself intensively with the inherent moral problem. It can be claimed that his two works, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*⁷⁸ and *On Naive and Sentimental Poetry*,⁷⁹ actually deal with the problem of attitude typology.

If we are now to offer evidence for our viewpoint by quoting from the first of these works, then we should begin by making the following qualification: Schiller’s remarks apply first and foremost to the conflict of opposites, more specifically to the fact that one attitude feels the other to be undesirable and inferior and therefore opposed and suppressed. As long as this struggle goes on externally, its effects are all too obvious in the outside world, both locally and on a national level. But Jung discovered that although one attitude predominates on average in the individual, which is what makes attitude typology possible in the first place, the other attitude is by no means nonexistent. The possibility is

always there that one "can be different." However, as in this case we usually say that the other attitude is in the unconscious, then it would be wrong, from the point of view of methodology, to discuss it in a book on consciousness. The place to do this will be in Volume IV, where the ensuing dynamics of the psyche will be dealt with. But some facts will have to be dealt with here, especially those dealing with the dynamic relation that exists between the opposing attitudes.

It is to be hoped that the reader will see for himself the relevance of the following Schiller citations. We shall keep to the excerpts Jung himself used in his *Psychological Types*, though adding short commentaries of our own.

Schiller takes as his starting point the opposition between the individual and society, and says:

I do not fail to appreciate the advantages to which the present generation, considered as a unity and weighed in the scales of reason, may lay claim in the face of the best of antiquity, but it has to enter the contest in close order and let whole compete with whole. What individual modern will emerge to contend in single combat with the individual Athenian for the prize of humanity? Whence comes this disadvantageous relation of individuals in spite of all the advantages of the race?

—(6th letter on the *Aesth. Ed. of M.*)

Later on in the same letter Schiller attempts to formulate the consequences of this opposition:

If the community makes the function the measure of the man, if it respects in one of its citizens only memory, in another a tabulating intellect, in a third only mechanical skill; if, indifferent to character, it here lays stress upon knowledge alone, and there pardons the profoundest darkness of the intellect so long as it co-exists with a spirit of order and a law-abiding demeanour—if at the same time it requires these special aptitudes to be exercised with an intensity proportionate to the loss of extensity which it permits in the individuals concerned—can we then wonder that the remaining aptitudes of the mind become neglected in order to bestow every attention upon the only one which brings honour and profit?

—(*Ibid.*)

Here we have the opposites of intensity and extensity. The demand for intensity is placed upon the individual by society, for the competitive spirit means that the individual is forced into increased specialization in his narrow field. Thus intensity is limitation and one-sidedness. But this dire necessity is confronted with the other demand, the one for extensity, the need to stretch the personality towards a sort of totality

and rounding off. For Schiller, intensity corresponds to the extraverted attitude, extensity to the introverted one. Schiller's last sentence suggests both a "pragmatic" justification of the conflict of opposites, as well as the amorality of a lack of consciousness about it.

In the following section, as an extension to what has just been said, there seems to be a sort of teleological justification of the conflict of opposites as well as a view of it as a cultural necessity.

There was no other way of developing the manifold capacities of man than by placing them in opposition to each other. This antagonism of powers is the great instrument of culture, but it is only the instrument; for as long as it persists, we are only on the way towards culture.

—(*Ibid.*)

Later on in the same letter comes the following paragraph:

Only by concentrating the whole energy of our spirit in one single focus, and drawing together our whole being into one single power, do we attach wings, so to say, to this individual power and lead it by artifice far beyond the bounds to which nature seems to have imposed upon it.

—(*Ibid.*)

This means that the "choice" of attitude, unless it is a compulsion, leads to one-sidedness. But when it is possible to "muster all one's strength," then it takes wing and starts to encroach on the borderlines, transgresses beyond nature, *i.e.*, what is simply given, so that a sort of transfer point is reached. We have mentioned this possibility above, but it will be dealt with at greater length in Volume IV. For Schiller there is a compulsion to compensate for the mutilation of our nature being brought about by enforced one-sidedness. This can be seen clearly towards the end of the following passage:

Thus, however much may be gained for the world as a whole by this fragmentary cultivation of human powers, it is undeniable that the individuals whom it affects suffer under the curse of this universal aim. Athletic bodies are certainly developed by means of gymnastic exercises, but only through the free and equable play of the limbs is beauty formed. In the same way the exertion of individual talents certainly produces extraordinary men, but only their even tempering makes full and happy men. And in what relation should we stand to past and future ages if the cultivation of human nature made such a human sacrifice necessary? We should have been the bondslaves of humanity, we should have drudged for it for centuries on end, and branded upon our mutilated nature the shameful traces of this servitude—in order that a later generation might devote itself in blissful indolence to the care of its moral health, and develop the free growth of its humanity! But can man really be destined

to neglect himself for any end whatever? Should Nature be able, by her designs, to rob us of a completeness which Reason prescribes to us by hers? It must be false that the cultivation of individual powers necessitates the sacrifice of their totality; or however much the law of Nature did have that tendency, we must be at liberty to restore by means of a higher Art this wholeness in our nature which Art has destroyed.

—(*Ibid.*)

Thus, if it is going to be possible to develop hitherto underdeveloped powers, to strive for the opposite of the attitude that has previously been adopted, then this wholeness will call for “a higher Art.” One is almost inclined to say that here Schiller has anticipated the rejection of all accepted values that we find with Nietzsche and hence modern psychology in general. Schiller was fully aware of the conflict involved in these demands and this can be seen in his frequent use of the word “must,” especially in the following excerpt:

Nature in her physical creation indicates to us the way we should pursue in moral creation. Not until the struggle of elementary powers in the lower organisations has been assuaged does she rise to the noble formation of the physical man. In the same way, the strife of elements in the ethical man, the conflict of blind instincts, must first be allayed, and the crude antagonism within him must have ceased, before we may dare to promote his diversity. On the other hand, the independence of his character must be assured, and subjection to alien despotic forms have given place to a decent freedom, before we can submit the multiplicity in him to the unity of the idea.

—(7th letter)

The word “must” appears three times, thus emphasizing both the difficulty of this matter and its necessity. The conflict between blind instinct and the morality of consciousness is illuminated from the point of view of descension theory. This “crude contradiction” is actually an irrefutable reality!

The conflict is depicted even more clearly in the next passage:

Terrified of the freedom which always declares its hostility to their first attempts, men will in one place throw themselves into the arms of a comfortable servitude, and in another, driven to despair by a pedantic tutelage, they will break out into the wild libertinism of the natural state. Usurpation will plead the weakness of human nature, insurrection its dignity, until at length the great sovereign of all human affairs, blind force, steps in to decide the sham conflict of principles like a common prize-fight.

—(*Ibid.*)

Schiller probably had Rousseau's *Back to Nature* in mind here, but he is fully aware of the temptation to avoid the issue and of the dangers of "the natural state." Nor should one forget that even "freedom" has its drawbacks. Thomas H. Huxley (1825–1895) aptly remarks that "a man's worst difficulties begin when he can do as he likes." At the end of the Schiller quotation, one should bear in mind that the work was written in 1795 and that the French Revolution had been raging since 1789; moreover, the words are also prophetic in relation to the rumble of Napoleon's cannons.

... Whence arises this still universal sway of prejudice, this intellectual darkness, beside all the light that philosophy and experience have shed? The age is enlightened, that is to say knowledge has been discovered and publicly disseminated, which would at least suffice to set right our practical principles. The spirit of free enquiry has scattered the delusions which for so long barred the approach to truth, and is undermining the foundations upon which fanaticism and fraud have raised their thrones. Reason has been purged of the illusions of the senses and of deceitful sophistry, and philosophy itself, which first caused us to forsake Nature, is calling us loudly and urgently back to her bosom—why is it that we still remain barbarians?

—(8th letter)

So Reason alone is not enough. We are still barbarians. Reason ruled, but it was the beast that triumphed. And Rousseau's recipe also failed. If Schiller had written today, he would have been able to have recourse to the message of the Nazis and other political programs as object lessons.

We mentioned earlier that Schiller also dealt with the opposition of the two attitude types in his *On Naive and Sentimental Poetry*. We shall not dwell further on this here, but simply sum up by saying that sentimental writing corresponds to the introverted attitude, which Schiller attributes to the idealists, and that naive writing corresponds to the extraverted attitude, which he attributes to the realists. One should note here that conversely, in the universals dispute, those Nominalists who were introverted were described as realists.

We have taken as our starting point Jung's assumption that Goethe was extraverted and Schiller introverted. The above quotations from Schiller will have been ample confirmation that the latter observation is true. For confirmation of Goethe's opposite attitude, we need only recall the quotation from *Maximen und Reflexionen* (p. 36).

A few verses from Faust offer further clarification:

I take the way of turmoil's bitterest gain,
 Of love-sick hate, of quickening bought with pain.
 My heart, from learning's tyranny set free,
 Shall no more shun distress, but take its toll
 Of all the hazards of humanity,
 And nourish mortal sadness in my soul.
 I'll sound the heights and depths that man can know,
 Their very souls shall be with mine entwined,
 I'll load my bosom with their weal and woe,
 And share with them the shipwreck of mankind.

—Faust I

There can hardly be a more vivid way of formulating the extension of the ego of an extraverted person into the *outside* world. But the dangers of this exaltation can be seen clearly in the last line. And of course it is also possible to read something totally different in Goethe, for his genius comprises far more than the "half truth" of pure extraversion. What we have said has been one-sided, for didactic reasons, and we beg to be excused for this. But there is no doubt that with Goethe the emphasis was on extraversion, even at a ripe old age, and this can be seen in his short 1823 essay on "*Bedeutende Förderniss durch ein einziges geistreiches Wort.*"

I hereby admit that the great and such important-sounding task of knowing oneself has always struck me as suspicious, a trick of secretly allied priests who confused people by placing unattainable demands on them and sought to turn them away from externally oriented activity into a false introspectiveness. Man only knows himself in so far as he knows the world, which he only sees in himself and himself in it.⁸⁰

To conclude this section on the typological opposition of the two poets, let us listen once more to what Schiller has to say:

Let some beneficent deity snatch the infant betimes from his mother's breast, nourish him with the milk of a better age and suffer him to grow up to full maturity under that far-off Grecian heaven. Then when he has become a man, let him return, a stranger, to his own century; not to gladden it by his appearance, but rather, terrible like Agamemnon's son, to cleanse it. He will indeed take his material from the present age, but his form he will borrow from a nobler time—nay, from beyond all time, from the absolute unchangeable unity of his being.⁸¹

—(9th letter)

Few people are likely to feel an enthusiasm for the role of Orestes, but the parable chosen by Schiller reminds us vividly of the tragedy of

the hero who realizes the “absolute unchangeability of his being.” In Christian terms this is developed into the fight between good and evil, God and the Devil, but here there is a need for a *divine* mediator. With Schiller it is an ideal *human being* who becomes the mediator, on the basis of a unity of his being that is given *before* any consciousness. It is obvious that what is going on here, to keep to human terms of reference, is the demand for individuation. This will be dealt with at greater length in Volume IV.

At this point I should like to offer a particularly pleasing and original example of the representation of a typological opposition in the Baroque period: Robert Fludd alias Robertus de Fluctibus (1547–1637) was an eminent doctor and alchemist. In the history of natural sciences he acted as a counterpole in a discussion with Kepler.⁸² He was also violently disliked by Mersenne and Gassendi because of his conviction that Nature was a *Mysterium*, a preconceived idea that denied Nature the possibility of being viewed in quantitative terms. Particularly interesting for us among his many publications is his *Philosophia Moysaica*, and especially the copper engraving on the title page of the second part (cf. Fig. 14).⁸³ The representation ends with what we might call typological dualism on the lower earth level, where Creation splits up into the Apollonian world of light and the Dionysian world of night. But the same dualism is also to be found on the upper cosmic level, and in its basic orientation, at the highest level, goes back to the *voluntas* and *noluntas divina* (cf. W. Pauli in footnote 82). So with Fludd dualism is inherent in God the Father, and this can be substantiated by quoting Isaiah 45:6–7 and Ecclesiastes 42:25. However, in the latter case there is no evidence of a version that corresponds exactly in the Vulgate text. To counteract this rather crass dualism he places in the center, in a conciliatory but tentative manner, the declaration of faith: *ex duobus unum* and *DEUS tamen unus*.

Fludd’s diagram reminds us of a later interpretation of the Dionysian-Apollonian pair of opposites, one which is to be found in Nietzsche. In his famous early work *Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik*,⁸¹ he says what can be summed up briefly as follows: tragedy came into being with the Greeks as a “metaphysical miracle” through pairing the Apollonian with the Dionysian element. There are clear religious aspects to this reconciliation of opposites. Other pairs of opposites are brought into this creative *coincidentia oppositorum*, such as the dream (Apollonian, cf. Vol. II) and ecstasy (Dionysian). One is reminded here of the beautiful painting by Lorenzo Lotto (ca. 1550, “Apollo Sleeping”)⁸⁵: as Apollo sleeps, the Muses give themselves over to frivolous play, i.e. the Dionysian principle. The all-embracing

principle of diastole (Dionysian) and systole (Apollonian), as Goethe called it, also fit into Nietzsche's concept. Nobody can really dispute Nietzsche's view that overcoming the problem of opposites is a mentally creative act, no matter how often scholarly criticism has come to other conclusions in looking at his early works.

In his *Psychological Types*, Jung has given many other examples of the intro- and extraverted attitude. Students will probably be interested in those that deal with the effects of the attitude with teachers. We shall content ourselves here with some particularly illuminating examples and quotations from Chapter VIII of Jung's book.


Wilhelm Ostwald (1853–1932), an expert in physics and chemistry, was famous for his discovery of the catalysis. He was also a sort of natural philosopher and a leading exponent of contemporary monism (cf. his *Monistische Sonntagspredigten* 1911–1916). But he also preached the "energetic imperative" (1912, cf. p. 34). Jung made use of Ostwald's biographies of eminent natural scientists (*Grosse Männer*, Leipzig 1910) to show how the descriptions of these various researchers lend themselves to a study of typology. Ostwald himself was aware of the difference, as we can see from the way he splits up his "great men" into the two categories of "Classicists" and "Romantics." It goes without saying that to a large extent the Classicists correspond to Jung's introverted attitude type and the Romantics to the extraverted attitude type. In Ostwald's words:

Whereas the former is characterized by the all-round perfection of each of his works, and at the same time by a rather retiring disposition and a personality that has but little influence on his immediate surroundings, the romantic stands out by reason of just the opposite qualities. His peculiarity lies not so much in the perfection of each individual work as in the variety and striking originality of numerous works following one another in rapid succession, and in the direct and powerful influence he has upon his contemporaries.

Relating typology to the teaching activity of a professor, Ostwald says that a Romantic can identify with his students and is able to come up with the right word at the right time. The Classicist, on the other hand, is absorbed in his own thoughts and problems and hence completely ignores the difficulties his students have in understanding him. Taking Helmholtz as an example of the classic type, Ostwald says of him:

In spite of his prodigious learning, wide experience, and richly creative mind, he was never a good teacher. He never reacted on the instant, but only after a long time. Confronted by a student's question in the laboratory, he would promise to think it over, and only after several days

Gemina fecit Deus omnia, quorum alterum est contrarium alteri, nec quicquam factum est, quod mancum est. Ecclesiastici cap.42.vers.25.



Ego Dominus & non est alter formans Lucem, creans tenebras, faciens bonum & creans malum : Ego Dominus faciens hæc omnia. Isai. 45. 67,

Fig. 14
Frontispiece to Part II of *Philosophia Moysaica*
by Robert Fludd, Gent 1638.

would he bring the answer. This turned out to be so remote from the predicament of the student that only in the rarest cases could the latter see any connection between the difficulty he had experienced and the nicely rounded theory of a general problem subsequently expounded to him. Not only was the immediate help lacking on which every beginner largely relies, but also any guidance adapted to the student's own personality, that would have helped him to outgrow the natural dependence of the beginner and win to complete mastery of his subject. All these deficiencies are directly due to the teacher's inability to react instantaneously to the student's needs, so that, when the desired reaction does come, its effect is entirely lost.⁸⁶

Ostwald is even clearer in the way he depicts the difficulties of the classic type in relating to his student. As a case in point he takes the mathematician Gauss, who used to discourage students from enrolling for his courses, claiming that they would not take place anyway because of poor attendance. Ostwald goes on to say that teaching was repugnant to Gauss because it involved having to

... having to pronounce scientific results in his lectures without first having checked and polished every word of the text. To be obliged to communicate his findings to others without such verification must have felt to him as though he were exhibiting himself before strangers in his nightshirt.⁸⁷

In the role of teacher or "man of the world," the introverted person will always have to struggle with his inferior extraversion. But this struggle may produce a valuable outcome. Let us recall the words of Heraclitus: "the struggle is the father of all things."⁸⁸

I should now like to go back to Schiller, this time to his *On Naive And Sentimental Poetry*:

This brings me to a very remarkable psychological antagonism among men in an age of progressive culture, an antagonism which, because it is radical and grounded in the innate emotional constitution, is the cause of a sharper division among men than the random conflict of interests could ever bring about; which robs the poet and artist of all hope of making a universal appeal and giving pleasure to everyone—although this is his task; which makes it impossible for the philosopher, in spite of every effort, to be universally convincing—although this is implied in the very idea of philosophy; and which, finally, will never permit a man in practical life to see his mode of behaviour universally applauded: in short, an antagonism which is to blame for the fact that no work of the mind and no deed of the heart can have a decisive success with one class of men without incurring the condemnation of the other. This antagonism is, without doubt, as old as the beginning of culture, and to

the end it can hardly be otherwise, save in rare individual cases, such as have always existed and, it is to be hoped, will always exist. But although it lies in the very nature of its operations that it frustrates every attempt at a settlement, because no party can be brought to admit either a deficiency on his own side or a reality on the other's, yet there is always profit enough in following up such an important antagonism to its final source, thus at least reducing the actual point at issue to a simpler formulation.⁸⁹

The "last point" and the "simpler formulation" would actually be Jung's two attitude types. We said at the beginning that the attitude is a given circumstance, in other words cannot really be further reducible, so that an uncertain future would await a "simpler formulation." What would always remain, however, is the achievement of "rare individual cases" who fight their way through the struggle of the pairs of opposites and produce the creative synthesis. For didactic reasons, however, this problem can only be dealt with in Volume IV, since it would mean bringing in the unconscious as the opposite of consciousness, and in this volume we are dealing exclusively with the latter.

With his typology book, Jung, in keeping with his own introversion, is attempting a sort of apologia for this attitude. This was necessary because for centuries the West has been cultivating a one-sided overestimation of extraversion, with mysticism and romanticism being just one of the exceptions that prove the rule. The East, by way of contrast, has been almost exclusively introverted for thousands of years, though there seem to be indications of a swing of the pendulum, with the taking over of Western extraversion, science and technology, bringing in their wake all the dangers and uncertainties that arise when ancient traditions start to crumble. From the many that are available, I should like to give a particularly ancient example of the typically introverted attitude of the Indians. It comes from one of the oldest of the Upanishads⁹⁰:

1. Yajnavalkya called on Janaka, Emperor of Videha. He said to himself: "I will not say anything." But once upon a time Janaka, Emperor of Videha, and Yajnavalkya had had a talk about the Agnihotra sacrifice, and Yajnavalkya had offered him a boon. Janaka had chosen the right to ask him any questions he wished, and Yajnavalkya had granted him the boon. So it was the Emperor who first questioned him.

2. "Yajnavalkya, what serves as a light for a man?"

"The light of the sun, O Emperor," said Yajnavalkya, "for with the sun as light he sits, goes out, works, and returns."

"Just so, Yajnavalkya."

3. "When the sun has set, Yajnavalkya, what serves as light for a man?"

"The moon serves as his light, for with the moon as light he sits, goes out, works, and returns."

"Just so, Yajnavalkya."

4. "When the sun has set and the moon has set, Yajnavalkya, what serves as light for a man?"

"Fire serves as his light, for with fire as light he sits, goes out, works, and returns."

"Just so, Yajnavalkya."

5. "When the sun has set, Yajnavalkya, and the moon has set and the fire has gone out, what serves as a light for a man?"

"Speech serves as his light, for with speech as his light he sits, goes out, works, and returns. Therefore, Your Majesty, when one cannot see even one's own hand, yet when a sound is uttered, one can go there."

"Just so, Yajnavalkya."

6. "When the sun has set, Yajnavalkya, and the moon has set and the fire has gone out and speech has stopped, what serves as light for a man?"

"The self, indeed, is his light, for with the self as light he sits, goes out, works, and returns."

In conclusion, let us recall that in the history of medicine, ever since the Greeks and right up to modern times, discussions about health and sickness have constantly revolved round *eucrasy* (good mixture) or the harmony of the elements, juices and forces. The basic operation deals exclusively with pairs of opposites (such as hot-cold, wet-dry), and in the classical case (with the four elements, for example), a tetrad always occurs, which is particularly interesting for us in view of the following chapter.⁹¹

CHAPTER VIII

THE ORIENTATION FUNCTIONS, OR THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In retrospect it can be said today that the germ for Jung's attitude typology first appeared in his association experiments (cf. Volume I). In these experiments two opposite forms of reaction were seen: the objective type and the predicate type. The expression "type" was selected because apparently there were two habitually different ways of reacting. In the psychopathological sphere, the objective types seemed to predominate in *Dementia praecox* (schizophrenia) and the predicate types in so-called hysteria. Today we would categorize them as the introverted and the extraverted type.

Another question then arose in this context: when it came to dealing with problems, the schizophrenics seemed to have more difficulty with the thinking approach and the hysterics with the feeling approach. Jung's original inclination was to make the following categories:

objective type
Dementia praecox
introverted
thinking problems

predicate type
hysteria
extraverted
feeling problems

However, it turned out to be rather more complicated than that. Endless discussions, especially with his friend Dr. med. Hans Schmid and with Toni Wolff, led to the situation being clarified in the form in which it finally appeared in *Psychological Types* (1921). These discussions were usually oral, and part of the relevant correspondence

is unfortunately lost, or, in the case of Dr. Schmid, only recently published. More can be read on this subject in Hans Konrad Iselin's book, published as recently as 1982 and entitled *Zur Entstehung von C.G. Jung's "Psychologischen Typen"*.

It is actually possible to identify a tremendous number of individual conscious functions. Test psychology attempts to isolate them as far as possible, and even to measure them, but usually they can only be recorded in groups. However, the more complex the group, the easier it is to talk about a "personality diagnosis" or about a "personality profile" or, when appropriate, about recording "intelligence." Individual functions are difficult to grasp, and what are they anyway? What was important to Jung was to perceive the elementary determinants in the bewildering variety of consciousness phenomena. In this way he hoped to arrive at some order and orientation as directly as possible. The Association Experiment was to be understood as an attempt to research the *simplest* processes possible (these very associations just referred to). And in actual fact, as mentioned above, the "reaction types" provided early indications, but they still needed to be thought through.

So Jung went on to ask himself which elementary consciousness processes (= functions) are necessary if an internal or external object or factual situation is to be fully grasped. Which psychic elements are necessary if we are to have adequate orientation in our internal and external space? The arguments involved in answering this question will be as simple as possible.

Jung's answer consists of a *tetrad*, which can be formulated as follows:

We can see that

1) there is something perceived before us, that something is there, and we can determine what *it is like*, i.e. cold, hard, sharp. In nineteenth-century psychology this was called *perception*, which tallies with the *fonction du réel* in French psychology. Jung gives this function the name SENSATION.

We can also see

2) WHAT it is. Thus what is perceived is categorized according to *a priori* ideas. In psychology this was once called *apperception*. Jung calls this function THINKING.

Furthermore I also see

3) HOW it is for me. For example, is it pleasant or unpleasant? Thus I experience how it affects me, what it means to me. This is then an evaluating function, which Jung calls FEELING.

And I also have an impression of

4) where it comes from and/or where it is going. This is not a question of sensory perception, but rather a sort of *notion*. Jung talks here of “indirect perception,” which actually comes about through the unconscious. Well-known examples of this are: first-sight diagnoses with good doctors, the famous “first impression,” which is so often confirmed, hunches and suchlike. Telepathic and “psychometric” phenomena can be attributed to this function, which Jung called INTUITION.

Whereas the first three definitions are clear and simple, that of intuition often comes up against lack of understanding or rejection. To begin with, rational understanding resists the fact that such things as telepathy are regarded as serious factors. But Jung was never prejudiced about such phenomena (cf. his doctoral dissertation, *Collected Works*, Vol. I). Secondly, people find it disconcerting that the unconscious is introduced into the definition of a conscious function. For Jung, however, it was a typical characteristic to bring in the unconscious whenever and wherever he could. And anyway, as we said on several occasions in Chapter III, experience has shown that it can never be totally eliminated. For intuition, defined here as a conscious function, all the unconscious does is to supply the material. In other words, this material comes from an unconscious perceiving process, which is what leads to the similarity between intuition and sensation as perceiving functions. This is material that cannot itself be perceived by consciousness. Let us take the simple example of when we are walking along the street and we suddenly find ourselves thinking of someone: the first person we bump into round the next corner is the very person we were thinking of. The conscious cannot see round corners but the unconscious can. That at least is the conclusion we must come to unless we dismiss such events by “explaining” them away as coincidences. We already stated in Volume I that the unconscious “can do more” than the conscious. If long overdue letters cross in the post, or if we find ourselves thinking about someone who then rings us up long distance, these are processes that belong to the sphere of parapsychology, where they are described as telepathy, or, in popular language, “mind-reading.” We cannot go into that subject at length here, but it is closely related to intuitive insight.

As we said earlier, we find it necessary to dwell at such length on the subject of intuition because this is usually the function that people have difficulty in understanding.

An attempt will now be made with a concrete, albeit constructed example, to illustrate what place the individual functions have in the conscious orientation. Jung always enjoyed explaining this as follows:

If we take a given object

- 1) *Sensation* (S) gives me the following information, for example: it is red, shining, sparkling, aromatic and has a definite form;
- 2) *Thinking* (T) tells me that the object is a glass of red wine;
- 3) *Feeling* (F) describes all this as something that is extremely pleasant, or, of I am a teetotaller, something that is nasty and "poisonous."
- 4) *Intuition* (I) tells me that it is a Pommard 1937 and might be a Christmas present from a certain friend of my host's.

Further to the last of the four, one should add that Jung always emphasized that intuition only has an accuracy of about 50%. It should be recalled at this point that this fact is something that complicates the evaluation of parapsychological experiments, which once again indicates the link between the two spheres. Another point to be remembered is that the last element in the example above is reminiscent of what is sometimes known as "psychometry" in parapsychology.

In his day-to-day contact with friends, colleagues and patients, Jung discovered that there are people in whom one of these four functions predominates, and others in whom it is one of the others. Particularly instructive are of course the extreme cases, which, as always, are to be found in the psychopathological sphere. After collecting a great deal of material, especially clinical observations, Jung was able to discover certain regular principles according to which these functions behave. In conclusion we shall try to sum up these principles in seven fundamental laws.

First Fundamental Law:

Four formal functions are essential if a phenomenon is to be fully apprehended. These are sensation (S), thinking (T), feeling (F), and intuition (I).⁹² Let us give an example: a phenomenon has a definite form. This is what S tells me. It also has a coming and going, given by I, that is, it has a form that changes with the passage of time. This has a certain effect upon me, which comes from F. It also has an effect upon me because of its meaning or significance, which comes from T.

Second Fundamental Law:


Of the four functions one pair is *rational* and *discriminating* (T and F), and one pair is *irrational* and *perceiving* (S and I).

T and F are rational functions, as their judgments are based on reason

and can be influenced by reflection. As these judgments only apprehend pure facts, one imagines they are based on reason, which is not the case with the irrational functions S and I. In discriminating, one considers first and foremost sensible things such as the meaning (T) and value (F) of the object, and not so much the individual being (*Gestalt*) of the object or the way it changes with the passage of time.


In perceiving, what one established first and foremost are the form (S) and the alteration (I) of the object, and secondly its meaning and value: in other words, one concentrates on absolute happenings, which in Nature are not usually predictable. This is why feeling and intuitive types would belong to the “aesthetic type” in Nietzsche.

This second fundamental law can be summed up in the following diagram:



Third Fundamental Law:

The two functions within each of the two pairs (second fundamental law) oppose each other and thus obey a principle of exclusion, as can be seen in the following diagram:



The thinking function must not take the feeling value into account when considering a set of circumstances. As we stated earlier, the psychiatrist must come to terms in a thinking way with the all too human problems of his patients, without being affected by their pleasantness or unpleasantness (F). Feeling shuns Thinking: *Le cœur a des raisons que la raison ne connaît point*. This proverb, by the way, shows that the F (*cœur*) is a rational function, for *raison* and *ratio* (lat.) are identical. “My country, right or wrong” is a further example of the fact that in patriotism (F) there is no room for reflection. We had better not go into the question here of whether love (F) always dulls the brain, making T impossible. One can more readily assume this of hatred.

Sensation has to establish “what is actually happening,” and must therefore exclude the before and after and the whole paraphernalia (I).

Scientific investigation and observation demand that all sensory data relating to the object be established as precisely as possible (S), and so anything that does not belong (I) must be painstakingly and artificially eliminated; this is one reason why we can only consider specimens in science.

Intuition, on the other hand, has to overlook concrete details so as to be able to get at and perceive the before and after, the whole paraphernalia, the atmosphere of the things. That is why an intuitive can be heard saying: “Alright, everything’s O.K., but I still have the feeling that . . . etc.”; here, of course, the word “feeling” really stands for Intuition. It must be mentioned at this point that unlike French, Italian and English, the German terminology for feeling is sadly lacking in clarity and precision. *Gefühl* in German can stand for Intuition (as above), or for Sensation (“I have the *Gefühl* (feeling) that it is warm here”), and thirdly for Feeling in our sense of the term. The maudlin sentimentality for which the Germans are well-known is almost certainly connected with this lack of differentiation (cf. Chapter 3, I).

Fourth Fundamental Law:

The four functions of consciousness show different degrees of differentiation within the same individual.

This principle arises partly out of the third fundamental law, in so far as, in accordance with the exclusion principle formulated there, the predominance of one of the paired functions excludes the predominance of the opposite function. Thus, for example, when the T is differentiated in a person, then his F *must* be undifferentiated, according to the third fundamental law. The differentiated function is called the *superior function*. This means that the opposite function, as defined in the third fundamental law, automatically becomes the *inferior function*. Thus, for a feeling dominated person, the T, by a process of elimination, must be the inferior function, just like the S with the intuitive. In the context of this terminology the word “inferiority” also means unconsciousness.

The formulation of our fourth fundamental law naturally calls for a definition of the term “differentiation.” In theory, the differentiated function should simply have the highest degree of consciousness, but in fact it is not all that easy to establish whether that is the case. In practice it is easier to prove that, for example, a thinking type quite automatically deals with his objects initially, without any reflection,

and according to thinking criteria as a matter of course. But it may not always be easy to establish this diagnostically. In this case what is recommended, as is often the case in medicine, is to attempt a diagnosis by process of elimination, i.e. in accordance with the third fundamental law. For by definition the inferior function is often much more striking to us, at least in our partner, than the differentiated one. In a pronounced thinking type we are much more quickly aware of his difficult feeling life, for example, than of his impeccable logic. So what differentiation means is the consciously making available of the function that under normal circumstances has pre-eminence. The inferior function, on the other hand, functions quite autonomously, that is, unconsciously and arbitrarily, and is thus perceived by the bearer at most as a disturbance (cf. 6th fundamental law). But normally it has a low energy level.

Now that we have a superior function and hence an inferior one (its opposite, in accordance with the third fundamental law), there remain the other two functions. It emerges that these two functions do in fact to a certain extent come into play in the conscious psychology of the subject. True, they do not predominate, but they remain more or less at the disposal of consciousness, in a consultative capacity, so to speak, unless they are affected by the exclusion principle of the third fundamental law. That is why we call them auxiliary functions. Of these two functions, once again one of them is better (or less badly) differentiated, whereas the third is even more poorly developed, which is why it is called an inferior function. This is where we can see clearly that differentiation is connected with consciousness, for the inferior, totally undifferentiated function is found, as we said above, on a completely unconscious level. Thus we speak of a primary and a secondary auxiliary function, the difference between them being a declining degree of differentiation. The poorer differentiation of the secondary auxiliary function also arises from its position opposite the primary auxiliary function, as a result of which it is subject to the exclusion principle. But this tension of opposites with the auxiliary functions is alleviated to a certain extent in that they are both relatively unconscious; hence this tension is not such a force to be reckoned with as is the general tension between conscious and unconscious.

Fifth Fundamental Law:

The attitude of the *differentiated function* coincides with the *attitude type*, and the attitude of the *inferior function* coincides with the *opposite*

type. What this means is that, for example, in an extraverted thinking type the T must necessarily be extraverted. Yet at the same time this diagnosis has revealed that, by way of contrast, his inferior F must be introverted.

This fundamental law contains, among other things, what Jung again and again referred to as the compensatory relationship between the conscious and the unconscious. It is also striking that there is a strong connection between attitude and differentiated function, which is not to be dismissed lightly and should be looked at more closely. Unfortunately we do not have all the statistical data, but the fact itself is irrefutable.

Sixth Fundamental Law:

Both the inferior function and the opposite *attitude* are found largely in the unconscious or are contaminated by the unconscious.

This emerges from Jung's basic hypothesis of the compensatory relationship between the conscious and the unconscious, a concept that cannot be overestimated in the typological problem either, for, as can easily be seen, it is also a factor in the fundamental laws three to five. The inferior *function* and the opposite *attitude*—which are, in accordance with the fifth fundamental law, linked together—are, by virtue of their unconsciousness, *autonomous* as regards consciousness. Once again, in accordance with the principle of the compensation of the conscious by the unconscious, we shall come across them most frequently in our dreams, where they are usually personified. Of course they also crop up in every spontaneous manifestation of the unconscious, as described in Volume I, and they are usually of a disturbing nature. And finally we come to the:

Seventh Fundamental Law:

In the course of life there is usually a natural shift of emphasis among the functions, which ends up with a total reversal of the typological perspective.

Sooner or later, usually at what is called the mid-life stage, the wheel of functions begins to turn. What used to have most emphasis gradually becomes less important and what had hitherto been despised slowly comes into its own. This is a real sacrifice and the transition can be very painful, especially if it is postponed because of obstinate clinging

to old ways. As has been stressed already, this can lead to a breakdown of the personality. It may not always be as traumatic as what happened to Paul on the road to Damascus, but it is always dangerous when the main function and attitude is rigid and inflexible.

A description of the dynamics of this process of the shifting of emphasis will be left till Volume IV. Here we shall conclude by looking at two questions:

The *attitude type* (introverted or extraverted) can be recognized very early on in the history of an individual. It may be genetically determined. Introversion, whose right to exist Jung defended very strongly, was claimed by him to have as its *psychological* origin the predominance of the “subjective factor.” Later we shall use the term “numinal accent” to express the fact that for the extravert the external object is interesting, whereas for the introvert it is the internal object.

The function type can only be clearly recognized later on in life. It does not seem to be so much a given factor as the attitude. Jung does not put forward any psychological causes, such as the “numinal accent,” for the predominance of any one or other of the functions. The “function selection” seems to be particularly determined by the milieu, positively or negatively, especially by the family structure, and later on by the demands of one’s “chosen” profession or sphere of interest.

On pages 96–97 we gave the reasons why four functions and only four are necessary for a phenomenon to be fully apprehended. It turns out that these four functions are made up of two pairs of opposites. The problem of opposites, as discussed in Chapter VI, makes its presence felt once again in the functions, this time in constituting their quaternity. Jung tried to set forth this quaternity early on, as Fig. 15 shows, with the contents of the circle coinciding with the wholeness of the object to be apprehended.




Fig. 15

A very similar figure had been created quite spontaneously by one of Jung's early test subjects, and can be found on p. 53 of his doctoral dissertation.⁹³ It is also strikingly reminiscent of the diagrams of Frau Hauffe with Justinus Kerner.⁹⁴

In 1923, Jung called this diagram the compass for his "critical psychology," which he would not like to be without.⁹⁵ The image fascinated him all his life, and was indeed to prove indispensable in his nocturnal journeyings and in his work with patients. The sea of psychological manifestations really does indicate that some means of orientation is called for. Jung later compared it to the system of axes in telescopes. These various analogies bring out the image's symbolic character very clearly, which also means that some part of the phenomenon, namely that associated with the inferior function, necessarily remains unconscious. Empirically, our observation always remains only partially conscious, i.e., not really complete.

We are reminded here of Schopenhauer's experiment when, in his dissertation in 1813, he tried to analyze the "thinking processing of experience" in the light of "*a priori* connections."⁹⁶ The "Principle of Sufficient Reason," the *principium rationis sufficientis*, is for him the logical thinking law, according to which every thought must go back to an axiom, a thought content that has already been acknowledged. Its basis must be logical and objective, i.e., it must not be subjective and psychic. This, he proposed, is the most general formal principle of thinking and is understood as *a priori*, but must not be applied indiscriminately. In examining the basic laws of our mental processing of the material of our experience, which enables us to classify together our experience of *a priori* connections (we would say a total apprehending thereof), Schopenhauer identified four types of connections between individual things ("always and everywhere, everything is, merely by virtue of something else," a phrase which, in our opinion, reflects the principle of opposites):

1. the *principium fiendi*: this is the occurrence of events in sequence, the growing apart in time, in short—visual, empirical concepts, causality from outside.
2. the *principium cognoscendi*: this is perceiving, with the dominant element being abstract concepts, ideas and truth. If judgment is to be cognition, it must have "a sufficient reason."
3. the *principium essendi*: this is being, the situation in space and consequently in time, i.e. the when and where. All the components in space and time have a specific relation to each other, with a role being played by formal concepts considered *a priori*, such as arithmetic and geometry.

4. the *principium agendi*: this deals with acting, the motivation, the why—in other words, causality from within.

It would be tempting here to try make categories according to Jung's four functions, but that might be stretching things a bit too far. It is sufficiently interesting in itself that Schopenhauer and Jung, acting on apparently quite rational grounds, both hit on the irrational tetrad. Schopenhauer is thus brought in merely as amplification.

In conclusion, we shall take the liberty of mentioning a further amplification, to show that Jung's quaternary typological schema can be found again and again on very different levels, albeit in different forms: cosmogonic myths can be seen in the light of complex psychology as the symbolic representations of the process of becoming conscious. As an example we shall present a myth of the North American Hopi Indians (Arizona).

The Hopi Creation Myth

When the world was young, the people, animals and all things were not on the earth's surface but beneath it. Total darkness reigned, both above and below. There were *four* worlds: this world on the earth's surface and three cave worlds, one below the other. None of the cave worlds was large enough to contain all living creatures and men, for they multiplied so rapidly that the first cave world was full to overflowing. The people were poor and did not know where they could go to in the darkness, and when they moved around they bumped into each other. The cave was full of the dirt and dung of those who dwelt there. Nobody could even turn round to spit without spitting on someone, or blow his nose without catching someone. The cave echoed with the cries of misery of the people.

So the leaders said: "This is not good" and "How can it be improved?" and "Let us try." Two boys—brothers—said: "Yes, let us try and see, and everything will be good; because of our wills, it will be good." This is how "The Two" spoke to the leaders and chief priests of the cave dwellers. "The Two" broke through the ceilings of the upper caves down to the gloomy dwelling place of the people and animals. Here they planted all the plants that would grow, in the hope that one of them would grow up to the hole through which they had come and that it would be strong enough to bear the weight of the people and animals. They hoped that the people and animals would be able to climb up into the second cave world. Finally, after several attempts, it came about that the bamboo cane grew so high that the tip went through the top, and was so strong that the people could climb up. It was full of knots, so it could

be used as a ladder, and ever since then the bamboo cane has grown with knots, as can be seen today in Colorado.

The people and animals climbed up this bamboo cane into the second cave world. When some of them were up there, they were afraid that this cave might also be too small (for it, too, was dark and they would not see anything). So they shook the ladder, so that those who were climbing up fell back. Then they pulled the ladder up, to stop any of the others from climbing up. It is said that those who were left behind also got out one day. They are our brothers in the West.

After a long period of time had elapsed, the second cave world was just as crowded as the first one had been. Arguments and complaints could be heard just like before. Once again the bamboo cane was placed under the roof and once again the people and animals were saved. But once again the slow ones were pushed back down the ladder. The third cave world was bigger but it was just as dark as the others. Then "The Two" found fire, so that torches could be lit, and by their light the people could build their huts and wander from place to place.

But bad times came to this world, too. The women went crazy. All they did was dance and they neglected everything. They even forgot their children. The women intermingled so that the men could not distinguish their own wife from the other women. It was never day, just night. The women danced the whole night long in the Kiwas and only stopped to sleep. The fathers had to act as mother to the neglected little ones. When the babies cried from hunger, the fathers took them to the Kiwas where the women were dancing. The mothers heard the crying and came to feed their babies. Then they forgot them again, left them to the fathers and went back to their dancing.

Because of these troubles, the men once again sought light and deliverance. They went up into the fourth world, which is our world. But when they got up there, they found that it was just as dark as the others, for the Earth was closed in by the sky, just like the cave worlds with their ceilings. The people went around and did their work just by the light of their torches and fires. They came across the tracks of just one creature, the sole ruler of the unpopulated world, the tracks of the "corpse demon" or "death." They fled to the East, but the world was wet, and in the darkness they were completely at a loss, for they seemed to be surrounded by water, and the paths led out into the water.

Along with the people, who had come up from the cave worlds with other creatures, were five animals: the spider, the vulture, the swallow, the coyote and the locust. The people and the creatures discussed together about how they could make light. Many, many attempts were made, but all in vain. It was decided that the spider would be the first one to try. It spun a cloak of pure white cotton, which gave off some light but not enough. That is why it is our grandmother. Then the people took the white hide of a stag, without any holes in it, and tanned it. They made

it into a shield and painted it turquoise. And lo and behold: when it was finished, it gave off such a bright light that the whole world was lit up. In its light the cotton light faded away. So they sent the shield light to the East, where it became the sun, and the cloak light to the West, where it became the moon.

Now down below in the cave world the coyote had stolen a vessel that was very heavy, so heavy that the coyote could not carry it. So he decided to leave it behind, but was curious to know what was inside. As it was now light, he opened it, whereupon several shining fragments and sparks shot out, burning his face. Ever since then, the coyote has had a black face. The sparks turned into stars.

By these lights it could be seen that the world was really very small and was surrounded by water on all sides, which is what made it wet. The people turned to the vulture for help and so, spreading out its wings, it fanned the waters, so that they flowed to the East and to the West till the mountains started to emerge. "The Two" carved out channels right through the mountains and the water flowed through them, digging its path deeper and deeper, thus creating the canyons and valleys of the world. The waters flowed on endlessly till the world grew drier and drier. Now that it was light and the land was emerging, the people followed the tracks of Death, which led to the East. That is why Death is our great Father and Mother, for we followed its tracks from the exit out of the cave world onwards; and it was the only creature that awaited us in the great world of water, which is now this world. Although all the waters had flowed away, the whole earth still remained wet and soft; this is why up to the present day we can still see the tracks of the people and of the many curious creatures leading from the this place to the West and to the place we came from. For in the meantime the Earth has turned into stone, and the tracks have been maintained as if they had been made yesterday.⁹⁷

So here, too, four steps are necessary in order to reach the conscious world and to finally emerge from the unconscious.

The circular form of the functions schema comes from the necessity of looking at an object from all sides if one wishes to apprehend its wholeness, if one wishes to become completely conscious of it. One half, conditioned by the original unconsciousness of the inferior function and the opposite attitude, remains dark at first. From this there arises the necessity of *circulating*, transmuting and circumambulating the meaning center. The concept of the *rota* or the *opus circulare* in alchemy also reveals this necessity. We still have some living examples of this circumambulation, for example the riding round the juridical precincts in Beromünster on Ascension Day.⁹⁸ It can be seen clearly here that this ritual ensures the wholeness that has been achieved, puts

a spell on it, for it is constantly threatened by the unconscious, which is never exhausted. But the dynamics of these processes within the circle of the functions and attitudes will only be dealt with in detail in Volume IV.

And a question to end with: why is it that radially symmetrical structures and centralized buildings always make such a spontaneously satisfying impression on us?

APPENDIX

A list of books and articles on the topic of Jungian typology, arranged chronologically.

1. C. G. Jung and F. Riklin, Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien, 1. Beitrag. *Journ. Psychol. Neurol.* III., Leipzig 1904, pp. 55–83, 193–215, 283–308 and IV. pp. 24–67.
2. C. G. Jung, Contribution à l'étude des Types Psychologiques. *Archs. Psychol.*, XIII. 52, Genève 1915, pp. 289–299.
3. B. M. Hinkle, A Study of Psychological Types. *Psychoanal. Revw.*, 9, 1922, pp. 107–197.
4. E. S. Conklin, The Definition of Introversion, Extraversion, and Allied Concepts, *Journ. Abnorm. Psychol.*, 17, 1923, pp. 367–382.
5. M. Freyd, Introverts and Extraverts, *Psychol. Revw.*, 31, 1924, pp. 74–87.
6. E. S. Conklin, The Determination of Normal Extravert–Introvert Interest Differences, *Journ. Genet. Psychol.*, 34, 1927, pp. 28–37.
7. C. G. Jung, Psychological Types. *Contribution to Analytical Psychology*, London 1928, pp. 295–312. (*Collected Works* VI)
8. K. J. Campbell, The Application of Extraversion–Introversion Tests to the Insane, *Journ. Abnorm. Psychol.*, 23, 1929, pp. 479–481.

9. W. McDougall, A Chemical Theory of Temperament Applied to Introversion and Extroversion, *Journ. Abnorm. Psychol.*, 24, 1929, pp. 393–409.
10. A. R. Root, A Short Test of Introversion–Extraversion. *Pers. J.*, 10, 1931, pp. 250–253.
11. C. G. Jung, *Psychologische Typologie. Seelenprobleme der Gegenwart*. Zürich 1931, pp. 115–143.
12. R. J. Ball, Introversion–Extraversion in a Group of Convicts. *Journ. Abnorm. Psychol.*, 26, 1932, pp. 422–428.
13. J. P. Guilford and R. B. Guilford, An Analysis of Factors in a Typical Test of Introversion-Extroversion, *Journ. Abnorm. Psychol.*, 28, 1933/34, pp. 377–399.
14. J. P. Guilford, Intro-Extraversion. *Psychol. Bull.*, 31, New York 1934, pp. 331–354.
15. Toni Wolff, *Einführung in die Grundlagen der Komplexen Psychologie. Die kulturelle Bedeutung der Komplexen Psychologie*. 1935, pp. 51–122.
16. J. H. v.d. Hoop, *Bewußtseinstypen*. Bern 1937.
17. R. M. Collier and M. Emch, Introversion–Extraversion; The Concepts and their Clinical Use. *Amer. Journ. Psychiatr.*, 94, 1938, pp. 1045–1075.
18. J. P. Guilford and K. M. Braly, Extra- and Introversion. *Psychol. Bull.*, 27, 1939, pp. 96–107.
19. W. Stephenson, Consideration of Jung's Typology, *Journ. Mental. Sc.*, 85, No. 355, 1939, pp. 185–205.
20. V. Case, *Your Personality, Introvert or Extravert*. New York 1941.
21. S. Cobb, *Foundations of Neuropsychiatry*, 2nd ed., Baltimore 1941.
22. C. Evans and T. R. McConnell, A New Measure of Introversion—Extraversion. *Journ. Psychol.*, 12, 1941, pp. 11–124.
23. J. S. Huxley, *Man Stands Alone*. New York 1941.
24. D. E. Super, The Bernreuter Personality Inventory: A Review of Research. *Psychol. Bull.*, 39, 1942, pp. 340–347.
25. H. Gray, Obesity: A Challenge to the Psychiatrist. *Stanford Med. Bull.*, 1, No. 7, November 1943, pp. 195–199.
26. J. B. Wheelwright and J. A. Bühler, *Jungian Type Survey* (The Gray-Wheelwright Test), 1944, 15th revision, Soc. Jungian Analysts of North Calif., San Francisco 1964.
27. H. Gray and J. B. Wheelwright, Jung's Psychological Types and Marriage. *Stanford Med. Bull.*, 2, No. 1, February 1944, pp. 37–39.
28. H. Gray and J. B. Wheelwright, Jung's Psychological Types, Including the Four Functions. *Journ. Gen. Psychol.*, 33, October 1945, pp. 265–284.

29. H. Gray, Intuition and Psychotherapists. *Stanford Med. Bull.*, 3, No. 3, August 1945, pp. 132–134.
30. H. Gray and J. B. Wheelwright, Jung's Psychological Types, Their Frequency of Occurrence. *Journ. Psychol.*, 34, January 1946, pp. 3–17.
31. R. B. Cattell, *Description and Measurement of Personality*. New York 1946.
32. H. Gray, Brother Klaus, with a Translation of Jung's Commentary. *Journ. Nerv. Ment. Dis.*, 103, No. 4, April 1946, pp. 359–377.
33. H. Gray, Jung's Psychological Types in Relation to Occupation, Race, Body-build. *Stanford Med. Bull.*, 4, No. 3–4, August–November 1946, pp. 100–103.
34. H. Gray, Psychological Types and Changes with Age. *Journ. Clinical Psychol.*, 3, No. 3, July 1947, pp. 273–277.
35. H. Gray, Jung's Psychological Types: Meaning and Consistency of the Questionnaire, *Journ. Gen. Psychol.*, 27, October 1947, pp. 177–186.
36. H. J. Eysenck, *Dimensions of Personality*. London 1947.
37. H. Gray, Jung's Psychological Types in Men and Women. *Stanford Med. Bull.*, 6, No. 1, February 1948, pp. 29–36.
38. H. Gray, Jung's Psychological Types: Ambiguous Scores and Their Interpretation, *Journ. Gen. Psychol.*, 40, January 1949, pp. 63–88.
39. H. Gray, Freud and Jung: Their Contrasting Psychological Types, *Psychoanalyt. Revw*, 36, No. 1, January 1949, pp. 22–44.
40. H. Gray, Jung's Psychological Types in Married People. *Journ. Social Psychol.*, 29, May 1949, pp. 189–200.
41. C. A. Meier, Projektion, Übertragung und Subjekt-Objektrelation in der Psychologie. *Dialectica* 8, Neuveville 1954, p. 302.
42. K. W. Bash, *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychopathologie*. Stuttgart 1955.
43. H. J. Eysenck, *Dynamics of Anxiety and Hysteria*. London 1957.
44. R. B. Cattell, *Personality and Motivation Structure and Measurement*. New York 1957.
45. J. P. Guilford, *Personality*. New York 1959.
46. Toni Wolff, *Studien zu C. G. Jungs Psychologie*. Ed. C. A. Meier, Zürich 1959, pp. 77–171.
47. H. J. Eysenck. *The Structure of Human Personality*. London 1960.
48. P. M. Carrigan, Extraversion–Introversion as Dimensions of Personality. *Psychol. Bull.*, 57, 1960, pp. 326–360.
49. I. B. Myers, *Manual, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator*. Princeton, N. J., 1962.

50. M. Fierz, *Die vier Elemente. Traum und Symbol*. Ed. C. A. Meier, Zürich 1963.
51. H. K. Fierz. *Klinik und analytische Psychologie* (Studien aus dem C. G. Jung-Institut, Band XV). Zürich 1963.
52. L. J. Stricker and J. Ross, *The Item Content and Some Correlates of a Jungian Personality Inventory*. Princeton, N. J. 1963.
53. L. J. Stricker and J. Ross, An Assessment of Some Structural Properties of the Jungian Personality Typology. *Journ. Abnorm. Psychol.*, 68, 1964, pp. 62–71.
54. L. J. Stricker and J. Ross, Some Correlations of a Jungian Personality Inventory. *Psychol. Reps.*, 14, 1964, pp. 623–643.
55. M. J. Dicks-Mireaux, Extraversion-Introversion in Experimental Psychology. *Journ. Analyt. Psychol.*, 9, 1964, pp. 117–128.
56. K. Bradway, Jung's Psychological Types. *Journ. Analyt. Psychol.*, 9, 1964, pp. 129–135.
57. F. B. Brawer and J. M. Spiegelmann, Rorschach and Jung. *Journ. Analyt. Psychol.*, 9, 1964, pp. 137–149.
58. B. Klopfer and J. M. Spiegelmann, Some Dimensions of Psychotherapy. *Spectrum Psychologiae*, 1965, pp. 177–183.
59. E. Wolpert and L. Michel, Die Typologie C. G. Jungs als Gegenstand empirischer Persönlichkeitsforschung. *Psychol. Forschg.*, 26, 1966, pp. 112–131.
60. I. S. von Zeppelin, *Die Variablen der Holtzmann Inkblot Technique in ihrer Beziehung zur Introversion und Extraversion*. Bern 1966.
61. M. A. Wozny and L. T. Dayhaw, Jung's Personality Dimensions in the Gray-Wheelwright Psychological Type Questionnaire. Diss. Univ. Ottawa, Can., 1966.
62. I. N. Marshall, Extraversion and Libido in Jung and Cattell. *Journ. Analyt. Psychol.*, 12, 1967, pp. 115–136.
63. I. N. Marshall, The Four Functions: A Conceptual Analysis. *Journ. Analyt. Psychol.*, 13, 1968, pp. 1–32.
64. H. G. Richek and O. H. Bown, Phenomenological Correlates of Jung's Typology. *Journ. Analyt. Psychol.*, 13, 1968, pp. 57–65.
65. H. Mann, M. Siegler and H. Osmond, The Many Worlds of Time. *Journ. Analyt. Psychol.*, 13, 1968, pp. 33–56.
66. C. A. Meier, Dynamic Psychology and the Classical World. G. Mora and J. Brand (Eds.), *Psychiatry and History, Problems in the Writing and the History of Psychiatry*. Springfield, Ill., 1969.
67. C. A. Meier, Individuation und Psychologische Typen. *Zs. Analyt. Psychol.*, 1, 1970, pp. 6–19.

68. A. Plaut, "Analytical Psychologists and Psychological Type." *Journ. Analyt. Psychol.*, 17, 1972, pp. 137-149.
69. R. Gollner, "Empirische Überprüfung einiger Aussagen von C. G. Jung über Einstellungs- und Funktionstypen." *Analyt. Psychol.*, VI/2, 1975.
70. U. Baumann, J. Angst, A. Henne, and F. E. Muser, "The Gray-Wheelwright Test." *Diagnostica*, XXI, 1975, pp. 66-83.
71. K. Bradway and Wayne Detloff, "Incidence of Psychological Types." *Journ. Analyt. Psychol.*, 21, 1976, pp. 134-146.
72. C. A. Meier and M. A. Wozny, "An Empirical Study of Jungian Typology." *Journ. Analyt. Psychol.*, 23, 1978, pp. 226-230.

I should like to add that a new typological test has recently been developed by June Singer and Mary Loomis. A preliminary publication is entitled "The Singer-Loomis Inventory of Personality: A Measure of Cognitive Styles Based on C. G. Jung's Theory of Psychological Types." There also exists a short publication entitled "About the SLIP: A Preliminary Manual for the Singer-Loomis Inventory of Personality." Both works are dated 1979.

C.A.M.

NOTES

1. C.C. Carus, *Psyche*. Stuttgart 1846.
2. cf. C.A. Meier, "The Jungian point of view in the latest experimental sleep and dream research," *Zs. Analyt. Psychol.* 11/3, Berlin 1971, p. 157.
3. Cf. Aristotle, Vol. II of this textbook, p. 50–52.
4. K. Lorenz, *Das sogenannte Böse*. Vienna, 1963.
5. Hölderlin, *Patmos*.
6. A. Jaffé. *The Myth of Meaning in the Work of C.G. Jung*. Einsiedeln 1989. German Orig., 1967.
7. N. Bohr, *Atomtheorie and Naturbeschreibung*. Berlin 1931. Chap. III p. 62.
8. W. Pauli, "Die philosophische Bedeutung der Idee der Komplementarität". *Experientia*, VL, Basel 1950, p. 72ff.
9. N. Bohr, "Licht und Leben". *Die Naturwissenschaften* 21, p. 245ff., cf. Vol II of this textbook, p. 16ff.
10. W. Pauli, *Dialectica II* La Neuveville 1957, p. 45.
11. Schopenhauer, *Parerga* 1.
12. cf. Plato, *Rep.* 597 E and *Tim.* 29 C.
13. E. DuBois-Reymond, *Reden*, p. 131.
14. Tertullian, *De testimonio animae* I, 5–7.
15. E. Furst, "Statistische Untersuchungen über Wortassoziationen und über familiäre Übereinstimmung im Reaktionstypus bei Ungebildeten". *Journ. Psychol. Neurol.* IX, 1907, pp. 243–278.
16. J.B. Lang, *Über Assoziationsversuche bei Schizophrenen und den Mitgliedern ihrer Familie*, Zürich Diss. 1913.
17. For more on Purkinje see footnote 24, Vol. II of this text book, p. 7.
18. J.E. Purkinje, in *Handwörterbuch der Physiologie mit Rücksicht auf physiologische Pathologie* ed, Rudolph Wagner, Vol III/2, Braunschweig 1846, p. 416f.
19. W. Rosenkrantz, *Wissenschaften des Wissens*, J. Mainz 1868, p. 10f.

20. S. Freud, "Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia. (Dementia paranoides)," *Jb. Psychoanal. psychopathol. Forschgg.* III, Leipzig and Vienna 1911, pp. 9–68.
21. D.P. Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken*. Leipzig 1903.
22. cf. *Romans* 7.
23. J.E. Purkinje, *ibid.*, p. 419.
24. C.G. Jung, *On the Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena*. CW 1. German original, Leipzig, 1902.
25. M. Prince, *The Dissociation of a Personality*. New York 1905.
26. E. Kant, *Werke*, Vol. VIII, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Berlin 1923.
27. J.W. Dunne, *The Serial Universe*, London 1934. Dunne was a great expert on aerodynamics and as such was very involved in the development of the Handley-Page wing for aeroplanes. He was therefore undoubtedly a careful and reliable observer.
28. As above, *An Experiment with Time*. London 1934.
29. C.G. Jung, *The Psychology of Transference*. CW 16, para. 397.
30. *Origenes*, Leviticus homily, 5,2.
31. C.A. Meier, *Moderne Physik—moderne Psychologie. Die kulturelle Bedeutung der Komplexen Psychologie*. Berlin 1935, pp. 349–362.
32. Michael Majer, *Scrutinium chymicum*, Emblema XLV, Francofurti 1687.
33. J. Corrie, *ABC of Jung's Psychology*. London 1927.
34. C.G. Jung, *Über die Energetik der Seele*. Zürich 1928. Über psychische Energetik und das Wesen der Träume. Zürich 1948.
35. Goethe, *Maximen und Reflexionen IV*. Nachgelassene Schriften.
36. C.A. Meier, *Ancient Incubation and Modern Psychotherapy*, Einsiedeln, 1989. Reprint of 1967 edition, pp. 7–9.
37. *Hereditary Genius*. London 1869. Sir Francis Galton (1822–1911), a cousin of Charles Darwin, studied heredity and was a pioneer of eugenics.
38. *Origenes*, Leviticus homily, 5,2, quoted from C.G. Jung, *Psychology of the Transference* (in *The Practice of Psychotherapy*, New York and London, 1954).
39. C.A. Meier, *The Unconscious in its Empirical Manifestations*, Boston: Sigo Press 1984, p. 28ff.
40. C.G. Jung, *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*. Zürich 1912, later modified slightly as *Symbols of Transformation*, Zürich 1952.
41. cf. footnote 33.
42. H. Keyserling, *Südamerikanische Meditationen*. Stuttgart 1932.
43. cf. J. Stallmach, *Dynamics und Energeia*. (Monographien zue philosophischen Forschung Bd. XXI), Meisenheim am Glan 1959.
44. M. Putscher, *Pneuma, Spiritus, Geist*. Wiesbaden 1973.
45. E. Clarke and K. Dewhurst, *An Illustrated History of Brain Function* (Oxford, 1972).
46. H. Jantz and K. Beringer, *Das Syndrom des Schwebenerlebnisses unmittelbar nach Kopfverletzungen*. *Der Nervenarzt* XVII, 1944, p. 202, quoted from C.G. Jung, *Synchronizität als ein Prinzip akausaler Zusammenhänge. Naturerklärung und Psyche*. (Studien aus dem C.G. Jung Institut Zürich IV), 1952, p. 92. (*Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle. The Interpretation of Nature and Psyche*, p. 125).
47. C. Green, *Out-of-the-body-Experiences*. London 1968.
48. L. Lévy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think*, trans. I.A. Clarke (London, 1926).
49. Sir John Woodroffe, *The Serpent Power*. Madras 1918.
50. E. Rousselle, *Seelische Führung im Taoismus. Eranos-Jb. 1933*, Zürich 1934,

- pp. 135–199. Spiritual Guidance in Contemporary Taoism in “Spiritual Disciplines” (*Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks*, 4, B.S.XXX, 1960).
51. A. Avalon, *The Garland of Letters*. 3 ed. Madras 1955.
 52. cf. Volume II of this textbook, pp. 80–81.
 53. *Heraclitus*, fr. 86.
 54. Musaeum Hermeticum, *De sulphure*. Francofurti 1677, p. 610.
 55. G. Dorneus, *Philosophia meditativa*. 1602.
 56. *Evangelium nach Thomas*, ed. A. Guillaumont, Leiden 1959, p. 55 (Logion 112). Now available in *The Nag Hammadi Library*, ed. James M. Robinson (San Francisco, 1977).
 57. A. Adler, *Studien über die Minderwertigkeit von Organen*. Vienna and Berlin 1907.
 58. cf. Volume I of this textbook p. 67.
 59. cf. Volume I, p. 163.
 60. C.A. Meier, *Ancient Incubation and Modern Psychotherapy*.
 61. cf. Volume II of this textbook.
 62. C.A. Meier, “Individuation und psychologische Typen.” *Zs. Analyt. Psychol.* 1./2, Berlin 1970, pp. 6–19.
 63. C.G. Jung, contribution à l’étude des Types Psychologiques. *Archs. Psychol.* XII, Geneva 1915, pp. 259–299. C.G. Jung “On Psychological Understanding.” *Journ. Abnorm. Psychol.*, Boston 1915, pp. 3–17. Now in German in C.W. III, p. 198ff.
 64. C.G. Jung, *Der Inhalt der Psychose*. Leipzig and Vienna, 2nd ed. 1914, pp. 34–44. “The Content of the Psychoses,” CW7.
 65. U. Baumann, J. Angst, A. Henne and F.E. Muser, “Der Gray-Wheelwright Test.” *Diagnostica XXI*, pp. 666–83, Göttingen, 1975. K. Bradway, W. Detloff, “Incidence of Psychological Types.” *Journal of Analyt. Psychol.* Vol. XXI, pp. 134–146, London 1976. M.A. Wozny and C.A. Meier, “An Empirical Study of Jungian Typology.” *Journal of Analyt. Psychol.* Vol. XXIII, pp. 226–230, London, 1978.
 66. Meister Eckehart, *Schriften und Predigten*. Ed. Herman Büttner. Jena 1917. Vol. II p. 10.
 67. C.G. Jung. *Psychological Types*. para 621.
 68. C.G. Jung, *Psychological Types*. Zurich 1921, paras 621–622.
 69. M. Freyd, “Introverts and Extraverts.” *Psychol. Revw.* 31, Baltimore, Pa. 1924, pp. 74–87.
 70. C.G. Jung, *Psychological Types*. Princeton 1971.
 71. See Bibliographical Appendix.
 72. C.G. Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 60–62.
 73. E. Kretschmer, *Körperbau und Charakter*. Leipzig 1921.
 74. R. Otto, *Das Heilige*. Munich 1917.
 75. H. Heine, *Deutschland* (Original: 1834) Cf. Germany (*Works*, translated by Charles Godfrey Leland, 5.) New York, 1892. (p. 81).
 76. C.G. Jung, in the manuscript of a lecture.
 77. The correspondence between Goethe and Schiller, vol. 20 of *Werke, Gedenkausgabe*, Edited by Ernst Beutler, Zurich, 1948–54.
 78. F. Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, trans. by Reginald Snell. New Haven and London, 1954. All citations taken from this source.
 79. F. Schiller, *Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung*. 1795.
 80. Goethe, “Bedeutende Förderniss durch ein einziges geistreiches Wort.” 1823.
 81. Schiller is undoubtedly thinking here of the “Verlesungen über das Wesen des

Gelehrten und seine Erscheinungen im Gebiete der Freiheit" of J.G. Fichte, who was also an introvert; this work was actually only published in 1806 in Berlin.

82. cf. W. Pauli, "The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of Kepler." Originally published in German as "Naturerklärung und Psyche" (Studien aus dem C.G. Jung-Institut Zürich, IV Ed. C.A. Meier, Zurich 1952).

83. R. Fludd, *Philosophica Moysaica*, fol. 66. Ghent 1638.

84. Fr. Nietzsche, *Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik*, 1870–71. Translated by William A. Haussman. *The Birth of Tragedy*, Edinburgh and London, 1910.

85. No. 947 in the Budapest Gallery, panel 23, Catalogue Klara Garas, Budapest 1972.

86. From C.G. Jung, *Psychological Types*. CW 6, para. 551.

87. *Ibid.*, para. 553.

88. Heraclitus, fr. B. 53.

89. cf. Footnote 79.

90. *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* 4, 3, 1–6.

91. Cf. C.A. Meier, "Dynamic Psychology and the Classical World." In: *Psychiatry and its History*, Ed. George Mora and Jeanne L. Brand, Springfield, Ill. 1970, pp. 159–171.

92. From now on the functions will be referred to by the following abbreviations: S=sensation, T=thinking, F=feeling, I=intuition.

93. C.G. Jung, *On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena*. CW. I. Zürich dissertation. German original, Leipzig, 1902.

94. J. Kerner, *Die Seherin von Prevorst*. Stuttgart und Tübingen 1829.

95. cf. C.G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. Ed. A. Jaffé, Zürich 1962.

96. A. Schopenhauer, *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*.

97. P. Radin, *The Story of the American Indian*. New York 1927, pp. 188–191. Cf. also the myth in Plato, *Phaedo* 114B.

98. cf. Eduard Fritz Knuchel, *Die Umwandlung in Kult, Magie und Rechtsbrauch*. Basel 1919.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adler, A. *Study of Organ Inferiority and Its Psychological Compensation*. New York, 1917. German orig., 1907.
- Aristotle *Peri enhypnion* (On Dreaming)
- *Peri tes kat' hypnon mantikes* (On Dream Interpretation)
- *Metaphysics* 9. 1074
- *Nicomachean Ethics*
- Avalon, A. (Sir John Woodroffe) *The Serpent Power*. Madras, 1918
- *The Garland of Letters*, 3rd ed. Madras, 1955
- *Shakti and Shakta: Essays and Addresses on the Sakta Tantrasastra*. German ed. Weilheim/Obb., 1962
- *Die Girlande der Buchstaben: Studien über d. Mantra-Shastra*. Übersetzung von Ursula von Mangoldt. Weilheim/Obb., 1968
- Die Schlagenkraft: Die Entfaltung schöpferischer Kräfte im Menschen* 2nd ed. Weilheim/Obb., 1971
- Baumann, U., Angst, J., Henne, A., and Muser, F.E. *Der Grey-Wheelwright Test*. *Diagnostica* xxi, 1975, pp. 66–83
- Bohr, N., *Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature*. New York, 1976. German orig., 1931
- "Licht und Leben." in *Die Naturwissenschaften* 21. Berlin, 1933
- Brhadaranyaka Upanishad*
- Carus, C.G. *Psyche*. New York: Spring Publications, 1970. German orig., 1846
- Clarke, E., and Dewhurst, K., *Illustrated History of Brain Function*, 1973.
- Corrie, J., *ABC of Jung's Psychology*. London, 1927
- Dorneus, G., *Philosophia meditativa*, 1602

- DuBois-Reymond, E. *Reden*, Vol. I (*Discourses*)
- Dunne, J.W., *An Experiment With Time*. London, 1927
- *The Serial Universe*. London, 1934
- Meister Eckehart, *Schriften und Predigten*. Herman Bittner, ed. Jena, 1917
- Evangelium nach Thomas (The Gospel According to Thomas)*. A Guillaumont, ed. Leiden, 1959
- Fichte, J.G., *Vorlesungen über das Wesen des Gelehrten und seine Erscheinungen im Gebiete der Freiheit*. Berlin, 1806. In *Fichtes Werke*, 1971
- Fludd, R., *Philosophia Moysaica*. Ghent, 1638
- Freud, S., "Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)." In *Standard Edition*, Vol XII, 1958
German orig., 1911
- Freyd, M., "Introverts and Extraverts." In *Psychol. Rev.*, 31. Baltimore, 1924
- Fürst, E., "Statistical Investigations on Word-Associations and on Familial Agreement in Reaction Type Among Uneducated Persons." In *Studies in Word-Association*. C.G. Jung, ed. London, 1918. German orig., 1907
- Galton, F., *Hereditary Genius*. London, 1869
- Goethe, J.W., *Bedeutende Förderniss durch ein einziges geistreiches Wort*. 1823
- *Maxims and Reflections*. German orig., *Maximen und Reflexionen IV. Nachgelassene Schriften*
- Govinda, Lama Anagarika, *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism*. York Beach, Me.: Weiser, 1969. German ed., 1972
- Green, C., *Out-of-the-Body Experiences*. London, 1968
- Heine, H., *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland, II (Der Salon II)*. 1852
- Heraclitus, fr. B. 53
- fr. 86
- Hölderlin, F., *Patmos*
- Homer, *Iliad*
- Jaffé, A., *The Myth of Meaning*. Einsiedeln: Daimon Verlag, 1989. German orig., 1967
- James, W., *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. London & New York, 1902
- Jantz, H., and Beringer, K., "Das Syndrom der Schwebelerlebnisses unmittelbar nach Kopfverletzungen." In *Der Nervenarzt*, xvii. Berlin, 1944
- Jung, C.G., "On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena." In *Collected Works*, Vol. I. German orig., 1902
- *Symbols of Transformation*. In *Collected Works*, Vol. V. (German orig. *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*, 1912)
- *The Content of the Psychoses*. In *Collection Works*, Vol. III. German orig., 1914
- "A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types." In *Collected Works*, Vol. VI. French orig., 1913
- "On Psychological Understanding." In *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, IX:6. Feb-Mar., 1915

- *Psychological Types*. In *Collected Works*, Vol. VI. German orig., 1921
- "On Psychic Energy." In *Collected Works*, Vol. VIII. German orig., 1928
- *The Psychology of the Transference*. In *Collected Works*, Vol. XVI. German orig., 1946
- *Über psychische Energetik und das Wesen der Träume*. Zürich, 1948
- *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*. In *Collected Works*, Vol. VIII. German orig., 1952
- *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. New York, 1962. German orig., 1962
- Kerner, J., *Die Seherin von Prevorst*. Stuttgart und Tübingen, 1829
- Keyserling, H., *Südamerikanische Meditationen*. Stuttgart, 1932
- Knuchel, E.F., *Die Umwandlung in Kult, Magie, und Rechtsbrauch*. Basel, 1919
- Kretschmer, E., *Physique and Character*, 1936. German orig., Leipzig, 1921
- Lang, J.B. *Über Assoziationversuche bei Schizophrenen und den Mitgliedern ihrer Familie*. Zurich diss., 1913
- Lévy-Bruhl, L., *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*. Paris, 1910
- Lorenz, K., *Das sogenannte Böse*. Vienna, 1963
- Majer, M., *Scrutinium chymicum*. Frankfurt, 1687
- Meier, C.A., *Moderne Physik—moderne Psychologie: Die kulturelle Bedeutung der Komplexen Psychologie*. Berlin, 1935
- *Ancient Incubation and Modern Psychotherapy*. Einsiedeln: Daimon Verlag, 1989. German orig., 1948
- *The Unconscious in its Empirical Manifestations*. Boston: Sigo Press, 1984. German orig., 1968
- "Dynamic Psychology and the Classical World." In *Psychiatry and its History*. Mora and Brand, eds. Springfield, Ill, 1970
- "Individuation und psychologische Typen." In *Zeitschrift Analyt. Psychol.*, I. Berlin, 1970
- "Der Jungsche Gesichtspunkt in der neueren experimentellen Schlafund Traumforschung." In *Zeitschrift Analyt. Psychol.*, II. Berlin, 1971
- *The Meaning and Significance of Dreams*. Boston: Sigo Press, 1987. German orig., 1972
- Mookerjee, A., *Tantra Asana*. New York, 1975. German ed., 1971
- Musaem Hermeticum. *De sulphure*. Frankfurt, 1677
- Nietzsche, F., *The Birth of Tragedy*. German orig. *Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik*, 1870/71
- Origen, *Leviticus Homily*
- Otto, R., *The Idea of the Holy*. London, 1950. German orig., 1917
- Pauli, W., "Die philosophische Bedeutung der Idee der Komplementarität." In *Experientia*, VI. Basel, 1950.
- "Der Einfluss archetypischer Vorstellungen auf die Bildung naturwis-

- senschaftlicher Theorien bei Kepler." In *Naturerklärung und Psyche*. Studien aus dem C.G. Jung-Institut Zurich IV. Zurich, 1952
- "Phänomen und physikalische Realität." In *Dialectica*, II. La Neuveville, 1957
- Plato, *Phaedo* 114b
- *Republic* 597e
- *Timaeus* 29c
- Prince, M., *The Dissociation of a Personality*. New York, 1905
- Purkinje, J.E., "Wachen, Schlafen, Traum und verwandte Zustände." In *Handwörterbuch der Physiologie mit Rücksicht auf physiologische Pathologie*, Bd. III/2. Braunschweig. 1846
- Putscher, M., *Pneuma, Spiritus, Geist*. Wiesbaden, 1973
- Radin, P., *The Story of the American Indian*. New York, 1927
- Rosenkrantz, W., *Wissenschaft des Wissens und Begründung der besonderen Wissenschaften durch die allgemeine Wissenschaft*. I. Mainz, 1866
- Rouselle, E., "Seelische Führung im lebenden Taoismus." In *Eranos Jahrbuch* 1933. Zürich, 1934
- Schiller, F., *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*. German orig., 1795
- *On Naive and Sentimental Poetry*. German orig., 1795
- Schopenhauer, A., *Parerga I*
- *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*.
- Schreber, D.P., *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken*. Leipzig, 1903
- Stallmach, J., *Dynamis und Energeia*. Meisenheim am Glan, 1959
- Stevenson, R.L., "The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde."
- Tertullian, *De testimonio animae*, I

INDEX

- Abelard, Peter, 81
- "absolute subject," 32, 34
 - as inner force, 34
 - identity with "absolute object," 36
 - in consciousness, 30
- Adler, Alfred
 - "language of the organs" and, 65
 - typological opposite of Freud, 75
- advaya* ("not-two"), 63
- affects, 25, 28, 38, 65–67
 - ancient theories of, 66–67
 - in Platonic view of soul, 65–66
 - James-Lange theory of, 65
 - libido and, 63, 65
 - overlooked in psychology, 67
 - thymos* as, 61
- Agni (Hindu god of fire), 61, 63
 - similarity to Mars, 61
- aletheia*, 11
- analysis
 - analogy to physics, 8 (see also *libido, energetic model*)
 - attitude and, 70, 77–78
 - Freudian, as "heroic," 4–5
 - Jungian, and typology, 70
 - of "normal" vs. "abnormal" cases, 5
 - training/teaching, 78
- anima/animus*, 33
- Anselm of Canterbury (as Realist), 82
- Aquinas, Thomas, 45
 - and four psychic forces, 47
 - as moderate Realist, 82
- Arddhanarishvara (Hindu androgynous god), 62
- Arian/Communion dispute (see *Universals dispute*)
- Aristotle, 15, 39, 44, 50, 79
 - "curbing the passions" and, 66
 - extraversion of, 80
- Arius, 81
- asceticism, 66
- assimilation, 2, 19, 33
 - definition of, 2
- Athanasius, 81
- attentiveness (of consciousness), 19–20
- attitude (see also *type, psychological*)
 - as orientation of libido, 75, 77
 - compensatory, of unconscious, 1, 43
 - Gray-Wheelwright Test and, 74
 - in individual psychology, 82
 - individuation and, 75
 - of ego to object, 40–41
 - of Schiller, of Goethe, 82–91 *passim*
 - one-sidedness and, 82, 84

- superior/differentiated function and, 101–102
- types, characteristics of, 71–72, 73
 - diagnosis of, 75, 100
 - Western (extraverted) vs. Eastern (introverted), 92
- Avalon, Arthur (Sir John Woodroffe), 50, 60
- Avicenna, 47

- Beethoven, Ludwig van, 71
- Bengali-South India Tantra (see *Kundalini Yoga*)
- Bergson, Henri-Louis, 32
- Beringer, K., 48
- Berkeley, George (as Nominalist), 82
- Bernard of Chartres (as Realist), 82
- Bessel, F. W., 18
- bête noire*, 32 (see also *shadow*)
- Bohr, Niels, 9–10
- Brahman (atman), 30, 61, 62
 - as *advaita* (not-two), 63
 - (see also *self*)

- Carus, C. G., 1, 15
- cénésthesie*, 28 (see also *ego-complex*)
- chakras*, 51, 52–59, 60, 61–62 (see also *Kundalini Yoga*)
- Charcot, J. M., 5
- Cicero, 66
- Clarke, E., 47
- Classicism (see *Universals dispute*)
- coincidentia oppositorum*, 88
 - creative synthesis and, 92
- complex, atomic structure of, 28
- Condillac, E. B. de (as Nominalist), 82
- consciousness
 - analogy with physics and, 19, 34, 43–44 (see also *libido*)
 - assimilation and, 2
 - attentiveness of, 19–21, 66
 - automatisms and, 19, 44
 - clarity of, 18–19
 - comparative analysis of, 13–15
 - compensatory attitude of unconscious and, 1
 - compensatory function of unconscious and, 1, 43, 83
 - contents of, 27
 - differentiation and, 100
 - definition of, 100–101
 - ego-complex and, 28
 - partial consciousness of, 30, 31
 - energetic factors in, 19, 43 (see also *libido*)
 - epistemological problems and, 7–15 *passim*, 29
 - ethical problems and, 3, 23, 25
 - field of, 22–24, 57
 - functions of, 19–24
 - coordinating, 21
 - discriminating (*diakresis*), 21–23
 - assimilating, 19
 - memory, 24
 - function-types of, 95–105 *passim* (see also *thinking, feeling sensing, intuiting*)
 - auxiliary, 101
 - behavioral characteristics of, 98–102
 - mutual exclusivity of functional pairs, 99
 - rational/discriminating vs. irrational/perceiving, 98–99
 - tetradic organization of, 96
 - superior vs. inferior, 100–102
 - inferior/undifferentiated
 - as “opposite type,” 101–102
 - unconscious and, 102
 - autonomy of, 101
 - differentiation of, over time, 102, 103–106
 - superior/differentiated, as attitude-type, 101
 - individuation and, 78
 - “irrationality” of, 11
 - Jungian psychology and, 1
 - light analogy, 22–24, 71
 - localization of, 47–64 *passim*
 - anatomical model, 49–50
 - ancient theories of, 48–51
 - “bush soul,” 48–49
 - (see also *Kundalini Yoga*)
 - narrowness of, 22
 - phenomenology of, 11, 13–22 *passim*
 - stages of, 47–48, 64, 102–103
 - structure of, 27–45 *passim*
 - subject/object distinction in, 29–31, 49
 - systemic nature of, 17–25 *passim*
 - temporal limitation of 17–19

- vs. unconscious, 3, 4, 8, 13, 43, 97, 101
- Corrie, Joan, 33
- Council of Nicaea (325 A.D.), 81
- Cynics, 66
- Darwin, Charles, 14
- Democritus, 66
- Descartes, René, 29
- Dewhurst, K., 47
- diakrisis*, 22 (see *consciousness, functions of*)
- differentiation, 100–101
 - definition of, 100
- Dorneus, Gerardus, 64
- dreams, 2, 17, 28, 48
 - as passive fantasy, 38
- Dubois-Reymond, E., 11
- Dunne, J. W., 29–30, 48
- ego (see *ego-complex*)
- ego-complex, 27–45 *passim*
 - cénesthésie and, 28
 - coherence, constancy, and continuity of, 28
 - development of, 32–33
 - ego-field and, 31
 - external stimuli and, 28
 - fantasy and, 36–39
 - immaturity of, 33
 - partial consciousness of, 31, 32
 - plurality of, 28
 - vs. fixed identity, 28
 - polarity/dualism of, 39
 - structure of, 33–36
 - unconscious and, 29 (see also *shadow*)
- Einstein, Albert, 45
- Eriugena, Johannes Scotus, 80, 82
- extraversion, 37, 69–93 *passim*
 - description of, 71
 - orientation of libido in, 76
 - outer object and, 71
- fantasy, 36–39
 - active, 37
 - as concrete product of libido, 36, 37
 - in structure of ego-complex 35–39
 - passive, 37
 - sources of 37–38
 - external 37
 - internal 38
- feeling, 95–104 *passim*
 - as rational/discriminating function 96, 98–99
- Fichte, J. G., 29, 31
- Fierz, Markus, 34
- Fludd, Robert (Robertus de Fluctibus)
 - Philosophia moysaica* (as example of psychological dualism), 88
- Freud, Sigmund, 5, 22, 34, 71
 - as typological opposite of Adler, 75
- Freyd, M., 74
- Furst, E., 15
- Galen, 66
- Galton, Sir Francis, 39
- gana* (Sp. “will”), 41–43
- Gauss, Friedrich, 91
- Gnostics, 66
- Goethe, J. W., x, 36, 82, 86–90 *passim*
 - as extravert, 82, 86
 - “Bedeutende Fördermiss durch ein einziges Geistreiches Wort,” 87
 - correspondence with Schiller, 84–89
 - Faust I*, 24, 28, 41, 87
 - Mephistopheles in, 41
 - Maximen und Reflexionen*, 36, 86
- Green, Celia, 48
- Hauer, J.W., 61
- hegemonikon* (Zeno), 50; (Aristotle), 50
- Helmholtz, Herman (as Classicist), 89–90
- Heine, Heinrich, 79–80
- Heraclitus, 61, 91
- hieros gamos* (“sacred marriage”), 63
- Hopi creation myth, 105–107
- Hölderlin, J.C.F., 4
- homoiousia* (similarity of substance), 81
- homoousia* (identity of substance), 81
- Hume, David (as Nominalist), 82
- Husserl, Edmund, 30
- Huxley, Thomas H., 86
- idées fixes, 25
- Iliad*, 50
- image, 37, 38
 - autonomy of, 38
 - definition of, 38
 - transformative effect of, 38
- imaginatio vera*, 38
- instincts, 3, 37

- introversion, 69–93 *passim*
 description of, 71–72
 orientation of libido in, 76
 inner object and, 72
 “subjective factor” and, 72–73
- intuition, 38, 95–104 *passim*
 as bridge with unconscious, 97
 as irrational/perceiving function, 97
 psychometric phenomena and, 97
- Iselin, Hans Konrad, 96
- Jackson, Hughling, 60
- Jaffé, Aniela, 7
- James, William, 28–29
- Janet, Pierre, 5
- Jantz, Pierre, 5
- Jung, Carl Gustav, 1, 7, 11, 30, 41, 50, 61,
 72, 75, 76, 82, 104, and *passim*
 as introvert, 75, 92
 association experiments, 24, 27, 95
 theory of consciousness, 5
 works:
Der Inhalt Der Psychose, 69
On Psychic Energy, 41
Psychological Types, 1, 7, 69–95
passim
Symbols of Transformation, 41
 “The Orienting Functions of Conscious-
 ness,” 47
- Kant, Immanuel, 29, 82
 definition of ego, 29
- Kekulé, F.A., 37
- Kepler, Johannes, 88
- Kerner, Justinus, 104
- Keyserling, Hermann, 41–43
- koinon aistheterion* (Aristotle), 50
- Krantor (Latin Academic), 66
- Kretschmer, E., 75–76
- Kundalini Yoga, 51–64 *passim*, 66
 analogy to “circulation of light” in
 Taoism, 51
 as “introspective way,” 51
 libido and, 60
 localization of consciousness in *chakras*:
Muladhara (perineum), 52, 53, 60,
 61
Svadhishthana (bladder), 52, 54, 60,
 61
Manipura (navel), 52, 55, 60, 61
- Anahata* (heart), 52, 56, 60, 62
Visuddha (larynx), 52, 57, 60, 62
Ajna (between eyes), 52, 58, 60, 61–
 63
Sahasrana (scalp; *extra corpus*), 52,
 59, 60, 63
- Nirvana and, 63
- Kung-Fu-Tse (Confucius), 1
- Lang, J.B., 14
- Leibniz, Gottfried (as Nominalist), 82
- learning theory, 2
- libido, 34, 36, 41, 43–44, 63, 67, and
passim
 Aristotelean concept of, 44
 as *kinesis alogos* (Stoa), 66
 as psychic energy, 34
 “circulation” in bodily organs, 63
 elephant as symbol of domesticated, 61
 energetic model of, 42–45, 66
 fantasy, as concrete product of, 36–39
 in affects, 63
Muladhara chakra (Kundalini) as, 60
 polarity of, 43, 69
 regression of, 43
 two aspects of, 34, 36
 unconscious and, 43
- Lorenz, Konrad, 3
- “loss of soul,” 49
- Lotto, Lorenzo, 88
- Mach, Ernst, 23, 34
- Maimonides, 29
- Majer, Michael, 31
- Mayer, Julius Robert, 34, 40, 43–44
- Meister Eckehart, 71
- memory, 24–25, 32
 affect and, 25
- metriophora* (“curbing the passions”), 66
- morphe*, 38–39
- Müller, Johannes, 44
- Neumann, Erich
*The Origins and History of
 Consciousness*, 11
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 88–89
The Birth of Tragedy, 85
- Nirvana (*nir-dvanda*, “no opposite”), 63
- Nominalism (see *Universals dispute*)

- Origenes, 30, 39, 66
 Ostwald, Wilhelm, 34, 89, 91
 Otto, Rudolf, 76

Patmos (Hölderlin), 5
 Pauli, Wolfgang, 9–10, 23, 63, 88
 and object/subject dilemma, 9
 persona, 33
 phallus
 as creative symbol, 36
 as *Lingam* (Kundalini Yoga), 61, 63
 Philo Judaeus, 66
 Pico, Gianfrancesco, 38
 Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni, 38
 Plato, 2, 36, 65–66, 79–80
 as introverted, 80
 conception of affect, 65–66
prima materia
 central fire (libido) and, 34
 Schopenhauer's "will" and, 36
 Prince, Morton, 29
 Principle of Uncertainty (Heisenberg), 10
 psyche
 activity of, 64
 as synonym for consciousness, 47
 localization of, 47–64
 physics and, 30, 33–34, 43–44
 self-regulating activity of, 43
 subjectivity of, 7–13
 vs. "scientific" objectivity, 15
 Purkinje, J.E., 19–21, 24
 Putscher, M., 47

 Realism (see *Universals dispute*)
 regression, 30
 of libido, 47
 Remigius of Aurerre (as Realist), 82
rite d'entrée rite de sortie, 23
 Romanticism (see *Universals dispute*)
 Rosenkrantz, Wilhelm, 22
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 86
 Rouselle, Erwin, 51
 Rudra (Hindu destroyer/creator god), 61

 St. Augustine, 66
 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 25
 Schelling, F.W.J., 22, 30
 Schiller, Friedrich, 71, 82–87, 91–92
 passim
 as introvert, 82, 86
 correspondence with Goethe, 82–87, 91
 works:
 "Ode to Joy," 71
 On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, 82, 91–92
 On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 82–87
 extensivity vs. extensity in, 83–84
 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 29, 36
 four connecting principles, 104–105
 The Principle of Sufficient Reason, 104
 Schreber, Daniel P., 22
 Schmid, Hans, 95–96
 self, 62 (see also *Brahman*)
 definition of term, 62
 identification with, dangers of, 62
 sensation, 96, 98–101
 as *fonction du réel*, 96
 as irrational/perceiving function, 96–97
 shadow, 31–33
 recognition of, 32, 62
 Shakespeare (*Midsummer Night's Dream*), 37
Shatchakranirupana, 50–51
 Spinoza, 36
 Stevenson, Robert Louis, 29
 Stoicism, 66, 82
sunyātā (the void), 63
 Sushuma ("the door of Brahman"), 61

 Tantrism, 51
 Terence, 5
 Tertullian, 12
 thinking, 96, 98–101 *passim*
 as apperception, 96
 as rational/discriminating function, 98–99
 type, psychological (see also *attitude*)
 as "basic" of analytic psychology, 70–71
 diagnosis of, 75, 100
 Gray-Wheelwright Test and, 74
 in analysis, 77–78
 no fixed determination of, 75
 objective vs. predicate, 96
 testing, 71, 74, 97
 typology (see also individual functions)
 as "compass," ix, 77
 tetrad of functions in, 96–105
 unconscious
 as nucleus of consciousness, 36

- auxiliary functions and, 101
- compensatory attitude of, 1
- compensatory function of, 1, 47
- fascination of, 7, 47
- intuition and, 97
- libido and, 47
- shadow and, 32
- symbols of (in Kundalini Yoga), 61–63
- vs. objectless pan-consciousness, 63
- Universals dispute
 - Arian vs. Communion dispute and, 81
 - defined, 79–80
 - Nominalism (see also *extraversion*)
 - Apollonian and, 88
 - proponents of, 82
 - Rationalism (Plato), 80
 - Romanticism and, 89
 - William of Occam, 80
 - Realism (see also *introversion*)
 - Dionysian and, 88
 - proponents of, 82
 - Empiricism (Aristotle), 80
 - Classicism and, 89
 - Eriugena, Johannes Scotus, 80
 - unio mystica*, 62–63
- van der Post, Sir Laurens, 49
- Vincent of Beauvais (as Realist), 82
- William of Occam (as Nominalist), 80, 82
- Wolff, Toni, 95

WASH. STATE

Not the property of the
Washington Public Library.
Sale of this material benefits the library.

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY



3 9999 03701 960 9


WITHDRAWN

**is no longer the property of the
Boston Public Library.**

Sale of this material benefits the Library.


consciousnessthe00carl

consciousnessthe00carl



consciousnessthe00carl

CONSCIOUSNESS. C.A. Meier, one of Jung's closest friends and associates, turns our attention to one of the most problematic fields in modern psychology—the nature of consciousness. Beginning with a discussion of the paradox inherent in the formulation of any concept of consciousness—defined as the only entity capable of observing itself—Meier proceeds with chapters on the phenomenology of consciousness, its structure, its dynamics, and its relationship to the seat of all psychic energy, the unconscious. Drawing on a wide variety of sources literary, philosophical, anthropological, and psychological, Meier has written one of the most erudite yet accessible treatises on the subject ever available. Like its companion volumes, *Consciousness* is a valuable addition to the library of anyone interested in Jung or Jungian Psychology.



Carl Alfred Meier resides, teaches and practices in Zurich, Switzerland. One of Carl G. Jung's closest associates, he is the founder of the Jung Institute in Zurich. Dr. Meier is the author of *Ancient Incubation and Modern Psychotherapy*, among other books, as well as numerous articles pertaining to Jungian psychology.



COVER ILLUSTRATION: THE NINE DRAGON SCROLL. PERMISSION: COURTESY MUSEUM OF FINE ART, BOSTON.

To know ourselves as we truly are, we must pay careful attention to our dreams, for unless we become as conscious as we possibly can, we shall never reach that inner wholeness which with Jung, many of us consider the goal of all serious human endeavour. C.A. Meier's book can be of help to those who try to gain that self-knowledge. —Hildegard Weinrich, Ph.D.

SIGO PRESS

25 New Chardon Street, 8748
Boston, Massachusetts 02114