

WHO OWNS JUNG?



Edited by
Ann Casement

KARNAC

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For Philip Tyler Zabriskie

FOREWORD

Hayao Kawai

It is a great honour and pleasure for me to write a short Foreword to this valuable book. When I began to study Jung's psychology in the United States in 1959, Professor Bruno Klopfer, who led me to it, was the only Jungian professor in that country. That meant two things: How lucky I was and how little Jungian psychology was accepted in the academic field. Nowadays, the situation has changed a great deal as many people in the world have become interested in Jung's ideas.

Several factors have contributed to this change among which I would like to stress the fact that Jungian psychology evaluates not only the masculine but also the feminine principle. Modern science and the academy have made huge progress in the last century at the cost of neglecting the feminine principle. Now, however, many people have come to realize the importance of the latter. For this reason, Jung's psychology will play an important role in the development of the new academic science of this century.

For this to happen, Jungians must be very careful not to mix together the masculine and feminine principles without careful conscious consideration. We have to be aware of the difficulty that for a long time prevented Jung's psychology from entering into the

academy. In this sense, I am sure the book will contribute to opening up new fields. *Who Owns Jung?* contains interesting new ideas by a variety of Jungian analysts and will be widely accepted in the world.

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Wolfgang Giegerich is a Jungian psychoanalyst in private practice near Munich, Germany. He is the author of more than 150 publications in several languages. His books in English include *The Soul's Logical Life* (Frankfurt et al. Peter Lang), *Dialectics & Analytical Psychology* (with David L. Miller and Greg Mogenson; New Orleans: Spring Journal Books), and *The Neurosis of Psychology. Primary Papers towards a Critical Psychology* (New Orleans: Spring Journal Books).

Joseph L. Henderson, MD, received his undergraduate degree in French literature from Princeton University and his MD from University College, London. He analyzed with C.G. Jung during the 1930s and was the only American contributor to *Man and His Symbols*. He established an analytic practice in San Francisco in the late 1940s, where he was one of the founders of the C.G. Jung Institute of San Francisco. He is the author of numerous articles and several books, including *Thresholds of Initiation* (recently re-released by Chiron) and *Transformation of the Psyche: The Symbolic Alchemy of the Splendor Solis* (co-authored by Dyane Sherwood; Routledge, 2003). He retired from his practice in 2005.

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Hayao Kawai first studied mathematics and then clinical psychology in Kyoto, California and Zürich. He became a Jungian analyst in 1965. He was Professor for Clinical Psychology at Kyoto University, and Director of the International Research Centre for Japanese Studies in Kyoto. He is now Commissioner of the Agency for Cultural Affairs Japan. His publications in English include *The Japanese Psyche*, *The Buddhist Priest Myoe: A life of dreams*, and *Dreams, Myths and Fairy Tales in Japan*.

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Introduction

W*ho Owns Jung?* was preceded by my article of the same name for the September 2004 issue of the *Karnac Review*, which featured the work of a few prominent writers in the world-wide Jungian community, many of whom have contributed to this work.

The book has a similar, though not identical, format to *Who Owns Psychoanalysis?* (Karnac, 2004) in being divided into Sections as follows: academic, clinical, history, philosophy, science.

The book aims to be a celebration of the diversity and interdisciplinary thinking that is a feature of the international Jungian community. Many of the contributors are practising analysts and members of the International Association for Analytical Psychology; others are scholars of Jung whose work has been influential in disseminating his ideas in the academy, though it is worth noting that a number of the analysts also work in academe.

It is no figure of speech to say it has been a pleasure to work with each of the distinguished contributors to this volume. The Foreword is by Hayao Kawai (Japan), and the Epilogue by Roberto Gambini (Brazil). Contributors to the five Sections are as follows. Academic: Toshio Kawai (Japan), Roderick Main (UK), Denise Gimenez Ramos

(Brazil), David Tacey (Australia). Clinical: James Astor (UK), Astrid Berg (South Africa), Michael Sinason and Andrea Cone-Farran (UK/Australia). History: Mario Jacoby (Switzerland), Thomas Kirsch (US), Sonu Shamdasani (UK). Philosophy: Joseph Henderson (US), Joe Cambray (US), Wolfgang Giegerich (Germany), Hester McFarland Solomon (UK). Science: George Hogenson (US), Jean Knox (UK), Margaret Wilkinson (UK). My own contribution has included editing the book and contributing to the History Section.

I have dedicated this book to the greatly loved and respected Philip Tyler Zabriskie, who died in 2005 on Christmas Day. There are no words to express the admiration he evoked for the fortitude with which he faced his illness and approaching death or the sense of loss at his going.

Finally, my warm thanks go to Oliver Rathbone, the inspiring Managing Director of Karnac Books Ltd.

Ann Casement, 2007

ACADEMIC

Jung in Japanese academy

Toshio Kawai

The reception of Jung in the Japanese academy started only after the death of C.G. Jung in 1961 so is a development of the last 40 years. Before this period, experimental psychology had been dominant in the Japanese academy, while clinical psychology had been only a very small part of psychology in general. The methodology of clinical psychology was defined by a scientific research model of statistics and psychological tests where psychotherapy and case studies did not play a central role. As a school and technique of psychotherapy, the client-centered-therapy of Rogers was the most popular and prevailing one. But in the last 40 years Jung's psychology has rapidly and continuously spread in the Japanese academy. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that Jung's psychology is better accepted in Japanese society and the academy than in any other country. Among various schools and theories of psychotherapy it has been the most influential in Japan, although the situation is a little changed in the last few years with the increasing influence of a scientific model and ideas where, for example, cognitive psychotherapy is gaining more and more interest among patients and therapists.

I will refer first in this paper to the formal aspects of Jung's reception in the Japanese academy. Then I would like to report on some substantial products from the Japanese academy. There are, in fact, many interesting papers and books written in Japanese that are not accessible in other languages and countries and it would be an important contribution to Jungian psychology to make them known outside of Japan. I will refer to these researches and point out some related literature that is written in English or German. In this connection, I would like also to reflect on reasons why Jung's psychology has found good echoes in Japan and the Japanese academy.

Institute and academy in Japan

It has been, at least in Europe and in the United States, a highly symbolic event that Jung resigned from the psychiatric clinic of Zürich University in 1909, and left the position of lecturer at Zürich University in 1913 to concentrate on his private praxis. Since then, Jung's psychology has been rather separated from the academic world and developed mainly in private praxis and institutes in Europe and the United States. Although the situation is changing a little, especially in Latin America, there are, still today, very few Jungian analysts who teach at a university level in Europe and the United States. This has given Jung's psychology a more or less esoteric nuance. In contrast to this development, the Institute has not been the main place for Jung's psychology in Japan. In fact it was only in 2001 that the Association of Jungian Analysts Japan (AJAJ) was officially founded and recognized by the IAAP as a training institute with 20 founding members, most of whom were trained in Zürich. Even since the establishment of the new Institute, there is a requirement for the middle exam and part of the training to be done abroad. There are now about 30 IAAP members and 12 candidates in AJAJ and the number is increasing.

Unlike the rather slow and late development of the Institute, there are many Jungian-oriented psychotherapists in Japan. As to the academic world, many professors of clinical psychology at universities have a Jungian theoretical background and even a personal analysis. Hayao Kawai, who studied in Zürich and became the first Jungian analyst in Japan in 1965, had for many years been at the

Department of Clinical Psychology at Kyoto University. This is one of the best in Japan, which has influenced academics at other universities and produced many academics in Kyoto itself who now teach at various universities. In line with this development, there are many important contributions to Jungian psychology made by non-analyst psychologists at the universities. Among them I would like to mention the numerous works of Yasuhiro Yamanaka who studied the sandplay therapy of Dora Kalff. He taught for many years at Kyoto University and made important contributions especially in the field of art therapy and play therapy. As to the dominance of Jungian oriented psychotherapy, the Japanese association of sandplay therapy has about 2000 members. It makes up roughly 10 percent of clinical psychologists in Japan, the members of the umbrella organization for Clinical Psychology, the Association of Japanese Clinical Psychology, and numbers 20,000. There is not yet an association for analytical psychology with non-analyst members as in the case of sandplay therapy, so it is difficult to say how many psychotherapists are interested in and engaged in Jungian psychology in general. But one can imagine that there are many more psychologists who are interested in Jungian psychology in general than those who are only interested in sandplay therapy.

Japanese psychic structure

The extraordinarily good reception of Jung in Japan is probably due to the fact that Jungian psychology corresponds very well with Japanese psychic structure. It is well known that Japanese do not assert themselves and that their opinions are unclear. Because of their lack of clear verbalization and ambiguous expression, a Jungian analysis rather than a Freudian one seems to be more suitable for Japanese.

In fact it was the Japanese psychoanalyst, Takeo Doi, who noticed this characteristic of Japanese analysands and named it *Amae*.¹ It consists of a need to be united with the object and a passive dependent feeling. This leads to a weak oedipal structure because incestuous relationships in a symbolic sense are not inhibited. In this connection Heisaku Kozawa, the first psychoanalyst in Japan, coined the "ajase complex" in contrast to the Oedipus complex.²

This is a complex named after an Indian story about an ajase prince. While the guilty feeling in the case of the Oedipus complex consists of anxiety about punishment, in the ajase complex one feels guilty because one is forgiven. So separation is a very difficult task.

From a Jungian standpoint, the specific Japanese ego structure or soul has been expressed in various ways. Less assertiveness is to be understood as ego consciousness not yet being clearly established. Hayao Kawai suggested that the differentiation of ego and self is vague in the case of the Japanese.³ Negatively speaking, this is a chaotic, undifferentiated situation; it can be called an ouroboric one. But positively speaking, a Japanese can experience the self much better than a Westerner. The self is constellated in others and in nature, which is why the feeling of alienation is not strong and there still remains the animistic sensation with nature in Japan. Because the idea of the self, which is one of the key concepts of Jungian psychology, is easy to be understood or felt, Jungian psychology has been well accepted in Japan. The same psychic condition as the undifferentiated ego-self-axis can also be described as unseparated mother-child unity or dominance of the Great Mother archetype. The psychological dominance of mother is already suggested in the psychoanalytic theory of Amae and the ajase complex. In fact, Hayao Kawai explained many psychological problems in Japan such as school phobia as the "pathology of maternal society";⁴ the inhibition or reluctance to attend school is to be explained by the psychological mother-child-unity. In a dream example of a boy who could not go to school, the dreamer was drawn into a whirl of flesh which could be understood as the Great Mother. The Japanese specific neurosis of "anthrophobia"—one is afraid of someone one knows a little bit who is like one's neighbors, but not family members and friends nor strangers—can be understood in terms of the anxiety to leave this mother-child-unity that appears as community on the social level. Such characteristics as mother-child unity and undifferentiated ego-self-axis are, however, not only to be understood in terms of culture. As the theory of Melanie Klein and object relations theory lay the accent on the mother-child relationship instead of the oedipal structure, so concepts such as Amae or undifferentiated ego-self-axis have anticipated the pathology of a weak ego structure in general. In this sense, therapeutic experience in

Japan may contribute to the treatment of severe pathologies like narcissism and borderline syndrome very well. I will refer to them later.

The structure of the Japanese soul has been studied in more depth as follows. Hayao Kawai has published many papers and books on the nature of the Japanese psyche. These were mostly based on studies in Japanese myth, fairy tales, classic literature and historical figures and appeared partly in English as contributions at Eranos conferences.⁵ In Japanese fairy tales, marriage with an animal does not come true and the heroine vanishes in the form of the figure of an animal when the taboo is broken; while in European fairy tales breaking a taboo leads to marriage and a happy ending. If the marriage in the story symbolizes the integration of personality and self-realization, the Japanese ending and hence Japanese psyche may be regarded as "immature" and "incomplete". However, in the vanishing female heroine, Hayao Kawai saw the Japanese ego configured. In contrast to the Western ethical solution which strives for marriage, he regarded the vanishing ending as an aesthetic solution; there is a beauty in the vanishing scene which can be also regarded as a solution and completion. In Japanese myth he saw a structure which is dominated by the sun goddess but which has a father figure behind her. This seems to be a balanced psychic system which is dominated by the mother archetype or femininity, but is compensated by a spiritual figure in the background. He compared this triadic structure with the psychology of the trinity which is instead dominated by the masculine principle. Within this well balanced pantheon it is interesting to note there is a male God, named Hiruko, who was born before the sun goddess was disabled and sent into exile. In this figure he saw the future psychological task of the Japanese.

One of the main characteristics of Japanese society is the co-existence of traditional culture and new technology. Toshio Kawai interpreted Japanese technology as the dominance of form in contrast to content and idea.⁶ One criticism often made is that Japanese technology only imitates American or European products and hence has no original ideas of its own. But this criticism is based on the assumption that ideas produce new products. On the contrary, Japanese technology is not based on the biblical idea of creation but rather on the philosophy of Japanese art; most Japanese art is based on imitating form and the master without knowing and asking why.⁷ This psychological attitude is probably still alive even in Japanese technology.

Despite this integration by the old ethos, technology may be something totally new in Japanese history. The relation between traditional culture and new technology can be understood not as co-existence but rather as dissociation. The novels of Haruki Murakami, one of the most famous and popular novelists in Japan, present a world where mythological ways of being and modern life exist side by side. As guilty feelings, conflict and the family do not play an important role in his novels, Toshio Kawai interpreted his novels as illustrating dissociation between the pre-modern and post-modern world, without establishing modern consciousness.⁸

Aesthetic therapy

As the large membership shows, sandplay therapy has had great success in Japan. Jungian psychology was first introduced to Japanese psychotherapists not as dream analysis but rather as sandplay therapy. This is why there is only an association for sandplay therapy but not one for analytical psychology in general yet. The popularity of sandplay therapy probably has to do with the long Japanese tradition of aesthetics. As is known, Japan has various kinds of traditional arts such as the Zen garden, flower arrangement, calligraphy, and the tea ceremony. In all these cases, the art is keenly connected with the state of the soul and is a kind of religious ritual. One can almost call them aesthetic therapy and an aesthetic solution. But it is not appropriate to say that the subjective, personal soul of the artist in a narrow sense is projected into the product of the art. As Corbin said once "it is their individuation, not ours",⁹ the thing, the product and performance of art is individuated, but not the person of the artist. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that Jung tried to look for the background of his psychology in alchemy. In the case of alchemy, matter is also beyond the personal and subjective in a narrow sense. And psychological process is shown in the concrete process of alchemy. But in alchemy, ideas and imagination are important; while the objective product is unimportant from the psychological point of view. If matter is objectively important, it is then science and not psychology. In the case of Japanese art, the product of art as such is important but it never becomes purely objective but remains always soulful.

Much interesting work in sandplay therapy, picture drawing technique and therapy is done in Japan. Along with the idea of aesthetic therapy, we may notice an interesting characteristic in Japanese psychotherapy using imagery. There is less intervention and interpretation of images on the side of the therapist, nor is there much discussion of the therapeutic relationship. The therapist trusts and respects the self healing power and process of images which develop very beautifully and almost independently. There are many impressive and convincing case reports using series of sandplay, pictures and dreams.

As to the picture drawing test, there is a unique technique in Japan. Hayao Kawai noticed that schizophrenics tend to make frames or fences just inside the sand tray.¹⁰ This can be interpreted as the schizophrenic's need for a double frame or double fence in the sandplay. For a normal or neurotic person, the ontological dimension—the sand tray is protected and contained by the frame—is self-evident, whereas it needs to be made thematically in the case of a schizophrenic. Inspired by this idea and sandplay therapy, a Japanese psychiatrist, Hisao Nakai, invented a picture drawing test that can be used not only for an assessment, but also for therapy.¹¹ This test is named "Landscape montage technique". In this technique, the therapist draws a frame with a fiber-tipped pen on the paper first and gives it to the patient. This is to guarantee more psychologically protected space for the patient. Then the patient is required to draw a river, after which he or she is asked to draw a mountain. In this way, each item—river, mountain, rice-field, house, tree, person, flower, animal and stone—must be drawn successively at the request of the therapist, so that a landscape is made at the end. After this, the patient is required to give colors to the picture.

In this picture drawing test, it is not only so called projected contents that are important, for example, if the patient draws a dog or a cat to denote an animal. The assessment of the structure is located much more centrally in this picture drawing technique. Small children cannot build a consistent landscape but draw a picture where each item stands out independently. With increasing age, children can draw a picture whose items are more and more coordinated so that it gives an impression of a landscape. The structure of the picture is not only significant in the assessment of development but also of pathology. A normal or neurotic person can draw a picture

that has a cohesive structure. The picture of a schizophrenic has, however, a strange structure; the boundary is broken, the relationship between the river and the road is strange, and so forth. In this way, it is useful for diagnostic purposes. As already mentioned, this technique can be used repeatedly. In this case, the picture plays the role of sandplay and has a therapeutic aspect. As is in the case of sandplay therapy, nature and landscape probably have healing powers.

Yamanaka made several important contributions to landscape montage technique. At the age of about 10 years, children draw a picture where the river goes from the bottom to the top of the picture, and the whole scene is seen from a very high point.¹² After this transitional phase, a perspective picture is made. Kyoko Takaishi¹³ made a developmental study of landscape montage test and interpreted the change of structure in the following way. Small children cannot construct a landscape and draw each part independently. In this case, the subject is still immersed in each item, so that there is no subject or consciousness which can give an overview. To put it differently, each item when it is drawn is the subject. For the establishment of adult consciousness, a radical separation from and negation of the object is needed. The picture around the age of 10 which is seen from a very high and distant point can be understood in this way. After this transitional phase of radical separation and negation, the subject can take an appropriate distance from the object, which leads to a perspective.

Severe pathology

As the pathology of Amai is often linked to narcissism, Japanese psychotherapists have been compelled to cope with weak ego structure. In fact it has been relatively difficult to keep the therapeutic structure of time, space and money in Japan, and, as a result, Japanese psychotherapists have managed to find a better term for severe pathology. Much important work is done in connection with so called borderline syndrome.

The work of Hayao Kawai has been critical of our way of viewing and coping with borderline patients.¹⁴ As is well-known, borderline patients have difficulty keeping the therapeutic structure. They call their therapist whenever they feel uneasy and lonely, asking him or her to make sessions longer or more frequent. Such behaviour is

understood as a weakness of ego. But in referring to the anthropological studies of Victor Turner,¹⁵ Hayao Kawai stresses the importance of liminality and *communitas*. In his study of the ritual process, Turner made the distinction between structure and anti-structure which he termed liminality or *communitas*. In normal everyday life, the structure of society or community is dominant. But in the transitional state of initiation, anti-structure is the ruling principle. Borderline patients are in this state of liminality, so that they are strictly against structure hence it is no wonder they cannot keep the therapeutic structure. In this way, Hayao Kawai understands borderline syndrome not only as pathological but as a creative act which has its own telos and meaning.

There are many interesting contributions to psychotherapy with schizophrenics. Takao Oda presented several cases with whom he worked using picture drawing techniques.¹⁶ He interpreted the healing process with reference to mythology, especially Japanese mythology. He pointed out, for example, the importance of making a center from the chaos. A schizophrenic who could only manage chaotic scribbles made a whirl which represented the beginning of a center, after which a healing process started. In reference to Japanese mythology, Oda pointed out the importance of the cosmological aspect in the drawing such as a vertical axis, center and periphery. Shunya Takeno showed the importance of the subject in the therapy of schizophrenics.¹⁷ The normal I-thou-relationship is lost in schizophrenics and the patient is totally passive and at the mercy of the power of the unconscious. Takeno stresses the importance of responding actively to the delusion to re-establish the I-thou relationship with it. Yoshihiro Kadono has many impressive case studies of schizophrenic patients with whom he worked with dreams and picture drawing methods.¹⁸ Clear changes in images are really convincing, for example, in the cases using landscape montage technique, the patients show more structured pictures in the course of psychotherapy.

There are also interesting findings concerning therapy with so called autistic children. Yamanaka noticed that autistic children have a certain object they could not leave; for example, a child brought a bottle of milk to each session and could not leave it.¹⁹ If it goes, they fall into a panic. Yamanaka calls it "externalized self". But after the self is somewhat internalized during the therapy, the child could leave the object.

Archetypal psychology and Giegerich

Samuels classified Jungians into the classical, developmental and archetypal schools.²⁰ There are, relatively speaking, many analysts and Jungian oriented psychologists who are orientated to archetypal psychology in Japan. This is also due to the fact that the non-personal approach is suited to the Japanese psyche. As already mentioned, what Hillman calls the polytheistic and aesthetic aspect is prevalent in Japanese culture. Many works by Hayao Kawai on fairy tales and myths, mentioned above, can be understood in this context.

Moreover there are several analysts of the younger generation in Japan who are strongly influenced by Wolfgang Giegerich, who criticizes the one-sided praise of imagery and, instead, stresses the importance of Logic. Yasuhiro Tanaka interpreted Jung's work as a repetition of integration and dissociation.²¹ He criticized that Jung substantiated the process of integration and union. Jung says, for example: "Psychologically the self is a union of conscious (masculine) and unconscious (feminine)". (CW 9/II par. 426) In this case, the third is substantiated as "both A and B". But Tanaka stressed the importance of the logic of "neither A nor B", which can lead to a dialectic movement.²² Tsuyoshi Inomata wrote a stimulating book on time and interpreted Walter Benjamin in a convincing way.²³ Using the methodology of Wolfgang Giegerich in approaching images thoroughly from within, Toshio Kawai interpreted dreams of depersonalization and dissociative disorder in a dialectic way and suggested that consciousness is already changing from modern consciousness toward postmodern consciousness.²⁴

Neuroscience

The influence of neuroscience is not yet strong among Japanese Jungians. This probably has to do with the fact that there are more analysts who belong to the archetypal than the developmental group in Japan. The only exception is Sachiko Taki-Reece, who is originally Japanese but belongs to the Jung institute in San Francisco and will be a visiting professor at Kyoto University in 2006–2007. She wrote a case study of sandplay therapy with a neuroscientific comment by Allan Schore.²⁵ However, as there are many joint projects at the University between experimental psychologists

and neuroscientists, there will certainly be important works in the near future. In fact there are already research projects concerning developmental disorder by the neuroscientists and cognitive scientists.

In connection with neuroscience, the work of philosopher Nakazawa²⁶ is worth mentioning. In referring to cognitive archeology, he pointed out that the network among various cognitive areas became possible with the brain of homo sapiens (neanthropic). And this network gave birth to metaphor, the logic of myth. This theory seems to support Jungian psychology.

Among other schools and theories

In universities and in the umbrella organization of psychotherapists there is often contact and confrontation with other schools and theories. This is also the advantage of a relatively weak Jungian institute and a strong presence at universities.

In connection with the Freudians, there have been many symposia based on the presentation of case studies. In this way, exchange and confrontation are possible not only on an abstract level but also on a concrete level. It is interesting to note that Freudians and Jungians can agree on whether a therapy is going well or not, or what is problematic in a therapy under discussion. But there are also some fundamental differences. Freudians lay the accent on the transference and the formal structure of therapy, while Japanese Jungians are much more interested in the contents of images. In a symposium based on a case of personality disorder, the difference is outstanding. In this case, the patient complained about the therapist in a session, then in following sessions reported dreams or told interesting stories. These two phases appeared alternately and repeatedly. While a Freudian commentator, strongly influenced by Bion, saw the essential part of the therapy as being located in the entanglement of the therapeutic situation and relationship, the Japanese Jungians were rather more interested in the images and stories. So from the Freudian point of view, telling images and stories could be understood as resistance to the therapy; while from the Japanese Jungian point of view, the entanglement in the therapeutic situation is not essential and indicates a resistance to the therapy.

With behavioral therapy, a very interesting similarity is highlighted. Fujiwara used color images for the desensitization in behavioral therapy and called it symbolic desensitization. In this case the anxiety of the client was connected not to the real situation but to the symbolism of color; for example, the patient may give a rating that the color red is the most emotional one and blue the least. Fujiwara further developed a technique called "triangle image experiencing method".²⁷ In this technique, it is suggested the patient imagine a triangle on which to transfer the anxiety or symptom; the patient, who is mainly on a neurotic level, begins to sense various feelings. In the therapy, the focus is laid on the subjective feeling and experience of the patient. This technique, emanating from behavioral therapy, has similarities with Jungian psychotherapy. It shows the problem being solved on a metaphorical, symbolic level of imagery. But the difference lies in the understanding of imagery. In behavioral therapy, this is arbitrary and fixed and, as such, is not important, whereas the subjective experience is. In the case of Jungian psychotherapy, the content of the image is singular and important.

Conclusion

As these two examples show, contact and confrontation with other schools and theories can contribute to both the general essence of psychotherapy and the uniqueness of Jungian psychology. This way of collaboration and also the interdisciplinary contact are surely fruitful for the future of Jungian psychology.

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CHAPTER TWO

Ruptured time and the re-enchantment of modernity¹

Roderick Main

In this chapter I would like to look at some factors possibly inhibiting the interdisciplinary engagement of analytical psychology with academic sociology. This issue concerns me both as an instance of the general problem of C.G. Jung's (1875–1961) relationship to the academy and, more particularly, for the reason that I work in a Centre for Psychoanalytic Studies (at the University of Essex in the United Kingdom) which, as it happens, maintains close ties for research purposes with the same university's Department of Sociology. I shall address the issue by considering Jung's response to a situation with which both disciplines have been deeply concerned: the disenchantment of the modern world.

The disenchantment of the world

The pioneering social scientist Max Weber (1864–1920) described modern culture as characterised by capitalism, rationalisation, disenchantment, subjectivist culture, and democratisation (Scaff, 2000, pp. 103–7). These features of modernity are intimately interlinked in Weber's thought, and any one of them gives access to the overall problem of modernity as he saw it. I shall focus on the feature of

disenchantment, in its particular form as “loss of myth”, and shall explore one attempt, of a kind foretold and observed by Weber, to re-enchanted or, as I shall also refer to it, to re-mythologise or re-sacralise modernity. So what does Weber mean when he writes of the “de-magification” (*Entzauberung*) or “disenchantment of the world?” As Lawrence Scaff summarises:

The *disenchantment thesis* holds that modernity represents a loss of the sacred sense of wholeness and reconciliation between self and world provided by myth, magic, tradition, religion, or immanent nature. It ushers in the disruptive sense of disengagement, abstraction, alienation, homelessness, and the “problem of meaning” that begins to gnaw at the vital core of modern experience and social philosophy. [Scaff, 2000, p. 105]

One of the most influential efforts at the re-enchancement of modernity—that is, restoring the “sense of wholeness and reconciliation between self and world”—has been made by Jung. Jung starts from an analysis of modernity broadly matching Weber’s. Though decidedly less articulate than Weber on the subjects of capitalism and democratisation, Jung does write about these as well as, more extensively and with the same general emphases as Weber, about rationalisation, disenchantment, and subjectivist culture. Relevant to capitalism, Jung writes about the dangers of materialistic science and unbridled materialism, as well as about the effects of urbanisation, industrialisation, and the specialisation of work (e.g., 1896–9, par. 11–66; 1945/1948, par. 393; 1912, par. 428; see also Main, 2004, p. 119–21). Relevant to rationalisation, he writes frequently and at length about the perilous one-sidedness of scientific rationalism and overly rational approaches to religion (e.g., 1957, par. 488–504; 1952b, par. 821, 904; 1896–9, p. 243–91; see also Main, 2004, p. 123–9). On the topic of disenchantment and its consequences, he writes about spiritual confusion, loss of tradition, loss of myth, and alienation from nature, and about the sense of uprootedness, disorientation, meaninglessness, and profound uncertainty to which these conditions give rise (e.g., 1933/1934, par. 313; 1963, 142, 165–6, 306; 1945, par. 1360–8; 1934, par. 815; 1928/1931, par. 155; see also Main, 2004, p. 120). With regard to subjectivist culture, he writes above all about the need for individual understanding but also about the need for religious experience and immediate relation to God (e.g., 1957, par. 564; see also

Main, 2004, pp. 137–138). And relevant to democratisation, he writes about the problems of mass-mindedness, collectivisation, and the delegation of responsibility (e.g., 1957, par. 488–504; see also Main, 2004, pp. 136–138).

In spite of characterising modernity in a way very similar to Weber and many other social theorists (see Homans, 1979/1995, pp. 3–8, 135–40, 148–60), Jung’s work “remains curiously ignored by sociologists”, as the *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* notes (Scott and Marshall, 2005, p. 329). This ignoring cannot simply stem from the fact that Weber’s work aims at describing and understanding modernity, while Jung’s work aims in various ways at transforming it. For there have been and still exist major traditions in sociology that aim not just to understand reality but to change it, such as Marxist and feminist approaches (Macionis and Plummer, 1998, pp. 22, 54). Nor can the ignoring stem simply from Jung’s being a psychologist concerned primarily with human subjectivity rather than with society. For Freud is equally a psychologist focused on human subjectivity, yet his work has had a much warmer reception among sociologists (*ibid.*, pp. 132–4). Nor, again, can the ignoring simply be because of Jung’s deep preoccupation with religion. For religion was also, in various ways, a deep concern of such seminal social theorists as Marx, Weber, and Durkheim (Davie, 2006, pp. 172–6). More likely is that the ignoring of Jung by sociologists—and indeed by social scientists more broadly, as also by academic psychologists—stems, largely if not wholly, from Jung’s having approached his subject matter, whether social, psychological, or religious, in a manner that seems to credit and be informed by religious and non-rational perspectives. This explanation has indeed been suggested both by Jungian scholars with an interest in the academic study of social issues (e.g., Tacey, 1997, pp. 315–16) and by sociologists and critical theorists themselves (see, e.g., Scott and Marshall, 2005, pp. 328–9; Macey, 2000, p. 212).

In what follows, rather than look for promising connections between analytical psychology and sociology, I would like to illustrate two aspects of Jung’s thought that make his work particularly difficult to swallow for academic sociologists, and which would need to be addressed if a lasting rapprochement is ever to be achieved between sociology and analytical psychology. The two aspects are Jung’s concept of synchronicity and his emphasis on the

autonomy of the unconscious psyche. Both come into focus when we look at Jung's attempt to address the pre-eminently social problem of the disenchantment of modernity.

Jung and the re-mythologisation of modernity

One might expect Jung's efforts at the re-enchantment of modernity to be found above all in his theory of myth. However, as the scholar of religions Robert Segal notes, Jung's earlier theory of myth falls short of a re-enchantment of the world. The early theory interprets myths positively as means by which the unconscious, specifically the collective unconscious, can reveal itself to consciousness. Consciousness then has the opportunity to integrate the revealed contents of the collective unconscious and thereby to further the process of self-realisation that Jung terms individuation (Segal, 1998, pp. 17–19). Myths are thus of the utmost importance from a psychological point of view. But in this process the external world acts only as a screen onto which the collective unconscious contents are projected. The inner psychological meaning of myths is appreciated precisely because these outer projections are withdrawn. As Segal summarises the implication of Jung's theory of myth:

Myths for moderns do not function to connect the inner world with the outer world, which remains impersonal and mechanical. Instead, modern myths function to connect—better, to reconnect—moderns to the inner world. Modern myths still provide meaning, but that meaning now lies entirely within humans rather than also within the world. [Segal, 1998, p. 19]

Segal suggests that for Jung the world serves only as a middle-man, which could be happily dispensed with if the contents of the collective unconscious could be revealed and encountered more directly, as arguably they can through the analysis of dreams. Such an approach to myth might restore some kind of meaning but not the "sacred sense of wholeness and reconciliation between self and world". Jung's strategy for a fuller sense of re-enchantment and re-mythologisation of the world depends on a feature of his psychological model that he did not develop in detail until late in his life: his theory of synchronicity.

Synchronicity

Briefly, synchronicity describes and theorises coincidences in which, for example, a person's dream or thought is matched by something that happens in the outer world, without it being possible that either event could have caused the other. Such coincidences can be experienced as especially meaningful and prompt one to wonder whether something more than mere chance may be involved. Jung defined synchronicity in a variety of ways. Most succinctly, he defined it as "meaningful coincidence" (1952b, par. 827), as "acausal parallelism" (1963, 342), or as "an acausal connecting principle" (1952b). More fully, he defined it as "the simultaneous occurrence of a certain psychic state with one or more external events which appear as meaningful parallels to the momentary subjective state" (1952b, par. 850).

I would like to look in detail at an episode of synchronicity which Jung says "is meant only as a paradigm of the innumerable cases of meaningful coincidence that have been observed not only by me but by many others, and recorded in large collections" (1951, par. 983). Famous though this incident is, I believe its full significance for Jung's theory of synchronicity and his attempt to re-enchant or re-mythologise the modern world has been insufficiently appreciated. The account is from Jung's lecture "On Synchronicity" delivered at a conference in Eranos in 1951 (par. 982). Writes Jung:

My example concerns a young woman patient who, in spite of efforts made on both sides, proved to be psychologically inaccessible. The difficulty lay in the fact that she always knew better about everything. Her excellent education had provided her with a weapon ideally suited to this purpose, namely a highly polished Cartesian rationalism with an impeccably "geometrical" idea of reality. After several fruitless attempts to sweeten her rationalism with a somewhat more human understanding, I had to confine myself to the hope that something unexpected and irrational would turn up, something that would burst the intellectual retort into which she had sealed herself. Well, I was sitting opposite her one day, with my back to the window, listening to her flow of rhetoric. She had had an impressive dream the night before, in which someone had given her a golden scarab—a costly piece of jewellery. While she was still telling me this dream, I heard something behind me gently tapping on the window. I

turned round and saw that it was a fairly large flying insect that was knocking against the window-pane in the obvious effort to get into the dark room. This seemed to me very strange. I opened the window immediately and caught the insect in the air as it flew in. It was a scarabaeid beetle, or common rose-chafer (*Cetonia aurata*), whose gold-green colour most nearly resembles that of a golden scarab. I handed the beetle to my patient with the words, "Here is your scarab". This experience punctured the desired hole in her rationalism and broke the ice of her intellectual resistance. The treatment could now be continued with satisfactory results. [Jung, 1951, par. 982]

Jung related a shorter version of the same incident the following year in his essay "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle" (1952b, pars. 843, 845). The only major addition this later account provides is an amplification of the symbolic meaning of the scarab beetle:

There ... seems to be an archetypal foundation to [this] case. ... Any essential change of attitude signifies a psychic renewal which is usually accompanied by symbols of rebirth in the patient's dreams and fantasies. The scarab is a classic example of a rebirth symbol. The ancient Egyptian Book of What Is in the Netherworld describes how the dead sun-god changes himself at the tenth station into Khepri, the scarab, and then, at the twelfth station, mounts the barge which carries the rejuvenated sun-god into the morning sky. [Jung, 1952b, par. 845]

Jung states that his purpose in recounting this episode is "simply to give some indication of how meaningful coincidences usually present themselves in practical life" (1952b, par. 845). The incident shows, for Jung, that psychic and physical events can parallel one another acausally but meaningfully, and that the imagery that provides the focus of the coincidence can be archetypal, i.e., it can express a part of the mind that "is identical in all individuals"—what Jung refers to as the "collective unconscious" (ibid., par. 840). However, there is a lot more going on in his presentation of this episode than Jung declares. In particular, the episode plays a crucial role, in several ways, in his attempt to re-enchant the modern world. I will look first at some general implications of the principle of synchronicity that the incident illustrates, then at the actual content of the incident. It will quickly become apparent that the general

implications are ones that do not sit very comfortably with mainstream academic sociology, which has tended to work with positivist, realist, or humanist epistemological assumptions (Macionis and Plummer, 1998, p. 36).

Synchronicity and re-sacralisation

In an interview with the Romanian-born historian and phenomenologist of religion, Mircea Eliade (1907–86), Jung connected synchronicity to numinous and religious experience:

Religious experience is *numinous*, as Rudolf Otto calls it, and for me, as a psychologist, this experience differs from all others in the way it transcends the ordinary categories of space, time, and causality. Recently I have put a great deal of study into synchronicity (briefly, the “rupture of time”), and I have established that it closely resembles numinous experiences where space, time, and causality are abolished. [McGuire and Hull, 1978, p. 230]

In this statement, religious experience is characterised as numinous, and what is distinctive about numinous experiences is said to be that they transcend the ordinary categories of space, time, and causality. Synchronicity, as the technical term that Jung developed to articulate this transcendence of space, time, and causality, thus implicitly describes what for Jung is the kernel of numinous or religious experience. His view of the social and cultural significance of this emerges from an assertion he made later in the same interview: “The modern world”, he states, “is desacralized, that is why it is in a crisis. Modern man must rediscover a deeper source of his own spiritual life” (ibid.). Jung’s concept of synchronicity can therefore be seen as part of his strategy for rediscovering a deeper source of spirituality in order to re-sacralise the modern world and thereby address the crisis of modernity.

Myth beyond projection

This is confirmed by the scholar of Gnosticism, Gilles Quispel (1916–2006), who was present at the 1951 Eranos lecture where Jung first formally presented his theory of synchronicity, including the example of the scarab beetle. Quispel reports that, after the lecture,

even Jung himself seemed quite relieved and unusually good humoured. All his life he had rummaged in the collective unconscious, but now he had forced a breakthrough from the soul to the cosmos. He beamed when he told me: “Es geht um die erfahrung der Fülle des Seins”; it is the experience of the fullness, the pleroma, of Being that matters. And he said to me on another occasion that now the concept of projection should be revised completely. [Quispel, in Segal et al. 1995, p. 19]

In his earlier theory of myth, Jung, like Freud, considered myths to be the projection of the contents of the unconscious psyche onto the world. He differed from Freud in believing that these projected contents stemmed from a collective rather than personal stratum of the psyche. But for both thinkers the world onto which the unconscious contents were projected was in itself impersonal and mechanical, the world revealed and investigated by the hard sciences. Indeed, the psychological concept of projection had in its way contributed to the disenchantment of the world, for the concept implies that the meanings we perceive in the world are not there in reality but are being foisted onto the world by the human mind. However, when his theory of myth is supplemented by his theory of synchronicity, Jung can argue that the outer world may not after all be totally alienated from human purposes but, at least on occasion, can be intimately involved with them. Thus, the real scarab beetle in his example behaved in a way that seemed mysteriously connected with the patient’s inner psychic world. As Jung later remarked to a correspondent: “At the moment my patient was telling me her dream a real “scarab” tried to get into the room, *as if it had understood that it must play its mythological role as a symbol of rebirth*” (1976, p. 541, emphasis added). Jung goes further: “Even inanimate objects”, he writes, “behave occasionally in the same way—meteorological phenomena, for instance” (ibid.).

Myth and history

As well as providing a resource for Jung to re-mythologise modernity, this outlook enables him to reconsider the relationship between myth and history—modernity’s view of the past. Specifically, synchronicity provides a new perspective on one of the issues that had undermined the religious view of the world—historical criticism of the Bible. Jung had lectured on this topic to his

student fraternity, the Zofingia Society, in 1899, arguing against a rationalistic, historicising interpretation of Christ (1896–9, par. 237–91). Now he can approach such problems from a new angle. With his theory of synchronicity, the mythic character of a story does not for Jung necessarily imply a lack of historical truth, since the archetypal motifs informing the myth, and giving it the vitality to persist as a gripping story, can express themselves as much outwardly as inwardly. In his book *Answer to Job* (1952a), published in the same year as his principal essay on synchronicity, Jung applies this to stories about Christ:

The fact that the life of Christ is largely myth does absolutely nothing to disprove its factual truth—quite the contrary. I would even go so far as to say that the mythical character of a life is just what expresses its universal human validity. It is perfectly possible, psychologically, for the unconscious or an archetype to take complete possession of a man and to determine his fate down to the smallest detail. At the same time objective, non-psychic parallel phenomena can occur which also represent the archetype. It not only seems so, it simply is so, that the archetype fulfils itself not only psychically in the individual, but objectively outside the individual. My own conjecture is that Christ was such a personality. [Jung, 1952a, par. 648]

A living symbol

When we turn to the content of Jung's paradigmatic synchronicity, we find that the image at the core of the incident is doing much more than just illustrating his theory. It is also symbolising a whole cluster of personal and cultural meanings that actively contribute to Jung's argument and its emotional charge.

Overcoming cartesian rationalism

The synchronicity with the scarab beetle not only provides an illustration of the general kind of event Jung's theory is meant to account for, it also enacts with the patient what the theory is intended to achieve for culture. As Paul Bishop notes, it is not just the patient's "animus" or "highly polished Cartesian rationalism" with its "impeccably "geometrical" idea of reality" that needs to be broken

down but “Cartesian philosophy, with its “geometrical method”, and rationalism in general” (2000, p. 17). The problem of the patient stands for the problem of the culture as a whole, and Jung’s success with the patient is the success he hopes his essay will have with culture. On 24 January 1955, Jung wrote to Michael Fordham about what he hoped would be “the impact of synchronicity upon the fanatical one-sidedness of scientific philosophy” (1976, p. 216), and on the same day he reported to R. F. C. Hull: “The latest comment about “Synchronicity” is that it cannot be accepted because it shakes the security of our scientific foundations, as if this were not exactly the goal I am aiming at” (ibid., p. 217). Weber famously described the rationalised forms of modernity as an “iron cage” (see Scaff, 2000, p. 100). Jung’s language in describing the synchronicity with the scarab evokes something similar. His patient is “inaccessible”, “rigid”, “sealed” in an “intellectual retort”, in the “ice of her intellectual resistance”, in the “armour of her animus possession”. Jung hopes for and then witnesses an event that will enable her to escape from—“burst”, “puncture”, “break”—this imprisoning condition.

The scarab incident as a synchronicity for Jung

Not mentioned by Jung but surely important is that there are at least two senses in which the incident involving the scarab beetle was a synchronicity not only for the patient but also for Jung. First, if we recall Jung’s definition of synchronicity as “the simultaneous occurrence of a certain psychic state with one or more external events which appear as meaningful parallels to the momentary subjective state” (1952b, par. 850), we can find this definition fulfilled by Jung’s psychic state of “hope that something unexpected and irrational would turn up” and the physical event of “something unexpected and irrational” actually occurring with the “very strange” appearance of the scarab “at the critical moment”. Second, the image of the scarab beetle already had considerable significance for Jung, and in view of this the occurrence in his consulting room of the patient’s synchronicity with the scarab beetle will have formed part of a second-order synchronicity with Jung’s own vivid interest in the symbol. The sources of the possible significance of the symbol of the scarab for Jung are worth exploring in detail.

Jung's 1913 vision of an Egyptian scarab

Most importantly, as Paul Bishop (2000, (17): p. 24–5) and others (e.g., Main, 1996, p. 176–7) have noted, Jung himself had had a vision of an Egyptian scarab during the period of intense psychic turmoil in his life referred to in his memoirs as his “confrontation with the unconscious”. The relevant part of this vision is that Jung, finding himself in an underground cavern, sees a corpse float by in some running water: “A youth with blond hair and a wound in the head. He was followed by a gigantic black scarab and then by a red, newborn sun, rising up out of the depths of the water” (Jung, 1963, p. 203). On the basis of his knowledge of mythology, Jung “realised [...] that it was a hero and solar myth, a drama of death and renewal, the rebirth symbolized by the Egyptian scarab” (ibid., p. 204). In the light of the events occurring in his own life at the time of the vision—his break with Freud and the beginnings of his own system of analytical psychology—the ideas of death and renewal are singularly appropriate.

Freud's collection of antiquities

It is worth bearing in mind one of the places where Jung, prior to this vision, almost certainly would have seen actual Egyptian antiquities in the form of scarabs: Freud's study. As can be confirmed from a visit to the Freud Museum in London, where Freud's study was reconstructed as closely as possible to how it had been in Vienna, Freud was a great collector of antiquities, and within his collection are several scarab amulets (see Rizzuto, 1998, pp. 120–1, 123). Such amulets were used in ancient Egypt as general good luck charms and, more importantly, for magical protection of the soul on its underworld journey through death—associations pertinent to the themes of synchronicity, re-enchantment, and Jung's “underworld journey” following his break with Freud. Freud had begun to build up his collection of antiquities in 1896 following the death of his father. Ana-Maria Rizzuto (1998) has revealed its fascinating significance for understanding Freud's relationship to religion, noting that many of the antiquities Freud collected are of mythological and religious figures represented in the Philipppson Bible which Freud's father had given to his son on his thirty-fifth birthday in the hope that he would become more religiously observant. On page 340 of

volume 1 of the Philipppson Bible is an image of a colossal scarab (ibid., p. 123). Also in Freud's study, among other books on Egyptology, is the classic work by Isaac Myer entitled *Scarabs* (1894) (see E. Freud et al. 1978, p. 235). Intriguing, too, are the anecdotes about Freud engaging in imaginal dialogues with figures from his collection of antiquities (see Noll, 1992, p. 80).

That Jung would have been interested in these antiquities and, if he saw it, Myer's book is clear from his own early and enduring interest in archaeology (see Squyres, 1999). In one of the chapters he himself wrote for *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung tells how, as he was approaching the age to go to university, his interests drew him in different directions: on the one hand towards science, and on the other hand towards the humanities including "Greco-Roman, Egyptian, and prehistoric archaeology" (1963, p. 91). It is noteworthy that, much later, in his principal essay on synchronicity, which was specifically written to combat the one-sidedness of contemporary science, Jung should give central importance to an experience involving a representative image (the ancient Egyptian scarab) from the other side of his divided interests—an image, moreover, that consciously or unconsciously he might have suspected of being bound up with the problem of religion and enchantment for Freud.

It is interesting, too, that Jung dates his fascination with the problem of synchronicity to "the middle twenties" (1952b, par. 843), for this coincides with the explosion of popular interest in Egyptology following the discovery in 1922 of the tomb of Tutankhamen. The royal cartouche of Tutankhamen includes the hieroglyph of the scarab, so that this image appears on many of the treasures recovered from the tomb, as well as being the central image of several exquisite jewels (pectorals and pendants) that would have been widely described, if not reproduced, and may have been the direct or indirect source of Jung's patient's dream (see plates II, XII, XVIII, and XX–XXIII in Desroches-Noblecourt, 1972). (There are, however, no clues in Jung's writings as to when the synchronicity with the scarab occurred.) The association of the scarab with the discovery of a fabulous treasure is pertinent both to the effect of the synchronicity in suddenly opening Jung's patient to the hidden riches of her unconscious and to Jung's own excitement, as related by Quispel, at how the concept of synchronicity "forced a breakthrough from the soul to the cosmos".

Scarabs and alchemy

Aside from its possible associations with his confrontation with the unconscious and with Freud, the symbol of the scarab may have been further charged for Jung, especially in relation to synchronicity and re-enchantment, by his encounters with it in alchemical contexts. These encounters were few—by Jung's account "The scarab is seldom mentioned in alchemical literature" (1944, par. 531). But they are suggestive.

One reference to the scarab occurs in the first few pages of the Taoist alchemical text, *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, to which Jung contributed a psychological commentary. In a section of the text titled "The Primal Spirit and the Conscious Spirit", the author discusses how by a meditative process called "circulation of the light" one can return to "the light that is the Creative" and produce one's immortal body. The text then has recourse to the following simile:

The scarabaeus rolls his ball and in the ball there develops life as the result of the undivided effort of his spiritual concentration. If now an embryo can grow in manure, and shed its shells, why should not the dwelling place of our heavenly heart also be able to create a body if we concentrate the spirit upon it? [Wilhelm and Jung, 1931, pp. 26–8]

Although Jung's commentary does not pick up on this image, he will certainly have read it, and that alone may have created an association in his mind between the scarab and synchronicity. For his timely receipt of this text from Richard Wilhelm was specifically registered by Jung as a synchronicity (1963, p. 223). Furthermore, the association of the scarab with the ability to create living bodies by spiritual concentration once more connects the symbol with the theme of re-enchantment.

Another reference to scarabs occurs in *Psychology and Alchemy*, in a sub-section on "The One-Horned Scarabaeus" (1944, pars. 530–1). There Jung argues that, like other real and imagined one-horned creatures ("unicorns"), the one-horned scarab is a symbol of the alchemical figure of Mercurius, who in turn is a symbol of the self. Among the properties attributed to this scarab in the alchemical literature, Jung notes its being "only-begotten", "a creature born of itself", "*increatum* (uncreated)", "bisexual, capable of self-fertilization

and self-parturition", and its undergoing beheading and dismemberment (ibid., par. 530). These references show Jung's awareness that in Egyptian mythology the scarab is not only a symbol of rebirth but also just as much a symbol of creation. The latter meaning stems from two sources. On the one hand, the word for beetle in ancient Egyptian (at least its Heliopolitan form) was pronounced like the word Khoprer, "the Becoming One", "He Who Comes into Existence", one of the deities of creation (Clark, 1959, p. 40). On the other hand, the scarab beetle "has the habit of pushing its eggs out of the sand enclosed in a ball of its own dung. The beetle therefore became the symbol of God as he came into existence and of the rising sun, the daily recapitulation of creation" (ibid.). This association of the scarab with creativity and autogenesis is again interesting in relation to synchronicity. For, as acausal events, synchronicities precisely do not have antecedent causes but emerge spontaneously; they are, for Jung, "creative acts" (1952b, par. 967). The concept of the autonomous psyche—that is, the ability of the psyche to generate contents that do not stem from interaction with other people or the environment—is of the greatest importance in Jung's psychological thinking and is one of the features that distinguish his model from those of other depth psychologists. One could even argue that his theory of synchronicity is in part an attempt to provide an underpinning framework for this notion (Main, 2004, p. 133). It therefore adds to the charge of the synchronistic experience related by Jung that its central image of the scarab symbolises such autonomous emergence.

In addition to these references, there is a surprising non-reference to the scarab in Jung's writings. It concerns the work of the seventeenth-century polymath Athanasius Kircher (1602–82). In his work *Oedipus Aegyptiacus* (*Oedipus the Egyptian*), Kircher presents the symbol or hieroglyph of the scarab as the key to the alchemical art and elaborates on various facets of its meaning, including its role in the spiritualisation of matter (see Bonnefoy, 1991, pp. 709–10). Jung refers to Kircher's works several times (see *General Index* to Jung's *Collected Works*), and even three times cites *Oedipus Aegyptiacus*. It may be that he simply overlooked this alchemical reference to the scarab or felt he had no specific reason to note it. But in view of the significance of Oedipus and indeed Egypt for Freud, and the connection we have found between the scarab and Freud, it is tempting to see here a complex of associations that may have further

contributed, however unconsciously, to the charge Jung experienced in the synchronicity with the scarab.

The hidden hero-myth in the scarab synchronicity

Jung commented that his 1913 vision was “a hero and solar myth, a drama of death and renewal, the rebirth symbolized by the Egyptian scarab”. The hero myth there was indicated by the floating corpse of the “youth with blond hair and a wound in the head”. The significance of this became clearer for Jung after a subsequent dream in which he participated in the killing of the hero Siegfried, which led him to reflect that “the attitude embodied by Siegfried, the hero, no longer suited me. Therefore it had to be killed” (1963, pp. 204–5). In his amplification of the scarab symbol in his patient’s synchronicity, Jung explains its status only as a symbol of rebirth. However, here too it may be possible to detect the latent presence of a hero myth. With Jung’s “young woman patient” sealed in the “intellectual retort” of her rationalistic attitude, we have, I suggest, the typical maiden imprisoned in a tower. The string of doctors who have failed to cure her suggests a series of suitors or champions who have failed to rescue the maiden. Jung’s eventual success thanks to the synchronicity reflects the motif of the improbable suitor who eventually succeeds thanks to supernatural aid. As the scarab entered through the window, so in the stories the rescuer or the rescuer’s supernatural accomplice often reaches or contacts the maiden through a window. As Jung’s patient is at first inaccessible, rigid, sealed up, icy, and resistant, and his efforts to free her are “fruitless”, but later she is sweetened and her natural being bursts forth when Jung “punctured the desired hole”, so the hero typically not only rescues the maiden but also wins her as his consort. Finally, just as Jung closes his anecdote with a vague but optimistic “The treatment could now be continued with satisfactory results”, so the story of a hero rescuing an imprisoned maiden typically ends with them “living happily ever after” (see, e.g., Thompson, 1958, pp. H310, L100, L160, N530, N640, R110, R121.1, T68.1, T381 [alphanumeric references are to the system of classifying folk-motifs in Thompson’s work]). A Jungian interpretation of such an episode in a hero myth would doubtless revolve around the task of awakening and entering into relationship with the anima or soul. In embedding this motif in

his account of the synchronistic event, Jung implies that with his theory of synchronicity he is heroically attempting to rescue the anima or soul of western culture. Such heroics may not contradict his earlier repudiation of the heroic attitude, since what they now involve is not asserting his will but respectfully co-operating with non-rational manifestations of the autonomous psyche.

Conclusion

Jung, like Weber and many subsequent sociologists, was profoundly concerned with the problem of the disenchantment of modernity. But we have seen that the manner in which Jung addressed this problem took him in directions widely divergent from those pursued in sociology. In invoking the concept of synchronicity, Jung involved himself, despite his protestations of empiricism and phenomenology (Main, 2004, pp. 47–8), in a number of religious and metaphysical assumptions and implications that are at variance with the positivist, realist, or humanist epistemological approaches mainly used in academic sociology (Macionis and Plummer, 1998, p. 36). Furthermore, I have suggested that in his choice of example to illustrate synchronicity Jung was drawing on a hypothesised feature of the unconscious psyche, its autonomous symbolising power, to present an image so richly charged with personal and cultural associations that it not only illustrated his argument but actively contributed to it and its emotional appeal. This was not simply a rhetorical ploy, in the sense that Jung consciously assembled the charged cluster of associations. It would better fit with his outlook to view the synchronicity with the scarab as an instance of the transpersonal psyche “staging its own manifestations spontaneously” (1945/1948, par. 395), presenting Jung with a compelling incident of whose full symbolic resonance he may not have been aware even as he intuited that it was absolutely the right example to use. Such respect for and cooperation with the non-rational unconscious psyche are again alien and alienating to the scientific aspirations and methods of sociology.

The Jungian notions of synchronicity and the autonomous psyche are especially problematic for attempts to create a rapprochement between analytical psychology and sociology. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider whether these notions can or

should be downplayed within Jungian thought for the sake of such a rapprochement, or whether they could, however surprisingly, find a place within a theoretically and methodologically more plural sociology—though I have touched on some of these issues elsewhere (Main, 2006). What can be noted here, finally, is that the theory of synchronicity as presented by Jung is tentative and provisional and is perhaps such that it must always remain so (Main, 2004, p. 61–2), while the autonomous psyche by definition cannot be rationally grasped in its totality. These two ungovernable concepts thus epitomise that the ideas, images, processes, and experiences with which Jung is dealing are not such as even he would claim to own.

NOTE

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Who owns Jungian psychology? Jung in Brazilian academia

Denise Gimenez Ramos

Jungian thought and the clinical tradition of Analytical Psychology have been present in Brazil since the country's first psychology courses were taught in the early 1950s. Initially, Analytical Psychology appeared sporadically in university psychology training through course programs such as Studies on Personality and Theories and Psychotherapy Techniques. Over time, Jungian psychology secured its place within academia, beginning with areas of teaching from group study and basic university training to today's post-graduate courses in various research fields.

The first Jungians in Brazil

One of the pioneers responsible for this growth was Dr Nise da Silveira (1905–1999), a Brazilian psychiatrist who had a major influence on everyone in the domestic field who followed this path. Unhappy with the Cartesian and biomedical view, as well as the classical methods for treating mental illnesses (which included electroshock, insulin shock therapy, lobotomies, and so on), in the early 1930s she began questioning traditional psychiatric practices. In

daily sessions with psychiatry patients at Dom Pedro II Hospital in Rio de Janeiro, she adopted a non-orthodox stance on mental health treatment. The image of a doctor committed to working with psychiatric patients, and completely in harmony with human suffering, forms a backbone of the Brazilian Jungian movement and expresses the spirit of battling mental illness in this country.

In those early years, Dr Nise conducted volunteer work and took part in social movements seeking better living conditions for women and disadvantaged minorities. She subsequently took to the writings of Karl Marx and attended several meetings of the Brazilian Communist Party, with which she was briefly affiliated (Motta, 2005).

This period in Brazilian history was highlighted by a 1930 military coup, which began the dictatorial government of President Getúlio Vargas. He suspended the National Constitution and installed a political regime characterized by the return of oligarchic groups that had held sway during the Old Republic. The political climate during this phase of our history set the stage for the events that followed.

In March 1936, Dr Nise was called before her hospital Board, which carried out a government order to send her to prison, after she was reported by a nurse who found four Marxist books in her room (Motta, 2005). While in jail, the doctor observed how the behaviour of the other prisoners was adapted to help them survive the regime of reclusion and abuse of power (Motta, 2005). This painful experience probably contributed to her view of the psyche as a place of imagination and freedom.

In 1944, she began working again at Dom Pedro II Hospital in the National Psychiatric Centre Complex (Motta, 2005, p. 65). At that time, electroshock therapy was being widely used as a modern tool to treat mental illness, but Dr Nise thought it inhuman and refused to employ such methods. As a result of her contrary stance to standard psychiatric medicine, she was transferred to the Occupational Therapy sector, which was considered an area of lesser importance. But she accepted her transfer as a professional challenge and began developing creative activities for the mentally ill through art studios and workshops using painting and clay modelling (Gullar, 1996, pp. 10–11).

The pioneering contribution of Nise da Silveira consisted of an understanding that creative activities represented an innovative

form of therapy in the field of psychiatry, an understanding borne of her extensive knowledge of psychology literature and a critical view on psychiatric theory. As she saw it, psychology, in comparison to strictly organicist treatment, could offer psychiatric patients a cure through the possibility of overcoming their psychic disorders and re-establishing contact with reality through symbolic expression (Gullar, 1996, p. 10).

In her work at the new Occupational Therapy Centre, Nise admired the artistic expression demonstrated by her patients. She also noted a high frequency of circular patterns in paintings done by schizophrenics, which she related to the symbolic images of mandalas, which knew through her study of eastern religions. It would be in the psychology of C.G. Jung that this leading edge psychiatrist would find “the strongest resonance for therapeutic practice and comprehension of the images that arose spontaneously in the art studios” (Mello, 2001, p. 13).

Her connection to the world of Analytical Psychology became increasingly indispensable. Nise noted that while she could see the therapeutic value of working with unconscious images manifested in her patients’ artwork, it lacked a scientific base—an empirical psychology theory—to understand the how the activities of the psyche became manifest in the shapes of mandalas (Mello, 2001, p. 13).

In 1954, Nise took the initiative of writing to C.G. Jung. She sent him photographs and paintings made by her patients and asked the Swiss psychiatrist if these images corresponded to the mandalas that he himself had written about. Jung was very receptive and asked Dr Nise for the two to stay in close touch. As a result, she traveled to Switzerland to discuss her work at the II International Psychiatry Congress in 1957. Taking up five rooms at the Congress, Nise brought with her hundreds of paintings made in her therapeutic art studios (Motta, 2005; Gullar, 1996).

In 1952, the Museum of Unconscious Images was opened in Rio de Janeiro. It brought together a peculiar collection of artistic works by psychiatric patients, including those by artists such as Artur Bispo do Rosário. In 1955, the C.G. Jung Studies Group was created, whose first event was a lecture discussing the English edition of *Psychology and Alchemy*. Ten years later the Group put out its first scientific publication, the *Quarterly Review*. From 1958 to 1964, Dr Nise da Silveira spent time at the C.G. Jung Institute in

Zürich and conducted a personal analysis with Dr Marie Louise von Franz.

Exhibits from the Museum of Unconscious Images continue being shown around the world, and the work begun by Dr Nise da Silveira has had a major impact on various academic areas—both in modern and traditional psychiatry. Her first book, published in 1968, *Jung, Life and Work*, was a best seller in specialized literature, and is still used today in entry level Jungian courses in psychology schools.

While Dr Nise never taught at a Brazilian university, her contributions to the psychoanalytic movement, and particularly to the insertion of Jungian thought into formal education, are among the cornerstones of the development and growth of Analytical Psychology in Brazil.

As mentioned, Analytical Psychology arrived in Brazilian universities through general Studies about Personality course programs at a time when few had been exposed to Jungian ideas in this context.

In 1969, Dr Ione Galleotti, a teacher, psychologist and expert in mythology and traditional psychology, began Brazil's first course program geared exclusively to the psychology of C.G. Jung. Teaching at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP), Prof Ione's efforts generated serious opposition from the school's directors, who had strongly behaviourist leftist leanings and who saw Jung as a scientist dedicated to the elite and who was popularized by mystical, new age groups. Faced with such pressure, he asked to resign and was substituted by a foreigner, Dr Pethö Sándor.

Dr Sándor (1916–1992), a Hungarian physician who fled the Russian invasion during WWII, came with his family to Brazil in 1949 after passing through various European countries in search of safe haven. In São Paulo he began practicing medicine using an integrative approach that sought to combine psychic dynamism with body therapy.

Thanks to his experience with war injuries, especially with amputees, Dr Sándor developed a technique of psychophysical integration called Calatonia. This technique, based on Jungian theory and on the concept of the compensation mechanism, proved itself to be an effective instrument in mobilizing unconscious images, as well as reaching physio-psychic mnemonics of traumatic events and allowing a natural rebalancing of the body.

We don't know how Pethö Sándor first came into contact with Analytical Psychology. It is thought he had studied Jung during his university days in Europe (Motta, 2005, p. 81). Friends and relatives say that Sándor told them that while he was a war refugee (1945–1949), he had “all the time in the world” to read and re-read Jung's works.

On joining the PUC-SP faculty in March, 1971, Prof Sándor brought with him an academic milieu and Jungian thought through two lesser known course programs at the time: Psychophysics Integration and Deep Psychology. When he introduced Analytical Psychology, the subject of the body and the body conscience was included as a fundamental element and characteristic of Jungian studies conducted at the school. In just a short time his teaching schedule rose to 30 hours a week, including courses such as Theories and Techniques of Psychotherapy, Sleep and Dreams, and Conflictive Relations, among others (Motta, 2005, p. 86).

The students readily accepted these new courses, and a lack of empty seats underlined the success of the classes taught by Prof Sándor. However, as happened with Prof Galleotti, his considerable popularity with psychology teachers and students did not go unnoticed by the previously left-leaning College Board.

The socio-political climate in Brazil at the beginning of the 1970s was very tense, and overshadowed by a right-wing military dictatorship. PUC-SP was an important university centre of resistance to the oppression of military rule, having been the scene of one of Brazil's largest conflicts between students from the right and the left, in the fateful year of 1968. The presence of a professor who had been a victim of communist persecution in his home country—his parents were shot by German troops, and his wife had died from war trauma—turned him into an anti-communist symbol. In the context of a left wing university environment, his political stance was strongly criticized by his colleagues at work. This led to the Jungian view being erroneously perceived as a theoretical construct contrary to the political interests of the time.

Once again, strong opposition began to establish between the Board, characterized by a leftist trend and by B.F. Skinner's primate theory of behaviourism and the Jungian teachings of Dr Sándor. This mixture of political interests and theoretical approaches interfered directly with the development of Analytical Psychology at the

school, igniting a conflict that in a few years time would result in Dr Sándor's dismissal from the faculty at PUC-SP.

This presents an interesting yet paradoxical relation between the two names that formed the foundation of the psychology of C.G. Jung in Brazil.

While Dr Nise da Silveira proposed freedom of expression regarding mental illnesses, as a member of the Communist Party she saw Analytical Psychology and individuation as roads to freedom to be a human being. In the political context of the university where Prof. Sándor taught, these same ideals were identified as a threat to leftist thought.

It seems that the battle to nullify being a human and control behaviour had different interpretations or were manipulated for different contexts. Accordingly, while in the psychiatric context Jungian thought was a liberator for some, at the university it came into direct conflict with the behaviourist ideas of observation and behavioural control. These conflicts reached Prof. Sándor quite painfully, considering he had come to Brazil after being persecuted by communist regimes in Europe. In 1980 he left PUC-SP for good, leaving behind a team of teachers that continued his efforts at the school.

Dr Sándor subsequently began working at the *Sedes Sapientiae* Institute, a school of open training for professionals from the area of health and education, where he remained active until his death in 1992. Among his many contributions were his courses and research on applied kinesiology, psychophysics integration and Jungian Psychotherapy linked to body techniques. His followers continued his teaching work and maintained two important publications: *Hermes* and *Jung and the Body*.

Also important was the presence of Belgian analyst Leon Bonavénture and his wife Jette Bonavénture, who moved to Brazil. In addition to beginning the translation of C.G. Jung's works into Portuguese, they also gave lectures and taught classes at PUC-SP. Additionally, they provided analyses for a number of analysts, and in 1978 formed the Brazilian Society of Analytical Psychology, the first Latin American society affiliated with the International Association for Analytical Psychology (IAAP).

In 1975, after the arrival of Dr Carlos Byington from the C.G. Jung Institute, there was a visible acceleration in the growth of the

Jungian movement, including visits to São Paulo by various international analysts.

Current status of analytical psychology in academia

Analytical Psychology is now taught in a number of Brazilian schools, principally in graduate programs in Psychology, Education, Philosophy and Medicine. The largest centre for Jungian studies continues to be PUC-SP, which offers courses in the Psychology Faculty, in graduate courses, extension courses, plus continuing education and post-graduate courses.

In 2001, a post-graduate program in Clinical Psychology was created through the school's Centre for Jungian Studies, with the participation of various Analytical Psychology professors, including Liliana Wahba (an analyst from SBrPA), Durval Faria (an analyst from AJB) and Ceres Araújo (SBrPA), under the coordination of Denise Ramos (SBrPA). Since its creation, a wide range of theses has been presented in the fields of psychosomatics, clinical practices, Psychology of development, and interfaces with the arts and religion.

The Jungian faculty at PUC-SP, made up of nine teachers, is active at various academic levels. Following is a summary of the main courses offered by the school:

Undergraduate Courses

Analytical Psychology I	History and epistemology of Analytical Psychology; basic concepts; theory of complexes; Ego-Self relationship; typology and functions of the conscience
Analytical Psychology II	Conception and studies of symbols; persona; shadow; anima/animus; theory of arche types; individuation process

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<i>Continued</i>	
<i>Undergraduate Courses</i>	
Research Methods in Analytical Psychology	This course is designed to develop the students' understanding of research design and the research process in analytical psychology
Body-mind relationship: An introduction to psychosomatic	The analytical model applied to the treatment of organic illnesses and the psychosomatics phenomenon
Theories and techniques of Psychotherapy: Jung analysis	Origins of Psychotherapy; the symbolic dimension of man and the world; principles of practical psychotherapy; transference and counter transference; the use of dream analysis; expressive techniques in Jungian analysis
Art, myth and dreaming	Theory and literary critiques from the Jungian perspective
Psychotherapeutic praxis: Theory and intervention	The development of consciousness and the individuation process
Grouping of Jungian Psychotherapy for students in their final year of Psychology	Basic principles of psychotherapeutic methods in Analytical Psychology
Five course programs:	Clinical methods in analytical praxis Work research project Supervised clinical internship

Masters and PhD in Clinical Psychology
Department of Jungian Studies

* This program trains behavioural sciences students for careers in research and teaching in health and clinical psychology.

* It offers seven areas of specialization, although several streams may be integrated into a particular course of study:

Epistemology and Psychology	Life and historical perspective of Jung's work
Fundamentals of Analytical Psychology	Basic concepts of Analytical Psychology
Structure and dynamics of the psyche	Complex theory and archetypes; individuation process
Origins and developmental studies of the psyche	The Development of the child from the viewpoint of E. Neumann and M. Fordham
Psychopathology from the Jungian point of view	History of different diseases; classification of mental diseases; psychodynamic of mental illnesses
Childhood mental representations from an Analytical Psychology perspective	The "clinically reconstructed child" in psychological theories of the 20 th century; the "observed child" in new research approaches; the nature of early development; inter-subjectivity and children – mother interaction; the symbolic function
Structure and dynamic of psychotherapy	General questions on diagnosis and psychotherapy; transference and counter transference
Research designs and methodology	Research work on an elective theme

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<i>Continued</i>	
<i>Masters and PhD in Clinical Psychology</i>	
<i>Department of Jungian Studies</i>	
Elective subjects	* Symbolic studies: Dreams, dream work and active imagination;
	* Symbolic studies: Myths and fairy tales
	* Symbolic studies: Art and culture
	* Symbolic studies: Psychology and religion

In addition to courses offered at the graduate and post-graduate level in the Faculty of Psychology, Analytical Psychology is also found in post-graduate courses in Religious Sciences, Psychosomatics and Psychology of Health at PUC-SP. The faculty of Philosophy and Communication also offers an elective course based on studies of Analytical Psychology and its interface with literature and the arts. Additionally, the interdisciplinary debate with Analytical Psychology appears in other departments at PUC-SP, particularly in PhD theses in Law and Economics.

Jungian thought is also present in the Psychology Institute of the University of São Paulo (USP). Analytical Psychology began at USP in 1983 as part of the Psychology of the Personality course program and in psychological counselling activities.

As well, two optional course programs were introduced in the Psychology department at USP. The Analytical Psychology of C.G. Jung, whose objective is to teach students the theoretical conditions “to recognize and to make use of texts based on Jungian Psychology, to identify basic themes considered by Jung and his followers, to articulate their own ideas on this basis and to establish points of dialogue with other theoretical approaches” (Freitas, 2005, p. 5). The other program, introduced in 2005, known as Psychic Energy and Creativity in the Psychology of Carl G. Jung, focuses “primarily on the concepts of symbol and of symbol creation using non-verbal expressive resources” (Idem).

According to Prof Freitas (2005), at the post-graduate level Jungian psychology is officially included in the line of research labelled “Health and Human Development” and has inspired projects such as “Masks and Experiential Groups” and “Myths and Symbolic Life Experience”. The University of São Paulo also includes Analytical Psychology as part of its Medicine course in the area of psychiatry, under the guidance of Prof. Nairo Vargas.

Other important works have included those of Prof Dartiu Xavier, who was responsible for the Orientation and Chemical Dependency Assistance Program at the Federal University of São Paulo Medical School (UNIFESP). Also in the area of medicine, Prof Joel Giglio has monitored Jungian approach post-graduate theses in psychiatry at Campinas State University (UNICAMP).

Several other university centres have also been gradually introducing Analytical Psychology into their curricula, in large part due to student demand and the popularity of C.G. Jung in the media. This interest for Analytical Psychology has gone beyond the field of training psychologists, and has found an important place in areas such as Business Administration and Economics, which frequently generate articles in popular magazines that deal with everyday themes from the Jungian perspective.

Analytical psychology in other areas of debate

In all these centres there is a drive to apply Analytical Psychology in other fields of knowledge, as well as create venues to debate colleagues from other disciplines, primarily psychoanalysis. PUC-SP has been the site, for example, of events between psychoanalysts and Jungians to debate different theories and practices.

In 2003, a packed theatre of 700 people watched Christian Gaillard, then President-elect of the IAAP, debate Claudio Eysirik, then President-elect of the IPA, on meeting points between the two theories.

Political and educational themes also are the subject of debates with respect to Analytical Psychology. In 2005 PUC-SP hosted *The Shadow of Politics*, a debate in which two Jungian analysts, a law professor, a businessman and a federal senator spoke on the psychological causes of corruption in Brazil.

Conclusion

The ease and speed with which Analytical Psychology in Brazil was absorbed by various educational institutions shows that its ideas and fundamentals have always found a link with certain cultural standards in the Brazilian collective consciousness. Academics anxious for a psychology whose field of theory could comprise an analysis of symbols, and permit the development of individuality outside of the strict standards of behaviourism or the more limited standards of psychoanalysis, had an immediate interest in Jungian thought.

As we have seen, its entry into the professional and academic fields led to strong reactions and transformations, the roots of which have grown today into a rich variety of manifestations.

It is also surprising how its application in various fields of learning has been growing, seen in the number of Jungian-based dissertations, theses and articles in a wide range of areas.

We also see that “to be Jungian” in Brazil, despite the heterogeneity and amplitude contained in the term, reflects not only an identity that goes beyond the academic world, but also describes a lifestyle and an idealist perspective: ethical freedom of expression and creative development of the being.

It is likely that Analytical Psychology will continue to develop rapidly in Brazil, and broaden its various areas of activity nationwide. To the extent it is incorporated into academia, its ideas will continue to be constantly re-evaluated and reformulated while maintaining a scientific and Jungian ontological paradigm.

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The challenge of teaching Jung in the university

David Tacey

Jung in the academy

Intellectual culture and experience

When I first tried to explore the exclusion of Jung from the universities in the 1970s numerous Jungian analysts told me that Jung did not belong in the university and is best not taught there. One of the strongest advocates of this view was Marie-Louise von Franz, who wrote to me that Jung in the university might degenerate into a “head trip” (1976). That is, he might become an object of purely intellectual study, and the emotional and psychological process that makes Jung’s work meaningful—namely, one’s own personal encounter with unconscious contents—would be missing. Effectively, this view maintained that analytical psychology in its clinical practice *owned* Jung, and that universities could not participate in this ownership, since they could only view Jung externally and superficially, and not from the inside.

Searching through the Jungian literature to find explicit statements about the clinical ownership of Jung is a difficult process, and yields few results. Mostly, this problem is expressed in personal remarks and letters, and not in the public domain. Andrew Samuels, however, can always be relied on to be outspoken about what others do not divulge. In his Preface to *Post-Jungian Criticism*, Samuels writes:

Certain analysts say that academics cannot really feel or suffer complex emotions because of their precocious intellectual development, which vitiates empathy and sensitivity. As this character assassination of the typical academic continues, she or he cannot really understand most of the concepts derived from Jungian psychology, because their provenance, and certainly their utility, are matters on which only practicing clinicians can rule. [Samuels, 2004, p. xi–xii]

Samuels is an analyst and a clinical professor who is sticking up for academics, whereas I am an academic who wishes to support the analysts. I agree with Samuels that we cannot bracket out Jungian studies from the university curriculum, on the grounds that the clinicians have exclusive ownership of this knowledge. However, I fully agree with analysts who object to the purely intellectual and therefore incomplete and inauthentic deployment of Jungian psychology in a university setting.

It seems to me that if Jung is to be used in the university, he should be used correctly, and this means teaching Jung in such a way that the whole self is engaged in this process, and not simply the disembodied intellect with its reductive grasp of concepts. I agree with the analyst's typical objection (Samuels, 2004, p. xii) that Jung's ideas are not really concepts to be taught but psychic images to be experienced. Jung's psychology is a complex depth psychology in which archetypes are to be understood phenomenologically as elements of human experience, or not at all. I agree with Jung that universities have been so preoccupied with a sterile "rationalism and intellectualism" that they have almost forfeited their right to appear as "disseminators of light" (1930, p. 86).

Testing boundaries and challenging hegemonies

As a student, I found the Jungian criticism of the universities to be illuminating. It not only explained why Jung had been rejected by university knowledge, but it also accounted for why so many students find their university studies to be dull and boring, especially the academic study of psychology. A mind-numbing rationalism has conditioned and limited the discipline of psychology, and in this environment it is understandable that a *depth* psychology based on experience has found itself confined to exclusive and elite institutes

of analytical psychology. I am pleased that these private institutes have kept the candle burning for Jungian psychology and knowledge of archetypes, but surely the time has come to challenge both the hegemony of rationalism in the universities and the hegemony of the institutes in their "ownership" of Jung.

Although formal and expensive clinical analysis must remain a central element of Jungian psychology, I am concerned about several issues: 1) That the encounter with the unconscious has apparently been made synonymous with clinical practice; 2) that the professionalisation of Jungian practice has served to strengthen and consolidate this fusion; 3) that Jungians have been unimaginative about finding other methods to impart their work beyond the clinical model; and 4) that this situation frequently boils down to the premise that only those who can afford to pay for therapy can embark on the complex journey of individuation. My social conscience rebels against these assumptions, and yet it is clear that personal analysis is beneficial, and I have benefited from it myself.

Every year, I teach scores of students who have a desire to discover the life of the unconscious, yet who cannot afford to go into expensive personal analysis. There must be other ways to encounter the unconscious apart from the clinical model, especially if, as Jung often claimed, individuation is a *natural* process (1917/1926/1943, p. 187). In the past, there were numerous traditional methods to transcend the conscious realm and engage the unconscious, and these would include religious belief and spiritual practice, ritual and dance, artwork and poetry, romance and relationship, music and dreams. In other words, any form of human activity that is creative, intuitive, or open to the nonrational side of experience is a potential site for the encounter with the unconscious. Of course, having that encounter monitored by someone with special knowledge is something that the clinical model has refined to an extraordinary degree, with its sensitivity to transference and unconscious contents.

The increasingly rational nature of modern life has had a destructive impact on our traditional forms of transcendence. Typically, the modern person has little or no access to religion or spirituality, to ritual or poetry, and even romance and relationship have become attenuated, commercialised, and clichéd. Many of our nonrational outlets and avenues have been blocked, devalued, or destroyed. The question came to me in the late 1980s: how can I, as

a university teacher, help my students to approach the unconscious in a creative way?

An experiment in teaching

The idea of teaching Jungian psychology to students at my university was not mine. The notion came to me from my colleague in the Philosophy Department, Robert Farrell, who thought it would be a worthwhile venture for us to join forces and produce such a course. I was based in the English Department, but we conducted our teaching experiment in a program called Interdisciplinary Studies. This seemed like an ideal place to teach Jung, whose work and vision encompass at least eight disciplines, including psychology, classical studies, mythological studies, comparative religion, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, and the history of ideas.

Indeed, one of the reasons why Jung is not taught in the modern university is because his work does not fit any specific academic discipline. Staff in psychology are likely to refer to it as religious studies, and lecturers in religious studies are likely to say that it is science and not religion. Philosophers regard the work of Jung as not squarely in the philosophical tradition, and of course Jung himself often said that his work was not philosophy but empirical science. However, the empirical scientists on campus are likely to point to the highly speculative, intuitive, and philosophical nature of Jung's enquiry. As a doctoral candidate in Jungian studies, I was moved back and forward from English to Anthropology, to Psychology, and eventually back to English Literature. The psychology professor referred to Jung as a "literary critic", and thus I incorporated the work into literary studies.

Jung's solitary confinement to the Arts and Humanities is, let us hope, temporary. It is an interesting place for him to be, but he cannot be confined to these disciplines. He is more than myth and literature; he is, or represents, an amalgam of mythos and logos, story and science. In truth, he does not belong to the Arts faculty or in the Science faculty—he belongs to both. He belongs to a university system that does not yet exist, one in which the whole of life is studied and taken seriously. Jung is the scientist and artist of life integration. His thinking is organic, holistic, literary, and scientific. As such, there is no available box or category for him. He is a scholar in the grand style, and his extraordinary breadth makes most academics feel

humbled. Academics are often said to know more and more about less and less, but Jung works in reverse: his momentum is centrifugal, encompassing more fields in a desire to understand human reality.

There is always the grave danger, however, that such a colossal intellect, which seemingly fits everywhere, will be said to belong nowhere. Like God in creation, Jung in the academy can almost be said to be *felt everywhere* and *seen nowhere*. I think when integrative sciences finally emerge in our universities, which they must with the rise of ecological and organic thinking, we will find that Jung will eventually find his place in a new paradigm of knowledge that will appreciate his synthetic style and encompassing worldview.

Robert Farrell and I called our subject "Jungian psychology", but there was a protest from the Psychology department that we were encroaching on their territory. I responded to this protest with a brief lecture on the etymology of the word *psychology*, pointing out its true meaning as the *logos of the psyche* or *soul*, and suggesting to the Psychology department that they had left *psyche* out of the study of human behaviour. This protest was dropped, and we were free to develop our own subject, although it was noted that our students were frequently defecting from Psychology to Interdisciplinary Studies. In due course, Psychology dropped its antagonism, and decided to include us in its range of subject choices, so that students majoring in Psychology could study Jung as part of their science degree. We could not be defeated, and so eventually we were incorporated.

As Robert and I designed our subject, we spoke about many things including the objection of Marie-Louise von Franz: how could we do this so that it did not become a mere head trip, which lost the value and intensity of Jung's vision? Obviously, we could not play the role of *de facto* therapists in the academic setting, and yet we both agreed that this subject would need to be *different*. Neither of us had the time, energy, or expertise to engage the student's interior process, and yet we agreed that we might be able to teach the subject in such a way that the nonrational dimension of life could be incorporated and assumed into the subject.

Robert Farrell and I have taught the Jung subject for nearly twenty years, and we feel that we have done so with reasonably good results. I am not talking about results in the narrow sense of high grades, but in the deeper and more important sense of having encouraged our students to engage the unconscious and to take the

nonrational side of their experience seriously. We have concluded that the success or otherwise of this teaching depends on the way Jung is taught and the attitude of the teacher. A Jung subject has to be taught with *psychological* intelligence, and this may not be the same as intellectual intelligence. If the teacher can be open to the depths of the psyche and receptive to its autonomous and living reality, then a certain “reverence” toward the psyche can be found, which prevents the academic experience from falling into a head trip.

I believe there is a lot of *middle ground* to be explored between Jung as an object of intellectual enquiry and Jung as an approach to the psyche in therapy. I will later explore four approaches to teaching Jung that demonstrate the range of possible approaches to this academic challenge.

The religious factor

The academic teacher of Jung cannot engage the subjective or emotional process of every student. This is not possible, nor is it desirable. But my colleague and I have found that a form of therapy does indeed take place in the classroom when Jung is taught with passion and concern. As soon as the teacher conveys a convincing sense that he or she is open to the depths of the psyche, to its existence and its effects on us, something therapeutic happens in the classroom which is quite uncanny and moving. I have experienced this many times, and such moments are transformative for teachers and students who are open to such experiences. Other students find that such experiences wash over them and do not seem affected. In other words, such students are not ready for an experience of the autonomy of the psyche and in this case no harm is done, and an opportunity has been missed or deferred until later.

There is of course a *religious* dimension to any experience of the autonomy of the psyche. When we acknowledge that we are in the presence of something greater than ourselves, something large and unseen, yet which “sees us” (Jung, 1934/54, p. 49), we are in the domain of religious or spiritual experience. We shift from being subjects who pursue knowledge for our own ends, to being objects of an invisible and autonomous reality. This obviously has to be handled carefully by teachers and students. To call into being, or into academic consideration, a numinous and powerful *other*, a life

which lives us, which holds sway over us and to which we must listen or adhere, is to cultivate what Jung calls a *religious attitude*.

The main problem for the teacher is not to identify with the wisdom that is generated by this educational process. The teacher has to watch his or her reactions, and make sure that psychological inflation does not occur, that he or she does not become the classroom guru, the arrogant fount of all wisdom. Obviously, there is an inescapable sense of reward and personal elevation in introducing a sense of spirit into students' lives, but the teacher has to contain this feeling and not allow it to gain the upper hand. As soon as this feeling wins, we lose the educational plot, and our integrity is in jeopardy. It is fine to be an instrument of knowledge, but not to identify oneself with this knowledge and become grandiose.

For their part, students do not use Jung's term "religious attitude", which does not seem to resonate with them. They speak instead about "spirituality", and an invitation into a spiritual view of the world can trigger reactions of various kinds (Tacey, 2004). Those students who are rationalistic may reject this invitation out of hand, and find it repellent, manipulative, or even anti-human. Those who have a committed religious faith will possibly reject this new approach for opposite reasons, and say "No thanks, I already have my religion and I don't need another one". But the vast majority of my students are secular adults who have had no exposure to formal religion, or who had only a rudimentary religious upbringing that they shrugged off at some early stage in their development.

Pedagogical problems in the teaching of Jung

Many of these students are eager for a new experience of the numinous, and long to feel themselves connected to a sense of a greater *other*. This creates problems of its own, because Jungian psychology is not a religious faith, but rather an approach to the psyche which advocates a reverential attitude (Gundry, 2006). Some students want to turn Jung himself into the religion they don't have or have never had. This approach can severely limit the capacity of the student to think critically. Instead, some adopt Jung as a religious system, and use the technical terms as articles of faith, speaking about the archetypes as if they were real objects in time and space, rather than metaphors for processes of the psyche.

Contact with the numinous, with what is infinite and *other*, is fraught with emotional reactions, resistances, defences, and enthusiasms. The stability of the ego is relativised and even threatened by the realisation that it is not the master of its house. Some students give away their ego authority too readily, while others defend against the *other* as from a hostile attack. Still others insist that the *other* is only to be found in heaven or in scriptures sanctified by orthodox religious authority. Some respond to the suggestion that the *other* can be found within as an outrageous expression of gnosticism or heresy.

I do not see Jung as an “outbreak” of gnosticism which is designed to belittle religious traditions. His psychology provides an existential ground upon which the statements of faith can be tested. If anything, Jung’s psychology adds weight and value to the religions, but they tend to respond with resistance because this internal dimension is feared. It is regarded as unorthodox or an acquired taste. The exception is where religious authorities have embraced the mystical sub-streams of their respective traditions. Jung’s psychology is a science of the relations between the human person (the ego) and the God Within (the Self).

The numinous calls for a response, and mostly the educated ego in the West responds through resistance and denial. It is either dismissed as an *illusion* by rational minds, or viewed as a truth greater than literal truth by those who are religious. Either way, presenting a balanced apologetic to students in secular universities can be difficult. How will students respond? What emotions will the numinous arouse? How will it impact upon their present beliefs and attitudes? By the time most academics have reflected on these questions, they have realised that the task is too daunting, and it is best not to bother. As one academic said to me, “To teach Jung is to look for trouble”.

Jung writes of the capacity of the unconscious to paralyse our critical faculty, and to hold us in its power (1928, p. 262). The same is true for the numinous, and for those who speak on its behalf. It is not uncommon for some students to fall helplessly under Jung’s spell, before they reach a more mature relationship to his ideas (Tacey, 1997). But reaching this mature level can be difficult and time-consuming. It is hard to be objective about Jung, if one is responding principally through a complex, and not through the mind. It may take some time for the mind to catch up, because the

complex works automatically and independently. Therefore, it is not surprising to discover that some students dismiss Jung's work as gobbledygook or mysticism, while others fall under its sway and are unable to take up a critical dialogue with it.

In such cases, fear and fascination of the numinous become difficult pedagogical issues. Do we have the capacity to deal with these responses in the university? Generally not, but if we are able to identify an emotional response as soon as possible, the teacher may have a chance to dialogue with it. In my experience, uncritical adulation is more common than hostile rejection. This can be contained by a sensitive teacher, but other faculty members are likely to point to this problem and announce that the Jung subject produces disciples and followers rather than critical readers. This may increase the academic prejudice that Jungians are part of what Richard Noll calls a "worldwide cult" (1994, p. 3). Jung seems to act as a trigger to what I have called the spirituality complex of the secular West (Tacey, 2004).

Once the spirituality complex is activated, it asks for objects of belief, and Jung is a likely target for such projections. But after the student has become adjusted to the reality of the spirit, he or she finds their way to religious, mythological, or cosmological attitudes and symbols, and Jung is let off the hook. Then Jung can be returned to reality, and seen as a scientific investigator of our human depths, rather than a god or idol. In technical terms, Jung acts as a transferential object while we are sorting out our relationship with spirit. Jung activates and arouses our need to believe, which we hardly knew we had before, because this libido was withheld by the secular ego and rendered unconscious.

Teaching styles

Towards a taxonomy of Jungian studies

Over recent years, I have been travelling interstate and overseas to see how other academics are dealing with the challenge of teaching Jung in the university. In every case, the success or otherwise of our efforts seems to be determined by our approach to the numinous. If we ignore the numinous, as is sometimes found in academic study, and if we teach only the "nuts and bolts" of Jung's psychology, we

are not teaching him properly. Rather, we are excluding the essence of his approach, which relates to the experience of the numinous (Tacey, 2006b).

But how do we, in the post-Christian West, in a university system governed by secular values, make the numinous convincing, real, and present? How do we handle our personal cynicism toward the unseen dimension? Just as importantly, how do we educate ourselves to become critical of the numinous, rather than fall for it with unthinking devotion? How can we avoid dualisms and complexes when we step into this realm? How can we teach Jung’s work when we do not yet have the cultural and religious forms to understand it? My guess is that new cultural forms are emerging now, and yet they are not widely known. When these new forms arise, and when the numinous can be properly incorporated into our knowledge, Jung will find his natural context and belonging, but until then he is in danger of being seen as an oddity.

I have discerned four main approaches to the teaching of Jung. Each could be seen to be governed by a particular “god” or archetypal style. I am sure there are more than four, and that I have left others out, but this at least will set the ball rolling toward a taxonomy of Jungian Studies.

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Fitting in or Conforming | Ruled by the Father, Senex, or Old Man. |
| 2. Updating or Reconstructing | Hermes, the Trickster. |
| 3. Soul-Making or Overturning | Dionysus. |
| 4. Keeping Pure or Standing Still | Disciple and Acolyte. |

As with all taxonomic categories, these styles are almost never found in pure form. As one sketches out these archetypal styles, they invariably become somewhat clichéd and stereotypical, but we have to take that into account.

Fitting in or conforming

Here the desire is to fit Jung into the university system, rather than to challenge the system by advocating new knowledge. Analytical psychology under this influence sets itself the task of conforming to

prevailing standards, expectations, and assumptions. The keyword for this approach is “respectability”.

The aim is to show how *respectable* Jungian psychology is, if only academic scholars took the time to understand the nature of Jungian thought. If scholars sat and reflected, they would see that the exclusion of Jung from the academy has been based on a misunderstanding. This approach is rational, cool, and collected; it is non-combative and diplomatic. It seeks to demonstrate the validity of Jungian psychology, by fitting it alongside other theories and knowledges.

Its aim is to demonstrate that the exclusion of Jung has been based on misconceptions. Jung is not a mystic, but a sound and worthy scientist of the more difficult reaches of mind. These depths are not “mystical” but are accessible to scientific analysis that is properly attuned to deep structures. This approach emphasises his scientific credentials, his career as a leading-edge psychiatrist, his philosophical education, and his empirical approach to mental illness and social problems.

Archetypally, this approach is ruled by the senex or old man, both in its creative aspect (accommodating and including) and its negative aspect (manipulating and controlling). This approach teaches the “nuts and bolts” of Jung, without teaching that the work is ultimately about self-transformation. Students are given information, but not the goal of self-transformation, and they rightly complain about the dryness and aridity of this approach when they find out more about the field. This drying-out effect is part of the long-standing opposition that many analysts have to bringing Jung into the academy. Divorced from the mystery dimension of the unconscious, is “knowledge about” Jung useful? Can Jung be understood without the kind of experience we gain from the encounter with the numinous?

Ironically, in our desire to include Jung in the academy, we have to be careful that we are not “excluding” him all over again. If our pedagogical style is too narrow, we are not including enough of this thinker’s work. If I can use a metaphor from physics, it is as if we are trying to pull in a single particle into the university, only Jung is not a particle, but a wave of vast extension. I was stuck in this rut myself some years ago, so I know all about it.

This is largely an emotional and pedagogical problem of the senex archetype. The senex (in men and women) thinks of itself as being important and in control. It won’t risk the self-disclosure that

transformation demands, since this involves the anima or soul, the revealer of the inner life. The more identified the teacher is with the persona, the more unconscious and distant the anima will be. To teach the art of transformation demands that the teacher shows that he or she is vulnerable to the numinous and receptive to the soul. We stand before the sacred not as someone in control, but as someone who receives. If the teacher is not prepared to risk their controlling stance, to let the guard slip, to show vulnerability, there can be no teaching with soul. As Jung once said of Freud, he was not prepared to “risk his authority”, and as a result he “lost it altogether” (1961, p. 182).

The other problem with senex pedagogy is that in its conservative interest in scientific standards, empirical evidence, rational proof, it fails to see that the academy itself has been radically transformed by postmodern knowledge. Many of the old, academic ideals, such as objectivity, precision and exactness in scientific method, have been overturned by postmodern thought and by feminist theory, at least in the social and human sciences, if not in the exact sciences. To some extent, the image of the academy that the senex holds no longer exists. This is because Hermes, the central archetype of the postmodern era, has got into the academy and turned things around (Neville, 1992).

Updating or reconstructing

Hermes governs the second teaching style I have detected, although Hermes can also outwit himself. The emphasis in this approach is on “reconstructing” Jung in the light of progressive discourses that have taken place in the social sciences, arts and humanities. If *respectability* is the keyword for the senex, here the overriding concern is *updating*.

Hermes is the messenger who moves between worlds, and he brings to the Jungian world messages from other knowledges, and he even introduces Jungian concerns to worlds that have never been interested in Jung. His concern is with potential connections and creative dialogues.

Hermes, the trickster, adopts the view that an unreconstructed Jung cannot be admitted to the academy. Whatever “Jung” may signify to Jungians, he has to be deconstructed before he can be

authentically brought before the university. This style may be paradoxical: It may even side with the established views of the academy, and argue against “Jung” in his unreconstructed form. This approach may be embarrassed by unreconstructed Jung, and seek to differentiate a “post-Jungian” from an earlier “Jungian” position.

This approach will seek to re-read Jung with current views in mind, often sharply critical of the ways in which the classical Jungian work falls short of contemporary values. It critiques the Jungian work, especially in terms of the “big three” preoccupations of the academy, namely: class, gender and race. It may seek to revise his metapsychology and his philosophical underpinnings, in an effort to bring these into line with contemporary philosophical thought, postmodern theory and phenomenology. This second approach might employ as its credo: “Reparation works best in the open”, and it will enjoin scholars and critics of Jung to enter into dialogue with “post-Jungians” in a mutually enriching work of cultural reconstruction.

A major drawback is that with all this fancy footwork and “adaptation” to contemporary concerns essential elements are not addressed. What happens to the numinous? Where is the divine? They are often ignored in the move to find meaningful connections between post-Jungian interests and the concerns of race, class and gender. This approach often says: we will redeem Jung’s psychology, but not bother about his theology. But this won’t do. Hermes outwits himself at this point. Jung’s religious attitude is not an added extra, an optional element we can do without. We cannot just say his religion is a residue of his conservative nature and that as radical post-Jungians we do not need to be concerned with it.

This problem is linked to other, larger issues. In the academy, religion is frequently relegated to the *right* side of political life, since religion is often viewed as the glue that binds society together and that keeps it stable and ordered. The socially progressive Jungian concern for updating, changing and renewing is forced to engage a basically leftist agenda that is hugely allergic to religious problems (Schmidt, 2005). But I do not believe that the religious dimension is extraneous to Jung; it is integral to his psychology.

Jung’s work seems to call for a “religious left” that does not yet exist on campus. The religious are often conservative; the politically aware are often very secular. The major exception to this rule is

Western Buddhism, which seems to be politically progressive. I know that progressives like to typecast Jung as irredeemably conservative and stuffy, but the implications of his psychology are radical (Tacey, 2006a).

Soul-making or overturning

The third approach focuses on the numinous dimension, but often has little to say about social and political aspects. Its interest is in the inner life and the cultivation of the soul. An exception to this rule is where Jungian visionaries suddenly decide that the outer world has "soul", and then behave almost as religious converts to political realities (Hillman & Ventura, 1993).

Soul-Making or Overturning is iconoclastic and rebellious. It accepts that the work of bringing Jung into the university is a subversive act, i.e., a counter-cultural enterprise. It is not interested in conforming Jung to existing paradigms, but in challenging the models of knowledge that have kept Jung out of the academy in the first place. Its concern is not *respectability* or *updating*, but *revolutionising* the system.

The third approach likes to employ language that flies in the face of the academy, using terms like "soul" and "spirit" that the academy considers obsolete. I know a Jungian teacher who gave a staff seminar on the gods and goddesses of the psyche, and some of his colleagues left the room. The revolutionary approach often decides that the academy "lacks soul", that it privileges knowledge but "not wisdom", that it is repressive toward "what counts", that it avoids an encounter with "ultimate questions". This approach is what Jung would call "inflated", or what the world calls arrogant. But whether arrogant, inflated, or inspired, it fails to see that the academy has been secular for many years, and if it wants to bring the numinous into the system, it has to be tactful and present an appropriate apologetic for the gods.

Scholars of the third approach frequently scorn what is current and contemporary, and often devalue these concerns as merely fashionable. They dislike the contemporary and are in love with antiquity. Their models of how to live are usually premodern, ancient or primordial. Favoured sources of inspiration are the

Florentine Renaissance, the Perennial Philosophy or Medieval Alchemy—which all look like hocus pocus to the university. The third approach believes that a primordial truth can be found, and this is an inspiration for championing such traditions as alchemy, shamanism, Neoplatonism, metaphysics and wisdom literature.

Scholars who follow this way have difficult and often lonely careers. They are generally not liked by their colleagues (apart from a few close associates), and develop ill feeling and rivalry in the workplace. They may exacerbate the problem by their repeated criticisms of mainstream knowledges. Because they celebrate soul and spirit they are often given a high profile by the media, and this rubs salt into the wounds of colleagues, who can be beset by envy. However, such teachers are often highly successful with students, who view them as inspired prophets on campus. They form the “Dead Poets Society” of the Jungian academic world, but they often get too entangled in the emotional currents and complications of students’ lives. The senex persona is dropped in the name of “soul”, but sometimes propriety and professional boundaries are dropped as well.

Keeping pure or standing still

There is also a purist approach, and this group tries to have as little to do with the intellectual life of the academy as possible. They do not stir the pot like the dynamic soul-makers. They hope that if they confine themselves to a Jungian bubble, the rest of the intellectual world will go away. They are suspicious of postmodernity, do not like Derrida or Foucault, ignore the post-Freudians and try as hard as possible to keep themselves pure for Jung. Their job is to inform people about Jung—a kind of informational bureau on campus.

I can’t think of an archetype that governs this approach, but I can think of a stereotype: the disciple or acolyte. This style, as Jung observes (1928), is secretly identified with the master, and hides this under a mask of subservience to the teachings. Such teachers do not talk about Jung’s scientific research, but about his “findings”, as if they are commandments written in stone or brought down from on high. The problem with this approach is that it is not doing Jung any

favours. It is keeping him hermetically sealed off from the world, away from the critical debates, making him almost gloriously irrelevant to intellectual life.

Teachers in this mode often behave as converts and their students are sometimes expected to become Jungians, rather than critical readers of Jung. Students rightly complain that this approach is claustrophobic, although it may suit the kind of student who is looking for something to believe in. Teachers in this mode are not always liked by their colleagues, who see them as priests or nuns of a religious sect. Often this style is short-lived, because it is sometimes a phase that people go through, a moment in which they fall in love with the numinous as revealed by Jung. This tendency of the work is savagely, and I think unfairly, attacked by Richard Noll (1994).

Again, this is largely a religious problem: how to incorporate the numinous in the secular academy? Jung evokes and stirs a spirituality complex; some reject him out of hand as a mystic, others revere him as a prophet. Converts do not know how to gain the necessary critical distance, since criticism is viewed as a transgression or heresy, signs that our spirituality complex has been activated. If Jungian purists are incapable of genuine criticism, their colleagues will argue that they are indoctrinating students, making them incapable of living politically aware and astute lives. This sets up the conditions for fundamentalism and intolerance, and arguably education should work in the opposite direction.

Diversity and experimentation

These four approaches cannot be pinned down to particular personalities in the world, but rather represent leanings or biases in the teaching of Jung. The first approach seeks to *conform*, the second to *reform*, the third strives to *transform*, and the fourth seeks to *inform*. It is sometimes the case that the one academic will experience elements of all four styles and approaches. Basically, they can be reduced to two larger categories: one and four are static styles, while two and three are dynamic. Number one is the static and number two is the dynamic form of adjusting to the academic world; whereas number three is the dynamic and number four the static form of adjusting to the numinous.

Hostility between our camps could be attributed largely to these different styles. The fast-moving trickster finds the disciple or acolyte to be static and uninteresting. The senex finds the trickster to be slippery and deceitful. The soul-makers find all other types to be superficial and defensive, and the purists argue that all the others are in danger of losing the plot. Sometimes soul-makers push the system too far, and are in danger of losing their jobs. The university might decide that soul-makers are actually trouble-makers, and it can get on better without them. Soul-makers can reinvent themselves as updaters or reformers, where at least they can hold down their jobs, and where passions are cooled by the need to enter into dialogue with contemporary concerns. The acolytes are also nudged onward to new styles, partly due to criticism from others, since the university will not tolerate an exclusive bubble world for very long. A Jungian information booth is arguably best dealt with by Jung clubs, and not by universities.

But the field is new and still being born. There will be other styles to discover and more problems to elaborate. We must expect this diversity in Jungian Studies, and if possible, hold the tension between conflicting positions. The recent establishment of an International Association for Jungian Studies, which specifically focuses on the teaching of Jung in university and college contexts, will do much to provide a forum for valuable discussion and critical reflection on teaching styles, pedagogical issues, and the meaning and purpose of Jung in the university. Readers are invited to consult the website, which can be found in the list of references.

In conclusion, we serve Jung best not by turning his work into a fixed ideology, but by playfully deconstructing it for the new era. We have to deconstruct his ideas about the numinous, but we cannot *eradicate* the numinous to suit the needs of a secular academy. Using one of Jung's key phrases, we have to "dream the myth onward" (1940, p. 76). As we move the work into the academy, we have to avoid the various pitfalls, including getting stuck in the senex and leaving out the soul; getting intoxicated by updating and leaving out the numinous; getting identified with the soul and condemning the world; or getting stuck in a ghetto and ignoring the world. These problems are not unique to Jungians. They are found wherever the numinous raises its head in a secular context.

This essay is dedicated to Robert Farrell, in recognition of twenty years of exploring the teaching of Jung at La Trobe University, Melbourne.

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CLINICAL

Analytical psychology and Michael Fordham

James Astor

Michael Fordham, was the last of the founders of a movement in analysis, and like the other founders,—for instance Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott, or Wilfred Bion,—he tapped into something essential in analysis.

Certainly the historical circumstances which gave him the opportunity to do so will never be repeated, any more than the Freud/Jung collaboration will ever be repeated. Fordham seized an opportunity and positioned analytical psychology between psychoanalysis and Jung's original formulations. His work was a turning point in Jungian studies. He co-edited the collected works of C.G. Jung, was a leader in setting up a Society of Analytical Psychology to train clinicians interested in Jung's ideas, made significant contributions to analytic theory and practice and pioneered the Jungian analysis of children.

Fordham, through the forum of the British Psychological Society's Medical Section, disseminated Jung's ideas in the post war period, making them known to a wide group of clinicians, who for the most part were not familiar with Jung's work or when it became available in English did not read it for political reasons (loyalty to

Freud). In practice this meant that he was, in return, open to the work of other analysts in the British object relations school, followers of Freud.

It was in this context that he was instrumental in starting the Society of Analytical Psychology in 1946 and in devising the content and requirements of the trainings in child and adult analysis and he was director of both trainings. This society was the first to offer training in Jungian analysis and Jung himself was its first President at its inception.

His second important contribution to the dissemination of analytical thought was in editing Jung. He set out the shape of the Collected Works, proposing which papers should be grouped together to form which books and what the sequence of publication should be. He was involved in the first publications from 1947, later ceding this executive role to William McGuire in the early fifties. Fordham was also the inspiration behind the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* and its first editor, a position he held for fifteen years from 1955. In addition he wrote eight books, numerous articles and a memoir.

Fordham came from an Hertfordshire landowning family. His father, Montagu Fordham, had written books on agriculture and been involved in the Arts and Crafts movement, while his mother had trained as a singer. He was educated at Trinity College Cambridge, and St Bartholomew's Medical School. He started his working life as a doctor interested in neurology, and was later attracted to the science of analysis. He met Jung through a friend of his father's Dr Godwin Baynes who was a student of Jung.

Individuation and the self

Fordham's pioneering work on infancy and childhood has led to a new model of development within Jungian circles and his studies in autism based on his development of Jung's ideas of the self have been accepted in the wider analytic community. His most radical departure from Jung was to describe the actions of the self in infancy and childhood such that the infant, far from being uncentred at birth, as Jung originally thought, is a person with an individual identity even in utero.

Almost unnoticed, remaining untouched by other researchers and practitioners, was the concept contained in this description of

the workings of the self, which was that the self, helped to mould and create the environment in its interactions with it. This concept introduced the idea of the agency of the individual in its own development. The self, as Fordham conceived it, was the instigator as much as the receptor of infant experience. This conception gave rise to the particularly Jungian theory of ego development in which the interaction between mother and baby ensured the uniqueness of the situation, a uniqueness created as much by the infant as by the mother.

Like Jung, Fordham understood that the instability of the mind, gave rise to fierce struggles internally, principally against negative forces of mindlessness, cynicism, and all their derivatives and perverse clothings. Throughout these struggles the beauty of the continuity of the self, of what Jung called the "prospective" nature of the psyche, with its capacity to heal itself, can carry forward the interested enquirer. Part of Fordham's contribution was to have shown his fellow analysts, through his example and published work, that the self in its unifying characteristics could transcend what seemed to be opposite forces and that, while it was engaged in this struggle, it was "exceedingly disruptive" both destructively and creatively.

Jung's psychology is an individual psychology, and his reluctance to foster the institutionalisation of his ideas arose from his knowing that an individual method could only be taught with difficulty. Much of Fordham's work has countered this religious aspect of Jungianism. In understanding the complementary nature of Jung's contribution to Freud's, Fordham drew attention to the need to be well grounded in the analysis of transference as a prerequisite to a deeper analysis of the self, and his example demonstrated the enriching qualities of psychoanalytic concepts in this task.

In essence he described a unified field theory of the self which changed the Jungian perception of life as having a first and a second half. He was inspired by Jung but he was not a "Jungian". What this has meant was that when Fordham was studying Jung's work and had identified an ambiguity, he relied on the clinical evidence to guide him and not, as so often happens, asserted that his view was the right one because it was what the master really meant, thereby introducing a moral element into the argument.

Traditionally Jungian analysis has treated mythology almost as metapsychology, looking to myths to illustrate behaviour. Fordham

reversed this tradition and used his clinical work with people to illuminate contemporary myths. By turning it that way round, without renouncing altogether the use of myths to elucidate clinical material, he not only did Jungian analysis a great service but he also provided a clinical base for the myths themselves; he grounded them and thereby stopped them floating away as if they were but fragments of an analysis drifting in a magical world.

Scientific was the word Fordham preferred for his approach. What this meant in essence for him was thinking about and working on emotional experience. The learning, he felt, came from the change in the mind resulting from this process, a kind of internal reorganisation akin to growth.

The schismatic tendencies in the analytic world have been fostered by devoted pupils of the great masters claiming their interpretation is the right one. Fordham eschewed this approach and in so doing stayed closer to the original spirit of his inspiration—Jung. He avoided groups and cults of personality. Jung did not want to establish trainings and societies and was once heard to say while attending a meeting in Zürich of analysts interested in his ideas: “Thank God I am not a Jungian!”

Fordham’s breadth of interests, love of Jung and scientific enquiry, led him to write on the occasion of Jung’s death:

His name is still almost automatically linked with that of Freud as most nearly Freud’s equal, and if his main life’s work was in the end to be founded on a personal and scientific incompatibility with Freud, there are those who believe, like myself, that this was a disaster, and in part an illusion, from which we suffer and will continue to do so until we have repaired the damage.
[Fordham, 1961]

Fordham’s life was open to this task of repair. He gave papers to psychoanalytic groups, demonstrating to them the value of Jung’s archetypal psychology. He promoted discussions and conferences in Britain with speakers drawn from Jungians, Freudians and psychiatrists. Through the careful study of the clinical work of Freud and those who have come after him, he equipped himself to disseminate psychoanalytic ideas in his analysing, his teaching and his supervising, and to show where the connections and differences lay between the two great pioneers. He was the leader in establishing a high

quality Jungian organisation for training analysts; in addition he was creative and innovative as an analyst and was one of very few Jungian analysts to have an international reputation.

Jung's inspiration

Jung was the inspiration behind most of Fordham's work. Looked at retrospectively his work shows him trying out Jung's ideas with patients and when the ideas needed modification struggling to assimilate the conflicts this gave rise to. Fordham was exceptional within the Jungian community in his interest in the internal world of the child. The impact of this was to be felt not just in his studies of infancy but also in his understanding of transference phenomena in adult analysis. He thought that if Jung's ideas about individuation in the second half of life had their origins in infancy there would be evidence for actions of the self in childhood. Jung had written of the individuation process as the realisation "in all its aspects, of the personality originally hidden away in the embryonic germ-plasm" (Jung CW 7: par. 186) but he did not follow this up. This was because he was more interested in the prospective functions of the unconscious and his patient's imaginative capacities, and less in their origins. This investigation has been Fordham's task. Jung had shown that there were two centres of integration in the personality, the ego and the self. But he nowhere demonstrated the significance of the self in childhood. He thought of the child as existing in a state of *participation mystique* the phrase used by Lévy-Bruhl to describe the characteristic of primitive tribal peoples' relationship between themselves and an object, such that they were unable to distinguish themselves from the object.

Jung thought of the child as unconscious, which in the context of his model of the psyche meant in need of protection by his mother from the dangerous contents of the collective unconscious. Much later, towards the end of his life Jung became fascinated by children's dreams but was daunted by the prospect of researching this area. He wrote to Fordham: "I just cannot see my way to anything so ambitious as a book about children's dreams. This would really be your province and I should like to persuade you to try your hand on such material. ... I'm now at an age when it becomes unwise to continue the great adventure of pioneering research. I must leave the

joy and despair of it to younger forces" (Jung to Fordham, 22.2.52). Fordham took up this mantle.

Fordham's relationship with Jung was personal as well as professional.

There was in my mind, a strong association between Jung and my father, ... Thus it was easy for Jung to take on a paternal role for me. [Fordham, 1993, p. 111]

Fordham felt real affection for Jung and the feelings were reciprocated:

He gave ample evidence of his good opinion of me and it was after all he who suggested I become editor of his *Collected Works*. He was always accessible when I wanted to see him, whilst his letters were, with one or two exceptions, perceptive and ended with "cordially". [ibid., p. 113]

He found Jung's outspokenness at times insensitive but it was a quality his father possessed and if it was apt he usually did not mind. He noticed in his personal interviews with Jung, when they were alone together and he was telling Jung about a difficulty he was having, that if Jung "got on the track of an archetype he tended to lose sight of the person in whom it was active" (ibid., p. 118). He enjoyed the informal meetings with Jung at his Bollingen house "when", he said, "one usually sat with him beside the lake on a stone bench with one of his stone carvings nearby" (ibid., p. 115). "It was these meetings over the years that consolidated the goodness of the relationship" (ibid., p. 119).

Fordham was initially interested in the analysis of the personal unconscious (and its impersonal features) and emphasised the importance of analysing childhood. He thought of Jung's work as being complementary to Freud's, not in opposition to it. He also had another motive:

My personal relationship with him (Jung) made me aware of a trend amongst some of his followers, and his detractors as well, which he deplored. It hinted that analytical psychology was a sort of religion. It was an error that I also deplored, and so gave lectures and wrote papers to oppose the tendency. [ibid., p. 117]

These articles also helped establish an interest in the application of Jung's ideas to clinical practice. Then in the 1940s he began to investigate the relationship of the self to the ego and out of this came his

early descriptions of actions of the self and their relation to ego development.

Studying the evolution of Fordham's work, what is noticeable is how he began by demonstrating the impact of archetypal images on child development (Fordham, 1994). Later he emphasised more the affective state of the child in the consulting room, in relation to him. Gradually he began to piece together a theory of development which, while deriving from Jung's work, was very different from it.

The particular nature of the work Fordham was working on was a theory of the self which extended Jung's use of the concept to include eventually a primary or original state of integration. This primal self, he thought, gave rise to structures from interaction with the environment which it in part created. It existed outside of time and space, and was similar to a mystical (or contemporary scientific concept such as emergence), whose manifestations had archetypal form. This primary self was integrated, and in Jung's sense it was an agency of the psyche which transcended opposites. His theory required the self to have some sort of dynamic, a potential energy, so that its actions could in time contribute to ego development.

In imagining how the infant self would come into relation to the environment Fordham described the process as follows:

In essence, deintegration and reintegration describe a fluctuating state of learning in which the infant opens itself to new experiences and then withdraws in order to reintegrate and consolidate those experiences. During a deintegrative activity, the infant maintains continuity with the main body of the self (or its centre), while venturing into the external world to accumulate experience in motor action and sensory stimulation. ... Such a concept of the self brings a new dimension to both depth psychology and developmental psychology, for it is now conceived to be a dynamic structure through whose activity the infant's emotional and ego growth takes place. [Fordham, 1988: p. 64]

What I want to draw your attention to about this statement, is the phrase "dynamic structure". For this phrase takes us into the uniqueness of one of Fordham's enduring contributions to analytical psychology, namely that his theory of child development is both a structural and a dynamic one. Klein as we know had a very

dynamic theory, largely based on instincts and drives. Bion had a theory which was mainly about the development of structures in the mind, the thinking breast. But Fordham's model is one which combines structure and dynamism. What is exciting about this today is that infant research which is not analytic in orientation seems to be arriving at a similar hypothesis. For Fordham's theory does not require the splitting off of good and bad but allows for the readiness of the infant to meet experience which then becomes characterised in a particular way. So putting it another way Fordham took the innateness of Jung's archetypal psychology and demonstrated the way in which the environment affected it, the paper *Abandonment in Infancy* (Fordham, 1985b) is a good example of this. Modern researchers who have conducted experiments with infant's perceptual and discriminatory skills often find that they are organised in ways which reflect the social interactions between mother and child. These interactions reflect the deintegrative and re-integrative actions of the self which are not dependent on splitting mechanisms in the ego.

Fordham's method

A careful study of his life shows that he often began a piece of work having studied the area and then tried to forget what he had learned so as to be open to the experience of the encounter. If we examine historically his approach to transference we find him initially trying out Jung's method of active imagination.

During the sessions the imagery produced by the patients was related to historical, alchemical and mythological parallels, but not to personal history and experience. The purpose was to integrate the images into the self. In doing this he proceeded in a similar fashion to Godwin, known as Peter, Baynes who had been his first analyst.

Fordham was putting to the test the prospective method for himself so as to be able to describe from the other side of the analytic duo, in a scientific manner, what its limitations were.

Fordham's patients were not homogeneous by type, pathology nor personality traits. He sat his patients opposite him, working with,

the emphasis on basic equality of status between myself and patient conceived to be embarking on a joint enterprise of understanding "the unconscious". In each case the transference did not feature prominently and this, as I subsequently learned, was due to the emphasis on the here and now relationship in which I and the patient were regarding myself as a person; this masked, but did not eliminate, the transference. ... [Fordham, 1967, p. 55]

He thought of active imagination as the ego's responding to deintegrations from the self. He found, however, that he had to modify this technique to make room for a reductive analytic method, the results of which he found to be more synthetic in some cases. The problems arose from that little caveat of Jung's concerning his method, namely that it was only suitable if infantile affects were not active.

What Fordham found in his practice was that the democratic nature of the prospective method could not resolve the delusional transferences which arose. If anything it probably fostered them. Sitting opposite the patient often put more stress on them, leading them to avoid saying what was really in their mind. His analysis of the difficulties of using this technique was that it led to the two parties accepting the delusional transference as an objective truth about the analyst (for instance that the analyst was just like the patient). What was happening he discovered was that he and the patient were accepting the patient's projection into him (that he was like this or thought that) as a statement which was true of himself rather than something the patient could not see as part of him or herself but only as an attribute of another. In this way the infantile transference feelings were lost and began to affect the analysis in an undercover and destructive way.

Working with children, enabled him to see what was happening with his adult patients. This led to the development of his work on syntonic transference. Later he was to revise this idea (Fordham, 1996, Ch. 15) and reformulate the interactions in terms of the presence of projective identificatory processes. This revealed to him the truth of Jung's teleological approach and gave new meaning to Jung's observation;

The patient, by bringing an activated unconscious content to bear upon the doctor, constellates the corresponding unconscious material in him, owing to the inductive effect which

always emanates from projections in greater or lesser degree. Doctor and patient thus find themselves in a relationship founded on mutual unconsciousness. [Jung CW 16, par. 364]

Fordham based his approach on Jung's idea that transference was an archetypal process and that the apparent lack of transference, initially, may be due to the analyst's and, later, to the patient's unawareness of it, rather than its absence.

He clarified that the therapeutic content of the analyst's personality was in his relation to his unconscious and so Jung's

theory of transpersonal archetypes may be expected to orientate us here. With it we can explain why the patient apparently calls out suitable or adapted therapeutic reactions in the analyst which, together with the unadapted ones of the patient, form the main substance of all intense transferences. [Fordham, 1957, p. 64]

He suggested that by making use of Jung's concept of "the actual situation", a term he used to describe the factors contributing to the contemporary neurotic conflict of his patients, then fruitless regressions could be avoided.

If, however, the actual situation be defined as the totality of present causes and the conflicts associated with them, then the genetic (historical) causes are brought into the picture in as much as they are still active in the present as contributing to the conflicts there manifested. [1957, p. 82]

This apparently unremarkable statement was significant for Jungians because Jung had distinguished his approach from Freud's, for historical reasons, by emphasising the prospective nature of the unconscious and the undesirability of an historical quest for the cause of the symptom or problem. Fordham had wanted to include the personal genetic factors and yet not be "heretical". This formulation, whereby he reinterpreted Jung's "actual situation" modernised analytical psychology while keeping it in touch with its origins. In his last publications Fordham made use of Jung's statements about the undesirability of the Dr knowing beforehand when in the presence of a new patient as a link to the analyst's aspiration

to analyse from an atheoretical approach and in so doing create a new theory for each interview (Fordham, 1996).

Fordham was concerned with his and his patient's states of mind. We can think of states of mind as a relational concept which links the inside (inner world) to the outside (perceptions of reality). So for instance a patient who is predominantly in a paranoid/schizoid state is denying either or both of these internal or external elements. This could be thought of as perverse, the work of the internal propaganda machine, as in John Steiner's paper on turning a blind eye, or alternatively ordinary in the meaning of ordinary life which accommodates huge dissociative states (Steiner, 1985). In the Jungian community there may be a tendency towards the latter. Not that ordinary life is at all easy, but is it meaningful to conceptualise it in terms of psychopathology? You may recall that Primo Levi in his book *The Periodic Table* referred to the officer in charge of the laboratory, next to Auschwitz, who was working on the gas ovens as being unaware of their purpose. He exemplified this ordinary condition. Levi described him not without empathy as a "one eyed man in the kingdom of the blind". (Levi, *The Periodic Table*, 1985)

Fordham the author

Fordham's weakest subject at school was English and yet he spent much of his professional life writing. Sometimes he was consciously filling in the gaps left by Jung. His work on the biological basis of archetypes, on ego development, or on countertransference were examples of where Jung either had not filled in the picture, or had only sketched an outline which needed elaboration (Fordham, 1957, 1974, 1979, 1985a). Similarly Fordham deliberately looked for an autistic child patient to analyse in order to test out certain ideas he had, which derived from his study of Jung's work (Fordham, 1976). This was in the context of his continuing investigations of childhood and his initially tentative revisions of Jung's view of individuation, to include the beginnings of ego development in childhood. Being asked to write about abandonment for an American conference led to one of his most important papers (Fordham, 1985b) which brought together his ideas about the self and his experience of infant

observation. It further helped him to describe where he differed from Kleinian child analysts.

Students asking him about Neumann detonated out of him the powerful paper he wrote on Neumann and Childhood (Fordham, 1981). Often the analysis of a particular patient stimulated him to write about their work together, usually in an effort to make more sense for himself of what had happened. His papers on transference and interaction (Fordham, 1957, 1974b, 1979) and his much quoted paper on Defences of the Self (Fordham, 1974d, 1985a) emerged in this way.

Another stimulus for his written work was the discussions within the Society of Analytical Psychology. For instance, when issues to do with training were being aired it often led to his setting out his views in a paper which might first have been given at one of the Society's scientific meetings. Papers on training analysis, supervision, and transference come within this category (Fordham, 1957, 1961, 1974c).

Fordham and religion

Fordham's own personal beliefs were fairly uncompromising as far as organised religion was concerned. He saw it as a way of trying to contain the psychotic elements of the personality in a societal way. But he was not an atheist, and while he was clear that faith, meaning belief in the resurrection, was a delusion, he was also clear that it was not without immense cultural value. He thought the progression from cannibalism to the Mass was a huge achievement. And he thought of the church as standing between the ego and the "divine mysteries in the same relation as the soul stands between the ego and the mystical communion with God" (Fordham, 1958, p. 120). His interest in St John was that he was very taken with St John's powers of self observation which he described as making clear,

that the soul is not only identical in its functioning but also in its phenomenology with the concept of the soul in analytical psychology, according to which the anima as soul image is the function of relationship between the ego and the unconscious psyche. [ibid., 1958, p. 121]

His respect for Jung and his understanding of the value of his studies of the manifestations of the collective unconscious led him to try to take a balanced position with respect to both the psychological and the religious perspective. Balanced that is if you are stuck on immanence rather than transcendence. His position was that “the metaphysical reality of God, cannot be grasped by psychology, though such miraculous proofs as the virgin birth are accessible to psychological examination” [ibid., p. 115].

There is, however, no logical incompatibility between the two different viewpoints if the phenomena are recognised as common to each discipline which treats them differently. If the two fields of knowledge get mixed up, this is only to be expected, for it is clear that psychology must lead sooner or later to religious experience, while religion can only be brought home to the individual through the psyche. [ibid., p. 113]

He was sensitive to the charge that this was psychologising religion. He thought that examining the accessible phenomena of religious experience, such as prayer, confession, ritual exercises, or certain spiritual experiences such as he did in his studies of St John of the Cross, could shed light on human psychology. This approach was not, he thought reducing religious experience to psychological categories any more than, as Jung pointed out, that by reducing physical matter to energy physicists had dispensed with matter or our experience of it.

He valued religious experience, just as Jung did, which offers people an experience of their irrational inner selves, which he thought psychology could deepen. But as Jung pointed out the differences between theologians and psychologists are that:

Both appear to speak the same language, but that this language calls up to their minds two totally different fields of associations. Both can apparently use the same concept and are then bound to acknowledge, to their amazement, that they are speaking of two different things. [Jung, *CW 11*, par. 454]

This seems to contradict Fordham’s observation quoted above that, “psychology must lead sooner or later to religious experience” but only if religious experience necessarily includes the way organised religious systems define phenomena, such as “the belief through faith of the metaphysical reality of God”.

But being a Doctor and a trained scientific observer Fordham, like Jung, grounded the psychological point of view in human biology; without a body the human animal cannot be examined psychologically. The survival of the soul therefore, he thought was outside of the realm of psychological investigation. So why then has man created a dogma such as we have in Christianity, he wondered. Fordham's view was that the need for Jesus to be an historical figure derived from the unconscious value which his historical existence gave to the objectivity of Christ and this a) prevented identification of the ego with the unconscious and b) located the power of religious experience in the hands of the church. Following on from this Fordham was left feeling that the unconscious was deeply mysterious, only partly known and knowable, terrifying to most people and Godlike in its awesomeness. But because he felt himself to be outside of the Christian tradition he did not identify with the meanings Christians assign to their symbolic world. This left him free to use his own categories, especially those relating to the infant and its development. Thus we find him making use of the concept of projective identification to compare the mystic's transformations of the soul with those which occur within the infant in relation to the mother's breast. While this may individualise Christian experience, to a religious person it limits the understanding of Christian experience to personal and impersonal insights. And Victor White's criticism of Jung applies here to Fordham as well that he failed to recognise the validity of the religious person's need to maintain the transcendence of God.

Summary

Why Michael Fordham is important to analytical psychology today is because he gave Jungians their childhood and a way of thinking about it and analysing it—not as one aspect of the archetypal relationship, but as the basis for the analysis of the transference within archetypal forms.

In an analytical sense Fordham spent much of his professional life investigating, in a more embodied way than Jung, the internal chambers of the mother's body. He also wanted to reattach Jung to the significance of the childhood he (Jung) had turned away from because it reminded him of psychotic anxieties. Out of this original

work came his understanding of the importance of the self from infancy to the grave. He was true to Jung's spirit in his manner of changing Jung's model of the mind, in that he let the empirical experience of the clinical work lead the changes. When he published a major discovery it was always with sufficient accompanying evidence for the reader to understand how he had arrived at the change he was proposing. His discoveries were inspired by Jung but not constricted by his eminence. Rather he thought out his own solutions, guided by Jung's originality.

He knew that there were gaps in Jung's work and his deep engagement with both Jung and psychoanalysis allowed him to fill many of them. I think of him as being different from Jung as an analyst. Jung's analysis of a dream Fordham once took him (Fordham, 1993, p. 118) missed the personal significance of Fordham's own Herculean task as expressed in the dream. Jung seemed more interested in the archetypal symbolism. Why I mention this is that Jung had forgotten briefly, as remembered by Fordham, that in analysis it is more important what the patient knows than what the analyst knows; Fordham understood that. He understood how to bring together the personal and the archetypal in the consulting room.

No mention of Fordham's life could omit the immense importance to him of his marriage to Frieda and her help and guidance to him especially with his writing with its often dense and difficult style.

His life and work has helped to heal the rift between the founders of our analytical work Freud and Jung. He has bequeathed us a living model of development into which much contemporary research can naturally find a home. This model focuses attention on the infant and what it does. We start our enquiries from the same position as the ordinary mother, thinking of the baby as a separate person. This leaves room for the baby's capacity for discrimination. Next by having a theory of deintegration we are able to think about the observed behaviour of the infant as being continuous with the self. What this means is that the development of the individual baby is in effect an early form of individuation, as experiences are being reintegrated within a continuum. So this model lets us proceed on the basis that the infant is a separate person but it also takes into account the fit between the infant and its mother and how actively the baby contributes to this.

Why is it useful to think of experience as being on a continuum? Because it takes us away from linear thinking where one developmental stage replaces another and puts in its place a model which allows previous experience to coexist with contemporary experience such that each may modify the other. And most important of all this is the only model which is both structural and dynamic. He recognises the self as an organising centre, which follows Jung but modernises him in the light of contemporary research. I like it too because it removes the study of behaviour from the realm of causal explanation and has made the study of the self into a unified field theory.

Finally an anecdote. It was December 1992 and I was at the Severalls, Fordham's house. I was preparing some lunch while he was reading a draft chapter of the book I was writing about his work (Astor, 1995). After we had eaten and discussed my errors and omissions we were just sitting and talking in the sitting room and he was puffing on his pipe ruminatively making little noises, not saying much. And then he said "I wish Jung was alive and I could talk to him about the self".

"What would you ask him?" I said.

I'd say to Jung, "Now Professor Jung I think I have understood your writings on the self, but why is it that Jungians don't understand what you have written".

And Jung would reply, "My dear Fordham you mustn't expect to be understood".

And he laughed and looking at me said, "Well I have had my conversation with Jung".

He was true to his own thoughts about Jung that "the best monument that can be raised to Jung's memory is to make use of and develop his work rather than let it be passively accepted and sterilized". In this he succeeded.

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Can we prevent colonization of the mind? Traditional culture in South Africa

Astrid Berg

It could be said that 2005 has become the year of Africa: It has been declared as such by the British government and it has been the main item on the agenda of the G8 summit in Scotland. The laudable motive of reducing poverty on the continent may not be entirely altruistic; the not inconsiderable oil reserves off the west coast of Africa may be the real reason behind this goodwill. With the Middle East becoming an increasingly complicated and fatal nexus of power play, the “dark continent” may yet be wooed by the so-called developed world with a hope that it will be able to keep the industrial, economic machinery of the western world going. This will bring once again into Africa explorers and seekers of gold, whatever its color might be, and with it a western view of the world. The danger of a psychological occupation is real and could be as, or even more devastating than the arbitrary division of countries and assumption of political power by Europe was some 120 years ago. “Colonial destruction of a country seeks to do away with traditional custom. Such destruction can lead only to a suffocation of the cultural creativity and potential of its people” (Funani, 1990, p. 57).

In this Chapter Analytical Psychology in South Africa will be briefly contextualized by a short description of its forebears; this will be followed by a focus on the issues surrounding a particular traditional custom. The argument will be made that only by understanding the archetypal basis of a ritual, can its continuing power be appreciated.

Analytical psychology in South Africa

The ancestors: C.G. Jung and Vera M. Bührmann

Although Jung never came as far as Southern Africa, he was the only one of the founding fathers and mothers of psychoanalysis to have ventured beyond the known world. At this time, when people of other races and customs were far away from Europe, it was only the most adventurous of western man (much less frequently women) who would travel, sometimes at great danger to himself, to come into the colonies in order to “study” primitive peoples.

Jung had been inspired to explore Africa by an exhibition in London which depicted the tribes in the colonies under British rule. His travels to Kenya and Uganda in 1925 brought him in touch with profound layers in his unconscious. In a courageous manner he allowed himself to experience the “otherness” of the African people he met, but in the end he did acknowledge anxiety and a need to return to what was known to him. Many of his observations were astute and accurate; however the generalisations and conclusions he drew from them were at times incorrect as he never realised that they were based on the reactions of the indigenous people to a European visitor, rather than having been a genuine giving of information (Burleson, 2005).

Jung’s paper *Archaic Man* is one of the outcomes of his experiences in Africa. He starts it off by stating that it is difficult to say anything about civilized man because one is talking about one’s own kind. However when it comes to “archaic man ... we are far removed from his world in time, our mental equipment, being more differentiated, is superior to his, so that from this more elevated coign vantage it is possible for us to survey his world and the meaning it held for him” (Jung, 1931, par. 104).

Jung was a man of his time and his words should be seen in that context. It is even ironic that the “archaic man” had seen far more than Jung had realized and had in fact outwitted him. Jung was, however, also ahead of his time, as throughout the paper he makes reference to how much of archaic man there is also in civilized man. The inherent racist assumptions and prejudices are nonetheless evident in his way of writing. While we today may have advanced in that no-one would dare to make comments in the manner that Jung and others did in 1932, the unconscious superiority some cultures feel in relation to others remains largely unchanged and unchallenged. One of the unfortunate effects of this is that many black African people identify with this superiority of western culture and strive to discard their traditions in order to become westernized. Sadly, they too may regard this as progress, as becoming “more differentiated” from “archaic man” as Jung implied.

While Jung was on his expedition, a young girl was growing up on a farm on the southern part of the African continent; she was living in close contact with black African people and speaking their language. This girl was Vera Bührmann whose destiny it was to bring Analytical Psychology to South Africa. She left her family's farm to study medicine, a path which ultimately led her to London where she became a psychiatrist, child psychiatrist and Jungian Analyst. Being a child of Africa, she returned, and for many years was the only Jungian Analyst in the country. But she was drawn even deeper into the country beyond the largely europeanized city life and returned to her roots in black rural Africa where she started a unique process: communicating with traditional healers in a remote community. What terrified Jung attracted her and she entered into that world with nerve and a vision which one can only appreciate if one has participated in something of this kind. Her qualitative research in the area of traditional healing brought her international fame and to date her findings are used as the basis for others who work in this area.

Because she as much as is possible tried to have no preconceived ideas, no prejudices (Bührmann, 1978) she was trusted by her black colleagues, indeed, was regarded as one of them, and through this trust gained access to their inner world.

The challenges today: can we judge without knowing?

From the first encounter with the “other” which so gripped Jung, to Vera Bührmann’s systematic study of traditional healing methods during the dark times of South Africa’s Apartheid history, we come to the situation today, in a democratic South Africa with its many western social and economic values, where the majority of its people are not of western origin and follow African traditions. What needs to be held in balance are the dilemmas posed by two questions: how do we prevent a repetition of colonization? And how do we prevent a patronizing, romantic attitude towards African traditions which ignores the shadow aspects which are present in all cultures? In the end we all have to evolve and move forward; it is the implicit and explicit assumption that the advance is automatically towards a western way that I challenge.

The spectrum of attitudes present in current South Africa and Africa are depicted in the following two reports: in the September, 2003 edition of the *South African Journal of Psychiatry*, Fred Kigozi, Senior Consultant Psychiatrist in Kampala, Uganda, writes:

“Despite rapid recent advances in knowledge and the evidence based approach in the developed countries, especially in the Western world, services in many countries in Africa remain under-developed with a large imbalance between urban and rural communities. It is equally sad to note that the first phrase of the historical process described above still prevails in almost all the rural areas in Africa, *where traditional care based on local healers remains the point of first contact for most patients.*” He then asks, poignantly, “*What has gone wrong in Africa?*” (Italics mine)

One can understand that Kigozi is referring to lack of available services, and he is obviously right in deploring this; of course everyone in the world should have access to the advantages that western medication has. However, his attitude to traditional care and healers is sad, and mirrors his question, but not in the way he intends it to. The African way of being is in danger of becoming westernized, and the fact that an African psychiatrist can want this, is what is sad indeed.

As a contrast the following report from Limpopo Province in South Africa: “Acclaimed Limpopo sangoma Hlathikulu Ngobeni is probably the first traditional healer to own a hospital which provides both traditional healing and western medical services. ... he has also

hired a medical doctor and white nursing sister to provide western medical services for patients who prefer this kind of care ..."¹

The solution that Ngobeni's hospital offers is something that is not so easily attainable and the tension between the cultures are not so simply resolved. The debate and at times, conflict, is ongoing in the country with vigorous statements made in the media. Many of the African traditions do not fit into a sanitized, reified western world view; but instead of acknowledging not understanding, and being respectful of difference, the Europeanized white person becomes attacking and arrogant, and the Europeanized black person becomes silent.

There are two traditions which have shown enormous flexibility and resilience in that they continue to be practiced to this day, even when other rituals may have been left behind: this is the system of *lobola* or bride price and the adolescent rite of passage for boys. While these traditions are alive, they are rarely talked about outside the community, and if so, not with the seriousness and interest they deserve. Rather, any misuse of them, any damage caused by them is seized and expanded upon, almost to show that they are outmoded, primitive, not working and proof that they should be discarded.

The one which is very much present in the current national debate and one which affects us as mental health professionals is the question of male ritual circumcision during adolescence. The number of genital injuries and deaths of young men following this ritual has led to a call to have it abolished—something which some missionary churches have been trying to do for many years. Despite the deaths, despite the calls from some churches, despite some individuals choosing not to go through the ritual, the tradition has been carried from generation to generation, it "is a custom entrenched in the livelihood of the Xhosa people" (Mogotlane et al. 2004). What becomes clear is that one is dealing with a powerful psychic imperative; without the motive power of a collective inborn need this tradition would not be able to remain alive in the way it has. The crucial question thus is: if a tradition remains so steadfast in the face of such public opposition, there has to be a very deep need to continue with it. In the theoretical frame of Analytical Psychology we would ask: what archetype is being constellated through this ritual? Before answering this, a disclaimer as well as a gesture of respect is needed: as a white South African woman I have no business in coming so

close to a very old African tradition, let alone an exclusively old male tradition. I know only the minimum of the details of the ritual; I have even omitted mentioning some aspects, some words that are part of it, as these are usually not spoken about. I have chosen this topic because it is a current major public health concern in our country; I am approaching it as a medical doctor and as an analyst.

The ukoluka ritual

Circumcision may be the oldest surgical procedure known to humankind, having been practiced by the Egyptians even before reference is made to it in the Old Testament. It probably also existed in Africa at that time, though the first written reports on Xhosa circumcision appear in the 1790s when European missionaries and settlers recorded their observations (Ngxamngxa, 1971).

Other than these early European writings, very little has been documented on the subject due to the taboos attached to discussion of this rite with persons outside the tribal groups (Mayatula et al. 1997). Notable exceptions are the work by Graeme Meintjies (1998) from the Eastern Cape, and the essay by an African nurse, Lumka Sheila Funani (1990). Most of the more recent publications focus on medical complications following a circumcision that has gone wrong.

The dearth in the academic literature is however no reflection on what is happening in everyday life for a large number of South Africa's youth. For example, research carried out in 2003 for a multimedia program, *Soul Buddyz*, which addresses contemporary issues for young people, asked boys and girls between the ages of 8–14 questions around gender and masculinity. The question: "What do boys do that makes them boys?" was answered: "It is going to initiation (ukoluka)" (p. 11) and throughout the boys who came from the Eastern Cape regarded becoming a man only after having gone to initiation school.

There are many variations of this rite of passage, depending on the ethnic group, clan and family the boy belongs to. However, in broad outline, the initiation schools follow a similar pattern in different regions, and circumcision is commonly part of the process, though this is not present in all groups. (V.d. Vliet, 1959) I will limit my description to the amaXhosa who are the main black African group living in Cape Town, as my information comes from this area.

The *ukoluka* is carried out when the boy is ready to assume the responsibility of a man; that is, towards the end of adolescence, when he is about to complete his school and enter the adult world of working and looking for a wife. In addition the family has to be able to afford sending their son to this initiation "school", as it involves considerable expense.

There are different phases of the process: the first being the preparation to go into the bush. If the boy has not had his childhood ritual, called the *imbeleko* performed, this will have to be done before he can continue. This ritual is a crucial one for both boys and girls, and introduces the child to the ancestors of the paternal clan. It involves the sacrifice of a goat and is a complex ritual in itself that merits separate description.

While in the "bush" the boys live in round huts (*amaboma*) which have been prepared for them. During holiday periods one can see, even in urban areas near the highways, these make-shift huts with their tied-together plastic sheeting. The initiates (*abakhwetha*) are accompanied by traditional attendants (*amakhankatha*) whose responsibility it is to nurse the wounds and supervise them. The traditional surgeon, called *incibi*, is usually chosen by the boy's father (Meintjies, 1998). This is important as it ensures involvement of the father and his family. In a patrilineal society where the clan and its ancestors are paramount, this connection is vital.

The first week away is the beginning of the seclusion period; there is the settling in and preparation for the circumcision. The *abakhwetha* are not allowed to be in contact with any woman. During this period of seclusion they are given instructions as to how to conduct themselves as men. There are various rituals and rules during this time which both the traditional surgeon and the boys have to adhere to. The culmination of the entire rite is of course the circumcision itself. This was done traditionally with an assegai or a very sharp knife (Ngxamngxa, 1971). Today surgical blades are being used increasingly. On completion of the circumcision the *incibi* calls out "*Yithi uyindoda*"—"You are a man"—to which the boy replies "*Ndiyindoda*"—"I am a man". This is the moment he has been waiting for and marks his change of status from child to adult man. Then follows a phase of intense pain and hardship: the wound is raw and bleeding; traditional medicines are applied to it and it is bandaged in a prescribed manner. No drinking of water or any fluids is

allowed, and no eating of ordinary food—only so-called “hard” food is allowed. This consists of kernels of maize called *inkobe*. This difficult and “hard” period lasts for 8 days, and ends with the *umojiso* ceremony: a goat or sheep is slaughtered in celebration of the healing of the wound; now eating ordinary food is again permitted. The boys remain in the bush for a variable period—from 3 weeks to one month. In previous times this was much longer and could last up to 6 months (*ibid.*); however with modern schooling requirements this is no longer possible. The termination of seclusion is marked by the huts and sometimes the old clothes being burnt. On reaching home there is great jubilation and a great feast. The young men, now known as *amarkhwala*, receive new clothes and a new blanket. Traditionally they are meant to obey certain codes of conduct for a few months. From this time onward everyone in the family, including the mother, treats the son with the respect and distance that a man traditionally receives.

An interesting variation of the above is described by the African writer Camara Laye when he recounts his childhood in Upper Guinea in the book *The African Child*. Before the actual circumcision the boys have to endure a night in the wilderness where they are exposed to the roar of *Konden Diara*—a mythical lion, whom they have been told about since their early childhood. The boys have to manage their fear and thereafter have to endure the physical pain of the circumcision. I was told by an African academic that the point of this is to learn to “sink low” and to endure pain, because this is one of the most important preparations for life. Life is not expected to be free of hardship and thus pain is not avoided, as in Europe, but is faced and endured;² the preparation for this starts early in childhood.

There are several important processes and phases contained within these adolescent rites of passage.

Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, it marks the separation from the mother. This is very concretely enacted in the physical separation, in the fact that no women are allowed to be present during the time in the bush (and in fact women do not know what exactly happens there). It is a time of tremendous anguish for mothers and they enter states of deep anxiety as they do not know whether their son will return undamaged, or return alive.

Secondly the boy has to tolerate pain and fear. He has to be able to do without water and eat only hard food; he has to endure the

physical pain of an un-anaesthetized circumcision and the lack of comfort. In Upper Guinea he also has to overcome his fear of being attacked by a lion. Only after all of this can he say "I am a man".

Thirdly he is in the company of men only. These men provide instructions to the boys on customs and general rules of conduct, particularly as regards sexual practices.

A man who has not been to "the bush" is not regarded as a proper man, and this holds not only true in the rural, more traditional areas, but also in the cities where young men with tertiary education will not see themselves as full men unless they have gone through this process. A field study done in 1998 found that amongst those young men interviewed there was overwhelming support for the ritual. Only 6 out of 76 people asked objected to its practice or had reservations (Meintjies, 1998). This is close to 80%.

The alternative of a hospital circumcision is not an option because it "is a medical procedure [that is] not a culturally significant event in a man's life and it takes away the value of circumcision as indicative of a man's worth in his group. The various physical hardships endured by the initiates strengthen them so as to be able to resist the evil influences in their life ahead." (Funani, 1990, p. 56)

The statistics regarding the morbidity and mortality of the ritual circumcisions shock South Africa every year. The provincial figures on complications from traditional circumcision for the Eastern Cape from October 1994 to February 1995 were 743 hospital admissions, 34 deaths and 36 penile mutilations (Meintjies, 1998). Once a hospital referral has been made, it is impossible to guard the boy from contact with females (Mayatula, et al. 1997), so that one of the basic tenets of this ritual is inevitably violated.

It must be stated that the health authorities in South Africa are grappling with this issue on local and national level; they realize that there would be huge opposition if this custom was declared dangerous and therefore outlawed. Thus traditional surgeons are being trained in current practices of hygiene and wound infection and are also in the process of becoming registered with the Health Professions Council.

However, from a psychological perspective the question of why this custom continues to persist in the face of the bad press it has received, has not been addressed.

Mother and father in traditional African society

Growing up in traditional Africa means growing up close to the mother: The baby is breastfed almost continuously on demand for the first 18 months or so of life; he sleeps with his mother until such time as he is ready, of his own accord, to go to sleep with his siblings; he is carried on his mother's back for as long as he is not able to walk. For the mother this is what parenting is all about and she will not complain about any of these tasks. When asked whether a 2 year old toddler (who was disabled and hence not able to walk) was not too heavy for his mother to carry, the reply very simply was "Does the elephant complain about his trunk?" The infant is a part of her and there is no anxiety, no complaining around this, it is something which she can give herself fully to. The separation occurs gradually and almost imperceptibly. I compare this to the multiple anxieties and doubts that can fill the European mother's mind such as to where her baby should sleep, when she should wean him from the breast and so forth.

The role of the father is far more variable: in most traditional cultures the father is not involved in infant care. In 10 years of community work in the township of Khayelitsha, fathers have only come with their babies to see us on one or two occasions. Men are simply not seen at a well baby clinic. As the boy gets older the father may become more involved, but again this is dependent on whether he is physically present—many fathers work elsewhere; this is one of the many legacies of the Apartheid system which remains with us today. More than 50% of fathers in South Africa do not have daily contact with their children (Richter, 2005). Urban life has also led to the disintegration of family life, leaving aside the tragedy which death through HIV/Aids brings with it. Many men do not acknowledge fatherhood and at best are not supportive or involved in their children's lives and at worst perpetrate acts of violence against them. This sad fact has resulted in the Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa initiating *The Fatherhood Project*³ which aims to recognize, encourage and support men's care and protection of children. The identity of fatherhood is being debated from a social, moral and relational perspective, as well as a cultural one (Mkhize, 2004) It is of interest to note that Mkhize does not mention the adolescent rite of passage as a preparation for fatherhood in traditional society.

In traditional African society mothers and infants form close bodily attachments which are accepted as the norm. As the toddler develops and starts walking independently and interacting with siblings and peers, so separation from the mother's body occurs naturally. However, on a psychological level the son may still be within the ambit of the mother, the world of the mothers and the matriarchate.

The incest taboo

The imperative to move away from the mother is a universal one; otherwise the new offspring would never become an adult. However, we start life being absolutely dependent on the mother. Erich Neumann (1990) writes at length about this early, primal relationship in human beings, stating that the first year of life could be regarded as the extra-uterine phase of the embryo's development, such is the closeness, the psychic and physical integration with the mother's body. It is also because of the complexity of this early interaction that the neuronal growth and wiring is so extensive in the human brain. If we follow the line of Jean Knox's argument regarding archetypes as psychic patterns, and more specifically as image schemata (Knox, 2003), it could be alleged that in traditional African society the child remains in the image schema of the circle, the container for a long time.

In a patriarchal society it is particularly important for the boy not only to move away from the mother, but to move towards and identify with the father. Thus it could be hypothesized that the archetypal image schema has to move from the containing, soft round of the mother, to the more angular, hard one of the father. This move from the matriarchate to the patriarchate is no small task—and is reflected in many writings in analytical psychology. Jung's theorizing on this is contained, amongst others, in his book *Symbols of Transformation*, the work in which he set himself apart from Freud and classical psychoanalysis. Every chapter has to do with different aspects of this enormous task of separating from the mother and staying separate from her. The *Battle of Deliverance from the Mother* is the title of the chapter following those that describe the birth of the hero. It is one thing to become a hero; it is another thing to stay on the heroic journey. To be delivered from the mother, even after separation, is no small feat.

Freud too based a large part of his work on this struggle, the Oedipus myth being at its centre. He writes: "A human being's first choice of an object is regularly an incestuous one ..." (Freud, 1917, p. 378) The incest taboo runs deep in human nature, and only the ancient gods were accorded the right to have relationships within their families. There is of course a very scientific reason as to why this is not possible for humans: if it were not for this taboo the species would ultimately not survive. To retreat back to the mother or sister is the easiest route to take, but biologically it would result in the progressive restriction of the gene pool. It is thus not surprising that castration, the most severe form of punishment, is the result of the enactment of this wish.

Jung posits the notion that the hero myth is born out of the human need to become an individual, separate from the parents, particularly the mother. The hero's task is to resist his infantile impulses and wishes of returning to and uniting with the mother. "Because the incest taboo opposes the libido and blocks the path to regression, it is possible for the libido to be canalized into the mother analogies thrown up the unconscious." (Jung, 1967, p. 313) Analogies, metaphorical equivalents referring to the mother, symbols representing aspects of the mother, thus become possible, and, indeed, become a necessity, otherwise this blocked libido has no where to go. The urge to "return to the mother" is depicted in numerous myths and human activities. One interesting African "mother analogy" originating from Zimbabwe⁴ is the custom of binding the ash of wood coming from the ancestral home-stead tree with egg white and to smear this on the fontanel of the new born baby. This functions as a protection for the child. We can see in this how the use of the tree, well known as a mother symbol (Jung, 1967) takes the place of the maternal womb to shield a vulnerable part of the infant from outside harm.

Besides finding mother analogies and symbols to substitute for the actual mother, the resolution of the oedipal complex is through identification with the father and the world of men. My hypothesis here is that African mothers are able to give themselves over to the primal union with their child without anxiety, as they know, consciously or unconsciously, that when the time is right, their sons will be separated from them and that thereby the incest taboo will be

respected. Even if the biological father is absent, then a male member of the father's clan (or even the mother's clan) will take it upon himself to be involved in the child's *ukoluka* ritual and make sure that it is done in the proper manner.

The battle for deliverance from the mother

Within the broad frame of the hero's journey, there are manifold archetypal themes and images that are constellated through this ritual; I cannot profess to know them all—I can only infer from what I hear and read.

If we start with the image schema of the archetype, the move from the soft, round circle of the mother to the hard, angular "weapon" of the father is embedded in many of the details of this rite. Firstly there is contact only with men—any "soft" option of being mothered or nursed by a female is prohibited, hence the tragedy when it goes wrong and when hospitalization is required. There is the "weapon" of the *ingcibi* with which he does the operation; this is followed by the very difficult stage when only "hard" food is eaten, no fluids imbibed and where severe pain is endured. No soft, round figure comes to the rescue, offering digestible food and milk; the only mother analogy possibly present is the round hut, the *ibhboma*, into which each initiate retreats. This could be seen as a re-entry into the womb in order to be re-born.

If we now extend the image schema to a more complex symbolic level we come to a host of archetypal-based motifs.

There is the notion of sacrifice. Jung writes: "The essence and motive force of the sacrificial drama consists in an unconscious transformation of energy ..." (Jung, 1967, par. 669) This transformation of energy is needed whenever there is a change of status for the individual in his or her society. Going away is bidding farewell to childhood, in particular to the mother and this is the task of the young adult male. During this period the mother suffers greatly—her fear for her son's well-being, indeed for his survival, is very real and can probably be equaled to sending him into the battle field. She has to literally give him up, and he has to literally leave her behind—as the original attachment was experienced so immediately on a bodily level, so this separation is an enactment on a physical level. Tied

into this is the motif of death and rebirth—again, very concretely there is the danger that he will not make it; even if the boy does not really die, he may come home mutilated and this could be worse than death.

As stated before, the myth that is being played out is that of the hero: the boy exposes himself to danger for the purpose of attaining a higher goal. The danger in this case is a sacrifice of a part of the bodily self for the purpose of becoming an adult male. The giving up of the foreskin, thereby, paradoxically endangering the boy's manhood, symbolizes the letting go of childhood, and very specifically the mother. He has to confront that which he fears most and thus he becomes "both the sacrificer and the sacrificed" (Jung, 1967, par. 668). Neumann so richly describes how the hero needs to overcome his fear of castration, which is "man's immemorial fear of woman" (Neumann, 1954, p. 156). Of interest to note is that the eighth-day circumcision in Judaism marks the time when the infant is said to move symbolically from the mother to the father—a sign of a patriarchal culture (Dreifuss, 2003). However, it could be argued that this has little to do with the infant boy's separation from his mother, and more to do with the collective symbol of a people belonging together and sharing a particular Father-God.

The severance from the mother's world, from the childhood home, the living amongst men in the bush and surviving on minimal means with no comforts, marks the entrance into the world of the adult male. This is accompanied, to greater or lesser degree, depending on the group's tradition, with discussions and instructions regarding sexual practices and the expected conduct of a man in his particular clan. Whatever may have been missing regarding fatherly involvement during early childhood is now compensated for in an intense manner. The desired oedipal identification with the father and his world is taking place now; however, it must be remembered that knowledge of this process is present in the cultural unconscious of the boy and his family since his birth, so that what happens in late adolescence is merely an actualization of what was expected all along. It is a cultural complex (Singer et al. 2004) that has had to be enacted.

With the putting on of new clothes and the return to festivities and celebration in the home, we have come full circle. The motif of death and rebirth has been constellated, particularly for the mother.

Her boy has died and a man has returned and in future she treats him with the respect a man deserves. I am not sure that we have anything in western culture that could match the certainty and inciseness of this African tradition.

Let our traditions continue?

Separation and development away from the mother, the primary love object, is a universal human need. This archetypal oedipal situation requires a resolution which cultures have provided for in their different ways. As long as fathers are on the periphery of their infants' care and upbringing, the unconscious will ensure that a rite of passage which literally cuts the tie to the mother will prevail and retain its power. It is not for anyone to condemn an ancient tradition which has a very specific and deep function; rather there needs to be understanding as to why it remains so powerfully present. As all cultures gradually change with time, as the sciences and detailed direct observation open up the importance of the beginning of life, and as fathers become more in touch with their young children's needs, this tradition may not be required and therefore may spontaneously wane. But then it will be on the basis of an archetypal imperative having been heeded, that is, it will come from deep below, from the double bass of the orchestral score which would then influence the manner in which the first violin plays the theme. Trying to force it the other way round, which is what the danger for Africa currently is, could have serious repercussions for the collective psyche of a people. And what could be more devastating than loss of soul? Until the gradual, natural change emanating from deep psychic structures evolves and manifests itself on a collective conscious level, I would agree with the saying *Amasiko Mawaqhubeke*—“Let our traditions continue”.

Conclusion

While change and evolution are inherent to all cultures, the striving towards the western model as a “better one” needs to be questioned, particularly in the African context where colonization of the people and their land has had such devastating consequences. One specific adolescent rite of passage, performed by large groups in

South Africa, is currently under considerable pressure to be done away with. The question arises as to why it continues nonetheless. Through the theoretical lens of Analytical Psychology this ritual can be viewed in its depth and its consequent resistance to being abolished can be more fully appreciated. When an archetypal imperative is being fulfilled such as in this case the separation between mother and son, then surface arguments are not likely to make an impression. Only once the archetypal imperative has been met in a different manner, could a change in the practice be forthcoming. The wisdom from which traditional world views spring, needs to be acknowledged; hopefully then the attitudes coming from a western perspective may become less elevated and more respectful.

Acknowledgement

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NOTES

1. Sun News, February 1, 2004.
2. Nyamende A. (2002). Personal communication.
3. <http://www.hsrc.ac.za/fatherhood/index.html>
4. Tapela, T.J. (2005). Personal communication.

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The new, the now and the nowhere in Kalsched's archetypal self-care system

M.D.A. Sinason and A.M. Cone-Farran

In this chapter the authors explore their experience of reading Donald Kalsched's book *"The Inner World of Trauma: Archetypal Defenses of the Personal Spirit"* (Kalsched, 1996) and also examine one of his subsequent papers *"Archetypal affect, anxiety and defence in patients who have suffered early trauma"* (Kalsched, 1998). In these works he describes an internal autonomous agency that can take over a patient's decision making and actions. This experience can be very disturbing and is often seen by the patient as damaging to self or others. However, Kalsched makes the case for it not being destructive in its aims. He considers its origins to arise from a reaction to severe childhood deprivation or trauma and to be aimed at survival. In the view of the authors, patients in other diagnostic groups can also experience the undermining of their own self agency. A different explanation of the experience will therefore be offered that addresses the much wider ramifications of it across the diagnostic spectrum.

Under the heading *"The New"* the present authors will be highlighting how Kalsched's descriptions of the experience of this mental takeover provide many insights into the agency of selfhood. These particularly address the differences between the self that is

taken over and the autonomous agency that effects the take over. In order to be able to articulate these issues, at the beginning of the section headed "*The New*" the authors will briefly survey the meaning of terms such as: *ego, self, mind, agency* because they are used throughout this essay. What will be immediately evident is that there is a huge variation in the meaning of these words as they are used by analytical psychologists and psychoanalysts.

Kalsched explains the loss of a person's self-agency as a defensive operation in the face of overwhelming affect. He provides a synthesis of Jungian and Object Relations concepts to explain the internal takeover. In this view, a vulnerable psyche experiencing "not good enough" provision for attachment and relatedness in early life uses "mechanisms of defence" to protect itself. Once installed, these "self protective" measures become very difficult to relinquish. From the standpoint of the authors, one of the problems with the familiar concept of "mechanisms of defence" is that it carries connotations of avoidance and evasion that are pejorative—even if the more forgiving "unconscious mechanisms of defence" is used. Of equal concern, is that it does not account for the loss of agency of the self—other than assuming that such a phenomenon must be somehow what is desired or needed by the self. In this chapter, the authors will be exploring this "defence mechanisms" framework under the heading of "*The Now*"—since it has remained common ground between analytical psychologists and psychoanalysts for the last half century—despite other areas of disagreement.

Michael Fordham pioneered the development of Jungian child analysis by building bridges between Jungian and Kleinian psychoanalysis. He was co-founder of the Society of Analytical Psychology in London and his technical innovations to Jungian analysis led to a division between "Developmental Jungians" at the SAP and the Classical or Zurich Jungians. Kalsched's writing supports Fordham's desire to link Jungian and Psychoanalytic organisations. This is particularly appreciated when such organisations are feeling threatened by hostility directed towards the psychoanalytic approach (Casement, 2004). However, Wiener (2004) has described how there are still major differences among Jungians on whether transference and countertransference analysis needs to be at centre stage of the clinical situation. Some Jungians who see themselves as "working in the transference" have started to call themselves

Jungian Psychoanalysts or to drop the Jungian term and simply refer to themselves as psychoanalysts. In what follows, we have decided to use the term analytical psychologist for the broad group of Jungians who are members of the International Association for Analytical Psychology and the term psychoanalyst for members of the International Psychoanalytical Association.

Under the heading of "*The Nowhere*" the authors will draw attention to significant phenomena of self-other differentiation in the inner world that are nowhere to be found in Kalsched's writings. These have appeared in the psychoanalytic literature as papers by well known psychoanalytic authors over the last 40 years, but their significance has not been fully realised in clinical practice. The authors draw these together to offer a different perspective on the internal agency that can take over the patient's mind and life. In our view, explanations for this phenomenon need to be able to account for the ubiquity of these experiences across the diagnostic spectrum.

The new

The *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) defines *self* (Latin: *ipse*) as the primary sense of the notion of identity as implied by: "The very man who" or "the same man who". It indicates emphatically reference to the person or thing mentioned and not, to some other. It can be superseded by the use of the "emphatic pronouns" e.g., himself, herself, itself. The term *ego* is thought by the OED to be derived from the Latin *ego* which means I and hence it is: that which is symbolized by the pronoun I; the conscious thinking subject, as opposed to the non-ego or object. An example is given from the 1829 Edinburgh Review: "In every act of consciousness we distinguish a self or ego". The OED defines *mind* as: the system of cognitive and emotional phenomena and powers that constitutes the subjective being of a person. It quotes from Tennyson 1847: "And still she fear'd that I should lose my mind". The source of the word *agency* is given by the OED as from the Latin *ag-ere*, to do or act, and defines it as: the faculty of acting, active working or operation. Examples are given from Coleridge 1830: "The State shall leave the largest portion of personal free agency to each of its citizens that is compatible with the free agency of all" and from Vathek (1868): "An invisible agency arrested his progress".

James and Alix Strachey, the English translators of Freud's works, desired to create a more "scientific" style in the translation than Freud's humanistic language. They used the Latin term *ego* instead of Freud's *Ich* which is more usually translated as *I*. This gave a more objective-sounding term for part of Freud's structural model of the mind. However, in translating *Ich* as *ego* the English translation loses the much more subjective connotation of Freud's term for the experience of being a conscious subject (Hinshelwood, 1991). In Freud's structural model, the ego, id and superego all have a share in agency so that the ego is *not a free agent* but has to negotiate with the id and the superego for all its activities.

Kalsched explains that experience with his patients taught him what Jung meant about there being a superordinate personality to the ego that Jung calls the Self (with a capital S). He says:

As a larger more encompassing unitary reality deeply in touch with the universe, this Self saw the tortured ego of my patient and how it was rationalising its own extinction, and intervened with a dream that kept her in life. [Kalsched, 1996, p. 44]

The use of the terms *ego* and *Self* to describe different entities each with their own autonomy underlines a difficult division in understanding between analytical psychologists and psychoanalysts—even though he wants to facilitate dialogue between these two groups. Klein tended to use "self", "ego" and "subject" interchangeably and this conflicts with the differentiations Kalsched wants to make. He is using Jung's idea of an ego that is the conscious part of a *primal/archetypal Self* that takes over control of the ego when there is a threat to life. Colman has described how this is: "... not from its customary usage in Western psychology but from the Hindu notion of the Self or "Atman", that aspect of divine power which resides in every individual as the source of being. This usage sets the "Jungian self" apart from almost all other Western conceptions of the self. These tend to equate the self with "the sense of self" or the capacity to possess a sense of self" (Colman, 2000, p. 3). To complicate matters further, Jung's use of the concept of self/Self was inconsistent and contemporary analytical psychology usage is highly idiosyncratic. In what follows we will use the lower case self to refer to the subjective experience of self and Self (with its first letter capitalised) to indicate the Kalsched usage.

In her paper "Relating to the Superego" O'Shaughnessy (1999) discusses how Bion recognised an internal situation in which the superego seems to function as a "superior ego" dominating the ego in a devastating way. Of such a superego Bion writes:

It is a super-ego that has hardly any of the characteristics of the super-ego as understood in psychoanalysis: it is "super" ego. It is an envious assertion of moral superiority without any morals. In short it is the resultant of an envious stripping or denudation of all good and is itself destined to continue the process of stripping ... till [there is] ... hardly more than an empty superiority-inferiority that in turn degenerates to nullity. [Bion, 1962, p. 97]

Such formulations nevertheless view such an internal entity as a *self-construction* and therefore do not confront the possibility of a truly different *other self* entity. In order to discuss the internal takeover of agency that is of interest to Kalsched, we need a way of speaking about how the self that is experiencing a loss of its own agency views the self that takes over as an internal "other"—and vice versa.

A self losing its agency

What is new about Kalsched's writing is that he addresses the subjective experience of a self whose agency, or ability to act, is being taken over by another agency. His argument is that this other agency is the Self i.e., the Jungian concept of a primal/archetypal Self that draws on unconscious timeless archaic sources of power and influence that are transpersonal i.e., not derived from personal experience. The authors will explore the phenomenology of one self taking over from another in the inner world—without agreeing with Kalsched's explanation of the nature of the self that is taking over. To distinguish one self from another is a complicated differentiation to make in writing—but it is a process not sufficiently addressed in clinical work. Common speech gives many examples of a cultural knowledge that "having a mind" or "being a self" is vulnerable to a variety of misfortunes that are described in the following phrases.

He is caught in two minds; he has lost his mind; he is not in his right mind; his mind has changed; he is out of his mind; he does not know his

own mind; he hasn't got a mind of his own; he is out to lunch; the lights are on but there is nobody home; he is self-ish; self-less; self-centred; self-serving; he is self-accusing; self-tormenting; self-adoring; self-aggrandising; self-abhorring; self-approving; self-advancing; he can't stand up for himself etc. etc.,

A self that is losing its agency is vividly encountered with patients who have addictions to food, alcohol, gambling or other compulsive behaviours. In these circumstances there is not enough agency in the self to overcome the compulsion to do things that are experienced as damaging to self and others. What Kalsched addresses is how and why the agency of the self can be sidelined by another self (that he calls the Self) with a different agenda that is effective in being able to execute its own priorities. This results in the self that has become depleted in its agency being sidelined and subservient.

Giving credit where it is due

Kalsched says that the belief among analysts in "destructive primitive defences" being the cause of severe psychopathology, has led to these defences not "getting any credit" for having accomplished anything in the process. He continues: "While everyone agrees how maladaptive these defences are in the later life of the patient, few writers have acknowledged the miraculous nature of these defences—their life saving sophistication or their archetypal nature and meaning" (Kalsched, 1998, p. 85). This is a shift towards having more respect for the survivalist orientation of the agency that takes over decision-making. Kalsched follows this up by the observation that for the traumatised psyche: "Integration is the worst imaginable thing, apparently equivalent in the "mind" of the defending Self to some early horror—never to be repeated" (Kalsched, 1998, p. 88). He is therefore recognising the incomprehension and hatred by the survivalist agency of any notion of integrating its outlook with the relational concerns of ordinary life. With these two observations Kalsched has inaugurated a very different stance that can be taken to the fierce resistance to change in analysis and the power of the repetition compulsion. In the view of the authors this results in a significant shift in the relationship between patient and analyst and the authors will now highlight some features of this change.

The separate authenticity of the ego and the non-ego self?

Kalsched argues that in trauma the archetypal defences of the Self are activated and take over from the ego. He sees this takeover as occurring because the Self is the protector of the "personal spirit" and when the ego is unable to take care of this the Self becomes a daemonic protector/persecutor of the ego. Kalsched's description of the way that ego and Self interact conveys the need for a reconciliation of two different authentic voices that are each prone to difficulties if not restrained by the other. In his book he uses stories from mythology and fables such as Rapunzel to illustrate this relationship:

... wizards and witches in mythology live a disembodied daemonic existence, always isolated from the community, always out of time and space in a magical world, stuck in "enchantment". Consequently they are always trying, so to speak, to capture real-life humans—usually children or beautiful (vulnerable) maidens because it is their very invulnerability that keeps them perpetually disembodied. We might say that they are trying to "embody"—to enter time and space and limitation. [Kalsched, 1996, p. 188]

In making these distinctions between ego and Self, Kalsched is recognising both the existence of two separate agencies, and the need for them to find some accommodation of their different natures, within the confines of the body. Both are indwelling agencies in a shared body but each agency is prone to view the body as its own. These features of internal differentiation between self and an internal other voice have been vividly reported by the mountaineer Joe Simpson in his book "Touching the Void". Simpson had a major fall in his attempt on a summit in the Siula Grande in the Peruvian Andes and had a shattered leg. Having been given up for dead by his climbing partner, he tries to get down the mountain by himself. In a one-footed hopping descent he fell many times and eventually had to crawl and slither across the rocks in extreme pain. He says:

I ate snow mechanically and drifted into daydreams, abdicating from the inevitable decision to move. There were no clouds to

look at, no birds flying by, yet I still lay there, eyes open but unseeing, and thought of anything but where I was. I awoke with a start—*Get moving ... don't lie there ... stop dozing ... move!* The *voice* came through the wandering idle thoughts of pop song lyrics, faces from the past, and fantasies of empty value. [Simpson, 1997, p. 157]

When he finally gets down the mountain under the influence of this inner *voice* he is found by his climbing partner and he says:

In an instant I had changed into an enfeebled, sobbing figure, incapable of moving any part of my body. Something which had held me up, kept a flicker of strength pulsing, had evaporated into the storm. [Simpson, 1997, p. 188]

Although sharing the same body as the *voice*, Joe Simpson's self did not have enough determination to get him down the mountain. However, in this near-death situation he discovered that he was not alone and that there was an internal *voice* that could bully and cajole him into action so that both Joe and this internal *voice* could survive. Once he was found by his climbing friends the internal *voice* disappeared and Joe could see how weak he was without the driving force for survival provided by this autonomous other agency indwelling within the same body.

The authors share with Kalsched a concern to articulate the importance of this internal differentiation and to study the nature of the differences between these two co-existing different selves cohabiting within the same body. However, the authors think that Kalsched's terminology when making the distinction obscures the full extent of the differences. Under the heading of *The Nowhere* the authors will say more about why it is difficult to introduce new terminology that allows for better recognition of the existence of two different selves and the differences between them.

Differentiation of aims, outlooks and consequences

Even though Kalsched makes use of the term "destructive primitive defences" he recognises in his descriptions that within its own frame of reference, what he calls the Self is not being destructive but is instead being constructive from its own different outlook. In clinical work and in everyday life we are prone to underestimate the fact

that acts with destructive consequences need not necessarily have destructive aims. What at first can seem to be horrendously cruel and callous in its effects on the patient and on others can be implemented by an agency that is operating according to a different agenda. Such an agency can be operating outside the usual parameters of social concerns and values and be then more *asocial* than *antisocial* and be acting *amorally* rather than *immorally*. If it is operating from a standpoint that is outside the loop of social relatedness it will have no regard for any other perspective.

The colloquial saying "the road to hell is paved with good intentions" recognises how people are persuaded both internally and externally to go for "quick-fix" solutions to problems without thinking enough about the consequences. This can bring about huge disasters but it is not the intention to bring about a disaster. The scandals in recent times of players in the financial markets such as Nicholas Leeson are good illustrations of how such behaviour is part of our social fabric rather than something that is confined to the mentally ill. Two days before his 28th birthday Nick Leeson went missing from Singapore. On his desk he left a hurriedly scribbled note saying "I'm Sorry". He had wiped out the 233 year-old Baring Investment Bank that proudly counted the Queen as a client. The 1.3 billion dollars of liabilities he had run up was more than the entire capital and reserves of the bank. Investors saw their savings wiped out and some 1,200 of Leeson's fellow employees lost their jobs. Dutch bank ING agreed to assume nearly all of Barings' debt and acquired the bank for the princely sum of £1.

Kalsched's interest and respect for the self-agency that takes over the mind of his patients provides an important counter to the widespread reaction of analysts to processes with destructive consequences which they often assume to be mediated by destructive aims. In our view this may allow more interest to be taken to learn about how differently the world is seen by a unilateral and self-sufficient internal agency. A more open minded enquiry into whether destructive consequences are brought about by destructive aims, or not, is a necessary shift away from a "one size fits all" concept of reality. In the post-modern era we know that what is taken to be "reality" is profoundly affected by the perspective from which phenomena are viewed. This change in stance is also more consistent

with analysis as a means of research into the inner world rather than as a direct means for changing the patient.

Kalsched's clinical experience includes many patients in whom a dictatorial takeover by a persecutor/protector Self occurred when the patient was faced in childhood with unendurable losses or threats. However, similar phenomena can be observed to come into operation with no childhood precursors. On 11th September 2001 on Flight 93 to San Francisco, some of the passengers decided to attack the hijackers to try to regain control of the airplane. Because the hijackers had allowed them to use their cellular phones they had found out what had happened to the other planes when they made contact with family and friends. They decided they would rather die fighting for their lives than be used in that way and seemed to find a level of internal resolve such as the one that helped Joe Simpson down the mountain. They managed to kill one of the hijackers with knives from the kitchen galley and used the drinks trolley as a battering ram to break through into the flight deck. The last sounds from the flight data recorder are of screaming and fighting in the cockpit which stopped when the plane landed upside down in a field at over 500 miles an hour. It was only 15 minutes away from its planned target in Washington.

Constitutional inability to change

Kalsched recognises that a significant feature of the nature of the archetypal Self is an inability to change in response to the demands of the external world. For example he says that the archetypal Self treats all new situations as the same as earlier ones when there was a need for radical unilateralism. He says: "Functioning as archaic defence, the Self ostensibly mistakes each new life opportunity for a dangerous threat (of re-traumatisation) and attacks it" (Kalsched, 1998, p. 91). He also refers to Jung on this matter in the following way:

Once an autonomous complex is formed in the unconscious it does not change in the same way that it does if associated with the conscious ego, i.e., owing to dissociation, the complex is not corrected by reality. Instead, it takes on the uninfluenceable and compulsive character of an automatism, an increasingly uncanny or numinous aspect. [Kalsched, 1996, p. 91]

In the concluding remarks at the end of his book, Kalsched says that the outcome of the struggle between ego and Self depends to a frightening degree upon whether human compassion can mediate the volcanic archetypal energies of the psyche. He says: "The Self 'itself' seems indifferent to this singularly human dilemma, and if constellated negatively as a survival-Self, it will keep on devouring the person's life ... ad nauseum" (Kalsched, 1996, p. 215). He is even more explicit about this in his later paper:

In the preceding remarks we have seen how the self-care-system with its archaic defences of the Self attacks the links between body and mind, affect and image, in an effort to prevent "meaningful experience" from occurring. This amounts to an attack on the symbolic process itself and the resulting devastation results in severe pathology of the symbolic function—something most Jungian psychology has not really considered. [Kalsched, 1998, p. 96]

This articulation of the attacks on linking and thinking, by the agency that takes over, links directly with other ways that the takeover of the ego by a radically unilateralist agency has been addressed by other psychoanalytic authors. For example, Bion (1967) has described the different agenda of the psychotic personality that coexists in the inner world with the non-psychotic personality. Once the psychotic personality has taken over, the way of seeing the world is structured by symbolic equations in which the linking possibilities of words and concepts is replaced by concrete asymbolic thinking (Segal, 1981). These concepts will be returned to in the later section headed "*The Nowhere*".

The now

Kalsched draws on Jung's differentiation of the Collective Unconscious from the Personal Unconscious to explicitly "give more credit" to the adjustment that has been operating internally before the patient seeks any external help. He engages the patient in discovering the "method in the madness" of the internal status quo before addressing the need for change. In his patients who suffered early childhood abuse or deprivation he finds examples of a duplex of protector/persecutor that is either protecting or torturing

a weak and dependent self. Jung's concept of the Collective Unconscious is of a psychoid realm in which the instinctual body side of the unconscious resides. Because this realm is innate and not developed on the basis of personal experience, Kalsched sees this as the reason it can take over when the personal experiences of the patient are traumatising. However, he also wants to make use of the findings from psychoanalytic researches into the impact of the personal history of early childhood. He says: "How do we reconcile Jung's mythopoetic religious fantasy about the "deeper anxiety" in the psyche with the best in contemporary analytic research, which invariably traces such "deeper" anxiety to early trauma and the defence-organization that follows it as severe personality disorder?" (Kalsched, 1998, p. 85).

Kalsched therefore builds his own bridge between Jungian Analytical Psychology and Object Relations theory in his descriptions of how the archetypal self-care system operates in its relation to the personal realm. However, to achieve such a synthesis many major conflicts and contradictions between these different epistemologies and explanatory systems are sidelined e.g., he does not discuss his differences with Williams (1963). The present authors also note that Redfearn (1985) and Zinkin (1987) provide different approaches to thinking about the conceptual and clinical aspects of self experience. In these circumstances it seems that the best way to evaluate Kalsched's account of the phenomena he is describing, is to see how it is translated into descriptions of clinical work and, in particular, to the resulting interpretations that are offered to the patient. Unfortunately there is a difficulty in doing this. Kalsched's way of using clinical material does not provide many examples of how he interprets this material to the patient—in contrast with how extensively he interprets it to the reader of his texts. Astor has said in a recent paper discussing Kalsched's work that: "The question then arises whether the analyst, by interpreting in the language of daimonic possession, is incarnating the spirit world in a way that obscures a more transference based conceptualisation" (Astor, 2003, p. 195).

One example of clinical work that Kalsched gives in his paper: "*Archetypal affect, anxiety and defence in patients who have suffered early trauma*" is of a patient he describes as: "A withdrawn but highly imaginative and likeable young woman" with an early childhood history of separations, serious injury and bereavements. He says

that, in the first few months of her treatment, the patient reported a repetitive nightmare to him. This had begun at age 5 but the patient had recalled the nightmare as she was exploring her early history in the session.

The scene is a kindergarten. A female teacher (not my real teacher) is taking pictures of all my animal friends who are sitting around in a circle talking and playing. It is such a wonderful scene—all mine—like a garden. But suddenly something is wrong. As the teacher takes the pictures, each animal turns into a stuffed replica of its former self. I am horrified. I rush helplessly from one animal to the next—screaming and crying—trying to stop this, but the “teacher” keeps snapping until all the animals are “dead”. [Kalsched 1998, pp. 96–97]

He then says: “What quickly became clear to me and my very astute patient was that in this image of the de-animation of her childhood reality by a “teacher”, we had a dramatic picture of her self-care-system in operation. The diabolical yet caring teacher accomplishes a petrification or freezing of animated transitional reality (self-world relations) and hence, a preservation of childhood animation at a time when the patient’s animate connection to life was simply too painful to continue” (Kalsched, 1998, p. 97).

It seems that Kalsched did not consider that any aspect of what was being transacted between the patient and himself was relevant to the material of her dream. Instead he talked to her of how the childhood dream fitted with his own concept of the self-care-system being in operation at that time in childhood. Perhaps the fact that she was reporting a repetitive dream from the age of 5 years led him to think that it could not be illustrative of how he was being seen. But there is a “here and now” dynamic to its emergence that is not diminished by its recall as a repetitive dream from the past. In our contemplation and discussion of this part of Kalsched’s paper, the present authors noted that this is *not* an example of a missed negative transference that needed interpretation. It is not a distorted view of her analyst that is at issue, but instead, a missed opportunity for him to contemplate how the patient may be “bearing witness” to a problem he is bringing into the sessions. It seems that the patient had found an association with her past that could potentially allow exploration of how she was experiencing her “new teacher” in the here and now.

There is further indication that Kalsched's focus on the primal/archetypal Self as the source of the dream material was stopping him "tuning-in" to the risk of becoming a teacher of his patient. As quoted above, he comments to the reader that it quickly became clear to him that the "diabolical yet caring teacher accomplishes petrification or freezing of animated transitional reality" (ibid.). But this has changed the patient's report of the dream because she said: "As the teacher takes the pictures, each animal turns into a stuffed replica of its former self" (ibid.). Turning her live animal friends into stuffed replicas of their former self is not the same as turning them into a petrified or frozen animal. The analyst has changed the dream and thereby lost the opportunity to reflect more on whether the patient was feeling like a "stuffed replica of her former self" in the "here and now". The patient may be feeling this because of the persuasions of the internal "persecutor/protector" who may see any "helper", other than itself, in this way. Alternatively, it may be because the internal "persecutor/protector" has accurately spotted this tendency in the analyst. However, such matters can only be explored if the words the patient has used in the dream *are not changed* so that the provenance of the term *a stuffed replica* can be explored.

Although Kalsched has found common ground with Object Relations theory in his explorations of the concept of "mechanisms of defence", difficulties seem to arise in the analysis of self/other differentiation in the interactions with the patient. His desire to find confirmation of: "Jung's mythopoetic religious fantasy about the "deeper anxiety" in the psyche" (Kalsched, 1998, p. 85) seems, in this example, to have taken priority over the "here and now" analysis of the interaction of the analytic couple, as noted by Astor (2003, p. 195). If such difficulties can be explored openly with the patient, it can strengthen the therapeutic alliance since it will exemplify how patient and analyst need each other to identify blind spots in their interactions in the analytic work.

The nowhere

Kalsched's descriptions of the operation of the self-care system are valuable but in this section the authors show that his explanations

nowhere address alternative explanations that are available for the powerful internal agency he describes. Dr Allan Schore, a member of the clinical faculty of the UCLA School of Medicine, has written extensively on how research on neurobiology contributes to understanding the development and disorders of the self. In a recent guest editorial in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* Schore says:

... Severe relational trauma, especially neglect and/or abuse, alters the development of specifically the right brain, the biological substrate of the human unconscious. This hemisphere is in a growth spurt in the first two years of life and dominant for the first three (years) ... Indeed, the right hemisphere specializes in the unconscious processing of social and emotional information, the regulation of bodily states, and attachment functions. [Schore, 2003, p. iv]

John Cutting (1997), in his *Principles of Psychopathology: Two Worlds—Two Minds—Two Hemispheres* has come to the same conclusion. He considers that the current state of the literature on hemisphere differences points to the fact that each hemisphere contains sufficient mental functions to allow it to interact independently with the outside world, including with its own body. Neither hemisphere is subordinate to the other with respect to the things that it represents (or constructs) of the world and each has a self-contained domain. He says: "Categorisation based on prototypes is tied to the left hemisphere and a concern with individuals and real-life experiences is tied to the right hemisphere" (Cutting, 1997, p. 449). In the normal subject, the language and conceptual thinking abilities of the left hemisphere seem to be saved from entering the emotionally arid, solipsistic and inert world of the schizophrenic by the functions of the right hemisphere. Similarly, the risk of entering the self-centred, unthinking and emotion-dominated world of the depressive psychotic, is mitigated by the functions of the left hemisphere.

For schizophrenics, any thought can become "thing-like" taking on realistic-like qualities in a process that Sass (1994) has referred to as "phantom concreteness". This characteristic has also been described by Segal (1981) who uses the term "symbolic equation" to describe how symbol and the thing symbolised become indistinguishable. This loss of the capacity for symbolic functioning is not therefore confined to the aftermath of trauma. Bion describes a

psychotic way of seeing the world that is always co-existing in the inner world with the non-psychotic mind that is capable of thinking, symbolising and relating to others. In the conclusion of his paper "Differentiation of the Psychotic from the Non-Psychotic Personalities" Bion states:

I do not think real progress with psychotic patients is likely to take place until due weight is given to the nature of the divergence between the psychotic and non-psychotic personality. ... Further, I consider that this holds true for the severe neurotic, in whom I believe there is a psychotic personality concealed by neurosis, as the neurotic personality is screened by psychosis in the psychotic, that has to be laid bare and dealt with. [Bion, 1967, p. 63]

In a paper entitled "Communicating and not communicating leading to a study of certain opposites" Winnicott makes a similar distinction. He recognises an active non-communicating mode of being in which "the infant relates to a subjective object, or to mere phenomena based on body experiences, these being scarcely influenced by an objectively perceived world" (Winnicott, 1963, p. 183). He goes on to say that although this is most manifest in childhood schizophrenia he thinks it is worth examining whether this other type of *actively non-communicating being* can be found in the more normal individual. He describes how it should be possible to make a positive statement of the healthy use of non-communication in the establishment of the feeling of "real". As an example he says: "In the artist of all kinds I think one can detect an inherent dilemma, which belongs to the co-existence of two trends, the urgent need to communicate and the still more urgent need not to be found" (ibid., p. 185).

Winnicott thinks of this *non-communicating self* as a "secret self" that is an isolate that reacts to the threat of being found or communicated with by a further hiding of itself. He says "rape and being eaten by cannibals are mere bagatelles as compared with the violation of this self that would be experienced by communication" (ibid., p. 187). Grotstein makes reference to Winnicott's 1963 paper, and points out that the secret non-communicating self: "Prefers privacy to the point of never being known, yet it desires not to be forgotten, abandoned or taken for granted. Its desires are paradoxical; it desires privacy *and* attention. "I wish to be left alone and remain

unknown and undiscovered but please always keep searching for me!" " (Grotstein, 1998, p. 51)

Psychoanalytic conceptualisations of a powerful inner agency or "inner voice" have often represented it as a defensive construction designed to avoid anxiety or dispose of hostility. However, in the view of the authors, this does not adequately address its truly autonomous nature, and, by relegating the significance of what such a voice has to say, such an attitude will provoke the hidden self into retaliations. In a paper entitled "Who is the mad voice inside?" one of the authors of this chapter (Sinason) explained his concern about this in the following way:

If an internal "other" mind is seen for example as a narcissistic defensive structure the aim of the analysis will be to subsume these characteristics within "the personality" of the patient. However, if such a mind has a separate sentient existence, then this conceptualisation of him and the aim to subsume him within the personality of the patient becomes one of neglect, denial of significance and abuse. [Sinason, 1993, p. 215]

Sinason therefore introduced a new clinical concept termed "Internal Cohabitation" in which there are two selves that are not assumed to have arisen by defensive splitting of a composite single self. Subsequent work indicates that one self is actively relational and the other is actively unilateral and self-sufficient. The differences between the two arises from two separate modes of relating to the world, operating from birth, which exist in parallel throughout life (see Sinason, 1999 & 2005; Richards, 1999).

Concluding comments

Through his use of mythology and religion, Kalsched describes an agency that has long been known to exist in the inner world although it is dedicated to remaining unknown. It has the ability to command obedience and take over control of a person's life from within. The authors share with Kalsched a desire to understand and address the implications of this in psychoanalytic work with patients. We have given our reasons for thinking that the range of patients who suffer from these difficulties is much wider than has been the focus of Kalsched's clinical illustrations. Our review of the

literature indicates to us that it is an inevitable aspect of existence that is accentuated by adverse experience. We conclude with some observations about how the matter of two co-existing different selves is reacted to by people whose outlook has not previously included such a possibility.

In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung described his own discovery of the other being living in his inner world that he called the No. 2 personality. He says: "Somewhere deep in the background I always knew that I was two persons. One was the son of my parents, who went to school and was less intelligent, attentive, hard working, decent and clean than many other boys. The other was grown up, old in fact, sceptical, mistrustful, remote from the world of men, but close to nature, the earth, the sun, the moon, the weather, all living creatures, and above all close to the night, to dreams ..." (Jung, 1995, p. 61). He later continues: "Although at that time I doubtless saw no difference as yet between personalities No. 1 and No. 2 and still claimed the world of No. 2 as my own personal world, there was always, deep in the background, the feeling that something other than myself was involved" (Jung, 1995, p. 84).

Although the authors acknowledge the claim that *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* was selectively edited by other writers assisting Jung, our understanding is that the early chapters (from which these quotes are taken) were Jung's own account (Shamdasani, 1995). Jung describes how phobic many people were of him speaking to them about his awareness of a No. 2 personality within. He says that he made tentative attempts to talk about this internal other with certain of his school friends and says: "I awakened no response, but on the contrary, stupefaction that warned me off". Jung goes on to say that: "Nietzsche had also discovered his No. 2 but only late in life, when he was already past middle age, whereas I had known mine ever since boyhood. Nietzsche had spoken naïvely and incautiously about this "*thing not to be named*" as though it were quite in order. But I had noticed in time that this only leads to trouble" (Jung, 1995, p. 123).

Although Jung did not discuss the reasons for this trouble in his autobiography, it is to be expected, as Winnicott described, as the reaction of actively non-communicating beings, hidden in the inner

world of the listener, for whom disclosure would be seen as a fate worse than death. If someone is speaking openly about the co-existence of a No. 2 person in their body, any other No. 2 person listening will react strongly to the increased risk of being unconcealed and will make strenuous efforts to interrupt, distract or otherwise terminate the proceedings. To have to take account of the existence of another presence in the body is undoubtedly disturbing. Nevertheless, there is increasing neuropsychological evidence that this "*thing not to be named*" is linked with the differences in function of the left and right cerebral hemispheres and their interaction. We therefore consider that it is necessary for it to be further explored—despite the opposition this inevitably engenders.

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HISTORY

Some memories and reflections
concerning my time at the
C.G. Jung Institute in Zürich
(1956 until 2006)

Mario Jacoby

It is quite a complicated business to write about the Jung-Institute in Zürich. I would not have chosen to undertake such a task myself, yet I was asked to do it by the editor and had first of all to reflect upon my legitimation and my own standpoint. What I especially esteem in Jung's own attitude was his insistence on taking into account the personal equation. From what standpoint can I best approach this task? I am not a historian but what finally made me accept this task is my long experience with and in this place. This dates back to the year 1956 when I entered the Institute for the first time just to hear a lecture given by Jolande Jacobi. The long term result of this first visit was that I applied for a full training to become a Jungian analyst. But as I was at the time a performing violinist, musician and teacher, I had first, or at the same time, to study at the University to get an academic degree. This means that my presence at the Institute as a trainee lasted over nine years until 1965 when I received my diploma. After graduation I soon began lecturing at the Institute and already by 1970 I was advanced by the Curatorium to the status of a training analyst. At about the same time I was elected to be President of the Swiss Society of Analytical Psychology, and this implied also being an ex-officio member of the Patrons of the

Institute. In 1980 I was elected to be a member of the Board of Directors, the Curatorium of the Institute, until I stepped back from this responsibility in 1997. Since then I have worked as senior training and supervisory analyst and was a personally elected Patron of the Institute until March 2006, when I definitely left the Institute and joined fully the newly founded ISAP (International School for Analytical Psychology). Thus I experienced the Institute for 50 years from a variety of functions over the course of time.

For this reason I consider myself to be much less a kind of amateur historian, than a witness of the time (*Ein Zeuge der Zeit*) and shall give mainly a verbal history of some events during my time at the Institute.

The Institute was founded in 1948 and I set foot in its premises for the first time in Spring 1956. Thus for an account of its process of foundation and for the events during the first eight years I have to rely on documents or oral accounts of people who were present at the very beginning and even active in its organisation like, for instance Jolande Jacobi. Of course, what Jung himself has written is of the main importance.

The beginning of the Jung-Institute was informal although the facts about how it became an organized entity are few and unclear. This is the opinion of Deirdre Bair who spent many years interviewing contemporaries who were still involved. (Bair, 2003, p. 529). But the facts seem to be that Jung's health had become more and more problematic, such that among his followers at the Psychological Club (founded by Jung himself in the year 1916 see Sonu Shamdasani, 1998, p. 23) it became an urgent question of how to organize the possibility of teaching Jung's ideas on a wider scale. Jolande Jacobi personally told me that she had collected, even before World War II, much information about other clinics and foundations, about government rules and regulations, and about faculty, curriculum or finances. She showed it to Jung with the idea of eventually founding an institute. But Jung was ambivalent and hesitant. And then the war came in between and the realisation of such an endeavour had to wait. At that time, C.A. Meier was also apparently actively planning for a place where Jung's psychology could be taught. In any case, there was, as far as I remember, a dispute between Jacobi and Meier about who initiated the plans and its detailed organisation for a future Institute.

There has always been a rumour around that Jung did not want to form an organized training center and especially that it should not be run under his name. He would have agreed with Toni Wolff to call it "Institut für komplexe Psychologie" or simply the Institute for Analytical Psychology. But he let it happen when his followers voted to call it the C.G. Jung Institute. On the other hand, it is also said that there was resistance and ambivalence in the Club, as many Club members were quite content to keep the dissemination of Jung's analytical psychology to themselves and for themselves only. This again was criticised by Jung and he attributed their attitude to the extreme introversion of the membership.

Once Jung agreed to found this Institute in order to organise it, he proposed a Curatorium i. e., a governing board, *independent* of the Psychological Club, to be elected for life or at least for as long as members chose to serve. It was originally composed of five persons and later expanded to seven. A design for the organisation and areas of work for an Institute in Analytical Psychology devised by Jolande Jacobi was incorporated into its work. Jung was the first president of the Curatorium, whose other members were C.A. Meier, K. Binswanger, Liliane Frey and Jolande Jacobi. Upon Jung's retirement, his wife Emma Jung served on the Curatorium until her death in 1955. Mrs Aniela Jaffé was the first secretary of the Institute. (Report of C.G. Jung-Institut Zürich, 1948–60, p. 14).

By suggesting the Curatorium as the governing board Jung wanted an organisation based on the so called "Stiftungstatuten". Those statutes are under the supervisory authority of the Board of Education of the Canton of Zürich, to give the founder of an organisation a guarantee that his intentions concerning the purpose of his particular organisation shall continue forever and cannot be changed, unless the aim of the foundation gets distorted or there is financial bankruptcy.

These statutes are fundamentally not democratic at all. Jolande Jacobi (who, paradoxically was born and raised in the Austria-Hungarian Monarchy) criticised this fact and said: "Future dispute is guaranteed". (Oral communication) How right she was showed itself in many subsequent conflicts but especially in our day, more than 50 years later, when the present conflict within the Institute has lead to a most serious split with the result that more than half of the analysts and teachers from the Institute left the place and founded a

new Jungian Training Center, the International School for Analytical Psychology (ISAP). But this will be reported later.

Jacobi was not at all popular amongst the Club members for many reasons but especially so for her outspoken bluntness. However, although she talked against Jung's plan to put the Curatorium, and thus the whole Institute under these authoritarian foundation laws, Jung was far-sighted enough to insist, against heavy resistance from the Club members, to choose her as a member of the Curatorium, saying that the board needed her badly because she was the only person who knew how to function in the world at large. Thus without explanation or elaboration, Jacobi was pronounced a member of the Curatorium (Bair, 2003, p. 531).

On April 24, 1948, there was the official inauguration to celebrate the founding of the Institute. Jung gave an address at this occasion and it is remarkable that he never mentions one of the main purposes of the Institute, namely the training of new Jungian analysts. He seems mainly interested in research and in the manifold possibilities for the further development of complex psychology. "I have had to leave many beginnings unfinished because of more pressing tasks that claimed my time and energies" (Jung, Vol. 8, p. 475). He put together a list to give the reader a rough idea of what had already been achieved in complex psychology, but also announced directions, which future researches conducted by the Institute might be expected to take.

The institute began its activities and was located during the first few years in the premises of the Psychological Club in Zürich at Gemeindestrasse 27.

The organisation of the training

Some more detailed remarks of its first organisation may be in place here. Although Jung, in his inaugural speech, had said hardly anything concerning the training of new analysts, this endeavour became the main activity of the Institute from the beginning. The training apparently followed very much the original design devised by Jolande Jacobi (C.G. Jung Institute Report, 1948–60).

The requirement for students to be accepted for training was already at that time a medical licensing exam or medical degree, or an academic degree (at least a master's degree) in other academic

departments. During my time of training and for a long time after, students may have been accepted for training, providing they were going to achieve their academic degree *before* they were entitled to receive the Diploma at the end of their training.

Twenty-eight was the minimum age for applicants to get accepted and the most important condition was that the entire training had (and still has) to be accompanied by a personal Jungian analysis of at least 300 hours minimum. The candidate may choose freely his or her analyst among the "Training-Analysts" designated by the Curatorium. During their training, the candidates had to pass two exams in the following subjects: basic Principles of Analytical Psychology, Theory and Technique of the Association Experiment, Psychology of dreams, Theories of Neuroses, Psychopathology, Psychology of "Primitives" (as native people were called at that time), Psychology of Fairy Tales and Myths, general History of Religions. These were, and partly still are, the subjects of the theoretical exam, the so called Propaedeuticum. The Final Exams before the Diploma can be obtained have more to do with the practical ability to handle cases and interpret their unconscious material. Still, psychiatry and Jungian ideas of the individuation process are until today also subjects of the Diploma-Exam.

Candidates had and still have to deliver a "scientific" work on a chosen topic related to analytical psychology, the so-called Diploma-Thesis. They also have to write reports on their "control-cases", after having done at least 250 hours of case-work under supervision. In the first few years up to the sixties, the number of hours a candidate had to work with the "Control-analyst" to supervise his cases was not fixed at all, only more or less recommended. I remember Dr Riklin, the President at the time, suggesting that candidates had only to come to him for supervision if they themselves felt the need to do so, for example, if they ran into difficulties and did not know how to proceed. Jolande Jacobi, in contrast, insisted that a candidate had to come to see her regularly, the minimum being every fortnight. She also wanted to see personally the candidate's analysis and—quite unaware of what such a contact may do to the transference situation between the "control-case" and his or her analyst in training. I personally went regularly every fortnight to Kurt Binswanger, M.L. v. Franz, Liliane Frey and J. Jacobi, to discuss my control-cases. By that time, in the late sixties, the number of

supervision-settings began also to be regulated and fixed by the Curatorium.

Before a candidate could be accepted for Diploma candidacy (after the Propedeuticum) or for the Diploma-Exam at the end, he or she had to present a written recommendation by the personal analyst, "concerning psychological maturity, character and professional proficiency" (Jung-Institute Report, 1948–60, p. 23).

Some personal subjective observations on the general atmosphere of the early days

I want to begin this part of oral history with a quote from Jung's "Memories, Dreams, Reflections" He wrote: "As a child I felt myself to be alone and I am still. I know things and must hint at things which others apparently know nothing of, and for the most part do not want to know" (MDR, p. 389). Although MDR was published only after Jung's death in 1961, this quote throws a characteristic light on an inner psychological state which was, to my mind quite striking amongst us students at the time I had come to the Institute in early 1956. But it was perhaps even more so for that generation of analysts which were our teachers—of course not for all. Many of us had come from a certain loneliness, as we had been in our neurosis or life-crisis on the search for something, we did not know quite what. But now, thanks to Jung, we belonged to the few-ones who wanted to know and felt that they did know more things between heaven and earth than the rest of the world would dream of—especially those rationally minded professors at University, not to speak of the "reductive Freudians". There was definitely an elitist spirit among us, especially in the early days. One knew that Jung had written about the dangers of inflation, but there was much good reason to be fascinated by the rich, new soul-world to which Jung had found the key. Such was the overall atmosphere at that time—at least how I remember it. Maybe there is also a good deal of projection in it of the effect that the encounter with Jung's psychology had on me personally.

But at the same time the critical side in me was never completely silenced. Thus I want to contribute some subjective impressions about trends and incidents which I have been part of or witnessed in the early days and also in the course of history of being a Jungian at the Jung-Institute in Zürich.

When I first started, the Institute, as mentioned before, was still located in the premises of the Analytical Psychology Club and we listeners were seated in comfortable, slightly worn out old fashioned armchairs. What I remember specially are the many enormous mandala-pictures on the wall and a statue of Jung's head—and for an uninitiated greenhorn like myself this whole atmosphere reminded me slightly of an anthroposophic assembly room. But then Jolande Jacobi started to lecture. She was an elegantly dressed, very lively woman with a loud and sharp voice, an impressive Jewish face and a strong Hungarian accent and her lecturing was very down to earth, witty and communicative—but some tendency to be an exacting schoolmaster was also not to be denied. I soon learned that this tendency was called in proper Jungian language an “Animus”. Anyhow, her presentation was very much in contrast to that surrounding club-atmosphere. Soon the Institute moved to its own premises in the first floor at Gemeindestrasse and the lecture hall had become much more sober and the chairs much less comfortable.

The years from 56 to 61 were special in so far as Jung was still alive. For the first years he never appeared for reasons of ill health, yet as a presence he was all around. He consistently was quoted by most lecturers usually as: Dr or Prof Jung has written or has said. It happened that when there were discussions or arguments between lecturer and students and one could not reach an agreement with the lecturer's point of view, the lecturer would telephone Jung and then bring back Jung's commentary. Of course, then the master had spoken and further discussions came to an end.

Yet there came the day when Jung himself in flesh and blood appeared at the Institute because he wanted to be in discussion with candidates. Beforehand candidates had to send in a written question and Jung would give his comments. I was present at two of those discussion-afternoons. But I also saw Jung at different social occasions, like the celebration of his 85th birthday. At one occasion, together with Dora Kalff accompanying at the piano, I was asked to give a little violin-concert at the Club in honour of Jung—as I was still a performing musician. But to get back to the discussion-afternoons—they were tremendously impressive. The man was well over eighty and his voice had become very weak. Still he had an incredibly charismatic presence, and the candidates and even more so the assembly of our analysts and teachers were greatly in awe of

him and quite afraid to a certain extent. Jung seemed to dislike all the adoration going on around him, but I felt that in some corner of his soul he also needed and enjoyed it. Still, he was enormously natural and spontaneous, and many of the already rigid concepts of the Institute's teaching suddenly came into a lively flux again. I also felt that his charismatic radiance was such that there was not much space left near his personality and wondered what effect that would have on being in analysis with him. It surely could be an enormous inspiration, yet at the same time a hindrance for his analysands to find their own inner space. I felt that this overweight of his personality may account very much for the kind of "missionary zeal" often to be found among the first generation of Jungians together with their enormous idealization. But one probably could say this also about many of Freud's direct disciples.

The first years after Jung's death

Jung's death on June 6, 1961, was much less a blow for the future of the Institute than many of us had feared. The Institute continued to flourish and to grow as it had during his lifetime. I have the impression—but I may be wrong—that a great number of students from all over the world came for the next decades more from motives of enthusiasm and fascination for the depth and richness of Jung's psychology than in order to learn some professional skill for their future career. The place was still considered as the center of the Jungian spirit. Marie Louise v. Franz was very active at that time and she gave all those lectures on fairy-tales, alchemy, creation myths, the Puer Aeternus, the Golden Ass, etc, which have since been published. The written version, as interesting it may be, does not give a real impression of the vitality and gripping brilliance by which these lectures were delivered, making an enormous impact on listeners. Barbara Hannah had her admiring crowd of elderly ladies. Jolande Jacobi attracted more the young artistic men and so called "pueri aeterni". C.A. Meier had already withdrawn from the Institute and made himself scarce. Franz Riklin, President during my student days and up to his untimely death in 1969, was a real intuitive personality. As the student body grew more and more, the Curatorium had to strengthen its organisation and issue more and more rules and regulations. If some of the regulations were not really observed

enough, Riklin did not blame the students but said that the respective regulation was wrong and had to be altered. I liked him for that. I remember very well Erich Neumann, author of "Origins and History of Consciousness" (New York, 1962) who came nearly every year from Israel and gave the most brilliant lectures talking without manuscript in a perfect ready for-print German. He had a way of putting his thoughts out with such apodictic certainty that any shadow of a doubt was eliminated from the beginning. Karl Kérényi lectured regularly on a mythological theme. He could at times be very dull and chaotic. But when he had a good day, it was as if a Greek god in person would give him his "enthusiasmos" (meaning "God within") and would directly speak through him, though with his Hungarian accent. I also remember the extremely knowledgeable Mircea Eliade and the impressive Gershom Sholem on Jewish mysticism. Also Paul Tillich, the famous theologian spoke at the Institute.

In 1959 James Hillman was appointed as the first "director of studies" who was also responsible for the program of lectures and seminars. Up to that time from the beginnings of the Institute, it had been Jolande Jacobi as a Curatorium-member who was in charge of organizing the lectures and seminars. She, as an extravert of the first generation in Zürich, had world-wide connections and had, for instance also invited well-known Freudians from Germany. I remember especially a week-end with two Freudian psychiatrists and analysts from a famous clinic in Göttingen, Germany. They had brought tapes of analytic sessions which contained in part the detailed word by word procedures between patient and analyst. The reaction of our Jungian teachers to their presentation was an incredibly aggressive put down, saying that all this was just superficial crap and senseless as long they did not bring dreams, which are the only real expression from the unconscious. Whether they were right or not is not the question, but it showed the righteousness and intolerance of our teachers vis-à-vis these very competent Freudians who had been invited to present their work. For some students it was very embarrassing and I remember the courage of Francesco Caracciolo, then a trainee, who got up and excused himself to the guests—in front of von Franz and Riklin—for the intolerance and lack of openness of the audience. I just wanted to mention this incident as an example of the hostile attitude which Jungian analysts harboured against the Freudians. It was of course vice versa at that

time, but the hostility from the side of the Freudians showed itself more by just ignoring and not taking seriously the Jungian views.

On the whole, the decade of the sixties was a time of deep commitment to the richness of soul. Everybody excelled in writing down his or her dreams, doing active imagination, painting one's pictures from the unconscious and so on. Many students like myself lived through a complete fusion with Jung's miraculous world of Gnosticism, Alchemy, Myths and Mysticism. There was much kinship among the small but growing number of adepts—of course mixed with rivalries and tension. There was, for instance, a case of ethical digression which caused quite an upheaval among the Jungian community, including the Curatorium.

Seen from today, much of this was very unprofessional but rich in inner experience, and I am very glad that I had the chance to be part of these early days at the Institute.

Of course, it could not remain like that.

The developments from the 1970s onwards

After the sudden death of Dr Riklin (1969), Adolf Guggenbühl became the new President of the Curatorium. We have to consider that the Zürich-Institute was in a special situation in so far as its whole structure, organisation and training regulations—although drawn up mainly by Jacobi and perhaps Meier—had been approved by Jung himself. Thus, any minor, not to talk of major revision of the original set-up proved to be enormously difficult and encountered great resistance. It was as if one would break a taboo and digress from the true Jungian spirit. Changes which seemed very necessary in the eye of many analysts were anathema for others.

Dr Riklin had been very close to M.L. v. Franz and B. Hannah, who were considered (probably also considered themselves as such) to be in many ways the guardians of the “authentic Jungian Spirit”. With Guggenbühl becoming President, it seemed very much the beginning of a new Era. He had just come back from working in the United States and was trained among other things in group dynamics. At that time, many people also wanted to introduce sessions in some sort of group dynamics at the Institute, and body work was announced on the Program, obviously with the consent of Guggenbühl

and the majority of the Curatorium of that time. V. Franz apparently had a dream protesting about such a sacrilege against Jungian individuation ideals and many people of her circle said to have dreamed of similar contents. Thus they decided to form a “pressure group” (but it was of course not named by them as such). They went on strike saying that nobody of their circle would give a lecture or seminar at the Institute as long as such group events were announced officially.

This was the beginning of a quite heated conflict between two major attitudes concerning Jung’s heritage and the question: what does it mean to be true to the authentic Jungian Spirit?

*The introduction of special committees
for the selection of trainees*

Another important issue of dissent was the problem of selecting new candidates and their progression to graduation. Up to about 1975 the candidates were mainly recommended by their own analysts. On this recommendation they had to be accepted without anyone else having anything to say, unless they failed their exams. Analysts belonging to the “Küsnacht group”—as the V. Franz circle was called—wanted to stick to this regulation, because the analyst knew the candidate best and, what was essential for Jungians, he or she knew the dreams of the candidate and thus was supposed to know about the candidate’s deepest unconscious motivations. But the majority of analysts felt the need to liberate the analysis from such power-issues like acceptance or non-acceptance of candidates into the program. As a result of those discussions, the Curatorium decided to reorganize the whole selection procedure and to form a special selection committee. The personal analyst had to get in contact with this committee in case he/she harboured severe doubts about the suitability of his or her candidate. But the analyst had no power any more to push their analysis through or to prevent the latter’s promotion. That meant for analysts from the so called “Küsnacht Group” that the Institute was now devaluing the significance of the unconscious and thus was digressing from a central point of Jung’s teaching.

This was a split which created conflicts for many years and led finally, some years ago in the late eighties, to the foundation of the

"Research and Training Center in Depth Psychology, according to C.G. Jung and M.L. v. Franz". At this Centre, it is the analyst again who recommends (or, seldom, rejects) the candidate.

To my mind the introduction of selection committees was a decisive step towards more professional efficiency and responsibility of our training. The selection of trainees is very crucial. Even in the light of contemporary psychotherapy-research the old Chinese saying remains valid: "If the *wrong* man uses the right means, then the *right* means have the wrong effect". This is specially true for Jungian analysis where the personality of the analyst counts for more than his or her method. But how do the right applicants reveal themselves and how are we to recognize them in advance? For a number of years the members of the selection committees have felt a certain reluctance to pronounce final judgment. In true Jungian spirit one wanted to "give a chance" whenever possible, and, when in doubt, just to recommend further analysis, because one never knows what the Self has in store for the future of a person. But with time and more experience it became evident that there was a general overestimation of what an analysis can do to overcome decisive shortcomings. It became evident that most candidates whose suitability had been doubted greatly at the beginning were never able to dispel these doubts up to the end of their training. Once they were graduate analysts the doubts remained still justified and we regretted ever having accepted them into the training program. However, there were some exceptions to this pattern.

But who are we to say who would be a good-enough and trustworthy Jungian analyst in the future and who not? How can we deal with our own power issues and its various subtle and often quite unconscious ramifications? How do we come to terms with our ambivalence and guilt feelings if we have to reject candidates? What about our own countertransference towards the different applicants? In what way can we use it "syntonically"—as Fordham described it—and where does it falsify our views due to our own complexes? Yet we cannot avoid the issue of selection and leave the choice open to anyone who fulfils the formal academic criteria. Our training institutes carry a responsibility toward future analysts who may trustingly choose an analyst because he or she has been trained at a Jungian Institute and is a member of IAAP.

I was myself for a long time on the selection committee and think that the selection was done as consciously and conscientiously as possible. It has its potentially productive side-effect of stirring up in its members many basic questions about our profession and the images we carry in ourselves of the ideal and less ideal analyst.

*The program to train therapists and analysts
for children and adolescents*

Another important event was the introduction of a program to train Jungian therapists specializing in the therapy of children and adolescents. That was in 1980. Against a good deal of resistance against getting into new territory which had not been of a direct concern for Jung, we felt that the world of archetypal fantasy was also the child's world and could be beautifully adapted to the needs of child therapy. In the meantime, around 1980, Helmut Barz had become the Curatorium's President. The Institute had just moved from the premises at the Gemeindestrasse in Zürich which had become too small to contain all the necessary activities of a constantly growing number of candidates, to the present beautiful quarters at the lake in Küsnacht near Zürich. Jung had been an honorary citizen of the municipality of Küsnacht where he had built his house and where he lived and lead his private practice from the year 1909 onwards (G. Wehr, 1985, p. 469). Thus, probably thanks to Jung's fame, the Institute had the chance to rent at an affordable price this wonderful big house which is owned by the municipality of Küsnacht.

Helmut Barz knew a remarkable Jungian child therapist, Gisela Broche, who was very knowledgeable and was quite enthusiastic to move from Germany to Zürich in order to organize a program for training child therapists. I myself had in the meantime become a member of the Curatorium and, as the latter's representative I was to sit in the concept group together with Broche and the too early deceased Jungian Child Psychiatrist Kaspar Kiepenheuer. I think we succeeded in organize a worthwhile program.

This new program also a welcome gain for the general training, namely the furthering of the study of developmental psychology. It had until then been very much neglected. As is known, Jung had not shown much interest in this issue and thus it was also badly neglected in our training. With the new "child-program" it became necessary

to teach, study and examine some works of Fordham, Spitz, Winnicott, Neumann, etc., and lately also of Daniel Stern. I am convinced that this broadens the spectrum of applicable models in our practice.

The political situation since the nineties

In recent times it seems that more and more professional political issues have come into the foreground. There were the disputes around licensing questions by the state, and also the question of third party payment (if, what and under what conditions will insurance companies pay psychotherapeutic treatment?) Within the Institute, after Helmut Barz resigned (he had served in the Curatorium for about 20 years after having been for more than 10 years an ordinary member), Paul Brutsche was elected by the Curatorium as the next President. As M.L. v. Franz's health progressively declined, the Küsnacht Group wanted, as fast as possible, to split off from the Institute and organize their own training centre in accordance with what they considered to be essential for a Jungian training. Paul Brutsche, with the support of the Curatorium, tried his best to find an agreement, to accept diversity and to offer the group their autonomous way of training *within* the frame of the Institute. But of course there always had been frictions and understandably they felt that all these political issues the Institute had to deal with were leading to extraverted superficiality and loss of the essence of soul. Thus they decided to act in accordance with their values and their understanding of Jungian Psychology and to found "The centre for research and training in depth psychology in accordance to C.G. Jung and M.L. v. Franz".

In the meantime, the majority of the Curatorium members felt increasingly uneasy about the lack of democratisation within the Institute due to the Foundation Statutes which could not be changed. They tried to find a way to include colleagues by forming democratically chosen sub-groups to be responsible for issues like public relations, questions to do with the Institute or training, etc., The sub-groups consisted of volunteer analyst-colleagues and one or two members of the Curatorium. All the sub-groups together formed the advisory committee building a bridge to the Curatorium, thus

involving more colleagues of the Jungian community in participating and having a say.

In April 1997 Paul Brutsche—as he had planned—retired from being President of the Curatorium and the choice fell on Brigitte Spillmann. She was a relatively new Graduate, had written a very interesting thesis and apparently had experience in communal politics. It was at a time where a sense for political experience and awareness was much needed in order to defend Jungian viewpoints—for instance the acceptance of gifted candidates with academic degrees from many different faculties—against a limitation to only medical and psychological academic backgrounds. In any case, the new President was first acclaimed by the majority of the community with the promise of more democratisation and increased efficiency and apparently had many ideas for reorganizing the structure of the Institute.

But it soon became apparent that this reorganisation was accompanied by a big shadow. Efficiency stood against collegiality. The Administrative Director of the Institute could not stand the new authoritarian atmosphere, felt too humiliated and left. Two of the long standing secretaries who had been most popular amongst the foreign students were abruptly dismissed. In reaction the students became furious and upset and wanted to go on strike. Also, analysts began to question whether this authoritarian style was really necessary to increase efficiency or stemmed rather from a pure power-complex. All the sub-groups were cancelled. The most difficult and saddening part was that there was no openness any more to really talk with the President or Curatorium members about this unbearable climate because they felt immediately attacked and responded with aggressive counterattacks. There were attempts by the committee of the Swiss Society for Analytical Psychology to search for solutions and to help finding, within the limitations of these Statutes, more democratic structures, but that all was unfortunately in vain. Lecturers who visited from other countries wondered about this atmosphere of tension, feeling somehow alienated.

Of course I cannot get in too many details about this but I want also to say that as far as the teaching, contents and psychological direction were concerned, there was still a liberal and pluralistic spirit. The lecturers were free to talk about what they felt to be necessary.

There was a growing interest and refinement in clinical issues so from that point of view one did not encounter any censorship.

But there was this fear among the staff and students, and, finally, on the part of most people who depended on the good will of the Curatorium. After the turn of the century there were less students turning up as depth psychology and long term analysis were not as popular any more. And, of course, this tight reorganisation and modernisation with new electronic equipment etc., had devoured a great amount of money. Altogether, this led to a financial crisis and the idea arose in the Curatorium to ask for financial contributions from the analysts and teachers. The analysts would have been willing to contribute in order to save the Institute, but under the condition that they had the right to be consulted if not actually have a greater say in matters. But this was completely denied by the Curatorium, who always emphasised their responsibility and their duty concerning the Statutes, adding that Jung had approved of them. The conflict escalated, the Curatorium in the end wanted to impose on analysts a specified financial contribution and threatened to exclude from the Institute's teaching everybody who was not willing to contribute. About two thirds of the analysts refused to comply. Twice it came to lawsuits initiated by members of or those intimately connected to the Curatorium. Once it was against the Swiss Society of Analytical Psychology and once against the Association of Graduate Analytical Psychologists (AGAP), who have in the meantime succeeded in founding the International School of Analytical Psychology, Zürich ("ISAP ZÜRICH").

Writing this, I still feel angry about the fact that analysts who have been analysed and know about the Shadow are unable to communicate with each other but have to recourse to costly and damaging lawsuits. Perhaps I have to be more tolerant as we are all human beings, analysts or not.

The result is that we now have three places in Zürich which offer training in analytical psychology. The question is: will they be able to coexist and/or will there come a time to unite again or at least work together?

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The legacy of C.G. Jung

Thomas B. Kirsch

Who owns Jung is a question that can be answered in two words. No one. One may rightfully ask how someone can own another person's name. I could end my article right now. However, since I was asked to consider this question I have been mulling over the notion of ownership of Jung as a symbol. Having been in and around Jung's psychology since my childhood, which is coming upon 60 years, I thought this might be a time to write about the issue. The present impetus for discussing this topic came up when psychoanalysts of different persuasions in the UK hotly debated who owns the title "psychoanalyst" and, therefore, who is entitled to be registered as a psychoanalyst. At that time, it was concluded that only members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society could be registered as psychoanalysts, and everyone else had to use some other title such as psychoanalytically-oriented psychotherapist for their identity. Ann Casement, at the time the head of the licensing body for psychotherapists in the UK was then asked to edit a book entitled *Who Owns Psychoanalysis?* to discuss this topic generally. This book was a success, and the editor thought that a companion book on who owns Jung also would prove to be of interest.

I do not believe that a book on who owns Jung has the same meaning as who owns psychoanalysis. Jung was the person who founded a movement which he called analytical psychology, so to own Jung feels different than to own psychoanalysis, which is a generic term for all those who practice that specialty. Granted that Freud stated that he “owned” psychoanalysis (Freud, 1914) but psychoanalysis today has developed in many different directions, some of which would not be recognizable to Freud. The only way that one can make the two books comparable is if you use the word Jung symbolically to stand for something which in its own way is equivalent to psychoanalysis. As the personage of Jung has become more distant, it is easier to make “Jung” a symbol for an attitude towards the unconscious and separate it from Jung the person. Perhaps as more time elapses, we will distance ourselves even further from Jung the man and find another name which seems suitable for our field. Even now many analytical psychologists, which is our official title from Jung, call themselves Jungian Analysts, or Jungian Psychoanalysts, as well as analytical psychologists ... Our identity as “Jungian Analysts” is evolving, and we are developing different personas depending upon which part of Jung we wish to be identified with.

Since my experience with Jungian psychology dates back to a time when Jung was still alive, I remember a favorite past time among those who knew him was to quote him on various topics. Whether these quotes were actually what Jung said to these particular people or not always left me with some doubt. Now I look back at some of these statements and realize that these quotes from Jung arose out of their respective strong transferences. Because Jung was charismatic, his words took on an authority which was nearly impossible to refute. Each of these people who knew Jung and had been in analysis with him thought that they had the real Jung, unknown to the rest of us. These people were part of the first generation of analysts, scattered around the globe, who had analyzed with Jung from the early 1920s until 1939 and then came back to see him after World War II for an occasional session. This was my first memory in response to the question asked to me by the editor of this book. Every one of these people had a different experience of Jung, and each felt that his or her own experience was the real Jung. The fact that Jung was severely criticized for his activities during the

1930s and during World War II only intensified these disciples of Jung and their sense of loyalty and ownership. Jung was being badly misunderstood, and ill-regarded by the dominant psychoanalytic culture.

Jung's influence has reached across the globe through his writings and those of his students, lectures given about his work, filmed interviews with him, etc. His books have been translated into many languages, and many of his theories have become part of our everyday language such as complex, archetype, introvert, extravert, synchronicity, and individuation. Jung has been a leading figure in demonstrating the value and importance of paying attention and deepening our inner experience through dreams, active imagination, expressive arts and the like. In our increasingly technological world, he has showed us a way to rekindle our deepest spiritual yearnings.

Jung's work touches people in different fields. On the one hand, Jung started out as a psychiatrist and moved from studying psychosis, namely schizophrenia, to studying neuroses and then to normal people. His study of psychological types was a study of normal differences in psychological attitudes and functions in the so called normal person. His seminal work, *Psychological Types*, influenced Myers and Briggs who developed a test to show how these different attitudes and functions: introversion, extraversion, thinking, feeling, intuition, sensation, function in the normal population, and which ones were dominant and which ones were less well developed. This test has become widely used both in academia and business to assess potential strengths and weaknesses of the individual. I mention this part of Jung's work in particular because although Jung's influence is acknowledged, it is largely practiced by people who have no other connection to Jung's psychology. Here is a part of Jung's psychology which is no longer really "owned" by Jungians, but which has become a separate discipline of its own. One remarkable exception is John Beebe who has made an extensive study of Jung's psychological types and who has bridged his work with that of the psychological type discipline.

During most of Jung's professional life he practiced and wrote about his way of doing analysis. He never wrote detailed case histories as he did not want to give the impression that analysis could be done one way only, and secondly, for reasons of confidentiality.

However, he gave numerous examples of working with dreams and active imagination among his writings. This meant that the first generation of Jungian analysts used their own personal analytic experience with Jung as their model for both doing analysis and for training others. Given that this first generation of analysts was comprised of people from many different cultures, the practice of Jungian analysis has evolved differently depending upon the founder/ founders and their cultural milieu.

In the second half of his life he discovered medieval alchemy, and his interests turned to the study of this discipline in terms of what it could reveal about the nature of the collective unconscious. He also became the dominant figure of a yearly conference entitled Eranos where leading philosophers, theologians, mythologists, and scientists would speak about the nature of the psyche from their respective view points. This chapter will not attempt to discuss what part of Jung they own, as that would take us into a study of cultural ideas and history of consciousness, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, the focus will be on the development of the Jungian professional analytic community from the time of the Freud/Jung split in 1913 until the present. Also, some discussion of where the state of Jung scholarship is today will be part of this chapter.

Jung's own family descendents comprise another group of people with a claim on Jung to which I will return later in the chapter. This is a complex story. Also, there are archives and libraries with documents from Jung, and accessibility to these institutions influences what we know about Jung. Later in this chapter I will return to a description of them.

Analytical psychology as a term for Jung's psychology begins after the break with Freud. Jung was the leader of the psychoanalytic group in Zürich at the time of the split in 1913. Zürich was the second leading psychoanalytic center at the time of the split. Most of the people in Zürich followed Jung when the split occurred. Jung underwent a period of disorientation which he described in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, as "Confrontation with the Unconscious". He was flooded by images from his unconscious which became the *prima material* for all his future scientific writings. These images and writings are contained in a book entitled *The Red Book*, which heretofore has never been published. Planned

publication of this important volume edited by Sonu Shamdasani is in process.

As an integral part of the analytic process as expressed by Jung, analysands were expected to do a comparative study of the images which appeared in their dreams. This required the reading of books which were often difficult to obtain. In order to facilitate making this material available to analysands, an Analytical Psychology Club was formed in Zürich and had its first meeting on February 26, 1916. The "Club" was to be a meeting place for analysands so that (1) social interaction could take place among the members, (2) reading material could be made available to analysands, (3) lectures by authorities on symbolism and related topics could be given. These meetings took place on a monthly basis, and a library of relevant books was accumulated. Analysts and analysands mixed freely, and membership in the Club required hours of personal analysis as well as written approval from the personal analyst. Prior to World War II Analytical Psychology Clubs were formed in London, New York, and San Francisco, and the model was always the same. The Analytical Psychology Club in Los Angeles formed in 1944. Other Analytical Psychology Clubs formed in Europe but did not survive World War II. These Analytical Psychology Clubs were the main structures which existed in the Jungian world until the formation of the Society of Analytical Psychology in London in 1946, and the CG Jung Institute in Zürich in 1948. Rudimentary professional organizations were formed in New York and San Francisco, but their influence only grew after World War II. Jung himself was extremely ambivalent about organizations, as his only two ventures into organizations, the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA), and the International General Medical Society for Psychotherapy, both had ended disastrously for him. Jung had at times an ambivalent relationship to the Analytical Psychology Club in Zürich. For instance, he withdrew from the Club in the early 1920s when Hans Trüb became the leading figure. Trüb later withdrew to follow Martin Buber and Jung returned and attended meetings. His colleague, Toni Wolff, was the president of the club in Zürich for more than 20 years.

The importance of the Analytical Psychology Clubs cannot be underestimated. To become a member was not easy, and especially in Zürich one needed to have the approval of some of the influential women members (Reid, 2001). Thus, to be a Jungian meant that one

was a member of one of these Analytical Psychology Clubs. They did not lose their influence until the formation of the IAAP in 1955 when the IAAP became the accrediting body of Jungian analysts in the world. This coincided with Jungian Analysts beginning to form their own professional organizations and separating from their Analytical Psychology Clubs. They still exist in those original cities, but their importance as forming a part of the Jungian identity has markedly decreased. They still have their monthly lectures, and their libraries contain a large number of volumes on symbolism.

How did one become a Jungian analyst before the formation of the IAAP in 1955? Jung's period of deep introversion ended at approximately the same time that World War I ended. Jung's book *Psychology of the Unconscious* had been well received in the English-speaking world, and his book *Psychological Types* was to be published in 1921. His fame spread and people from all over the world, but especially from the United States and England, clamored to see him for analysis. Analyses in those days were extremely short by present-day standards often lasting only three to six months. Travel in those days was also much more difficult and time-consuming so that it was not easy for people to stay a long time in Zürich unless independently wealthy. Furthermore, Jung himself did not practice analysis more than half of each year, as he spent increasing time at his tower in Bollingen as well as making several long journeys such as the one to Africa in 1925 which lasted for six months. The pattern was for analysands to see both Jung and Toni Wolff concurrently. Also, there were so many English-speaking analysands that Jung instituted a Wednesday morning seminar during the academic year so that his analysands would have something other than their personal analysis.

How one became a Jungian analyst under these circumstances was not completely clear. Some people came expressly for the purpose of becoming a Jungian analyst and others arrived to work on personal problems, and then found that they also wanted to become Jungian analysts. Jung signed letters stating that the individual in mind had attended seminars and had had personal analysis and was now authorized to practice his methods. What criteria Jung used to write these letters of recommendation was not clear. His intuition about the person's relationship to his or her own unconscious was the primary factor. His attitude about formal education

was contradictory. In some cases he required that the individual get an advanced degree, and in other cases he did not mind that the individual involved did not have much formal education.

Some who came expressly for Jung's recommendation never got it and others who had no intention of becoming an analyst would unexpectedly receive a recommendation from Jung. An example of the latter was my mother, Hilde Kirsch, who was a nursing mother in London in 1937 when she received a call from a medical doctor who had seen Jung. This doctor had met my mother at an Analytical Psychology Club meeting in London, and had liked her. When this doctor contacted Jung about her, Jung recommended that he follow through and go into analysis with her. This was how she became a Jungian analyst. Jung continued this pattern of individual recommendation until the time of his death in 1961. In the last ten years of his life he used this method sparingly. By that time the Jung Institute in Zürich was functioning, and the IAAP had come into existence and one of its main functions was to accredit analysts.

The Jung Institute in Zürich had already been thought about prior to World War II, but the war put all plans on hold. The Institute opened its doors in 1948, and it was organized along the lines of a European University. Courses included the study of dreams, complexes, word-association studies, mythology, comparative religion, fairy tales, Freud, psychiatry, and related subjects. Clinical colloquia were added as the student progressed in his studies. The Jung Institute emphasized academic studies, and the individual's personal analysis. A thesis was required to graduate. After that one could practice as a Jungian analyst. There were approximately thirty students a year in attendance and the courses were in German, English, and French. The size of the Institute did not change much until the 1970s when it moved from the English quarter in Zürich to Kusnacht, a suburb of Zürich and where Jung had lived. As Jung became more popular, the student population increased up to a maximum of 400. Political struggles within the Institute have caused two splits from the original Institute. The first split occurred in 1992 when students loyal to M.L. von Franz left to form the Zentrum. They felt that the original Institute had lost the essence of Jung. The students from the Zentrum have not in general been interested in an official accreditation from the IAAP, although some graduates from the Zentrum have desired the accreditation. The second split

occurred in 2004 and had to do with the finances of the Institute. The original Institute ran into financial difficulties, fewer students, etc., and the governing board, the Curatorium, wanted the training analysts and teachers at the Institute to contribute money to help with the Institute's financial short fall. This produced a massive protest on the part of some analysts, and so those analysts decided to form their own Institute. There were not any basic theoretical differences between the two, but the money issues loomed large. Both the original Institute and the one formed in 2004 are member institutes of the IAAP, and their graduates are accredited through the IAAP. As the original Jung Institute in Zürich was in place prior to the formation of the IAAP in 1955, it has had an anomalous position within the IAAP structure. It does not represent a geographical entity such as all the other professional societies within the IAAP. The graduates of the Institute in Zürich became and still become members of IAAP by being part of a graduate's organization entitled Association of Graduate Analytical Psychologists of the C.G. Jung Institute of Zürich (AGAP). AGAP has no geographical boundaries and those graduates from outside of Switzerland who return to their country of origin often do not belong to the local group in their country. This has produced tensions in many parts of the world (Kirsch, 1995).

I have mentioned the IAAP in passing several times, and as it is the main accrediting body of Jungian analysts, it is important to discuss its influence and authority in deciding "Who Owns Jung?". The IAAP, or The International Association for Analytical Psychology, was founded on July 26, 1955. This was given to Jung on his 80th birthday as a gift from his disciples. The IAAP was incorporated in Switzerland with the aim to (4) accredit individual members, (5) accredit new groups, (6) have congresses, (7) judicate disputes within professional groups. From an initial membership of around 150 members it has grown to a membership closer to 3,000 members. The tasks and responsibilities of the IAAP have grown as the membership has spread worldwide.

The first Congress was held in Zürich in 1958. Jung attended the opening session and the banquet. Only analysts could attend, and no outsiders were let in. This meant neither trainees nor spouses. The second Congress was held in Zürich again in 1962, one year after Jung's death. At the second Congress a dispute which had already been brewing in the first Congress came out into the open.

A clear differentiation between the classical methods used by Jung and Jungians in Zürich came into conflict with the newly espoused developmental model championed by Michael Fordham and others in the English professional group, the Society for Analytical Psychology (SAP). Esther Harding from New York who championed the classical position on archetypes and amplification sharply criticized a newly trained London analyst, Murray Jackson, who she felt had no understanding of what Jung meant by the term symbol. She criticized him for reducing the term symbol to sign just as Jung had criticized Freud earlier. She received strong approval for her position from the predominantly Zürich audience, and the British were not pleased with how they were received. For many years after that there was a deep tension between the positions of the SAP and Zürich. Most Jungians in the world sided with the Zürich position. Meanwhile, *The Journal of Analytical Psychology*, published by the SAP, presented the London clinical developmental position strongly and forcefully. Both groups claimed their Jungian identity, and both claimed their positions directly from Jung. They were both correct as Jung did espouse both positions, and he actually strongly urged the Zürich analysts to respect the developmental position. (Time Magazine, 1958) In terms of "Who Owns Jung" both had equal claims to representing Jung.

This dispute became a central question for the next several IAAP Congresses. Finally, in the 1983 Congress in Jerusalem this became the actual topic of the Congress. By that time the tension between the two sides had abated considerably. Clinical innovations from psychoanalysis and object relations theory had begun to creep into many classical Jungian ideas, and the developmental theory of the London Jungians fit into the over all zeitgeist of Jungian psychology.

In 1985 Andrew Samuels wrote his classic *Jung and the Post-Jungians*, where the differences among Jungians were first described. He based his classification on the emphasis which different analysts placed on the theory of archetypes, the self, transference, and the role of developmental issues in their work. The classical analyst pays greatest attention to the emergence of archetypal themes, especially the self, in his/her analysands. Transference phenomena are not emphasized and developmental issues are minimally acknowledged. The developmental group places greatest emphasis on early

childhood issues, relies heavily on transference interpretations, and pays less attention to imagery and the symbolism of archetypes. To developmentalists bodily parts represent the archetypes rather than images, and they also have modified the use of the term "self" to include a primal self in the first half of life. The third group, following Hillman, who chose the term "archetypal psychology" to designate his particular school, emphasizes archetypal images and experiences and pays relatively little attention to the childhood developmental issues as well as to the transference. When Samuels work was published in 1985, many analysts did not like to see this categorization, but it did provide a heuristic way of describing the development of analytical psychology, and it continues to be useful in describing the way different Jungian analysts work. All three groups see themselves as being centrally located in the psychology of Jung, and so all claim ownership to Jung.

Analytical psychology and Jung's work have continued to spread throughout the world. There are now analysts on every continent, and the IAAP's function is to help developing analysts in these far off places where no accredited training is taking place. This has taken up an increasing amount of time for the IAAP. As I have stated earlier the IAAP was founded in Switzerland, and in the early years the primary influence was Swiss and British. It needs to be mentioned that most of the member groups in the IAAP, except the United States, are national groups. Each country has a national group, and when there are enough members within a certain region of the country, satellite institutes are formed within the national group. This is the case in Germany, France, and Italy. The United States has never formed a national group within the IAAP, but instead there are regional geographical societies such as New York, Northern California, Southern California, and many others. The North Americans do meet on a yearly basis to discuss issues of mutual concern, but they have not formed a national group, although it has been proposed from time to time.

In the 1980s there was a shift in influence from Switzerland and England to the United States. Politically the United States Jungians became some of the dominant figures within the IAAP. In 1989 and shortly thereafter the opening up of the former Soviet Union brought an interest in analytical psychology from those areas plus Latin America, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, and Asia.

At the present time there has been a great interest in analytical psychology from much of Latin America, China, and the IAAP has truly become a world organization. There are now five official languages of the IAAP including German, English, French, Italian, and Spanish.

The IAAP holds Congresses every three years in different parts of the world, mainly Europe and the United States, but the next Congress in the year 2007 will take place in Cape Town, South Africa. In between these Congresses regional and topical conferences have been held. These Congresses are an opportunity for analysts to meet their colleagues and to exchange views on analytical psychology. It is also a time when the delegates from all the societies elect new groups and new individual members.

The IAAP has no official connection to either academia or to any government. Therefore, the IAAP has no legal authority to decide who can call himself/herself a Jungian analyst or not. There have been instances where individuals have called themselves Jungian analysts when they are not members of the IAAP. They have been asked to use another name to identify themselves, and in most cases they have agreed to that. The point is that the IAAP, like the IPA, was formed outside governmental channels and therefore has no legal claim to the name Jungian Analyst.

The Jung Family and the Eigenosse Technische Hochschul, (ETH) Archive.

The Jung family has naturally an interest in how Jung is viewed in the world. At the time of Jung's death in 1961 a trust was formed to handle Jung's personal estate. His English language intellectual property was handled by his American and British publishers respectively, the Bollingen Foundation, later transferred to Princeton and Routledge, while the Jung family made decisions on the German edition. It was and is named the *Erbgemeinschaft C.G. Jung*, and members of the extended family are part of the trust. At first the spokesman for the trust was Jung's son, Franz, but in 1981, the heirs adopted a legal structure to adapt to the growing size of the Jung family. An executive committee exists which consists of one member from each branch of the family. At present it includes two grandsons and three great grandchildren. The president of the trust is Ulrich Hoerni, an architect by training who has been devoting much of his life to the large number of issues around Jung's work.

Two other important members are Peter Jung, a psychiatrist, and Andreas Jung, an architect, who has lived in his grandfather's house since 1975 and who is the archivist and librarian. Decisions on the many unpublished works, such as seminar notes, correspondences, lectures, etc., have yet to be made. Earlier I have also mentioned the imminent publication of *The Red Book*, by Sonu Shamdasani of Jung's paintings and writings during his "Confrontation with the Unconscious" between 1912 and 1930. Translations of Jung's works into different languages continue, and the international copyright laws concerning them are complex. The fact of the matter is that staying abreast of all the ways that the name of Jung comes up is a rather time-consuming job.

In 1977 a Jung Archive was founded at the ETH in Zürich. Jung had been a professor there between 1933 and 1941, and Jung had it as a stipulation in his will that his papers should be preserved in an archive there. (Hoerni) Today it has over 1,000 manuscripts and 35,000 letters from and to Jung. The Archive has grown with the acquisitions of the papers of Professor C.A. Meier, Jung's successor at the ETH, Aniela Jaffe, Jung's secretary, and Jolande Jacobi, a close associate of Jung's, as well as the important correspondence between Sigmund Freud and Jung. Access to the archive is public, but only the "Press Archives" and "Separata Archives" are available (Tages Anzeiger, Dec. 3, 2005). Most of the material in the Archive has already been published, and the original manuscripts exist in the Archive. Unpublished material is open to any scholar but the documents in question need to be vetted by the *Erbgemeinschaft* beforehand in order to assess that confidential material is not being released. Confidentiality and "privacy laws" are all important in Switzerland and the rest of Europe. The result of this procedure is that it requires some preplanning in order to obtain the requested manuscripts. In the words of the curator, Yvonne Voegeli, "We house the Archive, but we do not administer the Archive" (Tages Anzeiger, Dec. 3, 2005). A further problem is that the ETH Archive has had budget cuts and there is no longer the personnel available to do the necessary work of administering the documents quickly. Thus, it can sometimes take many months to obtain documents which one would think would be readily available. Both the *Erbgemeinschaft* and the ETH have come under criticism from Jung scholars, because it has appeared that documents relating to Jung are being withheld,

when in fact the process of vetting and administering the documents is the real problem.

Philemon

In the year 2003 a new nonprofit foundation called Philemon was created in United States in order to fund the complete works of Jung in both German and English. Let me quote extensively from their announcement.

In distinction to the widely known *Collected Works*, the *Complete Works* will comprise manuscripts, seminars, and correspondence hitherto unpublished or formerly believed “lost” that number in tens of thousands of pages. The historical, clinical and cultural importance of this material equals and, in some instances, surpasses the importance of that which has been already published. Given the volume of material yet unpublished extant in various public and private archives, the Philemon Foundation conservatively estimates that it will prepare for publication an additional 30 volumes beyond the 20 volumes of the *Collected Works*, and that the time frame required to complete this task will be at least 30 years. Once this is complete, a new English translation of the existing *Collected Works* is envisaged. Philemon Foundation will make the completed body of C.G. Jung’s work available as volumes in The Philemon Series. As such, the Philemon Foundation is the successor to the Bollingen Foundation that originally made possible the publication of Jung’s *Collected Works*, cornerstone of their Bollingen Series. Philemon Foundation has the support and collaboration of the Heirs of C.G. Jung. This unique relationship ensures access by the Philemon Foundation to the wealth of unpublished material by C.G. Jung, thus entrusting the Philemon Foundation with the task of bringing that work to the widest reading public. All existing contractual rights and agreements remain unchanged.

The president of this new foundation is Stephen Martin, a Jungian analyst in Philadelphia and the general editor is Sonu Shamdasani, Jungian scholar and historian and author of books on Jung. Recently, he has been appointed to the Philemon Readership in Jung History at the Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at University College London, initially for ten years. In progress are the publication of Jung’s ETH lectures, the correspondence between Jung and Victor

White, and Jung's Children's Dreams seminar. The correspondence project had run out of funds, and the ETH lectures, the correspondence between Jung and Victor White, and the English version of the Children's Dreams seminar, though part of the original prospectus for the Jung seminar series, had been abandoned. All of us in the Jungian world are delighted by the prospect of more of Jung's works being made available. Unpublished manuscripts, seminars, and correspondences will be published as the funds become available. Depending upon how many of these get published, the Philemon Foundation will play an important role in the future of how Jung is seen.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have begun with Jung the person and those who were in analysis with him. Their extremely strong positive transferences influenced many of us who came in contact with Jungian psychology shortly after World War II. The formation of the IAAP in 1955 established an accreditation procedure for Jungian analysts throughout the world, which has only grown since then. The influence of the IAAP and of Jungian analysts has been described as a major portion of this chapter.

Before concluding this chapter I would like to present my own assessment of "who owns Jung" at this time. As with documents pertaining to the life and work of Freud and psychoanalysis, a similar pattern is emerging with regards to accessing material about the historical Jung. Much of the material is in private hands, and where it is in the public domain, access is not always readily available. The ETH, Jung family, the Library of Congress, the Countway library, and numerous private persons have many documents relating to Jung's life and work which have not yet been published. How available these documents become to the interested scholar have become more problematic over time. Jung scholarship is seemingly getting into many of the same kind of difficulties which happened in Freud scholarship. The interested parties in Jung scholarship have different aims, and the various groups are being protective about their own sources and materials. It is unfortunate but perhaps inevitable that this should have happened. Already in his own time Jung was an extremely controversial figure because he was an outspoken critic

on a number of issues relating to Christianity, Judaism, the nature of religious experience, cultural values, Eastern religions, and on the practice of psychotherapy and analysis. His views on these subjects and a number of others have had an enduring quality in our modern times. The continued interest in his life and work has provoked controversy in its own right. Who has the “correct” interpretation of Jung remains an open question. In this chapter I have attempted to describe some of the most important people and organizations that have a stake in how this question is being answered.

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Philemon Foundation

*Ann Casement, in collaboration with
Sonu Shamdasani*

Introduction

The Philemon Foundation, a non-profit [501(c) (3)] foundation was established in 2003 with the analytical psychologist, Steve Martin, as its President and the historian of psychology, Sonu Shamdasani, as its General Editor. The foundation is governed by a board and has a growing team of scholars. Its mission statement is laid out in a beautifully illustrated pamphlet distributed at the International Association for Analytical Psychology's (IAAP) XVIth International Congress in Barcelona in August 2004. It is preparing for publication the complete corpus of C.G. Jung's work to become available in editions that will meet the highest scholarly standards. These will appear in 30 volumes beyond the existing volumes of the *Collected Works* of Jung. The ensuing publication, *The Complete Works of C.G. Jung* in English and German,

will comprise manuscripts, seminars, and correspondence hitherto unpublished or formerly believed *lost* that number in tens of thousands of pages. The historical, clinical and cultural importance of material equals and, in some instances, surpasses the importance of that which has already been published. [Philemon Foundation, 2003]

The publication of the latter was made possible by the Bollingen Foundation, to which the Philemon Foundation is heir, with the support and contractual collaboration of the Heirs of C.G. Jung.

Philemon

Philemon is the significant fantasy figure that appeared to Jung from 1913 in what he termed his “confrontation with the unconscious”. He was based on the figure of Philemon who appeared in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* and Goethe’s *Faust*. Jung commemorated Philemon at his tower in Bollingen where he carved the following inscription over the gate: “Philemonis Sacrum–Fausti Poenitentia” [Philemon’s Shrine–Faust’s Repentance]. In one of the rooms, Jung painted a huge mural of the winged Philemon reproducing the painting from *The Red Book*, which features as the letterhead of the Philemon Foundation.

The Foundation’s first act was to complete the funding for the editing of Jung’s *Red Book*, the most important publication since his death. Further, it has commissioned the preparation of Jung’s lectures delivered at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH—Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) from 1933 to 1941 for publication. It has also commissioned the translation of Jung’s seminars on the *Interpretation of Children’s Dreams and Old Material on Dream Interpretation*, which demonstrate that, contrary to received wisdom, Jung did not neglect childhood in his research. The Philemon Foundation has also donated critical funds to the completion of the edited volume of letters exchanged by Jung and his close friend, the Dominican priest, Father Victor White. Other projects are in the planning stages.

The founding of the philemon foundation

In 1994, Shamdasani began research in Zürich and found a full list that had been put together in 1993 of Jung’s unpublished manuscripts at the ETH. He discussed these with the Jung family who were in principle in favour of publication of further works. Since that time, Shamdasani has been trying to alert people in the Jungian world to this, without much success. Shamdasani entered discussion

with the Jung family concerning the possible publication of Jung's *Red Book*. In May 2000 the Jung family decided to proceed with the publication of *The Red Book*, which was announced in 2001. The work is currently projected to appear in 2007.

In 2003, the analytical psychologist, Stephen Martin, contacted Shamdasani to meet. Martin had wanted to purchase the Jung/Baynes Letters at Sothebys but was outbid by the Wellcome Trust. Martin said he was interested in publishing any previously unpublished Jung letters. At this point, Shamdasani revealed that there were approximately 35,000 unpublished letters in the Jung archives at the ETH alone, as well as over a hundred unpublished manuscript items and seminars. Martin emailed Shamdasani a few weeks later to give the go-ahead, with the support of an anonymous donor. As a result of this, the Philemon Foundation was founded. Negotiations started between the Philemon Foundation and the Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at University College, London (UCL). These took two-and-a-half years and resulted in the establishment of the Philemon Readership in Jung History at UCL, initially for ten years. The starting date was January 2006 and represents the first recognition of Jung History as a formal designation at university level. Individuals will be able to undertake PhDs in this area. At the same time, Angela Graf-Nold was appointed as a scientific collaborator at the Institute for the History of Medicine at the University of Zürich for her work on Jung's ETH lectures, which represents a historic presence at the University of Zürich.

In November 2005, The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation formally announced that the Philemon Foundation had been awarded a \$40,000 matching grant to fund the transcription of over 100 unpublished manuscripts and seminars by C.G. Jung housed in the Jung Archives at the ETH in Zürich. The transcription process has already begun and is expected to last for at least three years. The matching funds have been met through a donation from a private foundation. Private donors, including Jungian colleagues, have been contributing to this important work since it started. In February 2006 at its annual Executive Committee meeting in Einsiedeln, Switzerland, the International Association for Analytical Psychology (IAAP) donated a grant to the Philemon

Foundation and stated its intention of collaborating with it in the future.

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The incomplete works of Jung¹

Sonu Shamdasani

To date, the principal source for studies of Jung and for works in analytical psychology have been his *Collected Works* and the two volumes of *Letters*. This has had hitherto unsuspected consequences for how his work has been understood, as both are far from complete. To comprehend their effect requires an explication of the genesis of these works.

When first presented by Jack Barrett of the Bollingen Foundation with a copy of the first volume of the *Collected Works* to be published, Jung complained that it looked like a coffin.² The project of a collected edition of Jung's writings was proposed by Herbert Read, who was at that time an editorial director at Kegan Paul in 1945 (Kegan Paul became Routledge & Kegan Paul in 1947). At the same time, the Bollingen Foundation, founded by Mary and Paul Mellon, put forward a similar proposal.³ An agreement was reached in 1947 to jointly publish the works, which were funded by the Bollingen Foundation.

At Jung's suggestion, Michael Fordham was appointed as the editor. As Fordham was not fluent in German, Jung suggested that Gerhard Adler be appointed to check the translations. Jung considered it absolutely necessary to have this done by a native German-speaker.⁴ For Jung, the manner in which he used language

was an integral part of his psychology. On June 17, 1952, he wrote to Zvi Werblowsky,

the language I speak must be equivocal, that is *ambiguous*, to do justice to psychic nature with its double aspect. I strive consciously and deliberately for ambiguous expressions, because it is superior to unequivocalness and corresponds to the nature of being.⁵

Jung commented to Fordham on the special problems confronting any translator of his works:

my German style is by no means simple and it wants a specifically trained ear to hear the somewhat subtle innuendos which abound in certain articles ... I find time and again that certain points are misunderstood or rendered badly by translators who do not grasp the full value of certain words ... I'm rather anxious to have my works presented to the English public in an English form that expresses what the German text says. It needs somebody of course, who has a wider reading than psychiatry or academical psychology, since my language is often more literary than merely "scientific". I also happen to use allusions or quotations from classical literature, which, to an English reader would be perfectly strange.⁶

As Jung later told Herbert Read, he took the question of the translation of his work very seriously, particularly as he had had some annoying experiences.⁷ Adler was also supposed to establish the equivalents for the German terminology, whilst Fordham was supposed to review the translation with a view to its English style.⁸

Fordham agreed to Adler being appointed as a translations editor, but Adler wanted to be on an equal footing with him. Fordham informed Herbert Read that he had met with Adler, who had told him that he wanted to be co-editor for the sake of his personal prestige. Fordham felt that he was not suited to the task, and furthermore, had also had doubts about his competency to check the translations, due to the poor quality of his English.⁹ Jung thought that Adler's proposal was not a good idea, and felt that there should be one editor. He tried to convince Adler of this, but was unsuccessful.¹⁰

Richard Hull was appointed as the translator. The first work which Hull was assigned to translate was Jung's *Psychology and*

Alchemy. Hull was a professional translator, with little prior exposure to Jung's work.¹¹ He specialised in literary and philosophical works, and also translated Rilke's letters in 1946, and works by Martin Buber and Martin Heidegger in 1949. He was a published poet, and some who knew him recalled him as an ardent rationalist.¹²

In the notes of a meeting between Jung, Herbert Read and Jack Barrett in 1949, it is recorded that: "Professor Jung remarks that Mr Hull seems to have difficulty in understanding some of his (Jung's) concepts (f.i., the Self)".¹³ Jung suggested that Hull should continue to collaborate with Barbara Hannah on future translations. Replying to Herbert Read concerning this plan to involve Hannah as a translation consultant, Hull informed him that this was a wish which he had confessed to nobody, as he had at times had trouble understanding Jung's ideas, and had not received sufficient clarification of this from Adler and Fordham when he was translating *Psychology and Alchemy*.¹⁴

In 1953, Jung reviewed Hull's translation of his essay on synchronicity, and wrote him that: "You certainly understand how to transform the heavy German grammatical forms into liquid English".¹⁵ Indeed, Hull's translations are so fluent at a literary level that they generally do not read like a translation. A week later, Jung wrote to Barrett about Hull's translation:

I have partially controlled Hull's translation of *Synchronicity* and have seen that it is absolutely necessary that somebody who understands the arguments of the paper, as well as German, should go with a fine comb through the translation that has already been controlled by Miss Hannah, and I therefore would propose that the ultimate translation should be given to Dr Adler.¹⁶

Two years later, Jung again commented upon Hull's translation of the text in a letter to Michael Fordham:

I am returning to you by this same mail the galley proofs of *Synchronicity*. My corrections are in the text. Hull has the unfortunate tendency to invent different words for one and the same concept; that's making for confusion.¹⁷

None of the editors were trained scholars, and furthermore, the magnitude of the undertaking was not immediately apparent.

Despite the practically limitless financial support of the Bollingen Foundation, works were initially slow in appearing, which tried Jung's patience. On 3rd January, 1953, he wrote to Jack Barrett:

From the above date you can inform yourself that we have arrived in the annus Domini 1953 for which I wish you every luck available in the four quarters of the world. But it is the year that begins with the most noticeable absence of a certain book called *Psychology and Alchemy*. Have you perchance heard of its whereabouts? I have been promised by the heads of the firm, that it would certainly appear towards the end of 1952. This same futile promise has been made repeatedly and for various dates. What is the name of the evil genius, that keeps on interfering? Or is there any bad human will behind this rather tiresome performance?

I wish you would elucidate my poor old mind. I cannot follow any more and my patience is at its lowest ebb.¹⁸

Gerhard Adler recalled to Ann Casement that Jung had been discontented with the book, and placed the following Latin inscription in the copy he gave to Adler: *Omnis festinatio ex parte diaboli est, et sic tam tarde advenit quam pulchre* [all haste is the work of the devil, and so this comes as tardily as it is beautiful].¹⁹

As time went on, Adler and Fordham withdrew into a more supervisory role (which alone generated a sizeable correspondence). The bulk of the editorial work was subsequently carried out by William McGuire, Richard Hull and Alan Glover. In recognition of this, McGuire was appointed Executive Editor in 1967 (Fordham suggested that Hull should have been as well, as his involvement went much further than translation).²⁰ Indeed, Hull saw his role as involving the silent correction of Jung's texts. To Herbert Read, he wrote:

Does it make sense to you that Jung's texts should be followed so faithfully that oversights, obscurities or inconsistencies of exposition should be reproduced, or should not be corrected save at the cost of an editorial explanation? What else are editors for, if not to clarify and correct where necessary, without drawing attention to themselves?²¹

Those responsible for the *Collected Works* managed to make the bulk of Jung's published writings available in a comparatively short span

of time from Jung's death. The value of this need not be stated. It has had an inestimable effect upon disseminating Jung's work and in fostering the development of the profession of analytical psychology in the English-speaking world. It is not incidental that the English-speaking world is where Jung's work has had its greatest impact. Furthermore, in their research in preparing the edition, the editors made many important contributions towards understanding the historical development of Jung's work. With the benefit of hindsight, numerous shortcomings are apparent. The manner in which these shortcomings have hindered the comprehension of Jung's work, as well as that of its development, needs to be pointed out. These hindrances only remain hindrances only so long as individuals rely unquestioningly upon the *Collected Works*, and regard the task of the editing of Jung's work as one which has already been completed.

The first major difficulties with the *Collected Works* is its choice of its contents. At Jung's request, the plan for the German edition of his works, edited by Lilly Merker-Jung, Marianne Niehus-Jung, Lena Hurwitz Eisner, Franz Riklin Jr., Elisabeth Rüb and Leonie Zander, followed that of the English edition.²² This was carried out. Consequently, decisions made concerning the editing of the English edition were also carried over into the German edition. So many of the problems with the English edition apply equally to the German edition. However, there was insufficient coordination between the two editions, and the editors of the German edition seem not to have been aware of revisions that Jung specifically undertook for the English edition. Consequently, there are places where the English edition contains significant material not represented in the German edition.²³

A major difficulty that confronted the editors was that there was no complete bibliography of Jung's writings. New texts were continually emerging. Furthermore, after Jung's death, a great deal of further material came to light, in various stages of completion. This was referred to as the "floating material". The question of what to do with this material came to a head at a meeting held in Küsnacht in 1964 between Marianne Niehus, Walter Niehus, Franz Riklin, Aniela Jaffé, Herbert Read, John Barrett and Vaun Gillmor. The question of the final disposition of the floating material centred on the desirability for a further volume of miscellaneous items, which was informally

referred to as the “junk volume”. Those present at the meeting came out against the need for such a volume, and also against the proposal that Hull be permitted to prepare a new translation of original the 1912 edition of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, which Jung had extensively rewritten in 1952. These discussions revealed that there were fundamental tensions as to what the *Collected Works* should be. As Herbert Read put it to Richard Hull,

It is now quite clear that Fordham and Adler have always had a different conception of the *Collected Works* from any that I have entertained. My idea was an authorised version which would present a final authoritative text of what Jung wished preserved. It now appears that Fordham and Adler have been fighting all the time for what one can only call a variorum edition. They attach great importance to everything Jung ever wrote and argue that the *Collected Works* should present the development of his thought.²⁴

Those present at the Küsnacht meeting came out strongly in favour of Read’s conception (of those not present, Hull supported Read, and McGuire supported Adler and Fordham). Adler and Fordham felt that their authority was being undermined. The latter had undertaken the project in the understanding that *all* of Jung’s published works were to be included, and, as he quite simply informed Read, “I have no criteria by which to exclude anything that Jung wrote”.²⁵ He continued:

More than once I found statements which give profoundly illuminating sidelights in the very minor writings. They have to be read in the course of interest in some topic relating to Jung. I think the reason for this may be that in writing short pieces Jung was less on his guard than in the longer ones. I can find no means of deciding which ones would fail to produce similar results for different people with a special interest.²⁶

In these discussions, both parties claimed that their proposals would have had the support of Jung. On October 12, 1964, Gerhard Adler wrote to Herbert Read:

Major decisions have been taken at the mentioned meeting concerning both the *Collected Works* and the Jung Letters without, in the first case, the two responsible Editors ... the decisions taken on the *Collected Works* appear to be a grave mistake, quite apart from the fact that they reverse the previous policy of

inclusiveness. ... After very careful consideration and extensive discussions, Fordham and I had come to the decision that an edition of Professor Jung's *Collected Works* along scientific lines should be as inclusive as possible. ... These small and "unimportant" items are not at all unimportant if viewed from the angle of scholarly use, which we hope will be made of the *Collected Works*. I am afraid that I cannot accept Dr Riklin's recommendations and I find it surprising that his or Mrs Jaffé's opinion on the matter of the *Collected Works* should have been solicited, or, worse, accepted.²⁷

Three days later, Adler wrote to McGuire:

the irony of it is that new pieces are continuously turning up. I myself suggest a really important and highly relevant addition to Vol. 18: the early (1915/16) correspondence between Jung and Schmid ... which shows Jung fighting for clarity on still confused concepts.²⁸

The following week, he contested Read's view of Jung's intentions concerning the *Collected Works*:

I cannot agree that Dr Jung did not envisage the inclusion "of everything he had ever written" in the *Collected Works*. This is simply one possible interpretation of his intentions. From my knowledge of Jung I am certain that he would have had no objection whatsoever.²⁹

The following week, Fordham wrote to Jack Barrett stating his position:

When I was elected co-editor of the *Collected Works* I made it very clear that I would do so if it was to be complete—that is all Jung's published works were to go into print. I was assured that this stipulation was written into the publishers' agreement with Jung and the Editorial note to Volume one makes the position public.³⁰

This last point appeared to have had some effect. On 4 November 1964, Barrett wrote to Read:

Certainly the opening sentence and p. viii of the Editorial note to Volume 1 to which he refers defines the scope of the edition in terms identical with Fordham's concept. I am somewhat

dégonflé ... I am beginning to feel we should at least give in on the last volume of miscellaneous material.³¹

In 1957, the first sentence of volume 1 of the *Collected Works* announced “the publication of the first *complete* collected edition”.³² Whilst the “junk” volume finally went ahead, the selection of material that went into was heavily curtailed. A discreet note found its way into the second edition of the preface to volume 1 of the *Collected Works* in 1970:

the amount of new material that has come to light since the *Collected Works* were planned is very considerable, most of it having been discovered after Jung’s death and too late to have been placed in the volumes where it thematically belonged.³³

The full extent of Jung’s literary remains was simply not known at the time of the Küsnacht meeting in 1964, and it wasn’t until 1993 that a catalogue was prepared. The amount of unpublished material in this catalogue far exceeded what was previously known. What Adler noted in 1964 is still true today: “New pieces are continuously turning up”.

As they stand, the *Collected Works* are far closer to Read’s ideal than to Fordham and Adler’s. As a consequence, while there is a *Collected Works* of Jung, this is far from being a *Complete Works* of Jung. Critically important published and unpublished writings by Jung remain outside the *Collected Works*. The former category contains items which were known about and excluded, as well as items which weren’t. Thus there are many papers by Jung that are as important as anything in the *Collected Works* that have remained unknown to this day.³⁴

Despite the fact that Jung himself was in favour of a strictly chronological approach, the editors adopted a thematic arrangement.³⁵ Through the course of his career, Jung frequently revised his works and published different versions of essays in different contexts. Except for a few instances, the editors chose as a matter of policy to include what they took to be the final version of a particular work. However, what constituted a final version was not always clear. This has had the consequence that historically critical formulations and statements of Jung are simply not to be found in the *Collected Works*. One example of this is Jung’s pivotal 1917 book, *The*

Psychology of the Unconscious Processes.³⁶ Another example is a short but important paper published by Jung and Bleuler detailing their disagreements concerning the aetiology of dementia praecox.³⁷ Furthermore, a result of this approach is that one is often unable to ascertain when a particular passage was written, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to study the development of his work on the basis of the *Collected Works*.³⁸

The reproduction of Jung's works was not without errors, and certain passages in the original editions were not reproduced in the *Collected Works* edition. Thus what is supposed to be the text of the first edition of *The structure of the unconscious* of 1916 does not exactly correspond to what was published in the *Archives de Psychologie*. Some of the editorial notes contain errors. A note in CW 18 states that Jung contributed abstracts in 1908 to *Folia neuro-biologica* and that "as these are summaries without critical comment, they are not translated but merely listed here".³⁹ However, if one inspects these abstracts, one sees that this is not actually the case. An editorial note states that a 1907 paper of Jung's "Associations d'idées familiales" was not included because its contents were similar to Jung's Clark University Lecture, "The family constellation" despite the fact that the former has several pages of important material not in the latter.⁴⁰

The editorial apparatus to the *Collected Works*, whilst providing some important historical information, is minimal, and the edition is far from being a critical historical edition. The level of information provided in the editorial apparatus is far inferior to that present in *The Standard Edition* of Freud's work, let alone in critical historical editions like Harvard University Press' works of William James, or indeed the Bollingen Foundation's exemplary edition of the works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Thus for example, information from correspondences and manuscript drafts which sheds light on the composition of the books and essays in question is not noted, nor are sufficient notes added to contextualise and explain Jung's references.

The English translation, while stylistically fluent at a literary level, leaves a great deal to be desired, containing interpolations, reformulations, and misunderstood concepts and general errors. A full consideration of Hull's work is beyond the scope of this article. The following are some brief examples. In "Theoretical reflections

on the essence of the psychical", a sentence occurs which states that the tragedy of psychology was that it had "no self-consistent mathematics at its disposal, but only a calculus of subjective prejudices".⁴¹ The last clause is not found in the original German. In "On the archetypes of the collective unconscious", a sentence occurs in English which reads: "What comes after the door is, surprisingly enough, a boundless expanse full of unprecedented uncertainty ..."⁴² Instead of a door (Tor), the word in German is death (Tod). Due to this error, the next few sentences are rendered meaningless. In "The relation of psychotherapy to the cure and of souls", a sentence occurs in English which reads, "the attitude of the psychotherapist is infinitely more important than the theories and methods of psychotherapy".⁴³ The last part of this sentence should be, "psychological theories and methods". The crux of the sentence lies in the contrast between psychotherapy and psychology. In Jung's inaugural address at the founding of the Jung Institute in Zürich in 1948, Jung stated that, "For psychotherapy, casuistic dream research in connection with comparative symbolism would be of great practical value".⁴⁴ This sentence is omitted altogether in the English translation. I concur with Paul Bishop's view that "Jung's reputation would grow to a large extent on a corrupt English version of his texts".⁴⁵ In my view and in that of others who have considered this issue, a complete new translation of English *Collected Works* is highly desirable.⁴⁶ Finally the bibliography of Jung's writings is by no means complete.

As the project for the *Collected Works* proceeded, it came to include the publication of Jung's seminars and correspondence. In 1974, the *Freud-Jung Letters* were published, edited by William McGuire and Wolfgang Sauerlander. The editing of this edition was exemplary, and has set the standard for all subsequent volumes of Freud correspondences. A great deal of the subsequent secondary literature on the Freud-Jung relation has been largely parasitical on the information provided in the footnotes to this volume.

In 1973 and 1975, a selection of Jung's letters was published, edited by Gerhard Adler, in collaboration with Aniela Jaffé. The editors stated that setting aside routine business letters, from the 1,600 letters written by Jung between the years 1906 and 1961, they selected over 1,000.⁴⁷ This gives the impression that approximately two

thirds of the letters of Jung's that have survived were published in this volume. Furthermore, the publication of 196 letters of Jung to Freud in 1974 (only seven of which had appeared in the *Letters* volume) would leave only about 400 unpublished letters. This is seriously misleading. From my researches, I would estimate that the amount of Jung's letters represented in these volumes to be less than ten percent. Moreover, their policy of only publishing Jung's letters and not that of his correspondents effectively decontextualised the letters that they did choose to include. From a comparison of the unpublished letters that I have read, problems in the choice of the letters that the editors selected are apparent. The larger share of the letters that the editors reproduced were from Jung's later years, and indeed, from the period when Aniela Jaffé was his secretary. Furthermore, the editors prioritised letters on religious subjects. Consequently, their edition by no means gives a fully representative portrait of Jung in correspondence.

The consequence of the shortcomings and unreliability of the *Collected Works* and *Letters* volumes is that one has, in effect, to "uncollect" the works, and start from basic primary research and comparison of manuscripts with first and subsequent editions, together with the study of complete correspondences.⁴⁸ Little of this work has been done. The reasons why such works should be published in proper historical editions is clear: for the quality of any field of thought is critically dependent on the comprehensiveness and reliability of its primary literature. Without such publications, secondary and tertiary literature on Jung will continue to be based on unstable foundations.

In 1967, the Bollingen Foundation wound down and it transferred the US publication of Jung's works to Princeton University Press, leaving funds for the completion of the *Collected Works*. Under the terms of the agreement, unused funds would revert to Princeton University. In the 1990s the publication process ran aground, before even Jung's most important and extensive lecture series from 1933 to 1941 at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology was published. In the late 1990s, Jung's *Collected Works* was declared closed by Princeton University Press, despite the extent of the unpublished works. A *Complete Works* of Jung remains a task for the future.⁴⁹

NOTES

1. The following is an expanded version of chapter three of my *Jung Stripped Bare by his Biographers, Even*, (2004).

2. Personal communication, Ximena Roelli. To Richard Hull, Jung wrote that he far preferred the jacket and binding of Routledge's edition to the "coffin-like appearance" of the Bollingen edition (Jung to Hull, 6 July, 1953, Library of Congress [hereafter LC]).

3. Mary Mellon's intention had been to make available *all* of Jung's writings (personal communication, Ximena Roelli).

4. Jung to Read, June 4, 1946, Routledge Archive, University of Reading [hereafter RA]. As the work progressed, Adler tended to restrict his work to dealing with specific queries raised by Hull (personal communication, Michael Fordham). In fairness to Adler, in my own experience, I have found that checking translations can take as much time as translating.

5. Ed. Adler, 1975, p. 71, Tr. Mod.

6. April 18, 1946, Contemporary medical archives, Wellcome Trust Library for the History and Understanding of Medicine, London [hereafter, CMAC], orig. in English.

7. Jung to Read, March 4, 1948, RA.

8. Jung to Read, October 8, 1946, Jung to Adler, September 12, 1946, RA.

9. "His English is by no means good—it is heavy, gets overweighted with words". Fordham to Read July 3, 1946, RA. Read had suggested the appointment of a separate translations editor, in which case, as Fordham saw it, Adler would be the second translations editor.

10. Jung to Read, July 17, 1946, RA.

11. In accepting Read's invitation to take on the translation editorship for Jung's works, Hull wrote to him on 14 June 1946 that the only two books of Jung which he knew well were *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, and *The Integration of the Personality* (RA).

12. Personal communication, Ximena Roelli.

13. RA.

14. September 1, 1949, RA.

15. July 6, 1953, LC, orig. in English.

16. July 13, 1953, Bollingen archive Library of Congress [hereafter, BA], orig. in English.

17. May 11, 1955, CMAC, orig. in English. In Hannah's view, as a "thinking type", Hull's translations left out feeling and the irrational. (1976, p. 334). von

Franz noted that Jung's writings had a double aspect, a logically understandable argument on the one hand, and on the other, the "unconscious" was allowed its say: "The reader finds himself at the same time exposed to the impact of that "other voice", the unconscious, which may either grip or frighten him off. That "other voice" can, among other factors, be heard in Jung's special way of reviving the original etymological meanings of words and allowing both feeling and imaginative elements to enter into his scientific exposition". She noted that "unfortunately, this double aspect of Jung's writings has not been preserved in the monumental English edition of his *Collected Works*, translated by R. F. C. Hull". (1972, p. 4). Franz Jung recalled heated discussions between Jung and Hull on issues of translation. He noted that Hull would come to see Jung with a completed translation, and would be unwilling to correct what he had done (personal communication).

18. 3rd January 1953, BA (orig in English).

19. Sotheby's exhibition catalogue, *Continental books and manuscripts*, 8 June, 2006, Lot 27.

20. To Herbert Read, Fordham wrote of McGuire "He doesn't have and never had the responsibility for making major decisions ... even though he does most of the work". March 3, 1967, CMAC.

21. November 23, 1964, RA. On one attempted major revision by Hull, see Shamdasani, 1994.

22. "Vorwort der Herausgeber" GW 16, p. 9. On the history of the German *Gesammelte Werke*, see Paul Bishop, 1998.

23. Hull wrote to Fordham that the Swiss editors were not fully aware of the changes which Jung made for the English edition (March 13, 1969, CMAC). An example of this is Jung's paper on "synchronicity" (CW 8), where important passages written for the English edition were not carried back into the German edition.

24. March 29, 1962, RA.

25. May 5, 1964, RA.

26. *Ibid.*

27. RA.

28. October 15, 1964. BA. The Jung/Schmid letters were finally published in German in 1982. The Philemon Foundation is currently preparing an English edition for publication.

29. October 20, RA.

30. October 21, 1964, CMAC.

31. BA.

32. CW 1, p. v. Emphasis added.

33. *Ibid.*, p. x.

34. A number of these are studied in Shamdasani, 2003.

35. Fordham to Jack Barrett, Jan 2, 1948, BA. As Fordham informed me, Jung took a *laissez faire* attitude to his editors, and generally left them to their own devices.

36. This book was a reworking and greatly expanded version of Jung's 1912 essay "New paths in psychology". The essay and the final version alone appear in the *Collected Works*. Realising the importance of the 1917 edition, Hull had wanted to do a new translation of it, but was not given the go-ahead.

37. As Fordham informed McGuire "Hull was against publishing the Bleuler/Jung discussion ... I feel fairly sure Read would be against it, which leaves me in a minority of one ..." (May 10, 1960, BA). Not incidentally, Fordham was the only person involved who had a background in psychiatry.

38. One author who dispensed completely with the *Collected Works* and relied on first editions was C.A. Meier, in his multi-volume text book, *The Psychology of C.G. Jung*. He indicated that only in such a manner was it possible to follow the original course of development of Jung's ideas, and to place them in context (1984, p. xii). It is not coincidental that this forms the most reliable exposition of Jung's work.

39. CW 18 § 1025.

40. CW 2, § 999.

41. (1946), CW 8, § 421.

42. (1954), CW 9, 1, § 45.

43. (1932), CW 11, § 537.

44. CW 18, § 1138.

45. Bishop, 1998, p. 375.

46. For a detailed study of the errors in one section of Hull's translation of Jung's "Theoretical reflections on the essence of the psychical", see David Holt, (1999).

47. Adler, ed, 1973, p. xii.

48. One instance where the first edition of a much revised text was recently reissued as part of the *Collected Works* (as CW B) in 1992 was Beatrice Hinkle's 1916 translation of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*. It has to be said that this reissue formed the low water mark of the *Collected Works*. On April 10, 1942, Jung wrote to Mary Mellon, "The "Psychology of the Unconscious" should be translated again which it needs very badly indeed". (JA), orig. in English. In January 1944, in response to a question from Stanley Young, Jung noted that the translation of the work should be revised. (BA). According to Joseph Henderson,

Jung wanted the text retranslated, but ran into problems with the copyrights (personal communication). Later on, Richard Hull had wanted to retranslated the text, but was not given the go ahead. In 1964, Adler wrote to Read that “it is a well known fact that the Hinkle translation, on account of its lack of clarity and style, has done a great deal of harm to Jung’s psychology, and I think its reissue in whatever form a grave mistake”. (October 12, 1964, RA).

49. In 2003, the Philemon Foundation was established to raise funds to accomplish this task. For details, see www.philemonfoundation.org, and Ann Casement (this volume). Princeton University Press will be publishing Jung’s *Children’s Dream Seminar* in the Philemon Series of the Philemon Foundation, reviving Jung publishing there.

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The founding of *The Journal of Analytical Psychology*

Ann Casement

The *Journal of Analytical Psychology* (JAP) celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2005 with a conference at Oxford where I was invited to give a paper as a member of a plenary panel chaired by Murray Stein, the former President of the International Association for Analytical Psychology (IAAP). My interest in writing the present chapter on the founding of the Journal was sparked by the research entailed in putting together the paper for that event. It seems appropriate to look back after fifty years and reflect on the early beginnings of such a prominent fixture in the worldwide Jungian community. Another contributing factor is that I have been a member of the Journal's lively Editorial Board for some time.

The first issue

The Journal of Analytical Psychology made its first appearance on the 31st October, 1955 under the editorship of Michael Fordham. As James Astor states in his authoritative book on Fordham's work: "Fordham was also the inspiration behind the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* (JAP), and its first editor, a position he held for fifteen

years, establishing a tradition of scientific rigour, which for most of its subsequent life it has maintained" (Astor 1995, p. 7).

The appearance of the first issue of the *JAP* published by Tavistock Publications marked an historic event for which reason it would be interesting to devote a little space to it. The *Editorial Note* at the front, which also acts as a mission statement, states it was dedicated to Professor C.G. Jung and presented to him in a specially bound volume by the members of The Society of Analytical Psychology (SAP) in London on the occasion of his 80th birthday. "They believe it to be a meaningful coincidence that in this year the Society is also celebrating its own tenth anniversary" (*JAP*, 1955, p. 3).

There is an encomium to Dr H.G. Baynes "who for many years pioneered virtually alone in this country" (*JAP*, 1955, p. 3). Mention is made of his publications, particularly *The Mythology of the Soul*, and the fact that he played the leading part in forming the first professional body of analysts in Britain. "Soon after his death this group, composed largely of colleagues from Germany, to whom special gratitude is also due, formed themselves into the Society of Analytical Psychology Ltd". (*JAP*, 1955, p. 3).

A statement of editorial policy follows: "The truly gigantic and fundamental nature of Jung's labours, however, could never blind us to our own capacity to work out in more detail, or to apply in new spheres, those concepts which can and need to be subjected to scrutiny, constructive criticism, and elaboration" (*JAP*, 1955, p. 4). It was this that stimulated members of the London Society to undertake original research, theoretical and clinical, in order to develop Jung's concepts and methods. This resulted in three realizations: that Jung's concepts were indeed capable of useful elaboration; that there was insufficient recorded case material; and that a wide gap separated analytic concepts and practice from psychiatry.

There was an acknowledgement that the SAP was the largest group of analysts in the world having forty members and to the fact that this gave it the impetus to publish its own Journal. This was followed by a hope that Societies in other parts of the world would follow suit, particularly Switzerland and the United States. The *Editorial Note* concludes with the Editor's thanks to the US Bollingen Foundation, originally funded by the Mellon family, for its donation "which will relieve us of much financial anxiety over the first years, and enable us to maintain the integrity of our policy" (*JAP*, 1955, p. 5).

The Editorial Board consisted of Michael Fordham as Editor, *with the assistance of* Gerhard Adler, John Layard, Robert Moody, and Leopold Stein, (all members of the SAP), *in collaboration with* C.G. Jung and E. Bernhard (Rome), R. Cahen (Paris), J. Henderson (San Francisco), J. Kirsch (Beverly Hills), E. Neumann (Tel-Aviv), F. Pye (Durban), Esther Harding (New York).

The first number has five papers all written by members of the SAP: J. Layard, R. Hobson, R. Moody, L. Stein and A. Allenby, with a short communication by A. Storr. The *Critical Notices* are two in all: a lengthy one by Gordon Stewart Prince on four of the volumes of the *Collected Works: Psychology and Alchemy; Two Essays on Analytical Psychology; The Practice of Psychotherapy; The Development of Personality*. The other, by Kenneth Lambert, is on what Fordham calls "that great little book *Answer to Job*", (JAP, 1955, p. 4). Anyone interested in finding out more about some of these is directed to the paper presented by Joe Cambray at the JAP's 50th anniversary conference entitled *Towards the feeling of emergence*, which has been published in Vol. 51, No. 1 in February 2006. As he says there: "The papers selected for the inaugural issue, the JAP's equivalent of a "creation myth", display a remarkable diversity of viewpoints" (JAP, 2006, p. 5).

It has not been possible to locate figures about the print run and number of subscribers to the first issue. However, the Journal's aim as set out in the *Editorial Note* is "not only for the readers, it is also a stimulus for the writers and analysts to develop and set out their ideas, and will thus tend to set a different tone to the Society's proceedings" (JAP, 1955, p. 5). Prior to the existence of the JAP, Michael Fordham published papers in journals that included *The Psychologist*, published lectures at the Guild of Pastoral Psychology, and probably the most important vehicle, *The British Medical Journal*, which includes Gerhard Adler and perhaps other Jungians" (Elizabeth Urban, personal communication).

As the JAP developed over the next few years, the list of assistant editors and collaborators grew steadily. In the January 1957 issue, E.F. Edinger (New York) was added to the masthead and F. Riklin's (Zürich) and C.A. Meier's (Zürich) names appear in January 1958. For obvious reasons, Jung's name was taken off the masthead from the January 1962 issue on. The founding and growth of the *Journal* ran in parallel with tensions between different orientations in the Jungian community as testified by Thomas Kirsch in the following:

... at the end of the first Congress in Zürich in 1958 ... I was at a dinner ... with my parents, Marie-Lousie von Franz and Barbara Hannah, I remember them discussing Michael Fordham, and the fact that they did not consider him a true Jungian. From this I have always gathered that the tension between the Zürich analysts and London goes back at least that far.

Bitter feelings between the London and Zürich groups remained for many years after that event. The Journal became the organ to expound and elucidate Jung's theories and practices in terms of developmental theory which included psychoanalytic influences. The international advisory board underwent a radical change to include individuals more sympathetic to developmental issues. Neumann died in 1960, Bernhard in 1965. Cahen withdrew and my father and Fordham had a conflict over my father's paper on King Lear, and my father resigned. [Thomas Kirsch, personal communication]

Following on from the above, it is worth noting that James Kirsch's name no longer appeared on the masthead from the July 1962 number on. As the years went by, non-UK representation on the masthead continued to expand and by July 1974 the assistant editors numbered four and the collaborators had grown to nineteen. The latter included five from the SAP—Michael Fordham, R.F. Hobson, John Layard, Gordon Prince and Jean Rhees. There were also five from the US whilst the rest came from Continental Europe.

The development of the Journal through the 1950s

The material in this section includes extracts from copies of the SAP News Letter, Minutes of the Editors' Annual Reports to the Annual General Meeting of the Society, and Reports from the Chair of the SAP.

The SAP News Letter of March 1956 carries the following report on the *Journal*:

The first issue of the *Journal* appeared on October 31st and a celebration party was held at the S.A.P. It represented a lot of hard work on the part of our Editor, Dr Fordham, and the Editorial Board, at present consisting of Drs Adler, Layard, Moody and Stein. We were fortunate to secure the services of

Mr Harvard-Watts of Tavistock Publications who has taken much pains in its production. 10,000 "blurbs" have been printed to advertise it and many have all ready been sent out to organisations, associations, booksellers, libraries, and individuals. Further names will always be welcome. Its appearance would hardly be possible without the support of The Bollingen Foundation who have given us 1,000 dollars for two years, by which time we hope the *Journal* will pay for itself. The next issue is scheduled for April. The Editor says that he has a sufficient number of long articles, but badly needs short contributions. Anyone who has an idea but is not sure how to set about it has any member of the Editorial Board at his disposal.

The \$1,000 dollars referred to above would be equal to \$6,870.42 in 2006.

The News Letter of October 1956 reports that there was a delay in publishing the second number of the *Journal* in May 1956 due to a printers' strike. A fortunate consequence of this was that it was possible to add the paper by Erich Neumann in honour of the centenary of Freud's birth. The report makes it clear that contrary to the impression given by the first number containing papers by members of the SAP only, the second number contains contributions from J.L. Henderson, Arnold Toynbee and E. Neumann. There is a moving obituary written by Michael Fordham for Emma Jung which concludes with the following words: "Mercifully her end was painless; like an act of divine providence she had scarcely any symptoms till she passed quietly away in a uræmic coma" (*JAP*, 1956, p. 112). The report also cites a reference to L. Stein's article *Loathesome Women* in the first number of the *Journal* which was featured in *Time Magazine*, and led to a number of enquiries about the *Journal*.

The SAP Chairman's Report to the AGM of July 1957 states it was a major achievement for a small Society to produce and maintain a *Journal* and gives credit to Michael Fordham as Editor and Doctors Adler, Layard, Moody and Stein, the Assistant Editors for its excellent quality. The SAP Council had discussed the proper functions of Assistant Editors and it was decided to hold regular meetings at least twice a year. It was resolved that Council would elect new Assistant Editors and Alfred Plaut and Robert Hobson were so elected.

The *JAP* Editor's Report to the same AGM stated that the *Journal* was always likely to be run at a loss if it were to maintain its present research standard but that circulation should rise progressively. Franz Riklin and C.A. Meier had agreed to be collaborating editors and Edward Edinger was the representative to coordinate activities in the U.S. where the circulation was unsatisfactory.

The Hon. Treasurer's Report to that AGM announced that there had been a loss of £449 on the first three numbers of the *Journal*. Further down in the Chairman's Report there is a statement by him that is a presentiment of difficulties to come in the worldwide analytical psychology community.

There are changes in the scope and theory of analytical psychology. The impact of other psychological schools of thought, increased by the clinical orientation in London and the advent of more thoroughly psychiatrically trained members has led to closer examination of fundamental findings and concepts. As flights of speculation give way to consideration of the reliability of research methods, and the validity of inference, the gaps in our theory become all too evident. The unique and important role of analytical psychology in encompassing both the exact-scientific explanatory approach and the holistic-intuitive, understanding attitude bring with it particular difficulties and special sources of conflict in a Jungian group.

The Chairman, Robert Hobson's News Letter dated 22nd January, 1958 stated that the price of the *Journal* had been increased to sixteen shillings per issue and thirty shillings per volume.

The entry on the *Journal* in the Chairman's Report for 1959 stated that under the able editorship of Dr M. Fordham it had maintained a high standard throughout the year and the Assistant Editors had met on one occasion. The Bollingen Foundation had promised a grant of up to £300 p.a. for three more years, on condition that it was matched by an equal figure by contributions from other sources. A *Journal* Fund had been opened at the SAP and 15 members and 3 outside bodies had so far contributed £189.8.10d. Edward Edinger was publicising the Fund in America. Due to major problems at Tavistock Publications Limited it was hoped that a contract could be entered into with a firm which would be more energetic in promoting publicity and sales.

The Chairman's News Bulletin of 31st March, 1959 stated that response to the *Journal* Fund had been disappointing and the future

of the *Journal* was uncertain unless it could be put on a sound financial basis.

Correspondence (1)

The material quoted in this section is from the Michael Fordham Archive housed at the Wellcome Institute Library in London. Correspondence (1) includes letters between Jung and Fordham the first two of which are dated 1955 and relate to the possibility of founding the International Association for Analytical Psychology (IAAP) and a Federation Journal.

22nd April, 1955

Dear Professor Jung,

I imagine you would like to know what is being thought over here about the notion of forming a federation of analysts and publishing a Federation Journal, and how it relates to our own Journal. It seems generally agreed that a Federation Journal need not collide with our own which is not primarily international, but of course analysts will have to work! Furthermore, it appears to us that provided the policies were collated, at least in outline, there should not be any difficulty. As far as I can see, with a definite editorial policy and a reasonably active editor there is no lack of writers to draw on. Therefore I cannot see that there would be a shortage of papers. I confess to some surprise when Meier wrote that the appearance of the *Journal* had caused some consternation, and still can only conjecture what it is about.

In general my own feeling about a federation is this: it is a good idea under certain conditions. Firstly the federating units should have almost complete autonomy, that is, the American, the Zürich Institute and the London Society should run their own shows completely. The federation between them should be very loose, having the aim at keeping each body informed of the others' activities and of having convening conferences at regular intervals. I think it is fair to say that this is the general view of my colleagues and I feel it is a practical one, since a central organisation is virtually impossible to bring about.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
[Michael Fordham]

27 April, 1955

Dear Fordham,

As to the idea of a journal to be published over here, I am [not] informed. I am leaving all decisions and plans to Dr Meier, and I have no intention to interfere in any way. If you raise no objections, I am going to inform Dr Meier of your thoughts as you presented them in your letter.

Sincerely yours,
[C.G. Jung]

This correspondence is followed two years later by some further correspondence between Jung and Fordham, this time centred on an article by C.A. Meier. This later correspondence is illuminating in showing how Fordham worked as the Editor of the *Journal*.

16th October, 1957

Dear Dr Fordham,

This is a confidential letter, of which I wish you to keep it under your hat. Frau Jaffé has told me that you are intending to publish a paper by Dr Meier that has been printed in Gonseth's "Dialectica". Since you don't mention the title of Meier's paper, I suppose it is a matter of the one, in which he deals with transference and synchronicity. Almost four months ago Dr Meier has asked me to give him a detailed critique of it, which I have done. When you study this paper carefully you will discover a considerable snag which I have demonstrated to Meier clearly enough. Meier has not let me know, whether he agrees with my critique or not and as there is nobody else having carefully read the paper, I am the only-one that has taken the trouble to read it critically. Therefore I should wish seriously that you would go through the paper with great care. The author is bringing in the question of synchronicity in an unwar[/r]antable way, according to my view. It is not even quite certain that he understands the term properly. Thus he applies it in places, where one should speak of [/] causality. The beginning of the paper is quite good, the trouble begins, when he starts with synchronicity. I don't like

at all to interfere with your plans, but in this case I thought it was my duty to warn you in time. I am sorry for Meier; particularly so, as it is not the first time, where I have had to prevent a "gaffe".

Yours sincerely,
[C.G. Jung]

18th October, 1957

Dear Professor Jung,

I am more than grateful to you for writing to me about Dr Meier's article, and I shall spend this weekend reading it through again. I fear my desire to have an article from one of the analysts in Zürich may have made me overlook something.

As you say he only showed you this article four months ago, I am just wondering whether it is the same one we are talking about. The paper which has now been sent to the publishers is called "Projektion, Übertragung und Subjekt-Objektrelation" and was published in 1954, so we may be talking about different ones. If it is the same I can see that it will be awkward from the point of view of the *Journal*. I felt this paper was useful because of its discussion of projection in a way that I do not recollect being put so well before. It will be followed by a paper on the counter-transference and the two fit together nicely. I shall hope that the paper may be let go as it stands and the corrections to it made in another issue, preferably by Meier himself. I think he might be able to do this without loss of face since the paper was written so long ago. I shall not, however, communicate with him until I am sure we are talking about the same paper.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
[Michael Fordham]

24th October, 1957

Dear Professor Jung,

Many thanks for your letter. I agree with you that Meier would do better to change his paper, but of course it is up to him to do what he feels best. I agree with you that he gets into trouble when it comes to synchronicity because he has identified it with

magical transference and compared it with primitive societies in which similarity is used for the purpose of *effecting* a cure. I am not at all sure about the long distance effect that he describes in Mrs. Wickes's case but I would be inclined to let that slide. There still remains the question of whether th[e] [changes] could be done before the article is printed. I realize that in a way I have been remiss as an editor because I had not read the article as carefully as I should. However, I fear I assumed that something coming out of Zürich would be authentic; in addition I was particularly anxious to give an hospitable reception to anybody who agreed to publish their paper.

Personally I cannot help feeling that a discussion arising from Meier's paper might be profitable, for I am sure numbers of people would overlook such a mistake. If it was taken up specifically it would not drive home to people that magic and synchronicity are not the same. I frequently come across this mistake in my patients!

I take it that you would not like to criticize Meier yourself at this juncture. I am also fond of him but I feel that all of us have made blunders from time to time and it is possible to be grateful to people for correcting them so long as it is done in a constructive and sympathetic way. I feel myself that Meier is on to something which might prove interesting, that it is behind the causal relation there is also a synchronistic one in the transference. I think he may have been reaching after this without hitting the mark.

If you would let me know whether your criticism and mine are in agreement, I will certainly transmit my view to Meier and ask him whether he wants to make an alteration. By a judicious combination of cutting I think he could succeed in getting round what I believe to be wrong.

Yours sincerely,
[Michael Fordham]

26th October, 1957

Dear Dr Fordham,

As a whole I think, we cannot risk it to print definite errors, without trying first to correct them. It certainly would start a discussion about Meier's paper, but not in his interest and not to his advantage. Moreover I think, it is not quite fair to let him step into a trap. He ought to be warned by all means. I also am

doubtful, whether it is in the interest of the Journal to print erroneous statements. A discussion can be started nevertheless, because, as you say, Meier is trying to formulate the innuendos of synchronicity in the process of transference, which is a very important topic indeed. If you allow me to express my subjective opinion, I should tell your criticism to Meier and ask him for the necessary corrections.

My best wishes

Yours cordially
[C.G. Jung]

29th October, 1957

Dear Professor Jung,

I agree with you entirely that Meier should not be allowed to step into a trap, and I would be most grateful if you would approach him on the subject. I feel I would like to write to him myself, however, saying where I think the difficulty arises and giving him an opportunity to make any changes he wishes. He should get a letter from me by the same post as this arrives with you and I shall tell him that you have been in touch with me. Recently in a letter to me he said there was some doubt about his paper so presumably he was referring to your critical assessment of it. I got the feeling from your letter that you might be induced to start a discussion and you will of course realize how welcome this would be.

(The rest of the letter is concerned with matters unrelated to the *Journal*)

With very best regards,

Yours,
[Michael Fordham]

6th November, 1957

Dear Dr Fordham,

(The first paragraph is irrelevant).

Concerning Dr Meier's article, Dr Jung says that he is sorry not to be in the position to "start a discussion" on it. All he had to say, he mentioned in the notes added to Dr Meier's copy; and

Dr Jung said, that it is now up to Dr Meier to think them over and to make the necessary changes in the article. Dr Jung thanks you that you let him know your own critique and to give him a chance to make the necessary changes.

(The rest of the letter is irrelevant).

Yours sincerely

[Aniela Jaffé]

8th November, 1957

Dear Mrs. Jaffé,

Many thanks for your letter. Will you tell Dr Jung that I have heard from Dr Meier and that he wishes to amplify his article, that I am resisting his doing so, but trying to persuade him to write another in amplification. If necessary I might put in an editorial note saying that Dr Meier is conscious of his errors but he acceded to my request not to make changes. I shall thus get the blame and it will be taken off him. It would spoil the *Journal* if the article were changed at this late date.

(The rest of the letter is irrelevant).

Yours sincerely,

[Michael Fordham]

It is worth noting in the above correspondence the rigorous editorial policy employed by Fordham's adherence to what he saw as the correctness of a theory from which vantage point an individual could be seen to make errors. As to the paper under discussion, it was published apparently without corrections in Vol. IV, No. 1 in January 1959 with the title *Projection, Transference, and the Subject-Object Relation*, in juxtaposition with Jung's *A Visionary Rumour*, the two being seen to "amplify each other" (*JAP*, 1959, p. 3). There is no critical commentary about the paper in that volume or succeeding ones. For further elaboration of the above, the reader is directed to Appendix B of this chapter.

Three years later in 1960 there is correspondence between Jung and Fordham, as Editor of the *JAP*, about Father Victor White on the occasion of the latter's death in which Jung refers to the serious condition of his own health. He died the following year.

18th October, 1960

Dear Professor Jung,

I want to ask you whether you would consider writing something about Victor White that could go in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*. I do so with some hesitation because I have heard that you felt he was hostile to you. From what I have known of him I feel sure that this was not true in a personal sense though he was critical of some of your formulations. I never felt myself that he was unconstructive, however, and I know very well the great respect and admiration that he had for you.

I think there is nobody else who would be capable of assessing his worth and we should either have to fall back on publishing a formal statement about him or nothing at all. It may be just as well if a formal statement goes in should you wish to make a personal contribution.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

[Michael Fordham]

21st October, 1960

Dear Fordham,

Unfortunately I am not in a condition to do any mental work. I am just recovering from a serious illness, due to exhaustion and I am under strict orders to avoid especially mental efforts. Under normal circumstances I should have liked to do something in the case of Victor White, his struggle against the psychological point of view being at the same time a general problem and worth a serious disquisition.

Frau Dr Jacobi might be a suitable substitute inasmuch as she knew Father White and as she is herself Catholic. I am sorry that I am so uncooperative, but my old age demands a high tribute. (The rest of the letter is irrelevant).

Sincerely yours

[C.G. Jung]

28th October, 1960

Dear Professor Jung,

I am sorry to hear that you have been ill and hope that your recovery is proceeding satisfactorily.

It is sad for us that you are not well enough to do anything about Victor White, and I hardly think there is anybody else who could do justice to this very difficult problem which he presents. Probably I shall not do anything, and since he was on the fringe there is really no obligation to do so.

(The rest is irrelevant)

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

[Michael Fordham]

This short correspondence is preceded in February 1954 by a letter from Jung to Fordham which is revealing about his strong feelings with regard both to Father Victor White and the Christian Church. One wonders whether if Jung had been well enough in 1960 he might have sent something similar to the *Journal* on the occasion of Father White's death.

16th February, 1954

Dear Fordham,

Thank you for your letter and its most amusing report about your philosophical dealings with Father White. Yes, he has a remarkable mind because it is not only logical, but also a remarkable twister and joker, and you put your foot just right into the middle of the plate. The question of the *privatio boni* is or rather was the favourite subject of discussion with Father White. The *privatio boni* is not a dogma, but a so-called sentential communis, i.e., a generally recognized doctrine, and a *discutabile* on principle. Father White thought it necessary—as he obviously did in your case—not to give way to any doubt about it. The doctrine is quite obviously a *petitio principii* of the worst kind, and one can criticize it as you do and in many other ways. One always comes to the conclusion that it is a nonsense. I have discussed it at length in "Aion" and still more privately with Father White until he almost collapsed, poor thing. I felt quite ruthless about it because I wanted to find out whether he really couldn't give way to simple logics. I hadn't known then how much the *privatio boni* is one of the main props of the Christian doctrine in general. It

hangs together with the necessity to maintain the one way goodness of the deity, the so-called Summum Bonum. They simply got to make the assertion absolute that God has not created evil although it is obvious that he has created Satan. Yet Satan is to be found in the dictionary under "devil" and the evil under "evil", and neither in the one nor in the other both subjects are mentioned. One only can feel compassion with the position of an intelligent priest saddled as a representative of the *ordo praedicatorum* is with the defence of the church (Domini cani = canes = God's watch dogs).

Of course, good and evil are subjective feeling judgments, but good is hypostatized in the doctrine, and evil then should be equally real, but it must be a "not being". One does not know exactly what is good and what evil, but the church just knows it.

Apart from those very awkward salti mortali, Father White is a very nice fellow and delightfully intelligent, but one can see in his case in what an awful position the church is.

Thank you for the news about Bennett.

Cordially yours,
[C.G. Jung]

Correspondence (2)

The following correspondence about the *Journal* is between Michael Fordham and Franz Riklin, President of the Curatorium in Zürich, and Vice-President of the newly formed International Association for Analytical Psychology's Executive Committee.

Zürich, 14th July, 1959

Dear Dr Fordham,

After having sent you an answer of the Curatorium, concerning your letter about the *Journal*, I wish to answer you personally as well. If I look back upon the development of the *Journal*, I wish to mention that it was agreed between the London-group and Zürich, that an International Journal should once be edited! You know yourself, that not only Dr Meier, but everybody in this country is disappointed by your autonomous proceeding. I think that this is one of the reasons why the *Journal* did not find enthusiasm in this country. As a *Journal* already exists now, we all feel

that it is not our personal task to support it in the way you are asking for.

I personally think that this question of the *Journal* should be submitted to The International Association for Analytical Psychology and it would be necessary to expose this question to the meeting of Delegates, after having past through the committees of the IAAP.

I am sorry not to be able to give you a more favourable answer, but I think that the only way to do something for a Journal would be through the IAAP.

Hoping that you will understand our point of view and that you will see, that we will be ready to cooperate through the channel of the IAAP, I am with my very best wishes and kindest regards.

[F. Riklin]

The SAP News Letter of March 1956 states that the IAAP Executive Committee consisted of R. Moody, (President), F. Riklin, Vice-president, G. Adler, J. Henderson, H. Kirsch, V. de Laszlo and E. Bernhard. At that time, Zürich was not favourably disposed to the clinical and theoretical London approach exemplified by the SAP and the *JAP*. Furthermore, there were growing tensions between Adler and Fordham touched on in Mario Jacoby's account below. These eventually led to Adler and his followers leaving the SAP in the 1970s. Another member of the IAAP Executive, Ernst Bernhard, was a close friend and colleague of Gerhard Adler's from Berlin so his sympathies would not have been with Fordham. The latter responded to Riklin's letter as follows:

17th July, 1959

Dear Dr Riklin,

I am very grateful for your reply to my earlier letter. I must confess to considerable disappointment at the lack of collaboration exhibited by you people in Zürich, and I frankly do not understand your argument, it being false that there was an agreement between the London group and Zürich. I must tell you that I challenged Dr Meier many years ago to produce any evidence of it and he could not do so, but I do not think this is the reason, which I believe to be more complicated.

Unfortunately there seems to have been an idea that the Society of Analytical Psychology in London was asking for money because it had not got it. We held strongly in London that since we have done the work other analytical psychologists should contribute, and we thought that by broadening the base others would be drawn in and so it would be the beginning of a greater sense of collaboration.

It is proposed to circulate a reply to the criticisms transmitted by Dr Plaut as a result of his stay in Zürich, and you will soon receive this letter.

[M. Fordham]

12th October, 1959

Dear Dr Riklin,

The holidays are over and it is time to get back to work. They have given time for reflection and I want to write to you personally about the response to our *Journal* appeal.

As a whole the response has been good and there have been many appreciative and constructive letters, some offer of papers from new quarters, and new contributors. This is in my view more important than the money, which in any case was guaranteed. However, though the contributions are not complete from the USA., well over £300 will have been collected.

Now it is quite clear that the attitude of analysts of the C.G. Jung Institute is, with a few exceptions, different from others, particularly in the USA. It seems that the Swiss analysts think it of primary importance to have a journal that pays its way. It is furthermore thought that a trilingual journal, supported by the International Association and the Zürich Institute would do better. Now I gather that this consideration is not the real one. What is really wanted is a journal of a general cultural kind, and this has become linked with hostility to the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, which is primarily technical and clinical.

I would be most grateful if you could confirm or otherwise this assessment. I ask this because the impression I get is that there is a great mass of fantasy at work which seems to have been turned against the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* on grounds which are unacceptable to us over here. In my view their unjustified nature will get recognized in the course of time, but nothing can be done about it yet.

If you could say anything about why a trilingual journal, of the kind that seems to be envisaged, does not materialize it would be helpful, and I want to make it clear that as far as I am concerned our journal will help foster one in any way that does not threaten the policy set out in the editorial to Vol. 1, No. 1. We regularly, as you will have noticed, give space to articles of this kind and consideration is being given to the idea of giving synopses in other languages than English. One further point: Would you agree that the aims of the London and Zürich groups are the same and that the difference arises on the subject of the means to realize it?

With kind regards,
[M. Fordham]

31st October, 1959

Dear Dr Fordham,

Thank you for your kind letter of October 12th from which I see that the response to your *Journal* appeal has been a good one. I am very pleased that this is so but at the same time must confirm that we really think that it is of primary importance to have a journal that pays its way, or, if this is not possible, to put it on a broader basis, that is—as I already wrote to you once—to have it supported by the International Association. Consequently, we feel that a trilingual journal would really do better as it would be much easier for us and all those who are not from the English speaking world to write contributions in their mother-tongue as this is the way one thinks.

On the other hand I must tell you that your assumption that we would prefer a journal of a general cultural kind is not right at all and we only can understand it as a projection. We have absolutely nothing against the journal being primarily technical and clinical, it is just for that reason that we would prefer publishing our contributions in our own language. I reassure you that there is no hostility involved, neither I can confirm your assessment that there is a great part of fantasy at work turned against the journal. After all I do not understand what you are asking for with your wish that I should agree that the aims of the London and Zürich groups are the same. How shall I be able to agree with something whereof I only know one side. I hope you will understand that I simply cannot reply to such a question without having knowledge of your aims.

[F. Riklin]

6th November, 1959

Dear Riklin,

I am very glad to get your letter and would like to continue our discussion a little further.

I am glad of your confirmation that you feel that it is of primary importance to have a journal that pays its way. I too think it important but believe it to be out of the question, whether it be trilingual, bilingual or monolingual. I gather by consulting authorities on this subject that the *Journal* is likely to double its circulation in time in which case the loss would be very small, and with a special effort we might conceivably push the circulation up to 1,000, it being 400 at present.

I fully appreciate the difficulty of your colleagues who want to write in their mother-tongue and to see their articles published in their own language, but what this means to me is that you want another journal and I get the impression that you are side-stepping this. I think you may very well be unaware of the developments proceeding in this country and in the States, and do not realize that a trilingual journal would not make the same appeal. I think it very unlikely that such a journal would be more of a financial success. I hope this answers the first paragraph of your letter adequately.

Now turning to the general culture question. It is true that I personally, and I think others of us, envy the collection of cultivated people that centre round Zürich and that we hope to collect them in this country as time goes on, but it is untrue to say that the idea of a general culture journal is a projection. It derives from a report from Dr Plaut when he was last over in Zürich and there he said this topic was widely broached. As it has also been put forward to me on several occasions by different people I believe it is correct that there are others in Zürich who want a journal of this kind. When you say there is no hostility involved this is incredible. Dr Plaut says there was a great deal, not only directed towards the *Journal* as a whole but to me personally, and this conforms to the numerous personal attacks to which I have been subjected over the years.

It is also true that there is fantasy connected with the *Journal*. This has been expressed to me and part of it is the notion openly stated that in starting the *Journal* I personally and the Society as a whole acted in bad faith. This is why I am so anxious to get this belief in an agreement settled, and I have asked Dr Hobson

to communicate directly with the Zürich Institute as he was not involved in the controversy whereas I was.

Now I would also like to point out another matter in the last bit of your letter where you say that you have no knowledge of our aims. I notice that though you are a collaborating editor, according to our files in London you do not take the *Journal*, but if you had looked in Vol. 1, No. 1, you would have found a statement of editorial policy which is being implemented in the *Journal* as it goes on. I therefore find it very difficult to understand how you can say you have no knowledge, unless it is that you do not want to know.

I hope you will take this letter as I intended as an attempt to clear up the misunderstandings which your letter only confirms are there.

[M. Fordham]

11th December, 1959

Dear Dr Fordham,

Thank you for your letter of November 6. I have been absent from Zürich in military service and therefore please excuse the delay.

I note what you have written in the first three paragraphs of your letter concerning the *Journal*. We would all be pleased if the *Journal* can achieve a larger circulation, so that it will be less of a financial burden. We shall recommend it to our students and hope to have copies for sale at our publication center when that is organised next year. Also, it is always on open display in the library of the Institute. This is all that we can do for its circulation here.

The many interesting developments in Analytical Psychology in the US and England of which you think we might be unaware, are brought to our attention through the Institute's widespread international connections and of course through the *Journal*. I wonder, on the other hand, if the English speaking world is aware of the developments taking place and elsewhere on the Continent. The problem of languages is a difficult one and we have tried to come to terms with it here by making the Institute as much as possible a genuine multi-lingual center in accordance with Swiss tradition and the international basis of Jung's teachings.

Concerning the accusation of “side-stepping” I want to refuse this absolutely, since the primary question is not “another Journal”, but rather how we can give the present *Journal* a broader basis. As it stands now, the Journal is a publication of the London Society (see Editorial Note Vol. 1, No. 1, page 5). Therefore, I remain with my earlier suggestion that the Journal be placed at the disposal of the International Association which would imply that it ought to be multi-lingual. I believe that in this way, the *Journal* could expect more help from the International Association. If Dr Plaut got the impression you report from his visit that is that a general cultural journal is desired here, there is nothing I can say to deny or to confirm his personal impression; perhaps, it means that the Journal as it has been in the last years does not reflect enough the point of view of people writing in non-English languages. As to your remark about hostility, however, I am very sorry that you have suffered from so many personal attacks but this is surely a result of gossip and matters of a private nature and in no case our official point of view.

Concerning the last point there is a real misunderstanding. I am aware that the aims of the *Journal* were given in the first issue, but you asked that I confirm that the aims of the London and Zürich groups are the same (see last paragraph of your letter of October 12).

I hope that this letter contributes to your attempts at clarification.

[F. Riklin]

It is interesting to note here the English language dominance of analytical psychology at this time with the publication of *Harvest* in London 1954 (personal communication, Renos Papadopoulos), and *Spring* in the US in 1941 (personal communication, Jan Marlan). Most importantly of all, the English edition of Jung's *Collected Works* made the bulk of Jung's published writings available in a comparatively short span of time from his death in 1961. “It has had an inestimable effect upon disseminating Jung's work and in fostering the development of the profession of analytical psychology in the English-speaking world. It is not incidental that the English-speaking world is where Jung's work has had its greatest impact” (Personal communication, Sonu Shamdasani).

15th December, 1959

Dear Dr Riklin,

I was glad to get your letter and pleased at the helpful proposals contained in the second paragraph. I take it that you do not feel able to help by buying the *Journal* in bulk for those Swiss analysts who want to subscribe to it and so circumvent the difficulties which seem to crop up in the transmission of money and renewal of subscriptions.

Turning to your third paragraph, I think there is a real difficulty in establishing mutual understanding of what is going on in the various parts of the world where analytical psychology is developing, and of course you in Switzerland are in a particularly strong position, both because you are nearest the source of all our inspirations and have a multilingual tradition behind you. I had hoped that the *Journal* might be able to help by publishing periodic bulletins of the International Association. This hope seems to have foundered, but I wondered whether there is not another way in which communication could be facilitated.

For instance, if you in Switzerland would consider sending information in whatever form you felt suitable, this would certainly be welcomed as a contribution to the *Journal*, and I think I can say without qualification that it would be printed. Your next paragraph: I am certainly glad to hear you are not side-stepping the issues, but I think I should make it clear to you that as far as I understand the policy of the London Society, it is likely for a good many years to come to insist on the *Journal* being its publication, and I may give it as my personal opinion that it would be most unsatisfactory for it to be an organ of the International Association because it would not only make for administrative difficulties, but also tend to embroil the publication in political manoeuvres, to which it would be highly vulnerable. This is not a theoretical statement, but one that has grown out of experience of committee work in international societies, and being assistant editor of journals of large societies, particularly the British Psychological Society.

There is, I think, another way in which your wish to put the *Journal* on a broader basis can be interpreted. It is by changing the content so that it accords more with the kind of material which analytical psychologists want to see in it. I think that I can say as editor that I would not be unsympathetic towards moves in any direction, and I tried to make this clear in the note on

editorial policy, but the implementation of moves ultimately depends on the activities of analysts and their capacity to produce papers of sufficiently good scientific standard. The fact remains that at the present time most papers are produced in London and this will only change if papers of a different kind are actually submitted.

In your next paragraph you remark about the personal attacks to which I am subjected. Though these are disagreeable I understand very well that they are virtually inevitable, and on the whole I have not found myself resenting them. It is nevertheless reassuring to hear from you that the Zürich Institute does not wish to express hostility towards the *Journal* nor, I hope, the London Society.

[M. Fordham]

There was some further correspondence between Fordham and Riklin but the next important letter is from Fordham below. This summarizes and responds to what had been taking place between them just before that.

1st April, 1960

Dear Riklin,

Many thanks for your letter, but I was sorry to think that you had in reality no possibility to cooperate with the editor's board, since I was hoping that you would feel able to take a more active part in activities of the *Journal*, and indeed I wanted to discuss with you certain propositions in which the publishers were also interested. I may perhaps take the opportunity of mentioning two of them here, though of course they are not fixed.

As you know, Tavistock Publications have now amalgamated with a much larger and I think more efficient publisher and I thought it might be of interest to you not only as a member of the editorial board but also as President of the International Association to see how things were managed over here. The propositions on which I would like to have your comments are these:

(1) That the *Journal* should contain in each number a *zusammenfassung* to the English papers of about one page in length to each; and

(2) that occasional papers in German, followed by an English translation in small print, should be published.

I also have it in mind, and this is I must tell you strictly confidential, to change the editorial arrangements and to put amongst the assistant editors one representative from Switzerland and another from the States. It is obvious from our point of view that it should be of interest to the Journal to have you as an assistant editor, taking a very much more active part than heretofore.

There is another sentence in your letter which I find nothing short of astonishing when you say that I am "the only editor who really has to do with the *Journal*". From my point of view this is utterly untrue and always has been. It disturbs me because your statement corresponds to rumours, and I want you to know that every step in the development of *Journal* policy has invariably been taken in active consultation with colleagues, and every paper is seen by a colleague as well as myself, and sometimes more than one, and that I have been in constant consultation with the editors in America when we were trying to increase the sales in that country.

[M. Fordham]

The rest of their correspondence deals with implementing proposals (1) and (2) in the above letter with the approval of the Curatorium. Dr K.W. Bash, a member of the Curatorium, was suggested as an Assistant Editor for Switzerland as he was fluent in English and German, and his name duly appears on the masthead of the *JAP* Vol. 6, No. 1 in 1961. Fordham's next letter is to Robert Hobson, Chair of the SAP.

3rd June, 1960

Dear Bob,

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have just had from Riklin together with my reply. If we can keep this up it looks as though the end of our intense conflicts is not too far away.

I am uncertain about changing the assistant editors. Riklin's letter makes me feel more inclined to do something drastic; on the other hand we might deal with the matter as we have already dealt with Edinger, by putting a note inside. As the assistant editors are appointed by the Society it might be desirable for the

Society itself to decide what should be done. This would make the whole thing more impersonal and avoid hurt feelings.

[M. Fordham]

This correspondence is rounded off by a letter from Fordham to Riklin in 1964 where the former offers to give space free of charge in the *Journal* to information which the International Society might like to make public.

Correspondence (3)

The following is a personal communication from Mario Jacoby in Zürich about Michael Fordham and the *Journal*.

The *Journal* started in 1955, if I am correct and read correctly the very first volume which I own. At that time I just began my training at the Jung-Institute in Zürich. I already was reading the journal but after 1965, when my training was finished Toni Frey (C.T. Frey) recommended me to Mary Williams to write a review on some books for the journal which I did. Thus Michael knew me just from the reviews which, I think, he did not like very much. It was at the Congress of 1968, when Gerhard Adler had his accusatory lecture against his colleagues around Michael Fordham, accusing them of not being Jungian any more, as they took so much to Klein and lost the essential Jungian spirit and the connection to the numinous. At that congress I had my first lecture on a "case of transference" which Michael seems to have liked. Anyhow he invited me to give this lecture in London at a meeting of the SAP. I also felt awful about Gerhard's accusations and the applause he had and I invited Mary Williams and Michael, Redfearn and so on for dinner in my home—as we Zürich people should offer some hospitality at a Congress. But at that time hardly anyone in Zürich did.

That was the beginning of a kind of friendship with Fordham. At the time there was very little tolerance from the side of Jungians for anything with the slightest Freudian slant. Thus one supported the attitude of Adler and had quite a lot of animosity against "Freudian renegades" like Michael and his colleagues ... Therefore I wrote to Michael Fordham a letter about the conflicts I felt between my feelings of gratefulness and loyalty to von Franz, Riklin, etc., my teachers at the Institute on

one hand and my interest in the ideas of Michael Fordham. Thus Michael wrote me a very understanding, even “warm” letter (difficult to believe, but he had also this side). Thus our correspondence was mainly about the different attitudes between Zürich and London and his satisfaction that I saw the lack of clinical sophistication over here in contrast to his attempts to integrate childhood and much more subtle and differentiated research into the transference/countertransference issues.

I just today found a very nice letter of his, written in 1975 after he had received the “Festschrift” for his birthday which Kenneth Lambert had put together and edited. In it there is also a paper of mine “Reflections on being a Jungian analyst” which, according to Michael’s wording “expresses your liberal point of view and is nicely written”. He continues: “It is good to know what the “London school” has produced can be used by you—that is the best that could be wished for. I want to continue quoting from his letter: “I believe that the exaggerated “Jungianism” that is going about and producing such disagreeable conflicts is a manifestation of mourning Jung’s death. That has at least produced much of my disagreement with colleagues over here who did not know Jung. Recognition of this has prevented me replying and only recently could I identify myself more closely with the SAP. I thought you might like to see what I said to them at our last meeting”. And as a p.s. “I am bound to say that I believe that, in reality, there are wide differences between members of our society and I welcome it”.

I think he was a little disappointed later on when I became so interested in Kohut’s self psychology. But when he came to Zürich or more often when I was in England, I always visited him in his country house.

This is just a gist of our relationship at the time and our correspondence.

Conclusion

From its inception in 1955 the *Journal* has been at the centre of the controversies in the worldwide analytical psychology community. Papers appeared in its pages pioneering an interdisciplinary approach which were initially received with many reservations by the IAAP community at large. And it is true that “many of the stated causes of the splits with Jungian organizations world wide have

occurred along the divide linked to the importation of psychoanalytic clinical technique in Jungian practice" (*JAP*, 2006, p. 89). There are divergent views on how Michael Fordham viewed this. For instance, Sonu Shamdasani comments: "I recall something in the memorial volume to Louis Zinkin where he expresses his shock at how psychoanalytic the SAP had become". (Personal communication). Shamdasani goes on to say: "Concerning the insufficient recognition of his work, this was something he expressed to me many times".

Barbara Wharton, a former Editor of the *JAP*, says that "Michael Fordham and the others who were involved in setting up the *JAP* were keen to show how Jung's work could be adapted to accommodate findings in child development research and in psychoanalysis. Fordham's aim was not to supersede the classical Jungian approach, but rather to marry the two, each informing the other. His theory of deintegration/reintegration is a working out of this". (Personal communication).

Many of the controversies sparked in the analytical psychology community by the founding of the *JAP* have centred on differences in language, both literal and ideological, which continue to this day. The limitations of space deter an elaboration of these here but the interested reader is referred to papers by Thomas Kirsch, Barbara Wharton and Ann Casement under the heading *Panel: The complementary roles of the IAAP and the JAP in developing Jungian clinical practice* in the *JAP*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2006. Lastly, it is important to bear in mind that Jung gave his blessing to the founding of the *JAP* and had his name on the masthead under *In collaboration with* from the very beginning until his death in 1961.

APPENDIX A

UK and US Editors

The following is a listing of all the UK and US *JAP* Editors since its inception in 1955. They have each kindly contributed a short statement about their time in office apart from Michael Fordham, whose entry the writer of this piece has put together.

Michael Fordham: Editor from 1955 to 1971

Michael Fordham was the *Journal's* founder and pioneer of the "developmental" approach that features prominently in its pages. Underlying this was the fact that the inclusion of infantile material became an essential ingredient of the analytic process. This has combined with an interdisciplinary and scientifically based approach to give the *JAP* its unique position in analytical psychology.

*Alfred (Fred) Plaut: Sole Editor from July 1971 to July 1976.
Joint Editor from January 1977 to January 1979*

I took over from Michael Fordham. During my apprenticeship he had told me what he had heard another editor say, namely that the only problem with being an editor were the authors. He smiled as he said it and I do as I write this.

I remember enjoying all the editorial work and was proud that during my sole editorship the frequency of the *Journal* could be raised from being a half-yearly to being a quarterly.

*Judith Hubback: Joint Editor from January 1977 to January 1979.
Sole Editor from January 1979 to January 1986*

Michael Fordham warned me not to commission a paper: turning it down would then be impossible. He added that the *Journal* would be all right in my obsessional hands. I hoped for the best and gathered from stray remarks by friends that it was good, including friends in the US. People said it had come alive. There was certainly enough very enjoyable work and little need to look for papers.

Rosemary Gordon: Editor from January 1986 to January 1994

For me it really started to click into place when the bridge started to work between myself as editor of the *Journal* in London and

John Beebe as Editor on the other side of the Atlantic. There was a sort of quantum shift in the quality and quantity of the papers that both of us received for the new transatlantic journal. It seemed to me that both sides benefited greatly. I think that Michael Fordham shared that view, as did John.

John Beebe: US Editor from 1990 to 1997

I was the first American co-editor of the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, a post I held for seven years, from 1990 to 1997. The decision to set up a transatlantic co-editorship has itself an interesting history. A number of Americans and others were growing restive with what seemed to them the insularity of the *Journal* especially around issues like homosexuality, self-disclosure, dialogic approaches to the conduct of psychotherapy, and self-psychology, all of which were being revalued in the American literature in advance of their reception in England during the 1980s. The question that arose was whether the *JAP* should be the main English language journal: perhaps the IAAP should sponsor its own journal in English. Murray Stein, Rosemary Gordon and I met at the Paris Congress in 1989, and not long after, on New Year's Day of 1990 as I recall, she offered me the American co-editorship of the *JAP*. That seemed to put to rest the need for a new English language journal that would incorporate some of the viewpoints that I and others felt the *JAP* had not been representing with the same vigour as it did those represented by Michael Fordham in his book *Jungian Psychotherapy*. Rosemary's offer brought with it my first real appreciation of the generosity the *JAP* could muster, and a chance to work first with Rosemary herself and then with Coline Covington and Barbara Wharton, all of whom treated me with a great deal of respect and love as I set about bringing what at least this American could to the already rich mix of the *Journal*. I suppose my major accomplishments involved helping the *Journal* capture a larger share of the American audience, modelling a more extensive process of editing manuscripts so that they would not, when published, appear to be speaking a language best understood by those who had trained at the Society for Analytical Psychology, and taking the major responsibility for two very successful "crossroads" conferences at which Jungian analysts entered into dialogue with psychoanalysts at a level of collegiality that was unprecedented. At the end of my

work of years with the *Journal*, the issues that had concerned me before I joined the team were no longer so relevant to me. What I had learned, and I hope those reading the *Journal* during those years of my editorship had done as well, was that analysis is in many ways a generic matter about which we all have much to learn, and that the job of an analytic journal is to keep us communicating as often, as fully, and as clearly as possible about what analysts are doing and thinking in every corner of the globe. I believe that view is a value that now prevails in the *Journal*, and I recognize (with more humility than I had when I came aboard) that it is one that fulfills Michael Fordham's vision from the beginning for the *JAP*. But I'm glad to have been one who moved it forward into the twenty-first century.

*Coline Covington and Barbara Wharton: Joint Editors
from January 1994 through January 2001*

At the start of our time as joint-editors of the *JAP*, along with John Beebe, we decided to embark on a new direction for the *Journal* with the aim of re-building bridges with the psychoanalytic community and furthering a cross-fertilization of analytic ideas. With this in mind, we began a series of conferences featuring psychoanalytic speakers alongside analytical psychologists and focusing on clinical and theoretical issues that were of common concern. The first of these conferences was held in Sebasco, Maine, in June 1996, and explored the interface between psychoanalysis and analytical psychology. This conference formed the seedbed for further conferences over the following six years in which different aspects of this theme were elaborated. We think these conferences achieved not only greater personal links between psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists but also a deeper understanding of some of the similarities and differences in our respective approaches. They also paved the way for exchanges between analytical psychologists and psychoanalysts in other contexts, most notably within the 2004 IPA congress where analytical psychologists were invited to participate in a panel discussion about analytical psychology and psychoanalytic approaches today. We think these initiatives have been important in developing a broader intellectual base for the *Journal* that continues to deepen and grow.

Joe Cambray: US Editor from July 1997 through April 2005

At the time I became the US editor the cultural zeitgeist was embracing diversity, including an intersubjective field approach to much of human endeavours. The first of the JAP conferences had occurred and I was delighted to become involved in aspects of planning the second one, "Family Matters". The responsiveness of the Jungian community to these and the following 4 conferences lead to our publishing a broadening range of topics with the Journal. Reconsideration of core Jungian concepts in the light of new knowledge from a host of fields, such as the neurosciences, cognitive and consciousness studies, attachment theory, psychoanalysis, evolutionary studies and many other disciplines brought a vibrant exchange with a number of scholars in various fields. This had a significant impact on many of the authors who submitted papers to the JAP; in general the community demonstrated a desire to explore and enter into dialogue with the larger world of contemporary thought, from the philosophical to the scientific and the historical. The ramification for clinical practice of these explorations was often included in papers as a necessary aspect to grounding the understanding of new ways of thinking.

Personally, during this period I too found myself returning to some of my previous training in the sciences, noting the developments, especially those in complexity theory. Forging links between the analytic and the scientific, weaving together strands of my own vocational strivings has been one of the unforeseen, emergent rewards from my work as editor.

Jean Knox: Editor from November 2000

I became the UK Editor at a point which offered exciting opportunities for developing the *Journal* in new directions, in keeping with its role as the main forum for scholarly clinical and theoretical discussion in analytical psychology. We increased from 4 to 5 issues in 2003. We have appointed specialists who can help us evaluate papers which cover specialist areas of knowledge relating to analytical psychology and we have continued to strengthen the *Journal's* international dimension, extending the international representation on the editorial board. The rapidly-evolving world of electronic publishing led to a decision to invest in a complete digitization of all

back issues as part of our celebration of 50 years of publication. As Editor my aims have been to maintain the clinical focus of the *Journal*, while placing clinical discussion in the context of the research from other disciplines which can help us to evaluate and revise our theories and clinical practice.

Michael Horne: US Editor from March 2005

My experience has been wonderful. I've met some very stimulating colleagues who are a joy to work with. The work of editing papers and organizing the content of each *Journal* issue is very fulfilling. A wonderful bonus is the pleasure of organizing a conference. This includes developing the issues involved with a particular topic with one's co-editor and designing the format of a conference to bring forward these issues, to foster an environment in which new and seasoned speakers feel welcomed and to create a friendly social setting for the renewal and creation of professional and personal relationships.

Another somewhat surprising benefit of being an editor has been the development of my own writing skills through the process of editing other writers work.

Pramila Bennett: Managing Editor from February 1997

It is interesting that the *Journal* started sporting the C.G. Jung Logo of the SAP from Volume 12, Issue 1, January 1967, after the Third International Congress in Montreux in 1965. The Editorial carried no explanation for this. Before that the *Journal* was just known as the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*. Another interesting fact is that it started calling itself "An International Quarterly of Jungian Practice and Theory" from January 1996 (following its 40th birthday). Although John Beebe, the first American Editor, had been appointed in 1990, his name appearing on the masthead from April 1990, Volume 35, Issue 2, neither this issue nor the previous one carries any explanation for the appointment of a US co-editor. There was a cover change from January 1996 and the Editorial of Volume 41, Issue 1 of 1996, has explanations of this development.

APPENDIX B

In the exchange of letters between Jung and Fordham (and with Jaffé for Jung) from 16th October 1957 through 8th November 1957 regarding Meier's paper which is headed for eventual publication in the *JAP* in 1959, we are offered a fascinating glimpse into some of the complications that arose in early editorial work of the *Journal*. It may be of interest to have a bit more of the relevant background operating in these letters and to reflect on Fordham's editorial decision regarding this paper, now at a distance of 50 years.

Fordham's choice of this particular article which he claims was based on his "desire to have an article from one of the analysts in Zürich" can be more fully grasped when contextualized by Fordham's own discussion of Meier in his memoir *The Making of an Analyst*. In this he describes how at the start of the *JAP* Meier had wanted to become co-editor together with Fordham and how the SAP's refusal of this request produced a rupture in his and Meier's friendship which persisted for a time (pp. 107, 135–6). Fordham also mentions how Meier had confided in him about Jung's attempting to block Meier from becoming a professor at the ETH in Zürich, which seems to have caused Fordham some consternation (*ibid.*, p. 136). It thus seems likely that publishing Meier's 1959 article involved a gesture of repair between them as well as some triangulation between the three men, which may explain why Fordham is being so careful with Jung in these letters.

The "considerable snag" to which Jung points in the first letter of this series is specified by Fordham as Meier's having identified synchronicity "with magical transference and compare it with primitive societies in which similarity is used for the purpose of affecting a cure". This refers to Meier's position presented on page 27 of his 1959 article in the *JAP* beginning with his recognition of a constellating factor in projections which he sees as "entirely abstract and invisible, while the similarity of pattern between transference and counter-transference is a visible phenomenon". He goes on to posit a synchronistic element, amplifying this with the derivation of "transference" from folklore "where ... the transferring of an illness to a tree for purposes of healing is thought of purely in magical terms, that is acausality" and cites Jung's monograph on synchronicity. Some further reflections of Meier's on synchronicity and magical healing can be found in his book *Personality*. There he goes into more

detail about “cloth trees” as used in the Balkans where cloth that has been wrapped around an ill person is hung on a tree in order for the vitality of the tree to absorb illness and this heals the sufferer [Meier also felt this was one source for Freud in his coining the term “transference”] (see 1995, pp. 136–138). Unfortunately Fordham’s insightful observation that “Meier is on to something ... [that] behind the causal relation there is also a synchronistic one in the transference” and that Meier “may have been reaching after this without hitting the mark” is only acknowledged by Jung but left undeveloped. Although Meier’s paper was subsequently published and Fordham on occasion cites this article, he does so only in passing but without critical commentary.

A further, related point from Meier’s 1959 *JAP* paper is worth reconsidering in terms of the Jung/Fordham letters. Meier’s explorations on the interpenetration of subject and object in projection and transference lead him to note symmetrical or reciprocal as well as asymmetrical aspects, with the implication that synchronistic phenomena belong to “totalistic” elements and have more or less symmetrical quality (pp. 28–33). Arguing along these lines dichotomizes the projective phenomena which may further contribute to the difficulty being intuited by Jung and Fordham even though it is being done for the sake of differentiating causal and acausal components. Alternatively looking at the phenomena from a field perspective which would include a third option of mutual but asymmetric influence is not carefully considered.

From a contemporary perspective Meier seems to be groping towards an emergent model of the transference/counter-transference field, though without the benefit of knowledge of general systems theory, especially the self-organizing properties of complex adaptive systems. This perspective could avoid the (artificial) parsing of causal/reductive from synchronistic aspects of an observed event. The study of transference/counter-transference enactments, noting the conditions and dynamics surrounding the specific moments they begin to appear, is likely to reveal synchronistic or emergent layers present in tandem with reductive ones. Also, Meier saw the mind-body problem as having a synchronistic core (1986, p. 183–4) a point Jung wavered on but conceded that if Meier were correct he would need to re-think the relative frequency of occurrence of synchronistic phenomena (1952, par. 938 n. 70), which

could lead to a deeper reconsideration of the issue of the spectrum of intensities of synchronicities.

Joe Cambray.

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PHILOSOPHY

I always think of Jung's own contribution as the Perennial Philosophy of our times, one of the very best.

Joseph Henderson, personal communication

Reconsidering imitation

Joe Cambray

The enigma of the title of this volume, *Who Owns Jung?* raises many questions. Any impulse to reply is tempered by the complexity just beneath the surface of our question. What is it we are being asked to ponder? Straightforward replies to the question seem not to yield adequate answers alone though they may hint through reflection at implied mysteries of identity and possession. Likewise, the sister volume to the present text is filled with thoughtful engagements seeking purchase on that seemingly related question, *Who Owns Psychoanalysis?* Vicissitudes of owning, ownership, etc., are discussed there as applied to a system of thought, with theories of the mind and culture including scientific and historical perspectives as well as forms of clinical practice, all with political and economic ramifications—the reader is encouraged to explore the range of arguments put forward there as a context for the present volume. Although significant discernments are made in the 400 pages of ensuing articles, much of which are applicable here, our question differs in its explicit focus on a single individual, Jung, rather than the field of “Analytical Psychology”, the closest parallel to “Psychoanalysis”.

What are we to make of this more personal focus: are we (whoever would call him or herself “Jungian”) still a generation or two

away from allowing our “founder” to retire into the historical background, a grieving process still in progress, so that “Jung” is still something of a ghostly presence among us, not yet fully an ancestor? Are we cultish in adhering to the person, or is our “Jung” a symbolic figure, ironically still needing a poet to give us a broader perspective as W.H. Auden accomplished with his elegy *In Memory of Sigmund Freud* (1940):

If often he was wrong and at times absurd,
To us he is no more a person
Now but a whole climate of opinion
Under whom we conduct our different lives.

However, unlike Freud with his political acumen and zeal for *his* movement (*Die Sache*), Jung’s own allergic reaction to being systematized or “owned” is legendary. Only with great reluctance, after a second heart attack would he allow an institute to be formed to promulgate his approach to the psyche, and then only to keep it from the “worst mistakes” (Hannah as quoted in Bair, 2003, p. 530). Then there is his legendary, notorious quip “Thank God, I am Jung and not a Jungian!” (Hannah, 1976, p. 78).

As James Yandell has discussed in his “The Imitation of Jung: An Exploration of the Meaning of “Jungian” ”, Jung was profoundly discomfited by discipleship, treating it as a form of “mental laziness” (Jung quoted by Yandell, 1978, p. 68). In his wrestling with Thomas á Kempis’s *The Imitation of Christ*, Jung attempts to revision the tradition of emulation associated with this text by seeing Christ’s life as “... a prototype of individuation and hence cannot be imitated: *One can only live one’s own life totally in the same way with all the consequences this entails*” (Jung, 1975, p. 77). With a series of quotes from Jung and several first generation Jungians, Yandell points to how central it has been to eschew any “slavish” or “apish” imitation of Jung, his life or thought, yet he also indicates Jung’s own difficulties with the notion of imitation. For example, Jung’s intense distaste for transference manifestations, especially from male analysands and his grudging recognition of the value of imitation in education, primarily for the young (Yandell, p. 73) are mentioned. In addition, he also analyzes a story Jung constructed ostensibly as a “parable on the mandala” but which Yandell shows is really critiquing “misguided

imitation" (ibid., pp. 64–69). While Yandell seeks to lead us to what might be seen as the telos of imitation, a paradoxical imitation of the impulse to become most fully oneself, individuated, we are left with split, good (symbolic) versus bad (concrete) imitation that mirrors Jung's own conflict in this area. What I propose to do here is to reexamine "imitation" in light of contemporary findings stemming from research in neuroscience and suggest some revisions to Jungian thought that derive from this.

New views on imitation

Starting with Edward Thorndike's initial 1898 scientific definition ("*learning to do an act from seeing it done*"), researchers have linked imitation to a series of brain and behavioral observations spanning the neurological, the functional, to the psychological, and on to social and cultural phenomena¹ (see Hurley & Chater, Ed. 2005, 2 Vol set for a compendium). In the last decade radical reexamination of the capacity to imitate has been given a strong impetus due to neuroscientific and brain imaging studies that have been directed towards understanding how perceptual-to-motor mapping is achieved. At a basic behavioral level imitation requires an individual creature be able to translate a perceived action by another into a similar performance, a non-trivial, intersubjective correspondence problem. A major step in understanding this capacity came with the discovery in 1996, by a research team headed by Prof. Giacomo Rizzolatti of the University of Parma, of a group of visuomotor neurons that bridge the perception-action gap.

First observed in macaque monkeys, these neurons, termed "mirror neurons", "discharge when the monkey *observes* an action made by another individual and [also] when it *executes* the same or similar action" (Fogassi & Gallese in Stemonov & Gallese, Ed. 2002, p. 15). Evidence for human homologues of these neurons has been reported in several brain sites, including Broca's area with its responsibility for speech as well as in other pre-motor cortices (Rizzolatti et al. in Stemonov & Gallese, Ed. 2002). While nothing like a complete description of the capacity to imitate can be gleaned from the study of mirror neurons alone, they do provide one essential neurological substrate underpinning this trait, which is not only universally

human but found in a number of animal species. In Jungian parlance these studies are focusing in on the “infra-red” or somatic/instinctual aspect of an archetypal pattern.

Researchers were quick to realize a number of implications from the discovery of mirror neurons, such as their role in “the capacity to represent mental states of others by means of a conceptual system, commonly designated as “Theory of Mind” (Fogassi & Gallese in Stemonov & Gallese, Ed. 2002, p. 30). This has been extended to identifying mirror neurons as having an important role in the ability to experience empathy, and conversely, deficits in or dysfunctions of mirror neuron systems have been proposed as contributing to the basic problems involved in autism (with the known failures to imitate or to coordinate self-other representations).

Developmental studies of imitation in humans have traced the rudiments of this ability to newborns. Meltzoff and Moore studying facial imitation in newborns detected the trait in individuals as young as 42 minutes and noted that within 32 hours the average infant could differentially imitate several kinds of tongue moments even though they obviously had not see their own faces, though they can feel their faces move. In a synopsis of experimental evidence Meltzoff identifies 7 different categories of actions found in neonatal imitation, including some emotional expressions (in Hurley & Chater, Ed. 2005, II, pp. 70–71). He goes on to cite evidence suggesting that not only is imitation an innate trait but “that infants already register the equivalence between acts of self and other” and this “is innate” (ibid., p. 76). The capacity to imitate thus is a basic intersubjective route for internalization, part of the neurophysiological foundation for image schema to incarnate archetypal propensities into lived experience in a manner consistent with what Jean Knox has been arguing in her papers and recent book (Knox, 2003), though she has not included mirror neuron research in her writings. The rudiments of the transcendent function can similarly be detected here in this first step in internalizing the interaction with the other through a (psycho)somatic channel.

Philosopher Alvin Goldman of Rutgers University has been articulating a developmental trajectory in which “imitation contributes to advanced mind reading through the intermediate route of role play” (in Hurley & Chater, Ed. 2005, II, p. 91)—“mind reading” is shorthand for the ability to employ a “theory of mind”, i.e., to understand

the minds of others,² now viewed by many contemporary neuro- and cognitive scientists as an innate trait which develops post-natally, probably continuing over the course of a lifetime. "Advanced mind-reading" includes mental imitation which in turn can involve discerning goals and intentions without the need to replicate behaviors; clinical, therapeutic empathy of course draws heavily on such abilities. Of particular note is the stress placed upon role playing and more broadly on the capacity to take part in play, as a key element in maturing imitative learning. Some striking observations which Goldman comments on are those where it was "found that children who engaged in more joint play, including role play, performed better on mind-reading tasks, but no such connection was found for solitary pretence" (in Hurley & Chater, Ed. II, p. 92). Extrapolated to analytic training this could have profound consequences, as it is suggestive of play with symbolic material and the study of enactments (with their conscious and unconscious role-play scenarios) in supervision could provide a means to enhance empathic attunement. (Fuller exploration of the developmental trajectory of imitation is beyond the scope of the present article; this might start with Piaget's classic *Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood*).

In a related series of experiments the role of emotional states and their communication in social cognition have been explored across sensory modalities using brain imaging techniques in conjunction with various sensory stimulants and videos of facial expressions. By these means Wicker, et al. were the first to demonstrate "that the same sites in the insula mediate both the observation and the feeling of disgust" (2003, p. 658). They feel that mirror neurons or a similar mechanism is involved in this linkage. After reviewing other relevant literature on a variety of emotions they conclude "the present results suggest that there is a common mechanism for understanding the emotion in others and feeling the same emotion in ourselves" (ibid., p. 661). Obviously this sort of communication can occur at conscious and/or unconscious levels of experience and thus forms the neural substrate for analytic observations of phenomena such as projective identification and more generally the affective component of field phenomena—I discussed the relevance of some of these observations as applied to empathy in more detail at *The Journal of Analytical Psychology's* 50th anniversary conference in Oxford (Cambray, 2006). Mirror neurons therefore contribute to the

neural apparatus which allows detection of the vicissitudes of the intersubjective, analytic “third” and thereby help Jungians detect archetypal patterns as they begin to constellate in the therapeutic process. This process fosters the instantiation of the transcendent function which in turn can continue to mature throughout life and should be a significant element in the formation of the analytic attitude both during and after training of the analyst.

More speculatively, the attachment hunger of certain types of patients who have suffered basic attachment injuries may be predicated on inadequate activation of incipient mirror neuronal systems during early development. The core dilemmas resulting from failures in primary object relations which leave some individuals perpetually scanning others for micro-shifts in affective expression, as has been discussed in the Jungian literature for “borderline patients” (e.g., see Schwartz-Salant, 1989), would be one area for further investigation.

Turning toward the “ultra-violet” end of Jung’s spectral metaphor for archetypal processes (the cultural-spiritual, imagistic pole), studies on imitation are proving to be valuable in advancing knowledge in numerous fields which involve human social behavior. For example, studies on the behavior of crowds, their potential for wisdom and folly, are becoming topics of popular interest (e.g., see Surowiecki, 2004; Johnson, 2004; Gladwell, 2005); increasingly economists are seeking to incorporate imitative tendencies into models of human economic activity. Sociologists and criminologists have also looked at the shadow sides of more sophisticated uses of imitation, as in seeking to understand identity theft using models based on deceptive mimicry within social networks. Some social psychologists such as John Bargh have been exploring society’s resistance to acknowledging the role of imitative impulses because of their largely unconscious nature; among other things, this has importance for our collective difficulty in admitting the extent of media related violence in our societies.

Likewise philosophers are recognizing the importance of imitation in moral development. Jesse Prinz has articulated a scheme including moral milestones beginning with newborns’ attempts at facial mimicry and very young children’s susceptibility to emotional contagion, underscoring the key foundational role of imitative capacities in moral development; this leads him to claim “[a] bad imitator is likely to form unstable attachments” (in Hurley & Chater,

Ed. 2005, II, p. 278). Applying this to the study of psychopaths, Prinz notes that they “can imitate the behaviors of others to a reasonable degree, but they cannot imitate the emotional states of others, and this has serious implications for competence and conduct” (in Hurley & Chater, Ed. 2005, II, p. 282). Thus the affective recognition and response to what is seen as evil may well emerge from a core capacity to access imitative processes and moral maturation may hinge on our creative use of those processes. Reflecting on Jung’s *Answer to Job*, might we not consider Jung’s ability to empathically identify (almost to the point of possession³) with suffering of the figure of Job as key? His accessing the affects that reading this book engendered in himself and creatively using the psychic energy released (in the form of focused rage) through this act produced one of Jung’s most profound set of moral reflections.

Psychologist Merlin Donald has identified the unique mimetic qualities of the genus *Homo* as an essential metacognitive component in his explorations on the origins of language and culture.⁴ He persuasively argues for a reversal of standard views by placing the rudiments of culture as preceding the emergence of language and symbols, seeing language as having been built upon mimesis. Beginning with social networks creating a “cognitive ecology” Donald employs a deeply intersubjective view of culture in which:

Symbols emerged from interacting groups of analog brains. They did not originate in the brain, but rather in distributed networks of brains wired for analog communication. Symbols thus have their origins in social interaction even in modern humans. As Saussure observed long ago, languages emerge in the space between brains. [in Hurley and Chater, 2005, II p. 290]⁵

This placement of social networks at the heart of symbol, language and culture brings us to the realm of emergent phenomena. As a form of scale-free networks, which have been shown to be complex systems exhibiting emergent properties, notably studied and popularized by Barabasi (2003), Watts (2003) and Strogatz (2003), the mesh of human social engagements appears to be grounded in mimesis. Since Jung’s methodology for identifying and engaging the archetypal layer of the psyche likewise can be considered dedicated to exploring the realm of the emergent (Cambray and Carter, 2004, pp. 116–148), it would seem that elements of imitation permeate

some of Jung's most important concepts, such as the archetype.⁶ Arriving at the imitative-emergent qualities of archetypal process, a brief look at the notion of a cultural replicator is in order.

Memes and archetypes

In 1976 zoologist Richard Dawkins, in his book *The Selfish Gene*, proposed the notion of a "meme" as "a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation" in an analogy to the role of the gene in biological replication and evolution. Dawkins claims to derive his term from the Greek "mimeme" which comes from "Mimeomai" or "Mimeisthai": to imitate.⁷ Although controversial and not universally accepted, the "meme" concept has gained sufficient currency to be included in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, which defines it as:

A cultural element or behavioural trait whose transmission and consequent persistence in a population, although occurring by non-genetic means (esp. imitation), is considered as analogous to the inheritance of a gene.

More generally a meme is anything that is imitatively transferred from mind to mind. This can range from snippets of songs, proverbs, children's games or stories, including fairy tales and myths, to increasingly more complex clusters of ideas such as religious systems. Memeticists refer to clusters of memes as memeplexes; in analogy with genetic evolution they speak of things such as the "meme-pool" and "memetic drift" and debate parallels to genes, e.g., heritability with variation, mutational change, cumulative effects and a selectional bias for adaptive advantage for the unit of transmission or the organism containing it—details of memetic theory have been developed in various books [for the fullest statements see those by Susan Blackmore (1999) and by Robert Aunger (2002)]. The growing interest in the idea is witnessed by the host of science websites discussing memetics including the *Journal of Memetics* which began in 1997.

Among recent debates on the applicability of the meme concept for various social sciences, one that is of particular relevance for this chapter is the meme's role, if any, in cultural transmission and evolution. For example, social and cognitive scientist Dan Sperber has argued that because memes would have potentially high rates

of change—often a story undergoes some modification with (every) retelling—that there is no possibility for cumulative change in the evolutionary sense. Thus Sperber in effect rejects memes as true replicators and sees culture as based on directed mutation rather than selection (1996, 2000). Within the Jungian community Anthony Stevens has echoed Sperber views on replication while amending them to include an archetypal model he has championed as part of his embrace of evolutionary psychiatry (2002, pp. 282–283).

Anthropologist Francisco Gil-White has challenged Sperber's position, suggesting that cumulative adaptation can occur even if rigorous replication is not maintained by looking at the quality and strength of changes that have occurred. His view is that if the mutations in question are perturbations moving towards an optimum and the accompanying changes are not too great then adaptation can arise through a gradual selection process rather than be under a directed process.⁸ Applied broadly to narration Gil-White identifies the essential feature as the "narrative skeleton", if this remains intact then a selectionist model remains viable (in Hurley and Chater, 2005, II, chapter 16). This last point recalls Marie Louise von Franz's writings on fairy tales, which she sees as "the purest and simplest expression of the collective unconscious psychic process" (von Franz, 1975, p. 1); she concludes "fairy tales mirror the more simple but also more basic structure—the bare skeleton—of the psyche" (*ibid.*, p. 17); the reproducibility of this "skeleton" in varying cultural contexts with diverse narrative elaborations (the "flesh" on the bones) is part of the argument for universal, archetypal patterns.

A striking trend in the critical discussions of meme theory is the attention given to deliberate, intelligent design and goals in the evolution of cultural productions, e.g., technological developments such as that of the airplane, refrigerators etc.,. In the decoupling of biological from cultural evolution with the focus on goals, social scientists have frequently left out, or strongly limited, discussion of unconscious process in cultural change, in my view an error that forecloses on emergentist perspectives. When the unconscious is mentioned the reference tends to be restricted to the cognitive unconscious. Thus, in an introduction to a series of essays on "the new unconscious" psychologist James Uleman comments on this, noting:

... the psychoanalytic unconscious is widely acknowledged to be a failure as a scientific theory because evidence of its major components cannot be observed, measured precisely, or manipulated easily. The theory's complexity renders it largely unfalsifiable. The unfalsifiability of the theory as a whole has not prevented investigators from adapting its ideas to make them more empirically tractable or finding support for aspects of the theory in contemporary research. But it does not provide an influential framework for understanding unconscious processes in academic or scientific circle. [in Hassin, Uleman & Bargh, Ed. 2005, p. 5]

Jungian theory, of course, can be held to these same criticisms and thus has not been seriously considered by social scientists or memeticists despite what it might contribute to understanding of culture by way of archetypal theory.

However, the Popperian logic Uleman cites, I suggest, will ultimately prove too restrictive as evidenced by the growing acceptance and wider interest throughout the scientific community for the study of complexity and complex systems which cannot be adequately grasped within the confines of Popperian constraints.⁹ In effect this also serves as a counter to the reductive use of "intelligent design" to render non-scientific that which is truly complex. The field of complexity studies is demonstrating that theories capable of descriptive utility often require formulations beyond the limitations of modernist epistemology. The failure to grasp the significance the self-organizing abilities of various complex systems can lead to a host of cultural as well as individual problems such as the current pseudoscientific attempts to refashion discredited creationism as "Intelligent Design", at the center of a religious fundamentalist-toned "cultural complex" (Singer & Kimbles, 2004) in the US at the time of this writing.

Finally for our consideration of meme theory, there is an article on "goals versus memes" by legal philosopher Mark Greenberg. In this Greenberg returns to the argument about technological advance in support of a goal directed view of cultural change, pointing out that such developments cannot realistically be viewed as an "accumulation of copying mistakes under selective pressure" (in Hurley & Chater, 2005, II, p. 341). His approach is open-minded and he sets out a worthy challenge: "Meme theory needs to offer a distinctive explanation of why ideas spread, an explanation that competes with, or contributes something beyond, the goal based account"

(*ibid.*, p. 347). Greenberg even suggests an approach, exploring the “biases in the transmission of ideas” as “it is implicit that an explanation in terms of biases is supposed to compete with an explanation in terms of deliberate choices” (*ibid.*, p. 352). While this line of reasoning seems intended to invite a Darwinesque reply, it also points to what may be missing that could indeed “contribute something beyond the goal based account”, i.e., the archetypal aspects of the unconscious.

Conclusion

In the past decade a broad reconsideration of “imitation” as understood by numerous disciplines spurred by the discovery of mirror neurons has revealed the complex nature of this seemingly simple notion. As surveyed here the study of the psyche, of human interactions and cultural productions can all benefit from such reconsiderations. The neurobiological foundations of the emergent mind have been shown to include imitative mechanisms originating in a specific class of neurons. At the level of the person, developmental trajectories for the evolution of imitative actions with increasingly complex behaviors, feelings and mentation are in the process of being elaborated; ideally these should integrate both conscious and unconscious dynamics. Clinically the intersubjective nature of imitation has direct application especially as revealed in its importance in empathy and in forming our “theory of mind” experiences of the other.

The field of Jungian studies would do well to join in these multidisciplinary discussions but must first come to grips with Jung’s own ambivalence about imitation and decline the bifurcation in this area to which he was prone. By replacing a polarized view with a series of successive emergent processes, a reconsideration of core Jungian concepts becomes possible; the telos of imitation could be revisioned as a striving for emergence. Thus for example, manifestations of the stereotypic dimension of an archetype would be construed as problematic only when it functions with inordinate strength outside a developmental appropriate framework and even then the imitative impulse so activated could be viewed as inhibiting yet pointing to a needed emergence of the fuller expression of the archetypal pattern constellating. This is of course not a wholly new approach; one can find the purposive aspects in Jung. However,

to “own” his ideas in our own fashion requires not only our individual adaptation of them but also that they be viable in our world, that their “truth” be in accord with the best understandings available to us. Perhaps my reply to the question of this volume is: the one who emerges from Jung.

NOTES

1. As Susan Blackmore (1998) notes, a contemporary of Thorndike’s, James Mark Baldwin in his 1902 book *Development and Evolution*, “gave imitation a central role in his theories of evolution, pointing out that all adaptive processes can be seen as imitative. ...” This is the same Baldwin whose writings on the relationship between culture and biological evolution (now known as the “Baldwin Effect”) had a significant impact on Jung’s formulation of his archetype theory, as detailed recently by George Hogenson (2001).

In exploring Jung’s ideas on imitation Sonu Shamdasani traces the tension in these to the conflicts between individualism and collectivism at play in the intellectual culture of the late 19th and early 20th century. Baldwin again comes up as a key figure with his interest in the role of imitation in development. According to Shamdasani, Baldwin drew upon the 1890 work on Gabriel Tarde *The Laws of Imitation* which Shamdasani argues may have been influential in forming Jung’s views on the topic (2003, pp. 284–308).

2. There are several competing models to explain “mind reading” or attributing mental states. The two linked to imitation are “theory theory” which according to Goldman is “guided by a commonsense psychology “theory”. ... [so that] learning by infants has the same character as scientific learning”; and “simulation theory” in which the subject attempts to replicate the mental state of the other, by pretense, then to filter this through one’s own psychology and surmise the goal or intention of the other—Goldman is staunchly on the side of this latter theory (in Hurley & Chater, Ed. 2005, II, Chapter 2). After the completion of this chapter Goldman has written a new book (2006) on the subject that provides a much fuller argument, entitled *Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading*. Vittorio Gallese, one of the original mirror neuron discoverers has similarly been writing on “embodied simulation” as the basis for social understanding (2005).

3. As Paul Bishop notes, Jung wrote *Answer to Job* while recovering from a liver ailment and in his correspondence at the time he makes clear how much it felt as if “outside forces” were the source of book. Bishop quotes a letter from Jung to Aniela Jaffé about this “If there is anything like the spirit seizing one by the scruff of the neck, it was the way this book came into being” (2002, pp. 41–42).

4. In fact, true imitation is rare in non-human species and usually limited to select behaviors, such as birdsongs. Also, it should be noted that Donald

acknowledges the echoes to Eric Auerbach's ideas of art and ritual as grounded in and continuing to manifest through mimesis (in Hurley & Chater, 2005, II, p. 299)

5. This bears remarkable similarity to Jung on transference dreams, as stated in his 1934 comment to James Kirsch on a series of dreams that one of Kirsch's patients was having:

With regard to your patient, it is quite correct that her dreams are occasioned by you. ... In the deepest sense we all dream not *out of ourselves* but out of what lies *between us and the other* (1973, p. 172).

6. Merlin Donald differentiates imitation from mimesis in a manner that may contribute to our understanding of Jung's discomfort with acts of imitation. Donald states:

[T]he word "mimesis" captures this wider urge to generate culture, whereas the word "imitation" connotes the replication and transmission of existing patterns, not the creation of new ones, and leaves out the social dimension captured by gesture and role-playing. Mimesis places more emphasis on the expressive and social aspects of action and less on the accurate reproduction of means and ends, but it includes the latter (in Hurley & Chater, 2005, II, p. 299).

The difference between imitation and mimesis presented here can be read in evolutionary and/or developmental terms. Clinically it is reminiscent of the resolution of infantile transference elements, allowing a person to integrate traits of the other in a creative manner facilitating rather than inhibiting self expression, i.e., the shift from imitation to mimesis follows an individuation trajectory.

7. John Laurent in tracing the history of the term cites several precursors to Dawkins' use of meme, including the term mneme and argues for the Greek root mimeskesthai or "memory" as the etymological base for meme (1999). One of the early sources of the term mneme is Maurice Maeterlinck in his book *The Life of the White Ant*. Although Jung does not reference this particular work he does cite several others of Maeterlinck's works in *Symbols of Transformation*, CW 5. In turn Maeterlinck acknowledged Richard Semon as his source for the term "mneme" and related ideas. More strikingly, Shamdasani demonstrates that originally "Jung identified the collective unconscious with Semon's Mneme (CW 6, par. 624)" but later distanced himself from Semon's work as an insufficient explanation (2003, p. 234 and n. 113)—Shamdasani points out that Semon was mentored by Ernest Haeckel (ibid., p. 189) and that "[b]oth Semon and Jung were developing modern forms of organic memory theory" (ibid., p. 234). While there is not space here to explore this network of connections, there is a suggestion of a cluster of ideas pointing to an archetypal nexus including memory and imitation, which is consistent with the findings cited in this article.

8. However, as Mark Greenberg notes Gil-White “does not adequately address Sperber’s more important objection, based on the point that it is not true that each instance of an idea is even a low-fidelity copy of a particular ancestor idea” (in Hurley & Chater, 2005, II, p. 342, n. 2). Nevertheless, the point of the present chapter is not to debate whether all of cultural evolution can be reduced to a Darwinian process but to consider the utility of a dialogue between memetics and archetypal theory. Additionally, it should be noted that Stevens uses the same point from Sperber that Gil-White discusses without reference to the question of ancestral ideas, so this will be retained for coherence of focus.

9. Adolf Grünbaum in numerous publications has challenged Popper’s falsifiability argument, especially as applied to psychoanalysis (for example, see Grünbaum, 1984). Grünbaum’s position has been repeatedly assailed by one group of psychoanalysts, as examples see Spruiell (1987) and O’Neil (1993), who wish to dismiss his critique on philosophical grounds. However, these arguments do not reference the changes in either scientific thought or philosophy of science that complexity theory has been introducing and therefore remain entrenched in a modernist paradigm.

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Psychology—the study of the soul’s logical life

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In 1956 Jung lamented that “my later and more important work (as it seems to me) is still left untouched in its primordial obscurity”.¹ This is probably still true today to a large extent. What Jung suggests in this statement is that there is a considerable difference between his earlier and his later work. His later work is not just a further elaboration in more detail and expansion of his beginnings, nor merely a partial modification. It is something in its own right and, as he felt, more important.

From Jung’s assessment we could conclude that now, more than four decades after his death, it is our task to finally do justice to his late work. But I think that this would not be enough. Or, to do justice to his late work would have to mean more than simply trying to understand it and basing our own work on it. Rather, we have to go *with Jung beyond Jung*.

It is not enough to listen to and be faithful to the letter of the explicit Jungian teachings. As Nietzsche once pointed out, it would be a poor way of repaying one’s teacher to stay his *disciple* forever. We have to further develop the impulses lying in his work, impulses that Jung himself did not fully develop and base his work on. Our loyalty has to be to the living spirit stirring from within Jung’s work,

to the unresolved problems that have come up through his work, to its internal necessities. Orthodoxy is not the best way to be true to Jung. This attitude, by the way, corresponds to Jung's own attitude toward Freud. In the same letter he wrote: "The problem nearest to Freud's heart was unquestionably the psychology of the unconscious, but none of his immediate followers has done anything about it. I happen to be the only one of his heirs that has carried out some further research along the lines he intuitively foresaw".² What Jung here implies is that he was the only true heir to Freud's project precisely by having deserted the literal Freudian school, and instead having taken over as his personal responsibility the deeper concern that was the driving force behind Freud's research.

In order to give some idea of the direction that this further development needs to take, I will at first compare and contrast two titles of works by Jung. By drawing an imaginary line between the standpoint implicit in the wording of the first title at the one end and the standpoint implicitly expressed in the second title at the other end we get a kind of vector that we will have to follow in our own attempts. Inherent in the development of Jung's psychological thought there is a certain hidden teleology, and our thinking has to be committed to the telos or *finis* (finality) rather than to the historical origin that lies behind it, in keeping with Jung's own view (which he expressed with respect to the psychology of neurosis) that "any historical deviation is a detour, if not actually a wrong turning" (CW 10, § 363, transl. modif.).

An early work that dates back to the year 1916 appeared in a revised version 1928 under the title:

The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious

Jung's main work of his later period is

Mysterium Coniunctionis
An Inquiry Into the Separation and Synthesis of Psychic Opposites in Alchemy

In the earlier title we have the idea of two entities who will be in a changing relation with each other. It is similar to two people, let's say a man and a woman, who may fall in love with each other, marry, have terrible fights, start to hate each other and finally may get a divorce or may reconcile themselves with each other again.

Logically speaking there are first these two persons and secondly they enter, in addition to their individual existence, into a relationship with all its possible vicissitudes. The essential point for our present discussion is that there is a separation and independence of, if not split between, the existence of the persons on the one hand and how they behave or what happens to them, on the other. The same two people might also not fall in love with each other and yet keep existing. The same can be said about the Ego and the Unconscious. There first of all exist, according to the fantasy of the title of this work, an ego as well as an Unconscious in the psyche, and secondly those existing psychic entities relate to each other in varying ways; their relation may be a constructive-creative one or, conversely, have the form of a dissociation. But no matter how they may specifically relate to each other, it is only the vicissitudes of life which the two existing psychic entities are subject to. A substantiating or reifying thinking is at work here. We could also call it "ontological" inasmuch as it starts out with the idea of subsisting entities.

The thinking underlying and expressed in the wording of the second title is totally different, despite the fact that both seem to speak about the same subject-matter. At first glance we might think that the psychic opposites could precisely be compared to a married couple, and the synthesis or *coniunctio* on the one hand and the separation on the other hand could correspond to the marriage and the divorce of the couple, in other words, to the harmonious and productive relation versus the dissociation between the ego and the unconscious. But the point is that in this new thinking there are no subsisting entities any more. Jung does not speak of the ego and the unconscious, not of man and woman or male and female, not of mind and body, spirit and matter, heaven and earth, or what have you. He is no longer concerned with any substance, any entity. Instead of referring in terms of an ontological or substantiating thinking to the psychic opposites as subsisting entities he simply expresses the abstract notion of the oppositional *structure* or *form* of the psychic. It is the internal nature of the psyche that it is oppositional, we could also say self-contradictory. That is all. *What* the opposites are is here not said, and it cannot, should not be said in the context of this late work, because this would be a relapse into the substantiating style of thought that this title has long left behind.

Instead of having two subsisting entities that are then said to be in opposition, we have here the notion of an oppositional structure as the primary (irreducible, *unhintergehbare*) fact so that all specific opposites that may appear on the phenomenological level are merely secondary *illustrations* or *exemplifications* or *costumes* of the fundamental (and actually *irrepresentable*) oppositional structure. And the terms separation and synthesis (or union) indicate the nature of this oppositional structure, namely that it is not really a “structure” at all (which would, after all, imply something ontic, subsisting, and rigid), but rather a movement, a living tension, the fluid interplay of separation and synthesis, of difference and identity. The psyche is here envisioned as pulsating life. We are with this thinking on the level of this life *itself* (life, movement *as such*) and no longer on the level of beings or entities *that* live or move or relate. In other words, the separation of psychic entities from what secondarily happens with or to them does no longer exist here. The form of “entity” has itself been dissolved into what formerly would have been seen as their relation to each other, so that only this *relation* in its fluidity is left.

Jung also developed, in his mythologizing way, the view that there are two forces in the psyche, which he called anima and animus, and that they form a couple or syzygy. If we take this view seriously, it follows that there can be three fundamentally different conceptions of psychology. Psychology can be construed from the standpoint of the anima, but it can also be construed from the standpoint of the animus, and finally also from the standpoint of the syzygy itself. Because Jung uses mythological imagery, the idea of the syzygy of anima and animus can thus itself be seen through as being the perception of the relation of anima-animus from the point of view of the anima. The anima *imagines* this syzygial relation in the naturalistic imagery of a marriage, just as it imagines also itself as well as its other, the animus and everything else, in naturalistic images (for example, itself as a nixie, a nymph, an age-old, but ever-young mysterious woman, as a mist above a bog, etc.). The same could also be seen in terms of the animus-position, where everything would no longer appear in the guise of personified figures and natural images, but as concepts, for example, of forces, tendencies, parts of the personality. In both cases the syzygy would be envisioned from the worm’s-eye view, from the standpoint of the separate figures or

concepts that are brought into a union by the syzygy *above* them, like a roof or umbrella.

But psychology can also rise to the level of the syzygy itself. However, if it does so, if it takes the standpoint of the “umbrella” itself, the syzygy will no longer be that umbrella above and encompassing anima and animus, and the latter two will *ipso facto* have disappeared as something in their own right and been reduced to internal *sublated* moments of the syzygy. There will then no longer be a yoke (syzygy lit. = yoke) that would connect two separate entities together. The only thing left will be the syzygy itself as an in-itself dialectical movement, as the unity of the unity and the difference of itself. From here we could say that the second of our two Jungian book titles speaks from the standpoint of the syzygy itself. Psychology has here in fact caught up with and integrated an idea that it had before only entertained as a vaguely intuited content of consciousness, so that now it is finally itself informed by this idea in its very style of thinking. The idea is no longer a content that it entertains and teaches; it has come home to psychology and revolutionized it.

So with respect to the earlier title, we can note a fundamental paradigm shift. A shift from a “semantic” to a “syntactic” level of psychology, from “ontological” to “logical” thinking, from “imaginable substance” to “abstract form or constitution”. The former title implied a psychologistic, personalistic psychology because it presupposed the human person as the foundation or container of the life of the soul. The pulsating life that the later title is about is no longer tied to the human person as substrate. It is self-sufficient, so that here psychology has finally come home to itself and is no longer alienated from itself. This pulsating life is logical life, not empirical process, it is the dialectical, self-contradictory movement of union *and* disunion. Separation and synthesis obviously represent logical relations or operations, however, *as* logical operations, not operations performed by us, by the subjective mind, but by the soul itself, or rather not even performed by the soul, but operations *as which* the soul exists.

These brief comments may already have given us a clearer idea of why Jung was right to have said that his “later and more important work [...] is still left untouched in its primordial obscurity”. Psychological thinking is usually still stuck in personalistic modes.

Now it is also true that the text that follows after this magnificent title of Jung's late book is not always up to the high level of psychological thinking achieved in the wording of the title. It is for this reason that we today have the task of going with Jung beyond Jung, the task of proceeding to the standpoint of the fluidity of the logical life as which the soul *is*.

The following expositions serve the purpose of trying to get us a little closer to that standpoint or level on which we can understand what is meant by the conception of the soul's logical life, which is dialectical life.

But first I will have to address the possible incredulity that the notion of "the soul's *logical* life" may give rise to in some readers. Has the depth-psychology of the past century not taught us that the soul is instinct, desire, emotion, affect, feeling, "the unconscious", irrationality, pathologizing, numinous (and fundamentally incomprehensible) image, etc.,—at any rate anything else but "logical"? In response to this objection I have to point out two things.

The first concerns a merely *semantic* problem that causes a misconception. "Logical" in the incriminated phrase does not amount to the assertion that psychological life always behaves in accordance with the rules of formal logic, that it is "correct thinking", rationalistic, calculated, plausibly argued. "Logic" can be understood in two different senses. The first one is that of a special discipline in the department of philosophy; logic is here essentially conceived as an *instrument* for correct thinking, for becoming more easily able to distinguish false from true forms of reasoning. This is what one could call, with Kantian terms, the *Schulbegriff* (the school concept) of logic, in contrast to its *Weltbegriff* (world concept, cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 866). In terms of the latter, the *conceptus cosmicus*, logic means something totally different. The philosopher who introduced the notion of *logos* into Western thinking, Heraclitus, spoke of the *logos eon*, the subsisting logos. We also speak, for example, of the logic of revolutions or the logic of capitalism. Karl R. Popper wrote a book entitled *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. Pascal spoke of the logic of the heart. Closer to home we have the following sentence by Jung: "By [x, y, z] I mean the tendencies or determinants that produce culture in man with the same logic as in the bird they produce the artfully woven nest, and antlers in the stag" (CW 4 § 665).

Jung did of course not want to suggest that stags or birds took courses in Formal Logic and when they want to grow antlers or build their nests, they reason them out, applying the laws of formal logic. What is meant in all these statements is the fact that inherent in the diverse phenomena talked about there is a certain *logos eon*, a consistent pattern and momentum, we could also say that in their development they follow certain internal rules, an inner necessity. One stage brings about a *determinate* other stage which in turn is consistently followed by a third one, etc., where the sequence is not brought about by an external cause-effect mechanism, but an internal position-response to the position relation (which is why it belongs to the sphere of *logos*). The stages develop a particular dynamic of their own, independent of or maybe even absolutely contrary to the intentions of the human agents through whom the phenomena come about (the latter possibility being especially blatant in "the logic of revolutions"). Similarly, the notion of the soul's logical life suggests—in a first regard—no more than that the life of the soul, both its life as a whole and that of its individual moments (or truths),³ is the self-unfolding of its own internal logic.

The second point to be made in response to the objection mentioned concerns the conventional (*modern*) ideas of soul as instinct, desire, emotion, affect, feeling, imagination, etc. The work of the later Jung presented us with alchemy as a theoretical model for psychology. Alchemy conceives of its *opus* as an *opus contra naturam*, and one of the main first objectives of the work is the dissolution of the *unio naturalis*. If the soul is conceived as essentially and primarily being affect, emotion, instinct, desire, etc., it is clear that the standpoint of such a view is precisely that of the undissolved *unio naturalis*. It is a naturalistic stance that clings to such notions by way of its definition of psyche or at least by way of what for it are the innermost core and basis of things psychological. And the psychologist who entertains such views is overly impressed by the physical aspects of experience. Desires, affects, emotions are always partly physical, rooted in the body.

But can psychology afford to demand that in an analytical process the natural union be dissolved while itself holding on to that very union? What psychology wants to achieve on the experiential level of dream work and the therapeutic process it must itself have achieved as a matter of course in its self-constitution. Psychology

must not constantly defer into the future, load onto the shoulders of its analysands as *their* task, and carry before itself as its preached message what is first and foremost its own job. Its work can only truly be *contra naturam*, if the radical cut that separates it from “nature” lies behind it and it firmly stands on the ground of the irrevocably *dissolved unio naturalis*. Otherwise it will inevitably be condemned to stay ego psychology, personalistic psychology. Even mythological thinking supports this thesis, inasmuch as *psyche* had originally its place in the underworld and was the name of the bloodless shades there who could only whisper. The word itself refers to the coldness of the breath of wind that is felt as coming from ghosts, the dead.

“Logical” in the phrase “the soul’s logical life” thus also has the second meaning of cold, abstract, formal, irrepresentable—if you wish to express it in mythological terms you could also say ghostly. The term “logical” comes as a narcissistic insult to the ego, the ego that naturally clings to the natural and wants to shift the burden of the *separatio* (if it becomes aware of it at all) away from *itself* to the experiential level and to the level of its contents of consciousness (its teachings) in order for the *logical structure* of consciousness to be able to remain in its virginal innocence as “natural” consciousness. But psychological consciousness has to take its own medicine, nay, it is only psychological consciousness in the first place if its having taken its own medicine lies behind itself.

While in my original list of those notions that seem to contradict the conception of the soul as logical life I had also included the numinous *image*, in my discussion so far I omitted the whole question of image and the imaginal. But ultimately, the presence of the imaginal style of thinking is evidence of the undissolved *unio naturalis*, too. Already a superficial glance at alchemy shows that it is past the imaginal style, that it not only preaches dissolution, but actively practices it. When, for example, it uses formulas like *lithos ou lithos*, the stone which is not a stone, and when it gives the alchemical stone a thousand other, often contradictory names, it makes it impossible for consciousness to stay with the *image* of “stone”. The imagination is upset. The very image character, the pictorial apperception of the idea of stone is destroyed. The same is true of the operations performed by alchemy. Putrefaction, fermenting corruption, pulverization, distillation, etc., are all aimed at violently

decomposing the imaginal shape of the matter worked with. Alchemy is not tender-minded with respect to "image".

Bishop Berkeley, in accordance with the entire tradition, explicitly stated that "the soul always thinks". One should not understand this sentence exclusively, as if the soul never desired, imagined, felt, got emotional, etc. No, what is meant is that even when the soul is not thinking in the narrower sense of the word, but imagining things or feeling passionate emotions, it nevertheless thinks, only in an obscured, beclouded way. Even psychogenic body symptoms and affects are at bottom thoughts, but, as it were, "materialized" thoughts, thoughts submerged, sunk into the natural, physical medium of body or emotion. Image is thought submerged in the murky natural(istic) element of space and time and material form. Conversely, thinking is sublated imagining (pictorial representation). And a psychology informed by alchemy would have the task of freeing "the spirit Mercurius", i.e., the thought that is imprisoned in "the matter" (in the image, the emotion, the body symptom). In general, we could establish the following series: body symptom is submerged emotion, emotion is submerged image, image is submerged thought, and conversely, thought is sublated image, image is sublated emotion, emotion is sublated body reaction.

In view of these ideas James Hillman once confronted me with the critical question of whether there could indeed be an imageless thinking and pointed to the dictum by Aristotle (*De anima*, 431 a 16), "The soul never thinks without an image". I have two answers to this question.

First, one has to read the cited statement by Aristotle in conjunction with his discussion in *De memoria*, 449 b 31 ff. The image (*phantasma*) of something quantitative leads to the knowing (the thought) of something non-quantitative. Inasmuch as the soul *thinks*, it does *not* think the image *the way* it is imaged. What thought concentrates on is precisely something else than what is imaged, something that the imagination can never represent. The thinking soul that Aristotle is speaking about is the *human* faculty of thinking (which apparently leans on the imagination, but only in order to transcend it and get to the soul's home territory of thought). Aristotle's "prime mover", however, is *noesis noeseos*, pure, imageless thinking, thinking that thinks *itself* and not some other. And even the human *nous* is the organ of principles (*archai*), which as such cannot be imagined. (More or less the same is true for Plotinus.)

Secondly, we do not have to accept in the first place the initial statement that the soul never thinks without an image. Hegel, e.g., contradicting the long Aristotelian tradition, insisted that we think in names,⁴ in the *words* of language (which interestingly enough reminds us of the thousand names that alchemy gave to the *lapis* or to the prime matter, etc.). Whereas the image retains the tie with the natural looks of whatever its content is, the name of things ("table", "house", etc.) refers indirectly and arbitrarily to it, the signifier (the sequence of phonemes in oral, of letters in written language) has here no relation to the sensible appearance of the content. In language, spirit has arbitrarily assigned certain sounds of its own production to the respective content and thus, even while possibly referring to things, nevertheless stays with what is its own property, rather than maintaining, with a narcissistic tenderness toward itself, the inner continuum with the given (the *participation mystique* in Jung's sense). This is precisely the problem with the imaginal and even with metaphors: they reaffirm the continuum with the natural likeness despite all subjective effort not to read them literalistically. The real, objective (logical) cut is avoided.

For Hegel, images belong to a still dreaming spirit; spirit awakens only in the realm of names, which, to put it in our alchemical terminology, are the existing evidence that the break with the *unio naturalis* has already occurred and accompanies language as an always already *accomplished* break. Now I would go a step further and say that pictorial thinking in images, while empirically maybe coming first, is *logically* secondary because it presupposes language, thinking in words (names). Without language no metaphors, no images, either.

We also know that already small children are in fact capable of imageless thought, namely when they learn to say "I". "I" is pure thought, not image, not a representation (*Vorstellung*). However, it is thought as *existing* concept, *as a real*. If it were a representation, it would precisely not be "I" and could not perform what the concept I in fact performs.

The last-mentioned point about the I can serve as an access to another essential aspect of the idea of the soul's logical life. It is clear that the I is not thought up by the child, just as the antlers are not thought up by the stag. Paradoxically, the thought of I is not an ego-thought. Thought here does not refer to the Jungian orientation

function, to an explicit act of thinking. It is not a subjective achievement. It is a thought that happens to and in the person. The person is just the place where this objective thought occurs, just as the nest-building and the growth of antlers occur as objectively ongoing thoughts, thoughts not "subjectively" thought by the bird or stag, respectively. The idea of the soul's logical life thus operates with the idea of the objective psyche, with non-ego processes. Adapting an alchemical adage we could say, *Psychologia nostra non est psychologia vulgi*. Psychology is the study of the self-thinking, self-unfolding, and self-realizing logic of real life (or individual phenomena of real life); it is the study, e.g., of what the Roman Catholic Mass, what the Philosophical Tree, what the Trinity, what the Flying Saucers "think" (to allude to some subjects treated by Jung). It is not the study of what *people* think, imagine, feel, intend, wish, all of which would belong to a personalistic or ego or naturalistic psychology. It has left the anthropological fallacy behind.

Only in this way does it also become possible to distinguish, concerning the great transformation processes in our time (keywords: globalization, advanced capitalism, computerization, internet, television, advertizing, information society, etc.), the subjective preferences and personally culpable behavior of the agents operating in those spheres from those changes in which it is nothing else but the action imperatives of the objective logic of the economy, of technology, etc., that are responsible for the development, even though they, too, are empirically of course brought about through human agents. And only in this way can we acknowledge and appreciate this objective logic as the soul's opus or, alchemically speaking, as that of the spirit Mercurius and must not, in terms of ego-psychology (which only knows of the opinions and motivations and behavior of *people*), disparage it as the evil, sinister work of those human agents who in reality happen to be the (even sometimes unwilling) instruments of its realization.

Along with this break with personalistic psychology we have also broken with the romanticized idea of soul that wants it to be something nice and harmless, a supporter of our ego wishes for "meaning", self-importance (called "individuation") and a "return to nature". We have also left the consulting room behind, of course not totally, but as the *main* place of the *opus*. The consulting room is only the place where we systematically focus on the *opus parvum*, the

“small work” of only private significance. The main place of the soul, however, the true laboratory or retort of the *opus magnum* is history, the real historical process. Psychology thus does not have, as already Jung stated, a delimited field; it is not one specialty side by side with all the other sciences and humanities. Rather, as depth-psychology it studies the internal objective logic—the mercurial spirit, the soul—in all real life processes and phenomena *inasmuch* as they already have been subject to the mind’s attention, reflection, and interpretation. This inner logic cannot be known a priori. It needs to be found out *ex post facto* and is again always a matter of interpretation.

When saying “The soul always thinks” we must of course (see our initial critique above of any substantiating thinking) not imagine that there is a soul (as a substance or entity, an author or agent) which also, in addition to its being there, spends its time with the activity of thinking. The use of “the soul” in this statement is only a mythologizing manner of speaking, not a hypostasis. There are not two things: the soul plus its thinking. There is only one thing, the actually occurring logical or thinking life itself, with nothing (no literal, substantialized soul) behind it; but this ongoing objective thinking is itself what receives, in our rhetorically still mythologizing mode of expression, the traditional name of “soul”.

In order to bring out another important advantage of the logical over against the imaginal perspective I will by way of example have a brief look at the interpretation of sexuality in psychology.

In the early days of Freudian psychoanalysis the life of the soul was predominantly seen in the realm of sexuality. Sexual needs, desires, behaviors, perversions, secrets of a person were interpreted as what the soul is basically and ultimately about. The soul = sexual libido. Jung did not agree. For him, too, sexuality was of greatest psychological importance, but not the sexual as such, rather as that which sexual phenomena expressed. Jung took the sexual ideas and behaviors *as symbols*.

What does this mean? Jung saw *the psychological difference* at work in sexual phenomenology. A given sexual symptom, behavior, or fantasy was for him in itself different, in itself divided; it was the unity of two “realities”: (a) the *phenomenal* aspect, the obvious, manifest sexual content, the empirical behavior or clinical symptom, and (b) what the phenomenal aspect symbolically represented and

expressed and what was precisely *not* manifest, not phenomenal. It was fundamentally hidden, invisible, even downright *unanschaulich* (irrepresentable), completely abstract, non-objectual (*ungegenständlich*). It could be represented only indirectly, namely symbolically. But the symbol just as much *concealed* as it *revealed* the soul. It concealed what it represented because the symbolic expression was a garb or garment in which the irrepresentable soul manifested itself.

This has several consequences or implications. 1. The sexual phenomenon could not be taken at face value, not literally. Inasmuch as it was a garment for something else, its true meaning was not identical with what this garment was about. Sexuality, viewed psychologically, was not about sexuality, but about the soul, who is something in its own right. Although the particular symbolic garment that the soul chooses to cloak itself in is not totally indifferent and arbitrary, but has its own significance, nevertheless different garments, different symbols could in principle have been used instead. There are many ways in which the soul can express its ideas. 2. Being a symbol, the sexual phenomenon (or any psychological phenomenon) within itself negates its own phenomenal, manifest, empirical aspect and points to what it is not, to the soul meaning expressed by it. There is a logical activity going on in the symbol. We could almost speak of a logical drama:

1st act: the invisible “soul” or logic expresses itself in symbolic garb, it manifests itself phenomenally, e.g., in a sexual phenomenon, i.e., it makes itself visible. The irrepresentable represents itself in this symbol.

2nd act: the phenomenal or obvious aspect of the symbol negates itself, sort of saying: “*I (the way I look)* am *not* what I am about. Don’t take me at face value. I am not really about sexuality at all”.

3rd act: the phenomenal aspect of the symbol pushes itself off from itself and points to some other, something hidden, invisible as to that which it is actually about. It says: “I am about this not-phenomenal other”.

4th act: the symbol says: “But only through me (this my garb) can you get an access to this other. The latter is not wholly other, not anything outside of me, like a speaker exists outside and independently of his sentences. That other to which I point, as that which I am actually about, exists exclusively within me myself; there is nothing

behind me. I *am* its valid and true representation, its best possible representation. And more than that: that other represented by me exists only through me, is produced by me, posited by and within myself, precisely through my negation of myself". In other words, what was described as the 1st act, namely that invisible logic that creates the symbol, can now be realized to be created by and within the symbol itself.

5th act: the symbol says: "Because my meaning is absolutely negative, I really mean *nothing*, but of course not simply nothing, nothing in the sense of total emptiness, but in the sense that I mean exactly what I phenomenally *show* and represent".

The symbol *is* this internal drama, all five acts or moves of this drama simultaneously, not successively. What from outside appears as a symbol, one unitary phenomenon, *is*, seen from within, this dramatic movement. It is a *logical* drama, i.e., not one played out in time and empirical reality, but behind the "face" of the symbol, and the logic of the symbol is a circular, uroboric logic. The end result of this logical drama returns to where we were at the very beginning. But this does not imply that we could simply eliminate and forget about the intermediate acts of this drama. No, the end contains all the stages that the movement passed through within itself, so that the end is not at all identical with the beginning. It is immensely enriched.

The foregoing, though in itself not a highly significant example, has been chosen here because, being relatively simple, it allows me to give a brief illustration of how the "logical" approach is capable of viewing the inner workings of a phenomenon *from within*. Neither the empirical nor even the imaginal approach are capable (or willing) to do this. This seeing phenomena from within is what we call thinking. Psychology has to *think* the phenomena, in contrast to merely "watching" them from outside. While it is clear that the empirical approach observes and theorizes from the standpoint of the subject opposite to the phenomena as object, its viewing remaining external, it is not quite so obvious that the imaginal approach also views from outside and from a vis-à-vis position. Inasmuch as for it the image is *poetic* image, there is no doubt for it a certain inwardness in the image. And yet, the imaginal approach persists in beholding, envisioning, perceiving the image, that is to say, in always keeping it logically before consciousness. The interiorization

into the phenomenon perceived as image remains incomplete, which is of course concomitant with the fact that this approach shrank away from the break with the *unio naturalis*. It is in love with the image and wants to keep it intact as a whole; it aims at *Facing the Gods* and the phenomena. It negates any literalism of the image, but is careful not to hurt the image itself (in contrast, e.g., to alchemy's blunt "the stone that is not a stone"). The "logical" approach, by contrast, destroys this intactness of the image, disrupts the tie with the natural likeness, by entering, penetrating the phenomenon. The difference between the imaginal and the logical approach is perhaps comparable to that between the aesthetic appreciation of an animal as a shape (a "face", a natural appearance) and anatomy's dissecting-and-reconstructing work upon it, or better yet: physiology.

Thus the logical approach does not really "view" the latter's inner workings from within, as I said before, but much rather itself goes through, and actively performs *as its own acts*, the individual steps of the internal self-movement as which the phenomenon *is*. In this way it does not merely look at the image as the finished result vis-à-vis itself of this logical drama, which itself disappears behind the face that the finished result shows. The opposition of subject and object no longer exists. This unity or inwardness is only possible in one's *thinking* the phenomenon.

Whereas ancient myths, symbols, local legends, cults might easily seduce us into using an imaginal approach since they themselves present their truths in imaginal garb, it would, in the case of fundamentally *modern* phenomena, be a serious mistake to try to face them in order "to see through to the divine image". We would simply miss them if we tried to see modern phenomena like neurosis (in the realm of the *opus parvum*) and the enormous changes in the areas of the economy, technology, social organization, etc., (as part of the soul's *opus magnum*) in terms of the gods or archetypal images. Truly modern phenomena are in themselves far too "cunning" as that one could hope to do justice to them beneath the level of their logic.

After having given some idea of what "logical" in the phrase "the soul's logical life" means and why the logical approach is indispensable for psychology, I want in conclusion to provide a few hints about the "life" that I have in mind here. Above all, two distinct aims of movements need to be distinguished. First, there is the aim to form a soulful tradition and constantly renew it. This aim is realized

in the dialectical interplay of the two movements of “projection” and “integration into consciousness”. Projection here is to be understood in the widest sense: the need of the soul to give its own inner, totally irrepresentable logical life an objective representation or expression by sinking itself into the medium of the natural, in the form of cults, customs, images, myths, works of arts, culture at large (see above what was said about the “1st act” in the inner drama of a symbol). The opposite movement comes from the need of the soul for the “initiation” of individual consciousness into the inner spirit of those objective representations, so that what at first was externalized may come home to consciousness and through this homecoming be filled with fresh lifeblood.

The second aim of the soul’s logical life is to overcome itself, to emancipate itself from itself. This is the “alchemical” work of history, which is a history of the development of consciousness. Development here means consciousness’s pushing off from its initial stage, negating and sublimating the latter and *ipso facto* reaching a new stage, from which the same process can begin again. In Jung this theme of progression through sublations occurs especially in his ideas about the death of symbols and the “metamorphosis of the gods” (one single example: “... view of the world that had sprung from the decay of Olympus and the transformation of the gods into philosophical and theological ideas”, *Letters* 2, p. 337, to Père Bruno de Jésus-Marie, 20 November, 1956). In each of the new stages reached the soul realizes and fulfills one potential of itself.

The whole life of the soul is comprised in the one axiom of Pseudo-Democritus, “Nature delights in nature [this corresponds to the first aim: the cultivation of traditional culture through projection (or objective representation) and initiation-integration], nature conquers nature [this corresponds to the step-by-step emancipation of consciousness, the alchemy of history as *opus contra naturam*], nature enjoys its mastery over nature [which we should not imagine as the utopia of a final stage, but as the soul’s enjoyment of the specific fulfillment reached at any stage]”.

NOTES

1. *Letters* 2, p. 309, to Benjamin Nelson, 17 June, 1956.
2. *Ibid.*

3. With Jung we could speak here of "archetypal" moments or truths, such as the moments of love, of strife, of birth, of the puer, of virginity, of illumination, etc.

4. G. W. F. Hegel, *Jenaer Systementwürfe III*, in: *Gesammelte Werke*, Hamburg 1968 ff. Vol. 8, Ed. R.P. Horstmann & J.H. Trede, pp. 185 ff. Idem, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §§ 458–64. See also Alfredo Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle*, Cambridge (Cambridge Univ. Pr.) 2001, pp. 287–308, and idem, "Logic, Thinking and Language", paper read at the International Hegel Congress on "Von der Logik zur Sprache" in Stuttgart 2005, to be published in the proceedings of that congress.

The transcendent function and Hegel's dialectical vision

Hester McFarland Solomon

In this chapter I will explore the parallels between Jung's concept of the transcendent function and the notion of dialectical change, first expounded by the German Romantic philosopher, Frederick Hegel (1770–1831).

Hegel's formulation of the method arrived at a particular time and place in European history, in Germany, at the time of the Romantic revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, a time of enormous social, political and economic turbulence and change. It formed an essential core of important 20th century European philosophical traditions, such as phenomenology and its derivatives, as well as the version of psychoanalysis developed by Lacan and his followers in France.

Hegel's dialectical model is a schema for understanding how change happens throughout all living systems; essentially, it is about the development of self-consciousness as it unfolds both internally and across society, in what he calls the World Spirit (*Geist*). Hegel's model finds a parallel in Jung's theory of how the individual develops a sense of identity or selfhood over time through the interplay between inner and outer, and between collective and personal psychological contents, both located at conscious and unconscious

levels. Hegel expounded a philosophy that reflects a deep structural view of the reality of the world (Hegel, 1807a, 1812, 1817, 1820). It has had a profound effect on the thinking of those schooled in European culture since the 19th century. Hegel's dialectical vision reflects an understanding of fundamental truths, including psychological truths, concerning reality, and how the self is brought into being and attains its fullest actualization through the interaction between self-consciousness and consciousness of an other. Both Hegel and Jung expounded models that are concerned with those deeply embedded, inherited structures and dynamic processes that underlie the ways in which we perceive ourselves and our reality, and the ways in which we become the individuals who we are. Both employ an archetypal model of the self expressed in terms of an image of wholeness, achieved through successive conflict-ridden steps towards individuation and integration.

Hegel's model is fundamentally about *Spirit* as the product of the dialectical interaction between subjective thought and the objective world, between *Logic* and *Nature*. In his introduction to the *Phenomenology of Mind*, Stepelevich states:

It begins with *Logic*, defined as the science of the Idea itself, which treats of the inner life of mind, of human thought. It is followed by the *Philosophy of Nature* the science of the Idea outside of itself, or for itself, which deals with the physical world. The *Encyclopaedia* concludes with the *Philosophy of Mind*, the Idea in and for itself. This is concerned with the origin, nature and purposes of human personality and social institutions. In this scheme, purely logical and natural beings are merely one-sided or partial expressions of spirit. The only true and complete reality is spiritual, which is the dialectical result of the interaction of subjective thought and objective world. [Stepelevich, 1990, p. 19]

As such, *Spirit* finds its fullest manifestation in human consciousness. For Hegel, the history of reality is equivalent to human history as it engages in the struggle to reconcile itself to itself through successive acts of (self) negation. In so doing, it achieves a synthesis, arriving at successive and increasingly encompassing states of consciousness. *Phenomenology of Mind*, Hegel's great work written in 1807, relates the story of this dynamic between conflict, negation, and integration, the goal of which is wholeness.

Although this chapter will concentrate mainly on the parallels between Jung's model of the transcendent function and Hegel's dialectical model, there is a deeper implication. An understanding of the dialectical model would contribute to a broader recognition of the philosophical bedrock that underpins the ways of thinking about human nature and development that we call analytical and psychoanalytic theory. It is able to contribute to an understanding of the differential roles of inner and outer influences in the development of personality. Thus it contributes conceptually to a central debate in depth psychology now: whether a primary self or a primary instinct for relatedness forms the basis of personality structure. It can lead us to think about a possible resolution of the debate through a view of the self as the result of successive interactions between the contents of the inner world and those objects in the outer world with which it relates. It is a model of how the self combines and interacts with its objects from birth through to maturity: that is, in Jungian terms, how the primary self becomes the individuated self.

The Hegelian notion of dialectical change permeates the psychological theories of Freud and Jung and their followers, steeped as they all were in the German speaking culture of their times. Neither Jung nor Freud acknowledged a real debt to Hegel. In fact, the few references to Hegel in Jung's *Collected Works* are quite scathing. Indeed, we also know from those sparse references to Hegel in his writings that Jung was highly critical of Hegel's style in expressing his philosophical ideas:

A philosophy like Hegel's is a self-revelation of psychic background and, philosophically, a presumption. Psychologically, it amounts to an invasion by the unconscious. The peculiar high-flown language Hegel uses bears out this view: it is reminiscent of the megalomaniac language of schizophrenics, who use terrific spellbinding words to reduce the transcendent to subjective form, to give banalities the charm of novelty, or pass off commonplaces as searches wisdom. So bombastic a terminology is a symptom of weakness, ineptitude, and lack of substance. But that does not prevent the latest German philosopher from using the same crackpot power-words and pretending that it is not unintentional psychology. [Jung, 1947, par. 360]

In another context, however, Jung called Hegel “that great psychologist in philosopher’s garb” (Jung, 1935, par. 1734). But in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* he wrote:

Of the nineteenth-century philosophers, Hegel put me off by his language, as arrogant as it was laborious; I regarded him with downright mistrust. He seemed to me like a man who was caged in the edifice of his own words and pompously gesticulating in his prison. [Jung, 1963]

It is not my intention to concentrate on Freud’s debt to Hegel here; that would be the basis for another study. It may suffice to mention Freud’s tripartite model of the mind and the three levels of consciousness, each in dynamic relationship within and between the various structures, with ego synthesizing the opposing demands of id and superego. The argument of this chapter is that the dialectical vision is the essence of Jung’s concept of the transcendent function.

The transcendent function

Jung considered the transcendent function to be a process central to the psyche. He thought of the conscious and unconscious as being in dynamic opposition to each other, resulting in an intense interaction, both conflictual but also full of potential for growth, and he thought of the transcendent function as an organic and creative way through the conflict of these opposites. For Jung the transcendent function is “a natural process, a manifestation of the energy that springs from the tension of opposites” (Jung, 1917, par. 121). It forms the basis for:

... a process not of dissolution but of construction, in which thesis and antithesis both play their part. In this way it becomes a new content that governs the whole attitude, putting an end to the division and forcing the energy of the opposites into a common channel. The standstill is overcome and life can flow on with renewed power towards new goals. [Jung, 1921, par. 827]

The image that results from this dynamic process (Figure 1) contains the possibility of a creative synthesis and a way out of what had appeared to be a locked state of polar opposition. This achievement,




Figure 1.

in turn, creates a position against which further elements will stand in opposition, leading to new conflictual polarities, which will also require further integration, mediation and synthesis. So the process continues, inexorably and relentlessly, each time reaching a higher level of synthesis.

Far from claiming it a philosophical idea, Jung compared the transcendent function to a mathematical function:

There is nothing mysterious or metaphysical about the term “transcendent function”, it means a psychological function comparable in its way to a mathematical function of the same name, which is a function of real and imaginary numbers. The psychological “transcendent function” arises from the union of conscious and unconscious contents. [Jung, 1957, par. 131]

The years 1912–1916 were pivotal in Jung’s psychic development, a time of great crisis. It was during this time that he wrote both the *Seven Sermons to the Dead* and the *Transcendent Function* (although the latter would not be published until 1957, the former was published in a private edition in 1925). Jung had broken with Freud in 1912, and this highly disturbing severing of what had been a cherished relationship was followed by Jung’s surrender to a descent into the depths of his own unconscious. There followed a profound self-exploration with dramatic consequences. It was at this time that he

began his studies of the writings of the Gnostics, later using images he found therein as metaphors for the dialectic within and between internal and external relationships, including the transference/counter-transference relationship. Judith Hubback, in her review of the *Seven Sermons to the Dead*, speculated that the abstract thinking formulated in the *Transcendent Function* was based on the personal experiences expressed in the *Seven Sermons*, and that Jung hesitated to publish it for that reason. As she points out, Jung was looking for “a pattern of order and interpretation in face of the confused and frightening contents of the unconscious” (Hubback, 1966, p. 107).

Going on from Judith Hubback’s understanding, I would suggest that Jung may have found containment for the highly personal and disruptive experiences found in the *Seven Sermons to the Dead* through exercising the philosophical and intellectual rigour expressed in the *Transcendent Function*, a kind of “progress report of his psychological thinking” (Shamdasani, private communication, 2005). I think that the schema of psychological functioning that Jung developed in the *Transcendent Function* has a parallel in the philosophical vision of Hegel’s dialectic. In the immediacy of the disintegrating psychological experiences that he went through in the years between 1912–1916, Jung swung from one pole of experience to the other, from the chaos and destabilization of unconscious irruptions witnessed in the *Seven Sermons to the Dead*, to the structuring and orderliness of thinking as expressed in the *Transcendent Function*. Through this dynamic interplay, he was able to achieve a personal synthesis, a position of relative integration between the conscious and unconscious attitudes. So Jung himself was living the dialectic.

The transcendent function, like the dialectical process, is about achieving greater and greater differentiations:

The confrontation of the two positions generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living, third thing ... a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a new situation. [Jung, 1957, par. 189]

Jung called the synthesis of what is oppositional at a particular moment in the unconscious and in the conscious “transcendent” because, as he says, “it makes the transition from one attitude to another organically possible ... the constructive or synthetic method

of treatment presupposes insights which are at least potentially present in the patient ..." (Jung, 1957, par. 145). It is especially through the transference and the catalytic contribution of the analyst that "... the suitably trained analyst mediates the transcendent function for the patient, i.e., helps him to bring conscious and unconscious together and so arrive at a new attitude". (Jung, 1957, par. 146)

Jung's vision of a bound-together dynamic between related and relating opposite functions which lead to change, forms the basis of my comparison of the transcendent function and the dialectical vision. Jung presents us with a vision of opposites that are in dynamic relation to each other. These may be situated intrapsychically, or between the self and an other (for example, between infant and mother, or analysand and analyst). Through the tension and conflict created by the dynamic relationship, a creative, forward-moving resolution, a synthesis is achieved. Death or stagnation resides in holding these factors separate and apart.

The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent function of opposites. The confrontation of the two positions generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living, third thing—not a logical stillbirth ... but a movement out of the suspension between opposites, a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a new situation. The transcendent function manifests itself as a quality of conjoined opposites. So long as these are kept apart—naturally for the purpose of avoiding conflict—they do not function and remain inert. [Jung, 1957, par. 189]

The dialectical vision

Hegel's grand design is an attempt to understand reality as constructed historically in pairs of opposites that are not dichotomous but are rather in intimate, dynamic, albeit oppositional relation to one another. The dialectical model allows for a two-fold view of reality, on the one hand in terms of bipolar opposites in dynamic relation to each other, and on the other hand a unity of opposites towards which each strives.

When any thought, notion, or understanding becomes fixed or defined, the mind's tendency to achieve a more comprehensive view is momentarily stunted. A potentially creative conflict may then

occur that enables the rigidly held position to be mediated, superseded or overcome (*aufgehoben*). The task of dialectical philosophy is to strive for greater and greater comprehension until a kind of totality of understanding is achieved. This is what Hegel called “absolute reason”. This involves the work of negation (*Aufhebung*), I will discuss later how this relates to Jung’s archetypal notion of the Self as an image of wholeness.

The dialectical process begins with a “thesis”—any definable moment of reality that is considered as an unconditioned beginning, a starting point from which future developments proceed. In the course of time, the thesis is seen to entail an opposite—“antithesis”—or “the other”. This opposite is understood in relation to the thesis, such that the thesis is seen to require the presence of the antithesis all along. A third stage is achieved, called the “synthesis”, which is the result of the dynamic, conflictual, and reciprocal relationship between thesis and antithesis (Figure 2). This resolution has the capacity to hold the two apparent opposites together.

Hegel begins his enquiry by an illustration of dialectical thinking: he posits “pure being” as the fundamental starting point of philosophical enquiry. The very next step, following the act of positing the idea of “pure being”, is immediately, almost simultaneously, to require its opposite—“nothingness”. (This equally could be “self” and “not self”.) “Being” as thesis implies “nothingness” as




Figure 2.

antithesis. As long as these two fundamental opposites remain in stagnant and mutually annihilating conflict without authentic interaction, no resolution, no creative change is possible. Hegel demonstrates that the only possible dynamic and creative outcome between these opposite positions is "becoming". "Dialectic is the process of thought that leads the mind from one idea into its complementary opposite, and reveals the unexpected conclusion that their fundamental truth is found only in their unity. Dialectical philosophy proceeds from the premise that true reality is a "unity of opposites" ". (Stepelevich, 1990, p. 16). This brilliant and immediately accessible understanding of the fundamentals of existence is matched by a similar understanding of the fundamentals of the human psyche and its relationship to others.

Hegel's major illustration of the dialectic between the self and others occurs in his analysis of "Lordship and Bondage", found in *Phenomenology of Spirit*. It is supremely psychological, in that it is concerned with how the individual develops self-consciousness. The process begins at the moment when one person first becomes aware of another as being like him, but also different, an *other*. "Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged". (Hegel, 1807b, par. 178). Each is filled by the desire for recognition by the other.

A living relationship is thus established between them, based on an encounter so authentic that the basic core identities of each are touched, threatened with takeover by the other, and then, in some way, reconciled.

Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come *out of itself*. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self. [Hegel, 1807b, par. 179]

The tripartite structure of the dialectical model reflects an archetypal pattern that we meet in the world and in the human mind as it mirrors the structures of the world. The Christian idea of the threefold nature of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit; Spinoza and Descartes' threefold vision of reality as consisting of three different kinds of substance (thought, nature and God); the Socratic dialectic

whereby rigid positions are confronted and thereby changed by adroit questioning leading to deeper understanding—all attest to the ubiquitous, deep structural nature of the tripartite dialectical vision. As an explanation of how change occurs psychologically, the dialectical model also gives us a way of thinking about another deep human structure: how a *two*-person becomes a *three-or more* person psychology. The primary mother-infant dyad, if maintained for too long, becomes a stultifying, anti-life set-up, which does not allow for change, as does not the oppositional either/or thinking characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position. The presence of the father, or the mediatory inner element, acts as a catalyst for forward movement where growth and change may be possible. The central psychoanalytic concept of the Oedipus complex is exactly about this, whether it be thought of at the classical psychosexual phase, creating emotional space for the individuation process to occur, or whether it be at the level of very early unconscious phantasy, creating mental space in which thoughts may occur.

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* concerns the steps by which the World Spirit (*Geist*) achieves wholeness. Each moment in the dialectical process corresponds to a centre or point of consciousness and, as Hegel says, "they stimulate each other into activity ... [so that] each has its "other" within it and they are only one unity". (Hegel, 1807b, par. 161)

Hegel's choice of language in the enquiry concerning the dialectical processes of Spirit (*Geist*) begins as if it were a statement concerning the primary self:

the simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal blood ... [that] pulsates w`ithin itself but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest. [Hegel, 1807b, par. 162]

This primary state of undifferentiated unity, this "restless infinity" (Hegel, 1807b, par. 169) holds the potential for all the differences to come. It is from out of "this self-identical essence" that an "I" and an "other" appear. For this to happen, consciousness must become self-consciousness, and this in turn can only occur when the self is conscious of itself in relation to another. To describe this achievement, Hegel uses the violent image of self-sundering:

These *sundered moments* are thus *in and for themselves* each an opposite—*of an other*; thus in each moment the “other” is at the same time expressed ... and so each is therefore in its own self the opposite of itself. [Hegel, 1807b, par. 162]

Hegel now carries the argument further. For the “I” to differentiate itself from the “first distinct moment”, something other than purely passive self-contemplation must occur. This other thing is, according to Hegel, the “second distinct moment”, a moment of antithesis, which Hegel calls “desire” (Hegel, 1807b, par. 167). The living, immediate quality achieved at this level of philosophical analysis, the introduction of psychological states of desire as the catalytic factor in the dialectic of the self, is remarkable. Hegel, “that great psychologist in philosopher’s garb”, as Jung called him (Jung, 1935, par. 1734), relates inner states of desire to the foundation of the self in its relation to others—I know myself through my desire in relation to an other. The language he uses is full of immediacy and life—“restless infinity” (par. 169), “Life as a *living thing*” (par. 171), “life points to something other than itself” (par. 172), “self-consciousness as Desire” (par. 174), “Desire destroying its object in order for the self to incorporate it” (par. 175).

Jungian analyst and writer of philosophical texts on aspects of archetypal psychology, Wolfgang Giegerich, commenting on a previous version of this paper, attributed a “peace negotiation fantasy” to my exploration of the parallels between Hegel’s dialectical vision and Jung’s concept of the transcendent function (Giegerich, 2005, p. 4). Although he concurs that I depart from the “peace negotiation” model by referring to a “*creative synthesis* [his italics]” (*ibid.*, p. 5), thus establishing “a fundamentally new level” (*ibid.*), Giegerich misreads me when he purports that I suggest that the dialectical process begins with Two, and not with One, with a *Position*. I very clearly state that the first position, the thesis, is the first moment, which gives rise to the second moment, the antithesis, the start of the dialectical *process*. It is through the dialectical process that an eventual synthesis of the oppositional state may occur, overcoming/sublating the initial negation as the fundamental attribute of that state by preserving what is negated and transforming it into a new position.

The differences between us may well lie in Giegerich's view concerning psychology, life, and the soul. He states:

Psychology is not about life and life phenomena, not about people and their development or behavior, but it is about "the soul", the "logical life", the dialectics operative *within* such life phenomena, *within* people's behavior. With the notion of "conflicts" we are already in the outside world, in the social and empirical arena of thing-like entities and events: of human beings and their behavior, their interaction and relationships (so-called object relations), their interests, their desire and fears, and thereby we have already closed behind us the door to the sphere of "the soul" and its concerns, the door to the sphere of psychology. [*ibid.*, p. 2]

When Giegerich states that "with the notion of "conflicts" we are already in the outside world", as if this were not possible within an Hegelian dialectical position, while still retaining a reflection that sublates and transforms these conflictual positions, then he leaves out practically all of Hegel's analysis of the history of the living world, including the history of humankind. I agree that Hegel's dialectical thinking proceeds from the standpoint of interiority (*ibid.*, p. 8); as, of course, does the analytic attitude. But to promote a dualism of psyche and matter is not, I think, in Hegel's philosophical disposition, nor is it in Jung's. A view of the organic relation between mind and matter is supported by recent advances in the neurosciences and theories in physics, including emergence theory (see, for example, Cambray, 2002). As I understand it, dialectical thinking mirrors dialectical processes in the living world, both drawing on deep structural realities that provide "common ground".

*The Self: a bridging concept between
the transcendent function and the dialectic*

The archetype of the Self can be usefully thought of as the analytical equivalent of Hegel's dialectical model of Spirit. Both involve a vision that includes a dynamic progression, a union of opposites through the dialectical resolution of the tensions between those opposites, such as conscious/unconscious, self/other, internal/external, leading to the emergence of the Self as a complex whole (see Sean Kelly's (1993) remarkable and sustained study of Hegel,

Jung, and the path toward wholeness.) In discussing this progression, I will consider three moments or steps in Jung's theoretical development and how these relate to the dialectic. This will take us along a path that includes the movement from libido to symbol, from symbol to Self, and from Self to *coniunctio*.

Much has been written by Jung and after Jung about the self in its various forms and functions. In recent years we have only to study the work of Michael Fordham (1985a, b), Kenneth Lambert (1981), Joseph Redfearn (1985) and Rosemary Gordon (1985), to embark on an impressive list of commentators and theoreticians on this most difficult of concepts.

In this chapter I would like to add to the discussion, specifically by relating Fordham's notion of a primary self with its integrates and deintegrates (1974, 1979), to Jung's original idea of the Self in relation to the transcendent function, and to explore how these may be expressions in psychological language that have their correlates in dialectical philosophy.

To set the scene, let us introduce the *I* and the *Other*, or in Hegel's language, the *Subject* and *Object*. In the view being elaborated here, neither the *I* and the *Other*, nor the *Subject* and the *Object*, are thought of independently of each other. Rather, they are considered as opposites that are in dynamic relation to each other—they interact, they conflict and, through the process of relating, over time and under the right (i.e., facilitating) conditions, each makes its own internal synthesis of the experience.

Jung's theory of libido was derived from a different model of the psyche from that of Freud's original drive model of libido which he conceived of as a release of instinctual energy according to erotogenic zones. Jung's own view of libido was consistent with an overall teleological position, in that instinctual energy was available to be transformed at the psychological level, especially via the production of psychic representations and symbols. He developed this view, in counter-distinction to Freud's theory, in his 1912 work, *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*, later to be published in English as *Symbols of Transformation* (Vol. 5 in the *Collected Works*). The publication of this work marked, for all intents and purposes, the end of the professional and personal collaboration in which both had been so engaged until then. I would like to consider those theoretical steps that took Jung from the concept of libido to that of symbol and

then to Self. A final point is reached when Self and *coniunctio* are bridged.

In *Symbols of Transformation*, Jung altered radically the concept of the symbol from that used by Freud. Instead of the, then prevalent, psychoanalytic view of the function of symbol formation as a sublimation and therefore prevention of the primary incest tendency, Jung's view of the symbol was that it designated

... phenomena requiring a teleological explanation ... [rather than] simple causalities ... [with] the purpose of canalizing the libido into new forms ... [Jung, 1912, par. 332]

It is not possible to overestimate the importance of this radical (we might call it dialectical) shift in the concept of libido. Through this new definition, Jung offered an alternative view of the purely psycho-sexual nature of libido, for he goes on to claim that, under the right (i.e., facilitating) conditions, the effect of the canalization of libido is to

... Stimulate the creative imagination which gradually opens up possible avenues for the self-realisation of libido. In this way the libido becomes imperceptibly spiritualized. [Jung, 1912, par. 332]

In this passage Jung has, in a dialectical manner, created an alternative meaning of libido to that designated by Freud. By juxtaposing the instinctual and the spiritual, while at the same time uniting them through the concept of symbol, Jung offers a demonstration of both the form and the content of the dialectical process in its immediacy. It was to be only a few years later that he would publish *The Transcendent Function* (Jung, 1916), where the dialectical view of psychological change is expounded, and a few years after that *Psychological Types* (Jung, 1921), in which he defines symbol in relation to the transcendent function. In *Psychological Types*, Jung describes the symbol as "a living thing ... the expression of a thing not to be characterised in any other or better way ... pregnant in meaning" (Jung, 1921, par. 816). He then gives a description of the symbol in dialectical terms:

But precisely because the new symbol is born out of man's highest spiritual aspirations and must at the same time spring from

the deepest roots of his being, it cannot be a one-sided product of the most highly differentiated mental functions but must derive equally from the lowest and most primitive levels of the psyche. For this collaboration of opposing states to be possible at all, they must first face one another in the fullest conscious opposition. This necessarily entails a violent disunion with oneself, to the point where thesis and antithesis negate one another, while the ego is forced to acknowledge its absolute participation in both. [Jung, 1921, par. 824]

Having posited thesis and antithesis, he goes on to state:

Since life cannot tolerate a standstill, a damming up of vital energy results, and this would lead to an insupportable condition did not the tension of the opposites produce a new, uniting function that transcends them. [Jung, 1921, par. 824]

This achievement culminates in what Jung calls "a middle ground" where:

... The energy created by the tension of opposites therefore flows into the mediatory product and protects it from the conflict ... for both the opposites are striving to get the new product on their side. [Jung, 1921, par. 825]

Despite the highly abstract nature of Jung's concept, his language is dramatic, energetic, and alive with immediacy. The words he uses include: living, pregnant, anticipatory, dead, flows, highest, deepest, violent disunion, damming up, conflict, striving, and energy. The dramatic and immediate quality of the language no doubt attests to the drama of Jung's personal experience as the contents of his unconscious burst upon his consciousness. It is interesting to reflect at this point that the language of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is also replete with the living and violent nature of the dialectical engagement, the life and death struggle when opposites meet, clash and war, risk dissolution and disintegration. An encounter of these titanic proportions constitutes the only authentic prelude to the possibility for the dynamic of the transcendent function to be released, creating an opportunity for a new position in the psyche. If Jung conceived his notions of libido, symbol and transcendent function in a state of extreme crisis, in a psychological life-and-death struggle of his own, when he submitted to the immediacy of the experience of

the contents of his unconscious as they pushed themselves forward, so (although we do not know his mental state at the time) Hegel conceived in similar language his dialectical model, writing the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as he sat at a table by his window, hearing the sounds of Napoleon's canons during the Battle of Jena in 1806.

Dialectical processes within the self

As we know, the symbol of the Self was for Jung the central unifying symbol that signified the containment of opposites within a unified whole. Much of Jung's writing is devoted to the discovery and elaboration of symbols and representations of the Self. Just as Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* expressed and, at the same time, by virtue of being written, contributed to the dialectical process that spanned original unity, to differentiation, and finally to integration, leading ultimately to an ordered sense of wholeness, so, too, Jung's notion of the Self and its symbols not only express potential integration and order, they also contribute to it.

We think of the archetype of the Self as spanning an early primitive state or core identity through to an individuated state of wholeness via the combination and differentiation of opposites leading to a "complex holism" (Kelly, op. cit. p. 2). When the Self is expressed through the symbol of the Divine Child, we might understand that we are dealing with a state of the primary, undifferentiated core identity of the Self—a primary self. The archetype of the child "paves the way for future change of personality. In the individuation process, it anticipates the figure that comes from the synthesis of conscious and unconscious elements ..." (Jung, 1940, par. 278). Jung goes on to state that "this it cannot do without detaching itself from its origins ... the conflict is not to be overcome by the conscious mind remaining caught between the opposites, and for this reason it needs a symbol..." (Jung, 1940, par. 287). The creation of symbols is the way to overcome "an original psychological state of non-recognition, i.e., of darkness or twilight, of non-differentiation between subject and object ..." (Jung, 1940, par. 290).

When, however, the Self is expressed through the symbol of the mandala, we might understand that we are dealing, albeit as an abstraction, with the end product of the process in which all the differentiations have occurred, all the steps towards individuation

have taken place, where an integrating, unified wholeness is achieved (Jung's "conglomerate soul", 1950, par. 634). Hegel's idea of the Perfect Man (i.e., man fully individuated and conscious of himself) is similar to Jung's idea of the wholeness of the Self. "Psychologically the self is a union of conscious (masculine) and unconscious (feminine). It stands for the psychic totality. So formulated, it is a psychological concept. Empirically, however, the self appears spontaneously in the shape of specific symbols, and its totality is discernible above all in the mandala and its countless variants" (Jung, 1951, par. 426).

We can conclude that at both poles of the Self archetype Jung expresses the dynamics of change in dialectical terms that resonate with Hegel's language concerning the dynamics of the Spirit. Later theoreticians, including Fordham, Winnicott, and Racker, amongst others take Hegel's dialectical model, adapting it for an age more centred on the notion of the reality of the psyche.

Fordham's dialectical model of self development

Michael Fordham's work offers us a further dialectical view of the processes in the development of the self. In postulating two forms of the self, the primary self and Jung's view of the Self, he has developed the idea of two kinds of self functioning—deintegration and reintegration (Fordham, 1976). His view of this process is dialectical:

A symbolic expression can never represent the whole self because in order to form, the self has to divide up to produce two part-systems, the one that creates the imagery (this is rather loosely called the unconscious) and another (the ego) that records and interacts with it ... it is the images referring to the self ... that become numinous ... when ... they come close to representing the whole self. [Fordham, 1979, p. 23]

His dynamic twofold model of deintegration and reintegration (Figure 3) provides a view of the primal self in relation to its experiences, whether they be internal or external to the self.

It is a vision of dynamic and synthesizing relating, like that ascribed to the dialectical vision, and offered by Fordham in the image drawn from Freud of the amoeba with pseudopodia that extend from the central area in order to incorporate elements from




Figure 3.

the outside world. In so doing, both the self and the deintegrate undergo a change—a synthesis—within the central area.

Just as deintegration is the action of the primary self as it relates to its objects (Urban, 1991), so the dialectical process is the action of being-in-the-world. Both describe the dynamic of change and both use a twofold model of, in psychological terms, “I” and “not-I”, the interaction between which produces a new element, which is reincorporated into and transforms each element in the process.

Applied to the evolution of the personality, the dialectical model can be used to explain how a series of incremental steps take place as a result of the collision of, and play between, opposite experiences (good/bad, separate/merged, through a practically infinite list of polarities), and how they gradually might achieve an internal synthesis. Each element defines and is defined by its opposite in the dialectical pair. Implicit but central to this view is a teleological vision of how living organisms develop and grow by subsuming (negating) and preserving each previous stage in the process in achieving the next stage (Hegel’s famous example is how the acorn becomes the oak tree). Implied in the model is an explanation of how a failure to develop might occur, when breakdown or a rigid defensiveness would arise through a conflict of opposites with too great pressure on the system and with no means of synthesis. In the process of the development of the neonate, we might call the starting point of the dialectic, the first moment, the thesis, the “primary

self", and the second moment, the antithesis, is the caregiver, not self. Thus, thesis and antithesis are seen to require the presence of each other all along. So we might say that the primary self was ready to interact with the caregiver, and the capacity to become itself-individuation—requires the capacity to find and relate to the other—in Hegel's terms, its desire is the desire for another (i.e., the mother or caregiver). In Winnicott's imagery, the baby invents the breast and the breast arrives (if it is a good enough breast) at that particular moment when the hallucinatory desire has occurred (Winnicott, 1952, p. 99).

The coniunctio as a creative image of the dialectical self

For Jungians, images of the *coniunctio* are symbols of central psychological importance, denoting the union or marriage of opposites in an intercourse that would have, as its fruition, the birth of a new element. Jung considered that many primal phantasies of adult patients did not arise from real childhood experiences of the primal scene, as traditionally understood by psychoanalytic theory, but were better conceived of as projected into what are experienced as memories from childhood. The sources of these projected "memories" are the bipolar archetypal images of the collective unconscious, images of, for example, the anima and animus in *coniunctio*.

In analytical psychology, the central archetypal image of the primal scene is envisaged as the coupling of the King and Queen in all its vicissitudes as Jung demonstrated in his well known study of the *Rosarium* (Jung, Coll. Wks. 16). Jung used alchemy as a vehicle through which to explore those elements in the psyche that could be observed in the special analytic *coniunctio* contained within the transference/counter-transference. In fact, the alchemical metaphor centred around the *coniunctio* image—a meeting within the *vas hermeticum* of the base or primitive psychic elements and those processes they undergo in a series of transformations from base (instinctual) to precious (psychological) substances. We could see the alchemical vessel as the analytic or therapeutic setting, and the elements to be transformed as aspects of the conscious and the unconscious of both the patient and the analyst. In alchemy, the elements

to be combined are conceived of as opposites, the combination leading the alchemist to the production of something in the third space, *tertium quid non datur*, or the interactive field. The new condition was unnatural, in the sense of not being found naturally (*contra naturam*, as Jung says). The alchemical metaphor is rich in its potential for viewing the processes that occur within any relationship, including those within the transference/countertransference relationship, because it is concerned (in a similar way to the dialectical model), with how individuals influence each other, impact upon each other, and how their experiences are internalized and synthesized by each other: what we call the various modes of projection, introjection, identification and projective identification.

The interrelations between therapist and patient, the openness of both to changes in each other, are clearly valued by Jung. It is through the changing, ongoing analytical relationship that the vicissitudes of the treatment take place, and that progress and process within the transference and countertransference can happen. Indeed the concepts of complementary, concordant and syntonic countertransference (Racker, 1968, Lambert, 1981) can be understood in dialectical terms as forms of mutual relatedness, contained by the analytic set-up, which allow for subtle communication through projective identification. An "approximate union or identity between the various parts (experiences, impulses, defences), of the subject and the object" is achieved (Racker, 1968, p. 136). Perhaps instead of Racker's idea of a straight-forward exchange producing unity or identity, we could envisage an emergent property of the analytic relationship composed of a complicated mix of shared projected and introjected elements. For the stuff of the projected or introjected material must find a mental space and place in the recipient's psyche, and then it goes on acting in there. Hegel's words are eloquent:

[Self-consciousness] must supersede this otherness of itself. This is the supersession of the first ambiguity, and is therefore itself a second ambiguity. First, it must proceed to supersede the *other* independent being in order thereby to become certain of *itself* as the essential being; secondly, in so doing it proceeds to supersede its *own* self, for this other is itself. [Hegel, 1807b, par. 180]

*The dialectical understanding of transference
and countertransference*

Racker referred to the subjective experience of the transference as "...determined by the infantile situations and archaic objects of the patient" (Racker, 1968, p. 152), the understanding of which the analyst can approximate only through his capacity to allow the analysand enough access to his own unconscious—what Racker calls "an intensified vibration" of his own infantile situations and archaic objects. This is similar to Fordham's view of the importance of the analyst's ability to tolerate their own deintegrative processes and states in the presence and service of the patient (Fordham, 1957). The understanding achieved by this subjective experience is then translated into an interpretation, which becomes part of the shared history-making between patient and analyst. It may then be re-experienced at the conscious or unconscious levels at the time of each subsequent interpretation. The quality of the resonating constitutes an important therapeutic factor in the subjective experience of the analysis.

The interrelations between analyst and patient, the openness of both to changes in each other, are clearly valued by Jung, and he referred to the centrality of the relationship between analyst and analysand in dialectical terms.

In actual practice, therefore, the suitably trained analyst mediates the transcendent function for the patient, i.e., helps him to bring conscious and unconscious together and so arrive at a new attitude. The patient clings by means of the transference to the person who seems to promise him a renewal of attitude; through it he seeks this change, which is vital to him, even though he may not be conscious of doing so. For the patient, therefore, the analyst has the character of an indispensable figure absolutely necessary for life. (Jung, 1957, par. 146).

Because each personality is equally involved in the process, change occurs for both:

For two personalities [doctor and patient] to meet is like mixing two different chemical substances: if there is any combination at all, both are transformed. In any effective psychological treatment the doctor is bound to influence the patient; but this

influence can only take place if the patient has a reciprocal influence on the doctor. You can exert no influence if you are not susceptible to influence. [Jung, 1929, par. 163]

In the transference, the analysand may project an internal object into the analyst, and in consequence, in the countertransference the analyst may feel himself to be identified with this object. The analyst's own subjective experience of the projected object will depend on the quality of the projection as well as the quality of his inner world. How conscious understanding of this subtle and complex process builds up over time forms the context of the analysis. Hegel's formulation of the dialectical interaction between two people as the "ambiguous supersession of [their] ambiguous otherness" is another rendering of the archetypal image of the *coniunctio*. "This ambiguous supersession of its ambiguous otherness is equally an ambiguous return *into itself*. For first, through the supersession, it receives back its own self, because, by superseding *its* otherness, it again becomes equal to itself; but secondly, the other self-consciousness equally gives it back again to itself, for it saw itself in the other, but supersedes this being of itself in the other and thus lets the other again go free". (Hegel, 1807b, par. 181)

Two dominant images linked to the analytic *coniunctio*, and studied extensively by Jung in alchemical texts, are the hermaphrodite, a combined male-female image, unconscious and lacking differentiation, and the androgyne, the integration of male and female aspects in conscious balance. They are seen, in clinical material, in terms of the wish to merge, at the undifferentiated hermaphroditic end of the spectrum. The more differentiated androgyne imagery can point to vicissitudes and variations in the *coniunctio*. It is possible to think of the development from less to more differentiated imagery as being achieved in part through processes facilitating the formation of what has been called the subtle body. An unconscious couple is created and interact together in the consulting room, by virtue of the consistent containment of the therapeutic setting and through the subtle communications that can occur within the interplay of projective identifications, or, in Jung's terms, through *participation mystique*. "Projective identification can initiate the process of gaining access to, and transforming, interactive fields of linking or relating. These fields are imaged, for example, by the couples in the *Rosarium*. The

alchemical process is devoted to overcoming the dangers of fusion states, of the tendency to concretise processes in the third area into something belonging to the ego" (Schwartz-Salant, 1988, p. 44).

The collisions that occur between the unconscious analytic couple and the conscious analytic couple are often called enactments; those inevitable errors in the analytic work that can lead to creative change.

Marital or long-term partnership is a further example, wherein a relationship is built up over time and across major life occurrences. It is imaged in the *coniunctio*, in the androgyne, and in the idea of the combined parents, and it is mirrored in the analytic relationship. *Hierosgamos*, the image of the *coniunctio* of the sacred marriage, is visioned, in alchemical terms, as the meeting of opposite elements, male and female, which unite to produce a third substance. In the actual marriage, it may be an actual child. At the symbolic level, the partners will engage in exchanges that may lead to internal transformations within each that could not have occurred without the other.

We are now coming full circle, and return to the image of the mother and infant who form a nurturing couple. By their very coming together, they create a third element, which we could identify as aspects of the shared subtle body, that contain each, negate each as separate entities, but which by so doing reach towards their further mutual and individual differentiations and development as re-internalized by each.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to demonstrate that Jung's idea of the transcendent function has a deep resonance with Hegel's seminal philosophical enquiry. Despite Jung's rejection of Hegel as too identified with his own unrecognized psychology, Jung's early notion of the transcendent function and his later understanding of analysis and the path of individuation as a dialectical process, the aim of which was the synthesis of the personality through the transformation of opposites, has a parallel in Hegel's dialectical vision. Understood psychologically, the dialectical process as imaged archetypally in the child—producing *coniunctio* has proved fertile in understanding the dynamics of the self and its development as lived out in the analytic transference and counter-transference.

In the work of analytic reconstruction, a history of the internal image building is recreated—a real process of *self*-consciousness. No matter how we seek to answer the question of what comes first—the primal self or the inter-relatedness that creates the self—in the end, our theories rest on speculations and inferences drawn from infant research, infant observation, and our day-to-day clinical work, and in the stages of our own dialectical, transformational development—our own individuation. In turn, these speculations must rest both on our best attempts to observe and understand, as well as our more or less conscious philosophical dispositions. All this points to fundamental concerns about epistemology in analytic theory building—how do we know what we know and what is it exactly that we *do* know?

Overall, we could view the basic differences between the philosophical stances taken by Freud and Jung as characterized by the reductionist method of Freud (the *archaeology* of mind) and the synthetic method of Jung (the *teleology* of mind). Seen together, they constitute a complementary system of opposites that form a whole—a dialectical system in itself.

It is possible that the dialectical model can help us to understand why these two lines of analytical enquiry, the archaeology and the teleology of mind, lead to potential conflict. It is also possible to use the dialectical model to understand how they are complementary. If we strive towards a mediation of the two positions, which does not deny differences but rather seeks to understand them as existing within a larger whole, then we would be adding to the work that brings forward the general development and evolution of our theoretical understanding and clinical work.

Throughout our lives there is a constant dialectical process that enables our essential self and our personal, special inner and outer capacities for *coniunctio* to elaborate and grow. If we allow that there is both a primal self and an innate predisposition for interrelating, then we are in a position to understand that the development of the personality is due to both and necessitates both. Jung's concept of the transcendent function and Hegel's dialectical vision both seek to address similar understandings of psychic reality and as such demonstrate a remarkable similarity of structure.

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SCIENCE

From moments of meeting to archetypal consciousness: emergence and the fractal structure of analytic practice

George B. Hogenson

How does analysis effect change? This question is perhaps the oldest and most persistent methodological issue in the analytic tradition. Given its persistence, and the variety of proposed answers, one wonders whether it is worthwhile attempting once more to address the issue. This concern notwithstanding, I hope, in this paper to identify certain specific features of the analytic process that may allow us to probe the question of change more deeply. In order to do this I will begin by linking two clinically oriented papers which, I believe, share an organizing feature that opens the possibility of a deeper appreciation of the analytic process. The feature in question is the time horizon of the analytic process; one might say the temporality of analysis. I will then link this feature to a way of thinking about phenomena in general—specifically the dynamics of complex systems, with the organizing concepts of emergence and fractal structure—that I hope will open up a space for reflection on the analytic process that has only begun to be explored in both psychoanalysis and analytical psychology. I will then conclude with some reflections on the nature of the analytic process and developments in our understanding of the process of

change that we will have to consider as we move ahead in our development of theory and practice.

The developmental argument in psychoanalysis

In the English speaking world, the most vigorous movement in psychoanalysis is characterized increasingly by an appreciation of the dynamics of interpersonal relations, and the value of detailed infant observation for guidance on the nature of those dynamics. This orientation, of course, derives at least implicit validation from the tradition, beginning with Freud and Klein. But what has distinguished it from the older tradition is that research now relies on a micro-analysis of infant-caregiver behavior rather than on more global inferences about unconscious mental states. The result, which moves this research into a far more compelling position than its forebears, is that analytic arguments can now be based on empirical findings that Freud and his early followers could only imagine. The work of analysts such as Beebe and Lachmann, in the United States and Fonagy and his associates in the United Kingdom, has genuinely transformed the discourse of psychoanalysis as has the work of Jean Knox in analytical psychology (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002; Fonagy, et al. 2002; Knox, 2003).

In many respects the leader of this research program is the eminent developmental psychologist and psychoanalyst, Daniel Stern, whose work on the *Interpersonal World of the Human Infant* (Stern, 1985), as his landmark book was titled, opened the possibility of linking the then developing field of the micro-analysis of infant development to the possibility of analytic implementation in the clinical setting. In thinking about this movement, I want to briefly highlight the characteristic of the research that most distinguished it from what went before—specifically, the ability of the researcher to examine infant development in both behavioral and temporal detail at a level not contemplated by earlier researchers. The simple reason this became possible was technological rather than theoretical. With the development of ever better video recording technology, it simply became possible to examine infant-caregiver behavior in new and illuminating ways. While behaviors were thereby revealed that had not previously been seen, it also became evident that these critical interpersonal interactions possessed a fine grained temporal

structure as well. As research by Stern, Trevarthan, Tronick and others progressed, the significance of this temporal structure increasingly came to shape their thinking about development and by extension, the process of clinical analysis. Summarizing the changes that have taken place in psychology due to these technological innovations, Horst Hendriks-Jansen writes:

The temporal patterning of behavior, and its importance in mother-infant exchanges and the emergence of language and conceptual thought was not properly appreciated until quite recently. The explanatory entities of psychology tend to be static entities like beliefs, desires, memories and mental states, whereas the new research suggests that meaning emerges in dynamic interactions. [Hendriks-Jansen, 1996, p. 252]

Although a number of examples of how the micro-analysis of infant behavior have been incorporated into psychoanalytic theory and practice, I want to focus on the work of Stern because he has taken the temporal features of the process to a level unmatched by others. Writing in 1998, Stern, and a group of colleagues (Stern, et al. 1998), published an important paper entitled “Non-Interpretive Mechanisms in Psychoanalytic Therapy”. This paper was followed by other work, and culminated most recently in Stern’s book, *The Present Moment* (Stern, 2004).

For our purposes, the 1998 paper is most instructive. In that paper, Stern et al. argue that interpretation, is not in fact the foundational element in a transformative analysis. Rather, drawing on their model of infant development, Stern and his colleagues argue that within the analytic process it is possible to discern critical instances of interaction, which they term “moments of meeting”. These moments replicate the dynamic pattern of the most important moments in early infant development when infant and care giver engage in a truly synchronized interaction that reshapes the “implicit relational knowing” of both parties. Moments of meeting exist, however, in a continuum of temporally ordered interactions that Stern et al. refer to as “moving along”. Moving along is the overarching process, but it is punctuated first by what they refer to as “now moments” and eventually by moments of meeting. Now moments are instances of close connection but not transformative connection. They tend, it seems, to occur when the more traditional

structure of analysis “risks being, or is, or should be, broken. (p. 912)”. Finally, moments of meeting occur at those points when the analytic structure does collapse and the participants in the interaction “meet as persons relatively unhidden by their usual therapeutic roles for that moment (p. 913)”.

Stern et al. give an example of a clinical moment when the analyst struggles with her reaction to the analysand’s charged reaction to the observing position of the analyst. The moment is fraught with danger for the analyst because “the sexual implications” of the exchange had become “so intense that to speak them seemed to bring them too close to action” (P. 913). It was only when the analyst realized that she was “being invited to either take the “superior position” or submit to Molly (the analysand)”, that she “suddenly felt free to be spontaneous and communicate to Molly her actual experience”. This enactment—not exactly acting out—is the point at which the moment of meeting is fulfilled. What matters is the depth and human reality of the analyst’s encounter with the analysand.

While many things may be said about this model of analysis I want to focus on the way time is conceived of in the analytic process. In his recent book, Stern has taken the temporal problematic to what one could easily call its logically reductive conclusion. In that book he records research he has conducted with subjects who are required to provide almost microscopic accounts of daily events such as taking a bottle of milk out of the refrigerator. It is this ideal of the micro-analysis of patterns of action in time that defines the essence of Stern’s current work. The methodological foundation for this approach, as Stern and his colleagues make clear, is the level of insight they have gained by a micro-analysis of infant development, as already noted. Although much is different from the tradition in this work, it nevertheless has the quality of an intensification of the form of observation Freud exemplified in his famous commentary on the “*fort-da*” behavior of the child rolling a spool away from himself and then recovering it. In both Freud’s classic example and in Stern’s greatly refined version, meaning resides first of all and most of the time in the moment. Temporal extension is not the locus of concern for these theoreticians. I want to keep this formulation in mind as we proceed.

Analytical psychology

In an important paper published in 2001, (Cambray, 2001) specifically addressing the role played by enactments in the analytic process, Joseph Cambray gives us an example of an alternative way of framing the temporality of analysis. In Cambray's account, the temporal horizon of analysis stretches over the course of an entire analytic day. Cambray begins with the need to prepare his clients for an extended break in his analytic schedule. The first client of the day is anxious about his leaving, but Cambray, in the course of musing on the state of the client, who also suffers from a degenerative disease, introduces an interpretation based on the myth of Pandora that distinctly misses the mark and throws the analytic session off balance. Interestingly, this example of a failed interaction has many of the marks of one of Stern's moments of meeting, albeit one that goes astray and yields what Stern refers to as a "missed now moment" (p. 915).

For our purposes, however, the important aspect of Cambray's account is that his associative relationship to the Pandora myth, itself derivative from his own early experience of illness, gives shape to the rest of the day. Cambray remarks that by tracking this process he can discern how "the variations in the handling of a single theme emerging in individualized forms", allows him to "observe the fluctuations and development of analytic consciousness; subtly emerging, dissolving, reforming, and shifting shape throughout the day" (p. 292). But the entire process begins with what Stern would have to recognize as an attempt at a moment of meeting. The question then becomes one of whether and how to reconcile these two divergent experiences of the temporality of the analytic process. To find a way to open up the relationship between these clinical accounts I want to move into a more general discussion of the elements of any dynamic model in any system. The elements that I want to discuss are the phenomenon of power law distributions in complex, dynamic systems; the fractal structure of phenomena defined by power laws, and finally the nature of emergent phenomena in general. While all of these elements of a dynamic system can be identified in a variety of fields, I will conclude by returning to the analytic setting to argue that a particular aspect of analysis, what I term symbolic density, allows us to unify the clinical

accounts we have considered, and open a window on the analytic process more generally.

The fractal structure of temporality and the emergence of the analytic moment

What we have in these two clinical papers are radically divergent accounts of the temporal pattern of analysis. In the first, Stern's, the transformative analytic event is reduced to a fleeting moment when the analytic structure collapses into a form of mutuality that for Stern and his colleagues captures the dynamic pattern of the infant-care giver interaction with all that portends for the development of deep implicit interpersonal knowing. In the case of Cambray, the singular interaction sets in motion an unfolding process that runs the course of the analytic day—and to a degree well beyond that as he and his analysands negotiate the experience of his extended absence. In this instance, the structure is provided by the persistence in the analytic space of Cambray's initial embrace of the Pandora myth. It is in the amplification of the series of analytic encounters afforded by the myth that the shape of this day unfolds.

Stern and his colleagues give us an important opening to understand the relationship between these two accounts of the structure of analytic experience. In a move that has become almost commonplace in recent theoretical and clinical discussions in both psychoanalysis and analytical psychology, Stern et al. explicitly embrace dynamic systems theory as the governing mechanism for their analysis. As they write:

A feature of dynamic systems theory relevant to our study is the self-organising principle. Applying the self-organising principle to human mental organization, we would claim that, in the absence of an opposing dynamic, the mind will tend to use all the shifts and changes in the intersubjective environment to create progressively more coherent implicit relational knowledge. [p. 906]

The source of much of the thinking about dynamic systems theory that Stern and other psychoanalysts resort to is the seminal work of the late Ester Thelen and her colleague, Linda Smith at the University of Indiana. Thelen and Smith have perhaps done more than any other investigators to reshape our understanding of the

dynamics of infant development. In a long series of publications they have unfolded a model of behavioral change and development that relies entirely on the mechanics of the organism and the interaction of the organism with an adult conspecific, rather than the maturation of innate cognitive or even emotional faculties in the organism (Thelen & Smith, 1998). What matters most for Thelen and Smith is the embedded nature of experience—embedded in the sense that development takes place in a “species typical” environment for which the mechanics of the organism have been optimally shaped by natural selection. We thus have a fundamentally mechanistic view of development, one that can, in fact, be simulated by simple robots, even to the point of simulating Piaget’s famous “A not B” test in an artificial “organism” (Thelen, et al. 2001).

It is at this point that I have to mark what I consider to be a deficiency in the psychoanalytic literature that seeks to build on dynamic systems theory (DST). My concern is that the psychoanalysts who reference dynamic systems theory do not fully grasp how radical DST is and how deeply it undermines rather than supports the elements of classical psychoanalytic theory that they wish to vindicate by way of DST interpretations. This is itself a subject for a far more detailed elaboration—well beyond the scope of this paper—but to set the stage for the second part of my argument let me briefly outline the issues.

First of all, the dynamic systems theory of Thelen and Smith is based on a set of fundamental theoretical constructs that have nothing to do with human development. This means that any use of DST to describe human development has to be sensitive to the larger context within which DST is situated. Simply put, DST is a general system of description applicable to a variety of phenomena that range from the workings of neurons in the brain to the evolution of the universe. As I will outline below, this ubiquity of DST analytics carries consequences with it that will have implications for any understanding of the analytic process that seeks to make use of the theory.

Second, and most critically for this paper, the range of phenomena described by DST means that at any level of analysis the specific system under investigation is always embedded or nested in a larger context, itself subject to the laws of a dynamic system. In other words, the infant is embedded in the system environment/care-giver. But that system itself can be seen as embedded in the system

of the culture, which includes, importantly, the system of symbolic representations that determine the possibility of higher level interactions. Thus as Kaye has argued in the case of infant nursing behavior, the species typical pattern of the human infant—a burst-pause-burst pattern unique to humans—is interpreted by the nursing mother as a response to the nursing process. The mother's response in turn yields a developmental convergence that sets the stage, in Kaye's analysis, of the development of turn taking, a fundamental aspect of uniquely human communication practices (Kaye, 1979; Kaye & Wells, 1980; Kaye, 1982) (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996). Kaye's model is a simple but profound instance of the movement from the purely mechanical—the infant has no sense of the burst-pause-burst pattern, it is simply innate mechanics—to a fundamental aspect of human symbolic interaction by way of the progressive unfolding of the embedded dynamic systems. Thus, to engage the DST model in understanding human behavior, particularly fully formed, adult human behavior, it is essential that we attend to the embedded nature of the phenomena we observe. This applies with particular force, I want to argue, in our understanding of the analytic process.

How are we to approach this problem if we are to fully grasp the implications of DST and, as noted in the quotation from Stern et al. just above, of the implications of self-organization for our understanding of the analytic process? To answer this question I now propose to look at self-organization and dynamic systems in domains that will appear at first to be far removed from our analytic interests. Self-organization is a concept that was first introduced by the Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, Ilya Prigogine. Prigogine's proposal was that many phenomena in nature had characteristics that did not exhibit simple causal relations, but rather came to be by virtue of the dynamics of the system in which they were imbedded and which they helped form. Self-organized systems, while made up of many elements—commonly referred to as a complex system—nevertheless display high levels of organization regardless of the scale at which they are examined.

Let us turn to a system that displays conspicuous self-organizing features, the stock market. In a remarkable example of cross-disciplinary analysis, the French geo-physicist, Didier Sornette, has analyzed stock market bubbles and crashes using the tools of dynamic

systems theory and the concept of self-organization (Sornette, 2003). What he found in his analysis is that in large scale market behavior the networks of association among major traders lends itself to a process of self-organization. This means that there need not be any particular cause for a major inflation of the market, a bubble. Rather, as each investor watches the behavior of their fellow traders the self-organization of the system entrains the collective behavior in such a way that bidding behavior escalates exponentially. This kind of exponential expansion in behavior defines a power law distribution, a concept that I will explain more fully in a moment. As Sornette analyses the process, the trading behavior within the market will progressively self-organize itself to the point where all of the traders are behaving in a tightly defined—and tightly coupled—pattern at all levels.

The problem with this process is that if the self-organizing dynamics of the system go on long enough, they reach a point known as a self-organizing criticality or what Sornette refers to as a singularity. Sornette argues it is this characteristic of intensely organized systems that leads to stock market crashes. What happens is that in a system at the point of self-organized criticality, even a small deviation from the organizational pattern can cause the entire system to reorganize itself in an abrupt and unpredictable, even catastrophic, manner called a phase transition. In the case of the market, if one investor suddenly changes his or her pattern of trading the rest of the system will enter a state of cascading collapse that results in a crash.

The classic analysis of this phenomenon was carried out by the physicist Per Bak with his colleagues at the Brookhaven laboratory on Long Island, New York (Bak, 1996). Bak and his colleagues began with a simple child's play model in which they slowly poured grains of sand on a table to form a pile. As the pile grew into its characteristic conical shape, the falling grains would gently slide down the sides, enlarging the pile in what appears to be a well ordered manner. However, at some point, which cannot be predicted in advance, the falling grains set off a much more dramatic "avalanche" on the side of the pile. The pile had reached a point of self-organizing criticality where the introduction of one more grain set off a "catastrophic" reorganization of the pile. There was no sudden alteration of the rate at which sand was deposited. Also, there was

no way of predicting which grain of sand would set off the avalanche. The event emerged from the self-organizing properties of the system. But catastrophic avalanches can be plotted on a power law distribution. What is a power law, and what does it have to do with our understanding of the analytic process?

Power laws

The idea of a power law distribution was first developed by Harvard University professor George Kingsley Zipf (1902–1950). Zipf demonstrating that in any given body of text the relative frequency of word occurrences, from the most common—usually “the” or “a”—to the least common, would fall on the same graph line defined by double logarithmic relations rather than in a normal, or Gaussian, bell curve. This linguistic observation has come to be known as Zipf’s Law. The work of Zipf initiated an approach to understanding certain scale related events as falling into a pattern known as a power law.

Power law distributions are important because, as analyses using these equations have proliferated, it has become clear that a wide variety of phenomena, from ion transfers in the brain to word frequencies in a text to volcano eruptions and earthquakes can all be shown to fall along a double logarithmic distribution. Power laws also identify another aspect of nature that is both mathematically rigorous and aesthetically beautiful. This aspect of the power law was first recognized by the mathematical economist, Benoit Mandelbrot in the form of what we know as the Mandelbrot set or fractal (Mandelbrot, 1983; Mandelbrot, 1997). Working from Zipf’s law between the late 1950s and the 1960s, Mandelbrot realized that the exponent in a power law defined a pattern of self-similar structure in the phenomenon under investigation that was “scale invariant”. What this meant was that regardless of the scale at which one examined a phenomenon, the same basic structure would be revealed. As Didier Sornette (2003) summarizes Mandelbrot’s insight, “Power laws describe the self-similar geometrical structures of fractals. [F]ractals are geometrical objects with structures at all scales that describe many complex systems, such as the delicately corrugated coast of Brittany or Norway, the irregular surface of

clouds, or the branched structure of river networks" (p. 366). To this list, I now want to add, the various scales with which analytic processes unfold.

With the foregoing discussion of the nature of scaled phenomena in mind, I now want to turn directly to the question of emergence. The core issue that I want to raise, in this discussion, is the ways in which different temporal patterns in the analytic process correspond to different processes of emergence, and to the mechanisms that shape the process of emergence. I will then be in a position to suggest a particular characteristic of the symbolic nature of the analytic process that, I hope, will begin to open new possibilities for understanding analysis in general.

Emergence

Given the argument to this point, to what degree can we usefully employ the concept of emergence in our understanding of the analytic process? This concept, I believe, has become so pervasive in the analytic literature of late, that it is now incumbent on analysts to be more rigorous in their use of the term. While some considerable effort has already been put into this project, most notably by my Jungian colleague, David Tresan (Tresan, 1996), the psychoanalytic literature has conspicuously neglected the need to more rigorously define what is meant when an aspect of an analysis is referred to as "emergent". The importance of this issue is given added weight in the paper by Stern et al. because of their explicit use of infant research as a paradigmatic instance of developmental emergence. A more refined understanding of the idea of emergence will, I believe, make the use of infant research more problematic in the development of analytic technique, but also more illuminating in the long run. Why would this be the case?

Emergence, as a more rigorously applied concept, can take a variety of forms. To begin to elaborate these forms, let me first turn to Terrence Deacon, Professor of Biological Anthropology and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley, who identifies three levels of emergence: 1) Emergence as supervenience; 2) Emergence by self-organization and 3) Emergence due to the evolution of a system (Deacon, 2003). In the first of these, properties

emerge that are dependent on the material substrate, but in the aggregate significantly alter the material in question. The most common example is the appearance of liquid properties in the combination of oxygen and hydrogen—water. Liquidity then “supervenes” on the atomic level. At the level of self organization, auto-poetic processes within the framework of chaotic systems become dominant. In essence, the supervenient first order emergent properties begin to organize themselves into new, higher order forms—crystal structures, cell membranes, and the like. At the third level, however, Deacon argues that emergence comes under the control of semiotic systems—the most elementary being the DNA code—in which a form of historical constraint on the system becomes possible. Evolution is the best example of this form of emergence, and natural selection drives the process. But natural selection is highly constrained by evolutionary history. A human embryo will not self-organize into another form of life, even though it is genetically very close to the higher primates and, indeed, to the genetic structure of a banana.

Deacon goes on to argue that in a consideration of emergence it is important to recognize that the three levels he defines are each contingent on emergence at lower levels. In this sense, all self-organizing forms of emergence involve the self-organization of supervenient forms of emergence, and evolutionary forms of emergence are processes that involve the reorganization of self-organized features. Emergence, in other words, displays a nested hierarchical structure, a notion we have already encountered in relation to the fractal organization of complex dynamic systems, and the use of emergence as a descriptive category in analytic practice necessarily has to address the level of emergence that is being used.

Deacon is not alone in proposing a taxonomy of emergent phenomena along these lines. The theoretical roboticist, and cognitive scientist, Horst Hendriks-Jansen also proposes three levels of emergence, virtually identical to Deacon’s, albeit in the opposite order, and with more of a behavioral impact. Hendriks-Jansen writes:

Species-typical activity patterns are emergent phenomena in three different senses of the word: they emerge in the species as a result of natural selection, in a maturing individual as the

result of ontogeny, and every time they occur within the life of that individual as the result of interactions between the creature's low-level activities and its species-typical environment. [Hendriks-Jansen, 1996, p. 248]

Again, a nested hierarchy of emergence patterns is developed which, when combined with Deacon's taxonomy presents us with an array of possible inferences about emergence in the analytic process.

One further element of Deacon's analysis of emergence, which is also congruent with the work of Hendriks-Jansen, has to do with the actual mechanisms that move the process of emergence. For Deacon, the mechanism of emergence, at all levels, is essentially a process of what he refers to as "amplification". In the case of supervenience, as with the "emergence" of water, the dynamic interaction of the quantum characteristics of oxygen and hydrogen are "amplified". At the human level, Hendriks-Jansen argues that it is a mistake to see the earliest patterns of infant behavior as in any sense intentional—either psychologically or philosophically. Rather, Hendriks-Jansen continues, the action patterns of the infant, which initially only simulate intentional behavior, thereby deceiving the mother into thinking that intentional behavior is present, results in what Hendriks-Jansen characterizes as a process of bootstrapping into the intentional world of human action. This process is at the second level of emergence in Deacon's taxonomy, i.e., at the level of self-organizational emergence that builds on supervenient emergence. It is only after the infant has been bootstrapped into the intentional world of human communication that a genuinely semiotic or evolutionary form of emergence can take over, at which point the amplification of the symbol becomes the operative dynamic that yields emergent phenomena. I will return to this issue below.

Returning then to the "moment of meeting" in Stern et al. what can we say about the use of the notion of emergence to characterize the phenomena described? The first issue it would appear is to determine at what level of emergence the moment of meeting takes place. This is not as simple to determine, however, as one might think. Are we, in keeping with the recourse to infant development as a paradigm of all developmental processes, involved in a process of simple supervenience, or is it a process of ontogenesis through self-organization,

which would place the emergent phenomena at the second level of both Deacon's and Hendriks-Jansen's schemas? Or are we observing a very high level process with two individuals engaged in a semiotically defined system that exhibits evolutionary characteristics? And what are we to make of Stern's claim that classical interpretation should not be viewed as the most compelling level of transformation? This last question is not so difficult to understand when one reflects on the unnatural nature of most analytic interactions, added to which is the notion in Stern et al. that moments of meeting are characterized by their transgression of the structures of the analytic relationship. The procedural constraints typical of the classical analytic interaction are manifestly, and largely purposefully, contrary to normal human patterns of interaction. The enforced silence of the analyst raises the question of whether a circumstance is being created that allows for supervenient emergence, but not for self-organizing let alone evolutionary or semiotically driven, emergence. This way of looking at the process of analysis has the consequence of explaining why interpretation alone would not be the ultimate transformative moment in analysis, and why Stern et al. could argue that they have moved to a higher level of emergent phenomena. But it leaves open the question of whether the most transformative level of emergence has as yet been reached, a question that will carry us to a deeper consideration of the relationship between the work of Stern and that of Cambray.

The logic of amplification

In his discussion of emergence, Deacon cites a remark, attributed to Einstein, to the effect that "compound interest" is the most powerful force in the universe. The point of this remark is that the gradual accumulation of incremental changes in a system is likely to dramatically change that system over time, precisely as Bak demonstrated with his sand pile. This is, in Deacon's rendering of the issue, the essence of amplification in the processes leading to emergence. Speaking of how this notion applies to the processes of emergence, Deacon writes:

The relevance of "compound interest logic" in the analysis of emergence is that it helps explain how certain minor or even incidental aspects of a complex phenomenon can come to be the

source of its dominant features. In this analysis, then, emergence will be treated as a form of amplification of certain topological features within a physical system. Specifically, I will argue that amplification occurs because of iterated superimposition of events sharing the same form occurring across levels of scale. [Deacon, 2003, p. 284]

Compare this formulation of emergence in a physical system with Jung's formulation of the role of amplification in alchemy:

The method of alchemy, psychologically speaking, is one of boundless amplification. The amplification is always appropriate when dealing with some obscure experience which is so vaguely adumbrated that it must be enlarged and expanded by being set in a psychological context in order to be understood at all. That is why, in analytical psychology, we resort to amplification in the interpretation of dreams, for a dream is too slender a hint to be understood until it is enriched by the stuff of association and analogy and thus amplified to the point of intelligibility. [Jung, *CW 12*, 403]

I want to argue, in this portion of the paper, that we are no longer in a position, as theoreticians, or clinicians, to simply invoke the notion of emergence to describe what happens in the analytic setting. If we are going to take the notion seriously, as I believe we should, then we have to take into account the mechanics of the process, which, I believe, Deacon has correctly identified as a process of amplification. Interestingly, it is in a discussion of amplification that we find one of the signature characteristics of Jung's methodology, a characteristic which, as we can see, he claims to inherit from the practices of the alchemists.

To draw the rest of my argument into relief, let me now propose a structural taxonomy of the analytic process that will highlight the distinctions that I believe we need to make to understand what we are doing as analysts, and move closer to answering the question of how analysis effects change, if not necessarily providing cures—to think for a moment in terms of Kohut's famous work. The taxonomy runs this way: all meaningful forms of analysis, regardless of the school of thought, reach a point where an emergent moment can be discerned. Similarly, all forms of analysis, if they are to reach that moment of emergence, in which, I would argue, meaning becomes

possible, will engage in a process of amplification by recourse to semiotic, or representational processes. This is the case whether we are talking about Freud, Jung, Stern, Cambray or any other analyst with a sense for the deeper levels of the psyche. However, the point of departure, the method and means of semiotic amplification, and what is considered to be the final form of meaningful content, all define the nature of the emergent processes. So, for example, Jung can write:

Freud also observed that the unconscious occasionally produces images that can only be described as "archaic". They are found more particularly in dreams and in waking fantasies. He, too, tried to interpret or amplify such symbols "historically", as for example in his study of the dual mother motif in a dream of Leonardo da Vinci. [Jung, *CW 16*, 246]

Thus in a very real sense Freud is amplifying the experience of the individual, but only in terms of their personal historical experience. Compare that to the experience of Stern and his colleagues and one begins to see that an amplificatory move beyond personal interpretation would be necessary if one takes more general theories of ontogenetic development, specifically theories emphasizing the self-organizing patterns of developmentally oriented dynamic systems theory as one's guiding perspective. While Stern, and those associated with him, derive much of their model from the near microscopic examination of developmental processes, this same move can be said to shift the analytic process into a different pattern and sense of scale, both more fine grained, and more global than Freud's individualized interpretative approach—notwithstanding Freud's attempt to define global features such as the Oedipus stage. In the case presented in their 1998 paper the emergent moment of meeting derives from the intersection of the sensibilities of the analyst and analysand, standing outside the formalized analytic relationship as prescribed by Freud.

Cambray's account of the day of analysis begins in a position similar to Stern's analysis of the individual, where there is a conjunction of the experiences of the individuals involved. But in the case of Cambray the scale of the processes involved is once again raised to a higher level. Analytic consciousness can now be seen to emerge from a process of amplification that extends over a longer

time scale, consisting at least of an entire day, and, arguably, a much longer process as the analogical material used to develop the amplification of the individual experience is seen as evolutionary in nature.

How can we reconcile the various schools of analysis within the argument proposed in this paper? The answer, I believe, lies in a deeper consideration of the semiotic nature of the analytic process, and the relationship between the semiotic or symbolic and the process of emergence, particularly the third-order, or evolutionary form of emergence as defined by Deacon.

Symbolic density

I have recently proposed a way of conceptualizing the structural characteristics of Jung's system of psychology, which I think of in terms of the complex, the archetype, the Self and synchronicity. My argument, presented at the international congress of analytical psychologists, in Barcelona, built on what I term "symbolic density" (Hogenson, 2005, for a related argument see Vogt, 2004). The basic sense I have tried to give to this concept involves the degree to which a given phenomenon can be invested with symbolic reference and content. I proposed that as symbolic density increases certain transitional points are reached, what are called phase transitions in the technical language of dynamic systems theory, where one's perception of the phenomenon in question undergoes a radical reorganization, very much like Per Bak's sand pile avalanches or the transition that one sees in a stock market crash. To these examples I now want to add the shifts that can take place in the analytic process as one intensifies the symbolic density of the analytic process, and moves from one form of third-order emergent phenomena to another.

When linked to the argument in this paper, it would be easy to draw invidious comparisons amongst the various forms of psychoanalysis—Freudian, interpersonal, Jungian. I would prefer to avoid this temptation, if possible, and rather highlight the complementarity that must exist among the forms if a fully developed understanding of emergence in the analytic process is our goal. As Terrence Deacon has correctly maintained, in his analysis of emergence, the levels of emergent process do not exist independently of one another. Rather,

as I have already noted, self-organizing processes are concerned with the organization of supervenient processes, and evolutionary processes with the amplification of self-organizing processes. Thus, it seems to me that in considering the analytic process more generally the real question is whether and how we come to understand our movement across various levels of scale, which I have characterized as movements within a framework of symbolic density. What I do believe Jung saw as a deficiency in Freud's work was the latter's reluctance to delve sufficiently into the depth of the symbolic material he had begun to uncover. I suspect the case can be made as well that Jung, and many of his followers, have failed to fully grasp the significance of the earlier levels of symbolic activity that define the foundations of a complete understanding of the emergence of meaning, although I think that more recently the Jungian community has done a better job of enlarging their sense of the psychoanalytic approaches than have the successors to Freud in understanding the depth sense of the symbolic found in Jung's work.

In a discussion of emergence in analysis the recognition that symbolic systems can ramify far beyond simple reductive analysis of personal history, no matter how generalized in form, is crucial to moving our processes and theoretical understanding of the psyche forward. Deacon, without directly addressing psychoanalysis, insists on just such openness, in a manner that I believe requires our attention. Writing about the limits of emergence, he remarks that his "hierarchic categorization" of emergence:

Does not exhaust the possibilities of increasingly more complex forms of emergent phenomena. Evolutionary emergent systems can further interact to form multilayer systems of exceeding complexity. Indeed, this is the nature of complex organisms that is exemplified in the ascending levels of "self" that proceed from gene to cell to organism to lineage to species, and so on, in the living world. But this logic does not lead to what might be called fourth-order emergence. Instead, I think we must rather analyze these more complex processes as first, second, and third-order emergent elaborations of third-order emergence, and so on, in recursive series. This is because third-order emergence includes the capacity to evolve new forms of emergence itself.

This is implicit in its representational or semiotic character. The introduction of referential relationship as the defining feature of third-order emergence creates a special and temporal boundedness that is able to encompass any physical system, and represent any system with respect to its correspondences with another. So there is no upper, outer, past, or future bound to what can constitute a third-order emergent phenomenon. Representational capacity is ultimately unbounded. [p. 302]

Conclusion

It is precisely in this sense that the essentially unbounded scaling characteristics of fractal geometry, the whole notion of emergence in analysis, and the sense that the density of the symbolic itself can shape the patterns of life in some genuinely unbounded ways that I believe we will find the answer to the question of how analysis effects change. Stern and his colleagues have clearly found their way to a level of change that transcends that provided by the classical sense of psychoanalytic interpretation. And in so doing they have shown the way to a deeper understanding of what probably makes up the bulk of our analytic experience. The problem, it seems to me, is that they have fallen prey to the common tendency to so value a new discovery that they do not look beyond it, to the next level.

How does analysis effect change? The answer, it seems to me, lies in an ever deeper appreciation of the infinity of the symbolic experience. Jung remarks that the archetypes are essentially transgressive; they do not respect boundaries (Jung, *CW 10*, 660). To the extent that this is the case, movement into an archetypal level of consciousness is the logical outcome of a process that relies on the symbolic dimension of human existence. It is from this point of view, I believe, that Jung assembled his arguments regarding the nature of the Self, as imaged in the form of God, rather than as a rather well grounded ego. This would mean that the process of change in analysis is always oriented to the transcendent nature of the symbolic. It is certainly the case that the sense of the transcendent can infuse any of the levels of emergence discussed in this paper, and for most of our analysands, whose lives have been characterized by such a narrowing

of the sense of the transcendent that even the slightest opening to a larger context is a revelation, that may be enough. But in formulating our own sense of what is possible in analysis, it seems to me that we must be constantly exploring the infinite, while still remaining grounded in the world of those we care for.

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Who owns the unconscious? or Why psychoanalysts need to “own” Jung

Jean Knox

The word “own” can mean two different things. It may imply possession, ownership or it may mean to acknowledge something as important and valuable. Jung himself did seem to fear that Freud wanted to own him, in the sense of possessing him. Much of the acrimony in the final letters between Freud and Jung arose partly from Jung’s struggle to assert his intellectual independence; Freud responded with injured dignity, refuting the charge of intellectual tyranny (Freud & Jung, 1974, p. 492). However Jung’s frustration with Freud finally erupted in the vitriolic letter of December 18th, 1912, in which he castigates Freud for “sniffing out all the symptomatic actions in your vicinity, thus reducing everyone to the level of sons and daughters who blushingly admit the existence of their faults” (ibid., p. 535). Their personal friendship and professional collaboration could not survive Jung’s increasing resentment over Freud’s resistance to “own”, in the sense of acknowledge, any of Jung’s original contributions to psychoanalytic theory (Shamdasani, 2003, pp. 50–51).

At the heart of this ultimately lay the battle between Freud and Jung’s territorial claims on the “unconscious”. The continuing reluctance of many psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists to

give any credence to each others' models means that the concept of the unconscious itself remains static and undeveloped; each group needs to "own" that the other's model has value or we remain stuck in a sterile feud between the pre-determined positions of partisan groups. This is no substitute for a genuine openness to new ideas which can bring about real paradigm shifts which analytic theory and practice need to bring them back into the mainstream of research on the human psyche, a position which they briefly held at the time of Freud's exploration of the process of repression and Jung's research on the word association test. Instead, innovative ideas are seen as a form of disloyalty to the founder to whom allegiance must be proved by rigid adherence to his particular orthodoxy. The creative dialogue and argument which are so essential both for the development of theory in any academic debate and for innovation and improvement in clinical practice simply do not take place.

Freud's legacy

The battle over the unconscious continues, not only between psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists but between factions within those two groups. Psychoanalysts originally needed to protect the unconscious as Freud's legacy, as Sylvia Payne's paper, read at the first Extraordinary Business meeting of the British Psychoanalytic Society and published in the "Controversial Discussions" makes clear: "The basic conceptions of psychoanalysis were laid down by Professor Freud and this Society and this Institute were founded on them". She then goes on to define those basic conceptions as "1) The concept of a dynamic psychology. 2) The existence of the unconscious. 3) The theory of instincts and repression. 4) Infantile sexuality. 5) The dynamics of the transference" (King & Steiner, 1990, pp. 53–54). Pearl King reminds psychoanalysts of the need to preserve this legacy:

This is our heritage. If we want to continue to call ourselves psychoanalysts, those of us who value this heritage and what we have learnt from Freud have an obligation to understand and to explain his contributions to our colleagues and especially to those who come after us. [King, 2004, p. 134]

The pattern, laid down with the very foundations of psychoanalysis, whereby significant theoretical or technical innovations were seen as fundamental threats to psychoanalysis, continues to the present day, as Pearl King so vividly describes in her account of the British Psychoanalytic Society. As Warren Colman points out:

Freud's psychology grounded itself in a form of biological determinism which took sexuality and the body as the ultimate source of all symbolic representations. As Ernest Jones said, a church spire may symbolize a penis but a penis can never symbolize a church spire. [Colman, 2005, p. 641]

It is perhaps surprising that Morris Eagle, a psychoanalyst with a very different orientation to that of Pearl King, takes a rather similar position on this issue in the chapter he wrote with Jerome Wakefield in "Who Owns Psychoanalysis?" They suggest that the newer relational approaches make a serious error in abandoning the idea of repressed unconscious mental content of a specifically sexual nature and in viewing the analytic process as a constructive dialogue. They suggest that this destroys the uniqueness of the claim of psychoanalysis to be the sole method for uncovering repressed mental content (Eagle & Wakefield, 2004, p. 352). However, this classical position has faced sustained attack on several fronts. The work of Klein and Bion, in particular, introduced major new developments to theory and practice; the classical position described by Eagle does not take contemporary object relations theory into consideration. Colman suggests that:

At its most extreme, this emphasis on object relating is expressed by Fairbairn's formulation that the infant does not seek an object in order to gratify its need for sexual pleasure but seeks sexual pleasure in order to gratify its need for an object. [Colman, 2005, p. 642]

In addition, as Darien Leader highlights, the classical psychoanalytic model simply did not work for borderline patients and required major modifications theoretically and clinically; these made it increasingly difficult to differentiate clearly between psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy (Leader, 2004, p. 248). Increasingly psychoanalysts themselves have been calling for recognition of the

pluralistic nature of psychoanalysis (Wallerstein, 1988). Finally, research in fields such as neuroscience, attachment theory and developmental psychology increasingly reveal the many-faceted nature of the unconscious. It is sometimes a repressed unconscious as psychoanalysts understand it, but may be a dissociated unconscious, along the lines that Jung suggested. Unconscious content may be well-formulated representations or relatively inchoate sensory fragments, as in PTSD. The implicit, procedural and semantic unconscious are all schematic, encoded in a form which can influence us but which cannot be revealed by interpretations aimed at overcoming repression (Clyman, 1991).

Jung's legacy

Freud's insistent assertion of his claim to own knowledge of the contents of the personal unconscious left Jung almost no room for manoeuvre in that territory. For some time he struggled to persuade Freud to agree that repressed infantile sexual desire was not the only source of unconscious content but without success (Freud & Jung, 1974, p. 471). After they went their separate ways, Jung devoted his energies towards developing his own model of the unconscious and clearly differentiating it from that of psychoanalysis.

The popular account is that Jung turned towards exploration of new territory, that of the collective unconscious, largely ceding the territory of the personal unconscious to Freud. However, this is only a part of the story; Jung's development of a truly dynamic model of the psyche is often overshadowed by the greater popular interest in the structural aspects, such as his concepts of archetypes and of the collective unconscious. The psychoanalytic claim to be a dynamic model rests on the concept of repression, the emotionally-driven exclusion of incestuous wishes from consciousness. This is an active process, but one which divides or compartmentalizes the mind so that the conscious mind remains unaware of the unconscious content. There is a state of balance arising from the interplay of conflicting forces, so that the dynamic unconscious refers to "mental contents that were being forcefully prevented from reaching consciousness or motor expression i.e., were actively held in

check by counterforces" (Sandler et al. 1997, p. 154). In contrast, in Jung's model of the psyche the dynamic quality of the psyche brings about a constant flow and exchange of information between different parts of the psyche. He saw the psyche as self-regulating, with unconscious compensation acting as a counter and balance to conscious biases. This idea is closely linked to a view of the unconscious as actively contributing to psychic development in a purposive way, a teleological rather than determinist view of the unconscious (Horne, 2002).

The key concepts that define the legacy from Jung that analytical psychologists strive to preserve include:

- 1) The self as an organizing psychic structure.
- 2) Archetypes and the collective unconscious.
- 3) The dissociative nature of the psyche and the formation of complexes.
- 4) The unconscious as an active and purposive agent in individuation.
- 5) The psyche as self regulating—the transcendent function.
- 6) Libido as neutral psychic energy, available for a number of purposes.
- 7) Psychic imagery as symbols not signs, reflecting something as yet unknown.

Although Jungians might give a different priority to each of these concepts, most would agree that these are the building blocks of analytical psychology.

Who owns the unconscious?

It is not so much about "Who owns psychoanalysis?", or "Who owns Jung?" as much as "Who owns the unconscious?" Each group claims the unconscious as its own territory, then defines it, marks out and protects its boundaries and defends them against invaders. The weapons with which this territorial war is waged are the analytic methods and techniques used to explore unconscious material; allegiances are defined in terms of the methods an analyst uses. In psychoanalysis, these may be "working in the transference" and the

“here and now” or repetition compulsion and a view of transference as the re-enactment of past relationship and past experience in the present. In analytical psychology, an analyst’s allegiance is identified, for example, by frequency of sessions, their use of active imagination, mythology, or Fordham’s developmental approach and use of the couch.

One possible solution to this multiplicity of approaches is to try to offer a meta-model of theory and technique which encompasses all the others. Jung himself tried to do this through his dissociationist model and the concept of the personal equation, as Sonu Shamdasani (2003) points out. However, Jung’s attempt did not result in the paradigm shift which Thomas Kuhn suggests is necessary for a model to gain general acceptance (Kuhn, 1962). For example, Freud simply re-defined dissociation as pathological, leaving the conceptual divisions unresolved (Astor, 2002).

On the other hand, it is not satisfactory simply to agree to differ, to live with pluralism because concepts never get tested—they remain in a hermeneutic vacuum, the “enumerative inductivism” described by Fonagy and Tallandini-Shallice (1993), in which psychotherapists rely on finding ever more examples to support their model but have no means of modifying or discarding their theories. Arlow (1996) points out the danger of this approach, in that terms such as psychic reality come to carry so many different meanings that they eventually become meaningless and James Astor suggests that this also applies to the concept of the unconscious: “For each of us this unconsciousness has properties which are so different as to be almost foreign discourses to each party” (Astor, 2005, unpublished).

We can only move on from this conceptual confusion by placing our existing knowledge into new contexts, drawing on other fields to help us to reframe the analytic problems we attempt to deal with and the methods we use for that purpose. My own view is that these new contexts are overwhelmingly those which involve empirical observation of the ways in which the reasonably healthy human mind develops and functions, rather than attempting to construct developmental theories from clinical work with adult patients. These new contexts are those of developmental psychology, attachment theory, cognitive science, as well as neuroscience which examines the brain processes which underpin the mind.

*The aims of analysis—changing mental structures
or activation of self-sustaining mental processes?*

Analytic models may emphasize, to varying degrees, three components of mind, namely, structure, content and process. Freud's earliest affect-trauma model focused on unconscious mental content, the emotions and memories aroused by real traumatic experience (Sandler et al. 1997, p. 14). His so-called topographical model actually emphasized structural divisions of the psyche into conscious, preconscious and unconscious, while his most mature structural model offers an integrated model of the psyche which combines structure (ego, id and superego), process (the ego's functioning as mediator between the demands of the id, superego and external reality) and content (repressed Oedipal fantasy).

Jung's early work on complexes was predominantly a structural model (complexes as splinter psyches). He then extended this structural model, with the concept of the collective unconscious, archetypes and the self. In parallel with this increasingly sophisticated structural model, he identified a range of mental process (self-regulation, compensation, individuation and the transcendent function) and specific forms of representational content (archetypal imagery), so that his mature model was also a combination of structure, process and content.

I think that much of the dogmatic opposition and mutual incomprehension between advocates of all psychodynamic models can be understood better by considering the relative emphasis each group gives to bringing about change in psychic structure, process or content in the course of analysis or psychotherapy. Across the spectrum of psychoanalytic theory, classical Freudian, Kleinian, Winnicottian or Kohutian, analytic work on psychic processes such as repression, projection, or internalization is often seen as the vehicle for bringing about structural change, such as strengthening of the ego, the achievement of the depressive position, or of unit status. Bion is the most obvious exception, in that the main focus of his model is on psychic processes such as alpha function, projective identification, container/contained and $PS \leftrightarrow D$, a model extended and developed by Ron Britton (1998, pp. 69–81).

In spite of these exceptions, it is still predominantly true that in many psychoanalytic models, development of psychic processes is

often not, in itself, the primary goal of analysis. In contrast, in the newer forms of analysis such as the relational model, the development of psychic process, the capacity for “recognition” of the other, is given at least as much weight as bringing about structural change, through the internalization of new relational models (Benjamin, 1995). Jungian models lay even more emphasis on a process, that of individuation, although even this is often presented more as a state to be achieved as a final goal, than as the development of a self-sustaining process which is itself the aim of analysis. It is with the concept of the transcendent function that Jung most clearly described a self-sustaining psychic process. Michael Fordham’s model of the psyche as engaged in a perpetual cycle of de-integration and re-integration is also one in which the analytic task is seen to be the activation of a process which then becomes self-sustaining:

What does the idea of the self as a deintegrating and integrating system add? It implies that the process of analysing a patient depends on the analyst having gone through a sufficient number of integrated and deintegrated states to reduce his anxiety to manageable proportions about changes occurring in the self, and be capable of not knowing in a fundamental sense. [Fordham, 1985, p. 112]

It is also in attachment theory and related research that we find work on psychic processes being placed at the centre of the analytic endeavour. Affect regulation is increasingly recognized as a therapeutic aim, based on the developmental research of Beatrice Beebe, Allan Schore and others (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002; Schore, 2000). Even more compelling is the increasing research evidence that a wide range of psychopathology, especially borderline phenomena, results from a defensive inhibition of reflective function, the unconscious capacity to relate to oneself and others as people with minds and emotions, not just as physical objects (Fonagy, 1991). Reflective function, once developed, is a self-sustaining process, a way of prioritizing the mental and emotional world of self and other over the physical.

Why does it matter whether the goal of analysis is a change in structure or the facilitation of a process? The answer, I think, is that it is only a process-based view which is truly developmental; this may be more evident in another field, such as that of language

acquisition. When a small child learns speech, the goal is apparently the acquisition of the child's native language, which becomes an internal structure. However, small children can become fluent in more than one language and the process of language acquisition is itself a developmental achievement which is never completely lost. This approach holds implications for the analyst's role in bringing about change and the analytic methods which will be effective. Both of these depend crucially on our view of the analytic task and if analysis is seen as a means to develop previously inhibited mental processes, this will begin to help us to offer a unifying overview of the analytic technique which might most effectively facilitate this. In other words, we can begin to "operationalize" analytic practice, offering a map of the analytic tools which might be most suitable in bringing about a particular analytic aim.

How does analysis bring about change? The active participation of the analysand's unconscious

In psychoanalytic models for change offered by King and Eagle, the force for change, the overcoming of repression, is the analyst's interpretation. In relational models it is the new experience (Fosshage, 2004; Renik, 2000). In neither is there a real sense of the *analysand's* own unconscious playing an active role in bringing about change and development. The analytic process is seen to serve the purpose of changing psychic structure (e.g., developing ego strength, integration of collective and personal etc.) rather than as a means to develop internal psychic processes which can then become autonomous. What is lacking is a sense of the emergent nature of the psyche, its capacity to self-organize, given the appropriate foundations.

It is this theoretical lacuna which makes the newer relational approaches so threatening to classical psychoanalysis. As Morris Eagle so succinctly explains, the psychoanalytic claim that analytic interpretations accurately describe repressed and therefore unconscious mental content is the foundation of its claim to be a unique and effective form of therapy. It is this view that Grünbaum's critique so devastatingly questioned (Grünbaum, 1984). Eagle suggests that the only alternative basis for therapeutic effectiveness is suggestion, the implanting of new mental contents into the patient's mind. In his

view, this may be therapeutically effective but there is nothing to distinguish it from a whole range of suggestive techniques and it would fatally undermine psychoanalysis to adopt such an approach.

This is why a developmental, process-based model becomes essential in order to break the impasse reached within psychoanalysis, because it can encompass a range of analytic approaches, including contemporary Jungian analysis as well those of traditional psychoanalysis and newer relational models. A process-based approach does not depend on suggestion, the implanting of new mental content but rather on facilitating the development of a previously inhibited capacity to link conscious and unconscious content through the action of the transcendent function, and the internal and external worlds, by means of the deintegration-reintegration cycle.

This is the point at which psychoanalysts need to “own” Jung, to acknowledge the value of his model, especially its dynamic, process-based features. Symbolism, by definition, is relational, the bringing together of two parts to make a whole, so complex meaning depends on relating one thing to another, or one part of the mind to another. Jung’s view was that in symbols “the union of conscious and unconscious is consummated”, a relational dynamic which he called the “transcendent function” (Jung, 1939, par. 524). In other words, the transcendent function is precisely the means by which one part of the mind can find out what another part is experiencing. In attachment theory terms, the transcendent function can be understood as a constant dynamic process of comparison and integration of explicit conscious information and memories with the more generalized knowledge which we accumulate unconsciously in the internal working models of implicit memory, a key part of which constitutes the sense of self. Meaningful experience therefore depends on the transcendent function, a process which compares and integrates:

- Internal objects and the self.
- a new event and past experience.
- explicit and implicit knowledge.
- cognition and emotion.
- left brain and right brain.
- orbito-frontal cortex and subcortical networks.

Consciousness or unconsciousness are not fixed attributes of either pole of these dyads but are distributed in varying degrees between the two poles, reflecting the variety of ways in which mental content may be processed and stored.

Michael Fordham's concept of de-integration and reintegration can be seen as an extension of this relational dynamic, by applying it to the integration of the internal and external world:

The deintegrates develop symbolic and other forms by reason of their interaction with the environment which provides perceptual images. These images make a pool and some of them are used in the organism's adaptation to the external world (ego activities), others to form inner symbolic images (the archetypal forms). [Fordham, 1985, p. 31]

The importance of this self-organizing process of deintegration and reintegration cannot be over-estimated. It has many similarities to the process recognized by many developmental psychologists as the fundamental mechanism underpinning the increasing complexity of mental functioning in all domains—cognitive, perceptual emotional, linguistic and a range of other psychological processes depend upon it. The essence of the mechanism underlying self-organization is one of "compare and contrast", the constant evaluation of similarity and difference between new information and existing knowledge. At the earliest stages of perceptual organization in the neonate, it takes the form of a process of perceptual analysis whereby sensory information is organized into meaningful categories (Mandler, 1988). This seems to be very close to Fordham's description (above).

At a later emotional level of development, this process of "compare and contrast" emerges in the form of emotional appraisal about relationships with key attachment figures, leading to core patterns of attachment. Appraisal is a constant unconscious process by which experiences are constantly screened and evaluated to determine their meaning and significance. Bowlby himself wrote:

Sensory inflow goes through many stages of selection, interpretation and appraisal before it can have any influence on behaviour, either immediately or later. This processing occurs in a succession of stages, all but the preliminary of which require that the inflow be related to matching information already stored in long-term memory. [Bowlby, 1980, p. 45]

New experience is therefore constantly being organized by unconscious internal working models and unconscious implicit patterns are constantly being identified in conscious language. Jung's theories about self-regulation and compensation thus anticipated the contemporary concept of appraisal. From a relational perspective, James Fosshage has described it as the "implicit-explicit dance in psychoanalytic therapy" (Fosshage, 2004).

In terms of the sense of self, this dynamic leads to increasing levels of complexity of self-agency, the impact we have on the other, from the physical, social, teleological and intentional levels to the final achievement of the capacity to mentalize and the full development of reflective function and the autobiographical self. In this final achievement of "unit status", the recognition of the complex and ever shifting similarity and difference between self and other forms the basis for the capacity to have deep emotional relationships without loss of self.

Contemporary neuroscience also places the processes of comparison and integration of information at the heart of the meaning-making process. Vilayanur Ramachandran (2003, p. 58) has suggested a possible neurophysiological basis for the capacity for metaphor, basing this on studies of synesthesia, a phenomenon shown by a small number of people for whom, for example, looking at numbers or listening to tones evokes the experience of a particular colour. He suggests that, although synesthesia is strikingly evident in only a small percentage of the population, we all have some capacity for it and that it reflects the functioning of the angular gyrus, the part of the brain where the occipital, parietal and temporal lobes meet and which is responsible for cross-modal synthesis. It is the brain region where information from touch, hearing and vision is thought to flow together to enable the construction of high-level perceptions. Ramachandran goes on to speculate that the role of the angular gyrus could have evolved so that the ability to engage in cross-modal abstraction would allow the emergence of other more abstract functions such as metaphors.

Joseph LeDoux also highlights the importance of integration of conceptual information from different memory systems and the crucial role of the hippocampus in this process. He writes:

Because the hippocampus and other convergence zones receive inputs from modulatory systems, during significant states of arousal, plasticity in these networks is coordinated with the plasticity occurring in other systems in the brain. [LeDoux, 2002, p. 318]

Allan Schore has accumulated a wealth of evidence that the orbito-frontal system, in particular, is important in assembling and monitoring relevant past and current experiences, including their affective and social values (Schore, 2003, pp. 255–259). Siegel offers neuroscientific support for the view that the whole brain is involved in the process of evaluating the meaning of experience and for the central role of emotion in this process, suggesting that:

[T]he integration of a wide array of functionally segregated processes, such as perception, abstract thought and motor action, may be a fundamental role of the brain. Such an *integrative process* may be at the core of what emotion *does* and indeed what emotion *is*. [Siegel, 1998, p. 7, original emphasis]

Three main developmental tasks— affect regulation, mentalization and the development of the self as agent

A great deal of the controversy about analytic technique arises from a failure to take a truly developmental approach to the analytic process itself. What I mean by this is that the analytic method needs to be attuned to the particular developmental issue that is determining the nature and process of conscious and unconscious content at a given moment and the impact these have on the person's capacity to function as an integrated whole—to achieve "unit status" (Winnicott, 1971, p. 56).

Attachment research is accumulating a wealth of evidence to suggest the three crucial areas of psychic development which lead to "unit status" are affect regulation, the development of the capacity for mentalization (the basis for reflective function) and of a truly psychic sense of self agency. In a recent editorial Fonagy and Bateman point out that:

Attachment and mentalization are loosely coupled systems existing in a state of interactive but partial exclusivity ... whereas

mentalization has its roots in the sense of being understood by an attachment figure, it is also more challenging to maintain in the context of the attachment relationship (e.g., the relationship with the therapist), for those individuals whose problem is fundamentally one of attachment. [Fonagy & Bateman, 2006, p. 2]

Surely everyone who enters therapy or analysis has, to varying degrees, problems with attachment, so the suggestion that it is harder to hold on to the capacity to mentalize in the context of an intense emotional relationship carries profound implications not only for work with borderline patients but for every therapy. No one single analytic technique is ever going to be entirely adequate. For example, if affect regulation is out of control, consciousness become flooded with inchoate emotions and bodily experiences; an attuned response, a Kohutian mirroring may create a new experience of object relationship and offer containment both through the analyst's instinctive down-regulation of affect and also through his/her reflective function, by which he/she makes sense of the experience. This would be largely an intuitive and unconscious response by the analyst, the equivalent in analysis of the parent's attuned response to the baby's cues (Beebe & Lachmann, 2002).

There is another aspect which Bateman and Fonagy highlight namely that:

The weaker an individual's sense of their own subjectivity, the harder it is for them to compare the validity of their own perceptions of the way their mind works with that which a "mind expert" presents. When presented with a coherent view of mental function in the context of psychotherapy, they are not able to compare the picture offered to them with a self-generated model and may all too often accept alternative perspectives uncritically or reject them wholesale. [ibid.]

However, in spite of their recognition of the crucial role of subjectivity, they do not describe the development of the capacity to mentalize. But elsewhere, Fonagy, with colleagues, has compiled the evidence which indicates that self-agency proceeds through a series of stages:

Self as Agent

1. *Physical Agency*: 0–6 months

Awareness that actions produce changes in the physical environment (perfect contingency).

2. *Social Agency*: 3–9 months

Actions produce behavioural and emotional mirroring (imperfectly contingent) responses in other people—action at a distance.

3. *Teleological Agency*: 9–24 months

Sense of purpose—actions seen as goal-directed. Capacity to choose action to bring about desired outcome. Intention not yet recognized as separate from action.

4. *Intentional Agency*: 2 years

Recognition of intentions as distinct from action. Actions are seen as caused by prior intentions and desires. Actions can change mental states.

5. *Representational Agency*: 3–4 years

Actions seen as caused by intentions which are also recognized as mental processes. Mind is represented to itself, so intentions are not just means to an end but mental states in themselves.

6. *Autobiographical self*:

Organization of memories as personally experienced-linked to self-representations and awareness of personal history. [Fonagy et al. 2002: pp. 204–207]

These stages of self-agency are levels of psychic organization in the implicit unconscious, structuring experience while themselves remaining outside awareness. I have suggested elsewhere that these different developmental stages of self-agency play a central role in determining the nature and function of both conscious and unconscious fantasy (Knox, 2005). If this is the case, then the level of self-agency which unconsciously predominates will also profoundly

influence the effectiveness of the analyst's approach. If a person's sense of self-agency is functioning at the teleological level, in which they only feel real when they are controlling the actions or feelings of another person, then interpretations which rely on that person's reflective function will be doomed to failure. This is frequently the case with borderline patients. At the intentional level, forbidden desires or wishes may feel dangerously powerful, able to create wishes and desires in the other—for example, the analyst; in this case, interpretations of incestuous wishes may be vehemently resisted because the patient's unconscious belief is that if the analyst knows about those wishes, he or she may be seduced by them.

These few examples are given to illustrate the need for a truly developmental approach to analysis itself—the recognition that as a person's implicit unconscious moves between developmental levels, the analyst's use of technique and overall analytic stance needs to mirror those fluctuations and use the method most suited to the current unconscious developmental task. It is this kind of “developmental attunement” which provides the basis for the analyst's use of a range of techniques; it does not solely rely on overcoming repression through interpretation but nor is it a process of suggestion. Instead it relies on the analyst's use of his or her countertransference to identify the particular nature of developmental inhibition that the patient brings to the analysis and to use the appropriate analytic techniques in response. Joseph Sandler (1976, p. 44) coined the phrase “role responsiveness” to describe the way in which an analyst allows the patient to project a particular role onto him or her and I think that process is part of developmental attunement.

Attachment theory has taken the lead in exploring models for the development of the human infant's relationships, emotional regulation and sense of self. In an attachment-based model of therapy, it is fully recognized that one of the tasks of any therapy is to help the patient develop the capacity for affect regulation in the context of an intense relationship and the transference is the main focus for this work (Schoore, 1994; Gerhardt, 2004). It has also been more recently accepted that analysis provides the framework for the development of reflective function, the capacity to relate to and make sense of ourselves and each other in mental and emotional, not just behavioural, terms (Slade, 2005; Fonagy, 1991). This depends both on transference experience and also on the detailed exploration of personal history

and the gradual construction of narratives which depend on an understanding of one's own and other people's desires, needs and beliefs as the explanation for their actions.

To these tasks I would add that analysis is also the context in which the inhibited development of self-agency can be overcome; a mature and stable autobiographical and reflective self can become firmly established, replacing a pattern in which teleological and intentional levels dominate the patient's unconscious psychic functioning and so their conscious relationships, both with the analyst and in the outside world. It is this developmental approach to the self which has been largely neglected by psychoanalysts. Even Jungian analysts who focus on the role of the self in guiding deintegration and reintegration do not discuss the changing experience of self-agency at different developmental stages. Self-psychologists might seem to focus on self-development but actually view the analytic process as one which "leads to the transmuting internalization of the selfobject analyst and his functions and thus to the acquisition of psychic structure" (Kohut, 1984, p. 172). In other words, for Kohut, change comes about through the processes of introjection and identification.

In contrast, a truly developmental model views the analysis as creating the conditions which allow the patient's own internal developmental processes to be mobilized. An increasingly complex and fully psychic self-agency can emerge, in which the sense of self does not depend on the direct physical or emotional impact one has on another person, but on the capacity for self-reflection and awareness of the mental and emotional separateness of self and other.

So what are the main tools by which analysis may facilitate this process? It was Winnicott who recognized the crucial role of destructiveness in the "subject's placing of the object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control" (Winnicott, 1971, p. 89). Winnicott argued that the object's repeated survival of destruction enables the subject to recognize the object as an independent entity in its own right. Winnicott suggested that for many patients the main analytic task is to help the patient to acquire the capacity to use the analyst:

The analyst, the analytic technique, and the analytic setting all come in as surviving or not surviving the patient's destructive attacks. This destructive activity is the patient's attempt to place

the analyst outside the area of omnipotent control, that is, out in the world. [Winnicott 1971, p. 91]

There is a reverse, equally important side to this coin. Viewed from the perspective of self-development, the repeated destruction, in fantasy, of the object and the gradual recognition that the object survives such attacks and goes on being is not only the basis for the sense of object constancy. It is also the means by which the infant becomes increasingly secure in the knowledge that he or she also exists separately and independently of his or her effect on the object. If the object survives the attack, the subject can discover that being is separate from doing, and existence independent of one's physical actions. The child goes on existing and knowing he or she exists even when having to recognize the continuing and independent physical and psychic survival of the other person, whom he or she has just tried to destroy. The object's survival of destructive attacks drives the move from the teleological and intentional level of self-agency, in which one knows one exists only through the physical or emotional impact one has on the other, to the true psychic autonomy of the representational level, at which mind can reflect on its own processes rather than automatically convert them into physical or emotional action. *In this sense, true psychic separateness and autonomy directly depend on the recognition of one's powerlessness to control or coerce others.*

In infancy, narcissistic grandiosity, the sense of omnipotent and magical control over the object world is essential as a form of psychic protection against the terrifying awareness of helplessness. However, in order to move from the teleological level, its gradual erosion is also essential, even though the painfulness of the accompanying disillusionment contributes to the tantrums and rage of toddlerhood. For many people who come to analysis it is also necessary to go through a similar experience of rage in adult life, as we know especially from our work with patients with a history of severe trauma.

An integrated view of analytic goals and techniques

I suggest that the wealth of information from other disciplines does, for the first time, put us in the position where we can operationalize

the analytic process. We can construct a table in which the three main analytic goals:

- Affect regulation and the development of secure attachment.
- developing the capacity for mentalization and reflective function.
- facilitating the emergence of the autobiographical self and the mature psychological experience of self-agency.

can be correlated with the 3 main therapeutic approaches:

- Interpretation as the main tool of classical psychoanalysis.
- new relational experiences, identified by the relational school as a fundamental part of analytic change.
- the analyst's attunement to regression in the patient..

This table then allows us to place a variety of specific analytic techniques in the context of the particular task and the particular broad analytic approach which the analyst feels most closely corresponds to the task, as in the table below:

	<i>Interpretation (narrative linking)</i>	<i>New experience (analyst as new object)</i>	<i>Developmental attunement</i>
<i>Affect regulation</i>	transference interpretation in the here and now	empathic mirroring attunement containment	activating attachment system
<i>Developing Reflective function</i>	transference interpretation- linking past and present	analyst's demonstration of his/her reflective function to patient	exploration of fantasy as imaginative narratives
<i>Development of Self agency</i>	interpretation of dreams fantasies, symptoms etc., as purposive/ creative	role responsiveness. analyst's survival of destructive attacks-	active imagination art, sandplay

With this kind of multi-vectored model, analytic controversies might begin to melt away. The different viewpoints can be seen to reflect differing emphases between analytic groups on their own particular view of the analytic task. As the Dodo in *Alice in Wonderland* said “All have won and all must have prizes”, but this egalitarian ideal does require each partisan group to acknowledge that those they disagree with have also something valuable to offer and also deserve prizes.

For example, an essential part of the operationalizing of the relationship between analytic theory and practice necessitates the inclusion of Jungian models for change. This would offer a way out of the impasse described by Morris Eagle. However there is still great resistance amongst psychoanalysts to any reference to Jungian literature, with the notable exceptions of Winnicott (1958, p. 273) in the past and Ron Britton (1998, p. 122) in the present day. Even when psychoanalysts are re-discovering well-established Jungian ideas, they often seem unaware of the Jungian literature or choose not to refer to it, perhaps for fear of alienating their readers.

Conclusion

So, in the face of so many competing territorial claims, can we make any reliable assertion about who owns the unconscious now? I think it is possible to say that each of the competing groups can claim ownership of a part of the unconscious, because the unconscious has many more facets than can be encompassed by any one model. It has structural aspects but also specific mental content. It is also a way of describing certain mental processes. Each psychodynamic theory focuses on and highlights one or two particular aspects of unconsciousness, but no single model offers a complete picture of unconscious structure, content and processes, nor of the developmental pathways towards the achievement of internal object constancy, which itself depends on affect regulation, reflective function and the full experience of subjectivity achieved with the representational level of self-agency. These are the foundations on which the unique symbolic capacity of the human mind is constructed.

Our differing analytic techniques are all ways of assisting the emergence of the patient's capacity to symbolize, that is, to separate

thought from action, to hold in mind and reflect on self and other as mental and emotional subjects, not just physical objects. This is what it means to be fully human. In future, analytic theory and practice needs to “own” Jung the better to achieve this goal.

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Jung and neuroscience: the making of mind

Margaret Wilkinson

As I consider the question “Who owns Jung?” I find that, in contrast to Jung (“thank God I am Jung and not a Jungian”), I have an increasing sense of pleasure that I am a Jungian, that is a “contemporary Jungian”, living in this particular period when contemporary neuroscience offers analytical psychologists the opportunity to explore the mind-brain relationship anew in the hope of grounding both theory and clinical practice in the science of the 21st century. In the discussion after Jung’s Second Tavistock Lecture Bion asked Jung whether he considered that there was a connection between mind and brain. Jung replied “The psychic fact and the physiological fact come together in a peculiar way ... We see them as two on account of the utter incapacity of our mind to think them together (Jung 1935, par. 135–136). As Solomon (2000, pp. 126–137) and Casement (2001, pp. 133–134) have predicted, the continuing relevance of Jung’s insights are being confirmed by research into neuroscience just as so many aspects of his thought remain relevant in our modern world.

There is not space here to offer a detailed exposition of how so many of Jung’s original psychoanalytic hypotheses, created within the framework of the early twentieth century science of the unconscious

mind, are now validated by neuroscientific findings of twenty-first century. However as I continue to explore the subject I am struck afresh by the increasing number of the Jungian community who write in this field and “own Jung” as they do so, that is they own his seminal influence and the relevance of his thought in relation to the advances that are emerging from this field of research. I have in mind colleagues such as Sherwood, Cambray and Ekstrom. Sherwood writes out of her work as an analytical psychologist but uses her earlier experience as a neuroscientist to explore our understanding of the symbolic (2006a, 2006b). Cambray (2005, 2006) and Ekstrom (2004) help us to place neuroscience in the history and development of ideas, in the case of Cambray highlighting “a feeling of emergence” and in Ekstrom exploring different “models of the unconscious”. It should be noted that Jung’s thought is seen as prescient not just by some of us in the analytic community but by an increasing number of neuroscientists as well. I seek to give a flavour of their thought in the exploration that follows. I have in mind as I write our everyday experience in the consulting-room and developing out of that our increasing understanding of the roots of the relational and the symbolic experience of self. Space here precludes detailed exploration but perhaps I may provide some insights into why I have found myself feeling ever more deeply a Jungian as I have explored the developments in thought in the field of contemporary neuroscience.

The imaging processes, especially the fMRI and PET scans that developed in the 1990’s, earned it the title of “the decade of the brain”. Sherwood has described these succinctly as “non-invasive neuro-imaging techniques that allow three-dimensional spatial mapping of metabolic activity (which reflects level of neuronal activity) in real time” (Sherwood, 2006a, p. 63). These scans have brought more detailed understanding of how electro-chemical conversations take place between neurons, making possible the coding of both inner and outer experience, and the responses of the human mind to such experience. As each person’s experience is different, so there are different patterns of connectivity in every brain-mind. These recent imaging studies are of course confirming just why as Jungian analysts we concentrate on the mood and affect that underpin mind as revealed in the consulting-room, and the relation of this to the patient’s emotional life and ways of relating.

I want to explore two strands of Jungian thought in relation to affective neuroscience: the first is the early making of mind and the second is the remaking of mind that takes place in the consulting-room.

The making of mind

Schore has noted that although Jung “never offered a formal developmental theory of the origin of the self, he was convinced that “The symbols of the self arise in the depths of the body” ” (Schore, 2006, p. ix). Schore has marshalled considerable evidence from the field of neuroscience research to establish that “the foundation of unconscious processes (are to be found) in the developmentally primitive inchoate infant mind” (Schore, 1994, p. 538). Decety and Chaminade conclude that there is good evidence that reciprocal imitation plays a vital part in the early development of the implicit self (Decety and Chaminade, 2003). As the self is fundamentally associative and its development based on psychological identification, mechanisms such as transference and countertransference are rooted in the very earliest experience of mind. It is in this area that Fordham’s seminal insights (1969, 1976) concerning the deintegrative and integrative processes of early development have been explored with reference to neuroscience and attachment theory by Jungians such as Davies (2002), Knox (2001, 2003, 2004) and most recently Woodhead (2004, 2005). It is the enrichment of our understanding of the development of mind in the analytic process as emergent, associative and relational where I think Jungian thought securely grounds insights that arise from neuroscience, and is in turn enriched by the neuropsychobiological insights into early relationships that are becoming increasingly available to us.

In his foreword to my book (Wilkinson, 2006, p. x) Schore comments:

In a conception that echoes Jung’s earlier prescient speculations, I have recently concluded: Affective processes appear to lie at the core of the self, and due to the intrinsic psychobiological nature of these bodily-based phenomena recent models of human development, from infancy throughout the lifespan, are moving towards brain-mind-body conceptualizations. These models are

redefining the essential characteristics of what makes us uniquely human. [Schore, 2003, p. xiv]

Schore continues “neuroscience now confirms that Jung’s self system (“the innermost nucleus of the psyche”, the “regulatory center”) and archetypes are processes that are emergent functions of the early developing right brain” (Schore, 2006, p. x). The repeated experiences of deintegration and reintegration that Fordham understood as the processes by which the baby grows its self, enable the growth of increasing connectivity in the brain, giving rise in turn to an experience of mind, which then in turn both stimulates and determines the development of further connectivity within the brain. Klein impressed on us the importance of what might be thought of as the genetic predispositions that the baby brings to its way of experiencing the world but neuroscience has made clear that this only becomes activated by environmental experience, leading us inexorably back to Fordham’s development of Jung’s thought. Fordham emphasized that it is the experiences of deintegration and reintegration unfolding in relation to the primary caregiver that give rise to the developing sense of self, a view confirmed by later research into attachment styles. Because genetic predispositions are activated by actual early experience, and sadly for some by actual early relational trauma, the development of mind is very much dependent on each individual’s experience of relating to others, the initial development of mind arising from intimate interactions with the mother and also the father. Schore explains that “the experience dependent maturation of the orbitofrontal cortex is expressed in the growth and stabilization of its dense interconnections with both cortical and subcortical areas” (1994, p. 542). Panksepp argues that it is these underlying emotional circuits of the brain that “*initiate, synchronize and energize* sets of coherent physiological, behavioural and psychological changes that are primal instinctive solutions to various archetypal life-challenging situations” (Panksepp, 1998, p. 123, italics are in the original). Jungians, such as Knox, writing from an interactionist, developmental viewpoint have already begun to explore the significance of this for our understanding of archetypal theory (Knox, 2003).

Cutting-edge contributions in the field of parent-infant psychotherapy are being made by Jungians such as Judith Woodhead, a Jungian analyst, who works as a member of a team that has developed

a Parent-Infant Project at the Anna Freud Centre, London. She turns to neuroscience to ground her thinking about her work with a traumatized mother and baby. It informs her empathic relational approach to work that will mirror the healthy empathic relational processes that need to develop in the mother-child relationship (Woodhead, 2004, p. 145). She has a sense of urgency about the work because of her neurobiologically-informed knowledge that early relational trauma may affect the development of specific areas of the infant brain-mind (Woodhead, 2004, p. 146). She is able to model a mothering attitude, which the baby's mother internalizes sufficiently to "begin to be able to follow her baby's clues and meet her needs more empathically" (Wilkinson, 2006, pp. 41–42).

The remaking of mind

What does all this have to with our everyday experience of working with adult patients? LeDoux speculates that analysis works by strengthening cortical control over the amygdala (LeDoux, 1996, p. 265) and Solms and Turnbull suggest that affectively focused treatment alters the frontal lobes of the brain in a way that is detectable by functional imaging studies (Solms & Turnbull, 2002, p. 288). Cozolino argues the value of the affect-regulating, relational aspects of analytic work that forge new neural pathways through emotional connection (Cozolino, 2002). Wharton draws our attention to the subtlety of the differences in interaction in each analytic dyad, how "intensely personal to the two people concerned" and how different each patient is "how, for example, even when the affect being expressed, or the developmental stage being enacted in the transference, is known by the same name, the quality of it varies subtly from one patient to another, or in the same patient at different times, and elicits subtly different responses" (Wharton, 1998, p. 215). It is that unique interactive experience between therapist and client that is crucial for the development of the emotional scaffolding necessary for the emergence of reflective function, for coming into mind.

As the self is fundamentally associative and relational, the analytic discourse is inevitably rooted in the relational. I would like to explore the insights that neuroscience may hold for us concerning the building blocks that go to establish intimacy in the beginning of

life and again in the very special kind of relationship that develops in the consulting-room. I have written extensively about the way in which the setting may most helpfully mirror the early interaction between mother and child, that chairs or chair and couch should be arranged in such a way as to permit the gaze and gaze-away sequences that characterize early relating to take place as a natural part of the engagement of the analytic dyad (Wilkinson, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). As space is limited here I will focus on the patient's experience of the personhood of the analyst, in particular the significance of the analyst's voice, in relation to what neuroscience reveals for us concerning early experience and the remaking of mind in the consulting-room.

The mother's voice

In their discussion of emotional sounds and the brain Panksepp and Bernatzky (2002) describe sound as "a special form of touch ... built upon the prosodic mechanisms of the right hemisphere ... [that] allows us affective emotional communication through vocal intonations" (2002, p. 136). They note that "sounds may arouse an enormous symphony of neurochemical effects within the brain" (2002, p. 147). They emphasize that the brain region (the inferior colliculus) which clearly mediates affective process, is the region where our mother's voice may leave forever its first affective imprint (2002, p. 137). They conclude that it is this region "richly endowed with opiate receptors which may mediate attachments", and this of course means the attachment that develops within the analytic experience.

We are also aware of the patterns of separation and distress calls that are universally manifest in the mother/infant relationship. In this connection I am minded of Susan, a patient who I described in *Coming into Mind*

This patient, a talented musician, discovered in analysis how as a child she had used music as a safe place to escape into, and how it became a shield, a means of defence against knowing about her painful early memories. She was particularly aware of the effect that sad sounding songs had on her. Panksepp notes that "one of the most intriguing manifestations of separation distress in the human brain may reflect a powerful response many of us have to

certain types of music". He suggests "a major component of the poignant feelings that accompany sad music (what one might call the chill or tingle factor) may acoustically resemble separation distress vocalizations—the primal cry of being lost or in despair". [Panksepp, 1998, p. 278] [Wilkinson, 2006, p. 63]

Butterton (2004) links Bollas's (1993) suggestion that we are seeking transformation of the unintegrated parts of the self with her view that the "feeling parts of the brain, in the inner feeling self have a form, shape and texture and we resonate with these corresponding shapes and textures while listening to a passage of music which we find really important for us (Butterton, 2000, pp. 148–9). What Butterton describes as "the feeling parts of the brain" and "the inner feeling self" of course arise from the early mother-baby relationship held in early implicit memory, known only in the emotions and the body, formed too early to arise from explicit memory or to be fully known in mind.

At the discussion after his first Tavistock Lecture Jung commented that "it is due to our most lamentable mind that we cannot think of body and mind as one and the same thing; probably they *are* one thing but we are unable to think it" (Jung, 1935, par. 69). Panksepp and Bernatzky draw our attention to the fact that separation distress will be accompanied by a drop in body temperature, controlled by the thermoregulatory systems deep within the cortical brain, likewise the "warmth" occasioned by re-attachment is accompanied by a rise in body temperature. They refer to an interesting piece of research that established that "happy music played to the left ear (preferentially stimulating the right hemisphere) tends to increase body temperature" whereas sad music has the opposite effect (McFarland and Kennison, 1989, cited in Panksepp & Bernatzky, 2002, p. 143). I reflect that by chance the patients who use the couch in my consulting-room have their left ear closest to me and as I read of this research I speculated that this arrangement of the room may actually assist access to the executive control centre of the emotional right brain thus enabling the processes of attachment and affect-regulation.

In connection with this I remembered a story told by a psychiatrist who some years earlier had been working in an emergency admissions unit. He told of the arrival of a severely catatonic patient "frozen" into a sitting position and virtually carried into

the department. After spending a considerable time trying to take a standard psychiatric history and having obtained no response, the patient's physiological state led the psychiatrist to diagnose a severe catatonic state. The psychiatrist thought for a while, then, understanding this behaviour as a metaphor, he crouched down beside his patient and said quietly "I am here to help". After a while he whispered quietly into the man's left ear, "I think you may be feeling very frightened". There was an almost imperceptible but just discernable response in the man's frozen face. The psychiatrist waited a moment or two then whispered again into the man's ear, "I think you are petrified". This time there was some eye movement. After some time had passed the psychiatrist whispered "Would you like me to take you to somewhere safe?" This time the man's body began to unfreeze enough for that to be able to happen.

Panksepp and Bernatzky employ an analogy to describe the wide distribution of the emotional circuits throughout the brain and hence resulting neural resonances. They describe it as a tree-like structure with roots and trunk-lines in sub-cortical areas, and branches interacting with wide canopies in cortical regions (Panksepp & Bernatzky, 2002, p. 137) Indeed I found my mind wandering to the richness of the tropical rain-forest of the Amazon with the life and activity that goes on both below and within the tree canopy. They conclude that music (and by inference the musicality of the analyst's voice), "could easily access the higher reaches of various emotional systems through the temporal lobe inputs into the amygdala, frontal and parietal cortical inputs into other basal ganglia such as the nucleus accumbens as well as more direct inputs into limbic areas such as the cingulate cortex".

It is also of note that the inferior colliculus (where the imprint of the mother's voice is thought to be stored) is adjacent to the periaqueductal gray (PAG), the site where all the emotional systems converge creating a coherent virtual self-representation (Schore, 1994). Thus our very sense of who we are is wedded closely to what we learn of our being from our earliest experiences of our mother's voice. It is from this area that an awareness of a coherent sense of self may ultimately emerge. A core self, one that is deeply unconscious, is posited by both Panksepp (1998) and Damasio (1999, 2004) and is strongly reminiscent of Fordham's primary self (1969, 1976). It

echoes Jung's description of the self as "a quantity that is superordinate to the conscious ego". Jung continues "It embraces not only the conscious but the unconscious psyche, and is therefore, so to speak, a personality which we *also* are" (Jung, 1953, par. 274).

The affective transference

In the light of all this we may begin to understand why the prosodic aspects, indeed the musicality of the analyst's voice, become so important to the patient with early relational trauma who is seeking to learn a new kind of attachment, and whose relating to the analyst is perceived as deep or regressive. Indeed it is deep, as the voice of the analyst resonates in the depths of the patient's mind-brain-being, in implicit memory. Elsewhere I explain that

Implicit memory is the source of the deeply founded ways of being and behaving that govern an individual life. These hidden depths are the early established patterns, recorded in the implicit memory store of the early developing right hemisphere. These are then manifest in the patient's ways of being, feeling and behaving which become known in the consulting-room through the transference and countertransference. [Wilkinson, 2006, p. 57]

I surmise it is this that led Gianna Williams, a Kleinian analyst, in her response to a paper given by Dr Proner to empathically conclude that such patients require the analyst to speak in "pastel rather than primary colours" (Williams, 2004). It has also led Cozolino to note the hazards of the inappropriate use of silence explaining that "silence is an ambiguous stimulus that activates systems of implicit memory" (Cozolino, 2002, p. 99). Such systems may be so persecutory that they lead patients to depths of affective despair. Emphasizing the importance of voice in the analytic dyad, Sherwood suggests that prosody is an important component in processing affective experiencing:

While the expression of basic emotions is universal, human facial expressions of more complex states can be quite difficult to read, and they may stimulate anxiety or curiosity in the viewer. Moreover, while negative states can be read easily, the interpretation of positive affects is more accurate if voice tone is added to the equation. [Sherwood, 2006b, p. 244]

Panksepp and Bernatzky emphasize that sound is “an excellent way to help to synchronize and regulate emotions” (2002, p. 140). I suspect that one patient was utilizing this when she found that just listening to her analyst’s voice on her answer-phone message brought reassurance, and caused another, at the conclusion of therapy, to say, “it seems so important to carry the memory of your voice”. In this connection I notice that I almost never have had to identify myself to a patient on the telephone, almost all know one’s voice instantly. I suspect that with many of us the same will almost always apply to our capacity to know the voices of our patients.

Concerning the transference, Perry has pointed out the dangers of either “being wafted into the lofty spiritual realms at the expense of losing touch with the instinctual ... or adhering too closely to the infantile transference. He argues with Jung that the transference” should rather be explored as “a bridge to reality (Jung, 1913, pp. 190–191) which entails the patient coming to relate to the analyst as he actually is” (Perry, 1997, p. 146). It is concerning the means by which this may most effectively be achieved that neuroscience may shed some light. Perry explores the analytic relationship as “the analytic or “marriage” quaternion”, and offers a simplified version of Jung’s original diagram concerning this (1997, p. 147). In it unconscious or implicit aspects as well as conscious, explicit aspects of experiencing together in the analytic dyad are represented. Haule notes that “*solve et coagula* (dissolve and coagulate), the motto of alchemy, has the psychological significance of “dissociate and integrate” (Haule, 1984, p. 656).

The importance of developing imagery as experienced in the twosome is envisaged in Jung’s exploration of the Rosarium. Sherwood draws our attention to the joining of the left hands of the King and Queen in Figure 1 of the Rosarium (Jung, 1946a, p. 213) and links it with understanding gained from contemporary neuroscience (Sherwood, 2006b). She notes that Jung wrote:

The left is inauspicious and awkward; also it is the side of the heart, from which comes not only love but all the evil thoughts connected with it, the moral contradictions in human nature that are expressed most clearly in our affective life. The contact of left hands could therefore be taken as an indication of the affective nature of the relationship. [Jung, 1946a, par. 410]

PHILOSOPHORVM.



Figure 1. *The King and Queen from the Rosarium.*

Source: Jung (1946, p. 213).

Sherwood continues:

Our bodies and brains have a bilateral form, with representations of the left side of the body's skin and musculature connecting to the right side of the brain. Thus the left hands of the king and queen in our alchemical picture connect to the right side of their brains. Roger Sperry won the Nobel Prize in Medicine in

1981 for showing that the two halves of the human cerebral cortex are not simple mirrors of each other: areas responsible for higher-order processing in the right and left cortices are differentiated to perform specific tasks. [Sherwood, 2006b, p. 240]

Larsen et al note that “In most people, the verbal, conscious and serial information processing takes place in the left hemisphere, while the unconscious, nonverbal and emotional information processing mainly takes place in the right hemisphere” (Larsen et al., 2003, p. 543, cited in Schore, 2006). Schore has amassed a massive amount of evidence that establishes the right hemisphere as the seat of our emotional affective life, with implicit ways of being and behaving securely established in the amygdaloidal memory of the right hemisphere from the earliest days and months of life in response to interactions with the primary caregiver (Schore, 1994, p. 2003). Just this is highlighted in the joining of the left hands of the King and Queen in the Rosarium.

For me, underpinning the experiences of the analytic dyad in the consulting-room are two sets of triangles, the first two represent the mind-brain-body being of each of the twosome. The second set consists of the attachment dynamics of each (Figure 2). The corners of these triangles consist of the early attachment relationship, the current attachments and lastly the therapeutic attachment relationship of the twosome (see below). Both analyst and patient have a series of attachment experiences both past and current that go to make up the attachment style that they bring to the therapeutic attachment. In the case of the patient it may well be an avoidant style learned early, or may be anxious or perhaps the most complex of all, disorganized. The analyst may have been fortunate enough to start with a secure attachment or may well have done a great deal of work in his/her own analysis to move from one of the other styles to the style that I describe as “learned secure” (Wilkinson, 2006, pp. 182–3).

As the analysis progresses both will also be affected by their current attachment experiences and in particular by any changes that may occur through stress, loss or good experience. Part of the task of the analysis will be through the transference experience to help the patient to explore and become aware of her early attachment style and able to look at the way this may be mirrored in her current relationships. Sherwood comments that we should not “underestimate the possibilities of maladaptive self-regulatory schemata, which




Figure 2.

unconsciously cause a person to recreate ... overwhelming or depriving states of being" (Sherwood, 2006b, pp. 243–244).

In order to do this analysts must be aware of their own early and current attachment styles and the way that these aspects of their inner world are impinging on the quality of the therapeutic attachment as it develops. For example, analysts whose early attachment style was avoidant and whose current circumstances suddenly plunge them into emotional pain may wish to avoid the dependency needs of the baby part of their adult patient. Watt concludes that there is "massive reciprocity of attachment and empathy, and functional imaging studies ... support this assumption" (Watt 2005, p. 199).

As I have commented elsewhere (Wilkinson 2006, p. 183), "I believe that Fordham had the right of it when he described the need for the analyst to be open to deintegrative processes within in order to put at the patient's disposal spontaneity of relating coming from deep within the analyst". I quote:

There are two ways of behaving: (1) Trying to isolate oneself from the patient by being as integrated as possible and (2) relinquishing this attitude and simply listening to and watching the patient to hear and see what comes out of the self in relation to the patient's activities and then reacting. This would appear to involve deintegrating; it is as if what is put at the disposal of patients are parts of the analyst which are spontaneously responding to the patient in the way that he needs. [Fordham, 1957, p. 97]

Knox observes:

As therapists we cannot be merely scientific observers of our patients' mental processes but must also allow ourselves to be drawn in and sometimes taken over emotionally; we must be able to feel love and hate, sometimes towards and sometimes with or on behalf of our patients. [Knox, 2001, p. 614]

However Casement warns that it is vital to guard against over-indulgence on the part of analysts in airing their internal processes, rather she argues that it is necessary to allow the development of the "analytic third" which is constellated between the two in the interactive field that exists between and is not entirely the analyst nor entirely the analysand (Casement, 2001, p. 83).

Images that emerge in the consulting-room in such circumstances express affective experience arising from implicit early

memory; their arrival becomes possible because of the affective re-experiencing that occurs within the transference. They act as windows to the psyche, to the soul, to the self as we work with our patients in the relational encounter that is special to the consulting-room. A practitioner described her own experience movingly commenting, "the image links consciousness and the unconscious, left and right brain, so beautifully. I simply must have some form of image "object", be it visual or sound—music is my real thing—and then everything takes on a true life of its own". It is appropriate that it is the new found richness of the world of imaging studies that is opening up our understanding of the processes of imagery in the brain-mind. As Solms and Turnbull argue, "powerful new methods and technologies in neuroscience ... are yielding previously undreamed of knowledge about the physiological underpinnings of the inner world" (Solms & Turnbull, 2002, p. 5).

The use of metaphor in whatever form it presents itself indicates emergent processes at work. Speaking of the series of images contained in the *Splendor Solis*, (an alchemical treatise dating from 1582, belonging to the British Library MS 3469), Sherwood notes that one way to approach a symbolic image is as an inner compensation or a response to an outer situation. The image then may be understood as "communications from the non-rational psyche about psycho-physiological states of being". She suggests that "such states are of particular interest to us as analysts because we attend to changes in the field or the emotional state of our patients and ourselves, and especially to the nature of transitions from one state to another" (Sherwood, 2006b, p. 238).

Pally stresses that "By containing within them sensory, imagistic, emotional and verbal elements, metaphors are believed to activate multiple brain centres simultaneously" (Pally, 2000, p. 132). Here neuroscience confirms what Jung knew both from intuition and observation. When writing of dreams (which I regard as extended metaphors) he commented "Dreams do not deceive, they do not lie, they do not distort or disguise, but naively announce what they are and what they mean ... they are invariably seeking to express something that the ego does not know and does not understand" (Jung, 1946b, par. 189). In this one remark Jung addresses the two issues that have been noted as central outcomes of recent dream research, namely, first that dreams make sense of emotional

experience and secondly that they benefit both learning and memory, whether cognitive or emotional. As I have looked into the research into the dreaming process I have become more and more aware that the outcomes reflect Jung's approach in an almost startling way. Ultimately it came as no surprise that Braun was in agreement with Jung's remark that he was doubtful whether we can assume that a dream is something other than it appears to be (Jung, 1938/1958). Braun concludes that what is important to analysts is the way in which dreams are meaningful and can lead to better understanding of unconscious processes. In his view neuroscience research into the dreaming process is hindered only when the ghost of Freud gets in the way (Braun, 1999, pp. 200–201). Panksepp comments "Perhaps the dream theories of Freud and Jung, which suggested dreams reflect unconscious and symbolic emotional forces affecting an individual may still hold some basic truths" (Panksepp, 1998, p. 129). He concludes REM sleep may help

to solidify the many unconscious habits that are the very foundation of our personality. In the final accounting dreams may construct the powerful subconscious or preconscious affective psychological patterns that make us ... the people that we are. They may help construct the many emotional myths and beliefs around which our lives revolve. [Panksepp, 1998, p. 142]

Because of the way, when shared in the consulting-room as an extended metaphor, they stimulate brain centres, they may facilitate change more comprehensively than any other form of human communication.

Cozolino describes the kind of processing that is constantly occurring within the mind-brain.

Transcortical networks in both hemispheres feed highly processed sensory-motor information forward to the frontal cortex. Simultaneously, multiple hierarchical networks, which loop up and down through the cortex, limbic system and brainstem, provide the frontal cortex with visceral, behavioural and emotional information. [Cozolino, 2002, p. 132]

It is just such processing and therefore increased connectivity that the exploration of metaphor in the analytic relationship is able to stimulate. Affeld-Niemeyer, writing of work with those who have experienced abuse, comments that it is "not the recall of actual abuse

that promotes therapeutic progress but the evolving symbolizations" (Affeld-Niemeyer, 1995, p. 38). The value of evolving symbolizations as indicators to the analytic dyad of progress in the healing process shows clearly in material described by Clare, a very capable lawyer in her early fifties. She described to me, her second analyst, the subtle differences in the transference manifestation of her early trauma, arising from a difficult relationship with her father, in her two experiences of analysis. This relationship manifested itself in similar yet subtly different ways in each. She described both analysts as working with her in a very gentle but containing way, yet with both the relationship from the past, born of early trauma, could easily intrude. In the first analysis with a man she encountered the father, whom she experienced at that time as "a monster", conceptualized only as "a fearsome black beast". By the later stages of the second analysis the transference image had become humanized, albeit remaining very persecuting and persecutory. At this stage the father was experienced as a severe critic, the one who often summoned her to the door of his study to berate her for her shortcomings, often adding as a veiled threat, "And I don't even have to touch you to break you" (a restraint that he had signally failed to observe with Clare's elder sister, who had removed herself from the family home for that reason). For me the attachment perspective of rupture and repair was helpful as I sought to find appropriate ways to be with my patient. While it was important to allow the re-experiencing to reoccur in the context of the transference relationship it was also crucial that my patient became able to differentiate the real analyst from the projection. An over-emphasis on an abstinent style of working would have prolonged this patient's difficulties; neuroscience with its healthy emphasis on the twosome offered a timely reminder of Jung's earlier insight.

Concerning the complexes Jung commented that "The *via regia* to the unconscious however is not the dream ... but the complex, which is the architect of dreams and of symptoms". In the same passage he described complexes as "the living units of the unconscious psyche" adding that "it is only through them that we are able to deduce its existence and constitution" adding "Nor is this *via* so very "royal" either, since the way pointed out by the complex is more like a rough and uncommonly devious footpath that often loses itself in the undergrowth" (Jung, 1934, p. par. 210).

Traumatic complexes in Jung's view arise when the psyche is presented with unassimilable experience, resulting in indigestible contents. Jung as a result of his early work with Charcot and the French dissociationists in Paris had become aware that the traumatic complex may force itself "tyrannically upon the conscious mind" (Jung, 1928, par. 267). He described such complexes as autonomous "splinter psyches", fragments, which became split off because of traumatic experience (Jung, 1934, par. 203). Such a complex "is not under the control of the will and for this reason it possesses the quality of psychic autonomy" (Jung, 1928, par. 266). Neuroscience makes clear that material that could not be processed in mind remains held in implicit memory and in the bodily unconscious. Kalsched has made clear that "earlier dissociated memories can only be recovered in the ego state in which they occurred, and the therapy ironically reconstellates this" (Kalsched, 1999, p. 468). Knox has observed that a patient may "suddenly find him/herself vividly re-living the abuse in the most painful and terrifying way if something happens to trigger state-dependent retrieval" (Knox, 2001, p. 620). Neuroscience offers a timely reminder of the dangers of technique that leads to a kindling rather than a quenching of the trauma pathways in the mind brain. Psychological kindling is the changed pattern of neuronal responses in the brain subsequent to emotional trauma whereby they fire in response to internal rather than external stimuli. In such circumstances fear circuits become over activated and a combination of behavioural and biological processes results in states of pathological anxiety (Rosen & Schulkin, 1998, pp. 325–50). Affect regulation must of necessity be central to any such therapy. The kindled state, once aroused, may linger for some considerable time with detrimental effects on the patient's state of mind, body and general well-being. The aim is not reassurance, or avoidance of the trauma, but rather to address the point of pain while enabling the patient to stay "in mind" and able to work. For work with material that arises from implicit memory right brain empathic relating is essential; left brain interpretational work is not enough.

When we deal with implicit memory we are by definition dealing with material so early, or so traumatic, that it cannot be brought to mind. The Freudian analyst Andrade goes so far as to suggest that in these circumstances "interpretation *per se* is entirely innocuous, just producing well-being through the positive affective context of

intersubjective relations". He concludes that in such circumstances "what the analyst says is immaterial" because "it is the affective content of the analyst's voice—not the semantic content—that has an impact on the patient's store of implicit memories"(Andrade, 2004, p. 683). I think this is to confuse, at least in part, the state of the baby mind where *only* implicit experiencing is possible (because the later developing left hemisphere has not yet come on line), with the adult mind-brain of the adult patient with its capacity for *both* explicit and implicit experiencing.

I would like to suggest that in such circumstances past is indeed re-experienced at the level of the implicit, changing deeply founded ways of being and behaving, and in successful analyses leads to a changed experience of attachment that I have characterized as "learned secure"(Wilkinson, 2006, pp. 182–3). Indeed it is this that takes place within the new experience of relating that occurs within the analytic dyad. However it must also be linked with the present by means of transformative interpretation. It is not a case of either just the old interpretational approach or just the new relational approach that leads to change. Well-timed interpretations that involve putting feelings into word bring about increasing connectivity, making possible healthy and integrated functioning of both hemispheres of the brain. Therapy is for me rather like a double helix where left brain and right brain processes intertwine. One is predominantly cognitive, arising from the experience of interpretation, and the other predominantly affective, arising out of the relational experiencing that is at the heart of the analytic engagement. It is the need for both that leads Cozolino to conclude that it is "the blending of the strengths of the right and left hemisphere [that] allows for the maximum integration of our cognitive and emotional experience with our inner and outer worlds" (Cozolino, 2002, p. 115).

It is because the early making of mind is implicit, emergent and relational that I suggest we must look again at the over-emphasis on the abstinent, interpretational left-brain approach that has characterized much of analytic thinking that arose out of Freud's early thought and look rather to our roots within the French dissociationist tradition which led to Jung's understanding of the dissociative processes, the complexes and the nature of the self. Schore comments: "The centre of psychic life shifts from Freud's *ego*, which he located in the speech area on the left hand side"(Freud, 1923) and

the posterior areas of the verbal left hemisphere, to the highest levels of the right hemisphere, the locus of the bodily based *self system*" (Schore, 2001, p. 77).

The way forward

The split between the two great founding fathers of our profession set a precedent for the increasing divisions within depth psychology that have occurred since. We are now at a point where psychoanalysis, analytical psychology and the psychoanalytic psychotherapies have an opportunity to reinstate the basic principle of our founding fathers, that is to reiterate, in Jung's words, that "natural science combines two worlds, the physical and the psychic [and that] psychology does this *only in so far as it is psychophysiology*" (Jung, 1946b, par. 162, italics in original). It seems that if the psychological therapies are to meet the challenge of 21st century science in order to thrive in as creative a way as Freud and Jung did in the late 19th and early 20th centuries there is every reason to embrace the insights that neuroscience offers. Fonagy offers a further reason for so doing with his argument that the failure to link theory to practice in a creative way has been caused by the failure of analytic theory as a scientific theory (Fonagy, 2003, p. 29). Solms and Turnbull argue that

In the long term, a comprehensive neuroscience of subjective experience will be developed with or without psychoanalysis. The cooperation of psychoanalysts at this point will surely speed up the process and enrich it immeasurably ... A radically different psychoanalysis will emerge ... its claims will be far more securely grounded. [Solms & Turnbull, 2002, pp. 314–5]

There is a danger at the moment that as each major sector in depth psychology seeks to explore and absorb the insights that are of such radical importance for our work that we do so merely from the standpoint of our own particular sector or even school of thought within that sector. I believe that those of us from all schools of psychoanalytic thought and practice who are interested in neuroscience should avoid the danger of merely examining the insights that are emerging from affective neuroscience from behind the high walls of our individual schools of analytic thought. Rather together we

should begin to undertake a more comprehensive re-evaluation of analytic theory in the light of affective neuroscience, thus embracing to the fullest the opportunities that it offers for grounding our clinical endeavours in 21st century science.

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Who owns the air?

Roberto Gambini

Jung was an inspiration, a bunch of seeds spread out by a strong wind over the vast land of rational thought. Jung was an attitude. Jung was one of the forgotten facets of the prism of consciousness. His legacy, the sum of his insights and proposals, is not a theory stamped with the sign of a registered mark. On the contrary, his discoveries and working hypotheses were a gift to culture, were his individual response to the paradoxes of reality, the uncertainties of knowledge and the pain and glory of life itself. If I were to use a minimalist style, I would say, in one phrase, that the quintessence of his contribution was a proposal for a way of being and thinking, namely: what we call “me”, “out there” or “reality” is not reduced to what meets the eye. His invitation was open to anyone: let us try to exercise a careful, constant and progressive observation of the manifestations of the unconscious in all levels of experience, in every act of apprehension of the meaning of existence. “Unconscious”, for him, is not just that part of my or your biography that is unknown to us, but that part of reality that is not taken into account simply because it cannot be directly observed, measured, described or conceptualized. Jung knew that the unknown exists and the task of his life was to invent or discover

ways and tools to approach the unapproachable, to coin words to refer to the transcendent, to make room for the unmanifested in the realm of experience—in his case, the unlighted areas of the psyche.

Inspiration is air. And as every native American knows since time immemorial, nobody owns the air, nobody owns the wind, nobody owns the light of the sun. These goods are outside human commerce, they cannot be bought or sold. An idea given to all is not the private property of anyone in particular. Even copyrights one day expire. The mass of pigment attached to the ceiling of the Sixtine Chapel may be the property of the Vatican, but not the emotion caused in us by contemplating the image it conveys. Watching the unconscious is an attitude, an inclination, a taste, a choice, a hobby, a task, a vocation: it is for free, like watching birds fly or the slow dance of the stars in the night sky.

The Jungian eye searches for the other side of the Moon. Not so much for the face behind the mask, but to what is behind the face itself. Jung searched for the limit of our knowledge about the mystery of death and the origin of life; he followed the silk thread that unites the physical and the psychic, he fought to envisage the unity that underlies perceptible diversities and dualities. Jung has always been eager to reach the uterus, the matrix whence consciousness originated, he wanted to discover the primary mold of existing thought forms, the link between image and action, the link between soul and world. He wanted to look into the eyes of the soul of the world and understand its silenced utterances. That was his goal: to hear the inaudible speech of stones and decipher its grammar.

Jung wanted to see a river in a statue, life as a constant flow and dreams as a living reality. Jung wanted to be able to honor the desire to become conscious that lies dormant in all forgotten or despised aspects of life: he was certain that the vast unconscious wants to become conscious, and that every historical phase is able to absorb just what it is able to digest, and no more at that point of evolution. Yes, in this sense Jung was an evolutionist, always maintaining that the psyche has a tendency to advance towards unexplored realms—without implying, as a consequence, that mankind has a tendency to evolve ethically. For him, Good and Evil were an unsolvable problem. His whole psychology is based on the idea that all that man can do in this respect is to recognize that one and all are carriers of both principles, therefore all projection is a vain

attempt to avoid the weight of being human. In describing and analyzing the shadow, Jung wanted man to acknowledge his imperfection, his condition of fallen angel who has the capacity to take responsibility for his actions. Mankind is a species gifted with the possibility to redeem the same destruction it causes. Consciousness is the turning point.

Jung knew there is a still point inside every human being. He offered to the current mentality a conception of the ego as an agent capable of transformation to the point of becoming a servant to a higher stance. The ego can be silenced, the incessant flow of thoughts can rest—and then a new sky appears, then the great Being can be witnessed by an emptied consciousness whose only function is to acknowledge what it breathlessly sees before its transfixed eyes. This emptiness, for him, was plenitude, was the gold of the alchemists: the possibility of experiencing, not just thinking, ontology.

When I was training in the Jung Institute in Zürich, back in the late 70's, I had two dreams that today, some twenty-five years later, I can clearly recognize as the foundation of all that I have said above—albeit minimally. In the first dream I am standing in front of an imposing palace in Zürich. It displayed a neo-classical façade, alternating high windows with niches containing classical statues. This was the Jung Institute, in which I was a dedicated and reverent student. There I am standing in admiration, this fellow from the Third World with a feeling that maybe he does not deserve it, he is not up to the challenge of becoming a member of an organization, a power structure that owns Jungian psychology. Then I start walking around the corner and, to my enormous surprise, I realize that the front of the impressive building is just a façade, with nothing behind it—very much like the Wind Palace in Jaipur, which I visited many years later. In the sequence I go back to the front view, and as I look again at it, it begins to shake and disassemble, finally falling to pieces. From that dream I initially learned not to idealize the Jung Institute that I loved, nor to stay with the façade of things. It also dawned on me that a cultural inferiority complex can be a defense against connecting the Self. Two decades later, disputes of power and shadow projections shook old institutional foundations in Zürich and did great harm to all involved—analysts! The old story of power cutting the wings of eros and sending spirit to banishment.

When I finished my studies in Switzerland and went back to my home town in Brazil I made a very serious decision and swore to myself that I would never belong to an institution. I do not criticize those who do, since evidently institutions have their function, but I knew that to my particular way of being, my Self cannot breathe inside a regulated organization. So I needed courage to stand on my own and keep silent and isolated for twelve years, until I reached my own understanding of Jungian psychology, one that would allow me to talk about Jung without quoting him all the time and keep free from any desire to be greater than him, or to become "post" something. I also had the enormous task of celebrating a marriage between the Social Sciences, my original field of training, and the psychology of the unconscious, an extroverted and an introverted approach to human reality.

In the first months of this long pregnancy I had a second dream, which is to me my diploma. I see on my right three scholars wearing long black robes and hats, three doctoral authorities discussing Jungian theory. Unnoticed by them, a very strange figure walks in, coming from the left side of the scene—a bent over man wearing rags over his head and shoulders. He is barefoot and his legs are thin like Gandhi's. He is bent because he walks looking at the ground. He passes by the three scholars, who solemnly ignore him. As he moves, sometimes he picks something from the ground. As he passes by me he lifts the rag from his head and winks at me—it is Jung himself, in disguise. He covers his head again, proceeds, and I realize he is picking golden nuggets from the earth.

Gold can be only found if we lower our head, leave behind intellectual arrogance and search for the great in the small. Golden nuggets are most valuable insights that surface from underground layers and lie there just to be picked by searching hands. The persona is secondary to the harvest. Jungian psychology can never be reduced to a technique or an academic science, because it blends objectivity and art, knowledge and initiation. Our objectivity is and must be contaminated by soul. Without the mediation of the psyche, the world is unknowable to us. We will never wear white aprons and work with precision instruments, as we will never become neo-Freudians.

I say it again: professional inferiority feelings can be a defense against contacting the Self. We Jungians have a heritage complex: we

do not know how to inherit. We fear that inheritance conceals a father problem, and that it curtails one's freedom. Nobody owns Jung, but we can surely own the golden nuggets that we find and become the unique tree each one of us is meant to become from the beginning.

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